





The collaboration that occurred between the Japanese military administration and local 
communities during World War II (WWII) was arguably a hallmark in the history of the 
Empire of Japan. As an Asian colonial power amid powerful European empires, the Japanese 
Empire was an anomaly in modern history.1 Although it expanded during the height of the 
imperialism and was largely patterned after the tropical empires of modern European powers, 
the Japanese Empire stood apart from its European counterparts, 2  as its historical and 
geographical circumstances gave it a character and purpose almost impossible to duplicate 
elsewhere.  
One primary distinction between the European colonial empires and the Japanese 
Empire is that none of the former ever earned as strong a reputation for repression as did the 
latter. After the outbreak of WWII, the Japanese Empire assumed the image of a colonial 
aggressor that had built an empire as a stepping-stone to the reckless conquest of Asia,3 an 
                                                 
1 Mark R. Peattie, “Introduction,” in The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945, ed. Ramon H. Myers and Mark 
R. Peattie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 6. Wade has argued that not only Japan but also China 
stands as a colonial power in modern history. See Geoff Wade, Ming China and Southeast Asia in the 15th 
Century: A Reappraisal, Asia Research Institute Working Paper no. 28 (July 2004), 
http://www.ari.nus.edu.sg/docs/wps/wps04_028.pdf (accessed July 1, 2006). Although historians have generally 
been reluctant to acknowledge China as a colonial power, several recent studies have exposed the remarkable 
parallels between China during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) and early modern European empires. Hostetler 
has shown that as did those of imperial France and Russia, early Qing settlers colonized parts of the Empire by 
displacing indigenous peoples. See Laura Hostetler, Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in 
Early Modern China (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), xiv. Hevia, who has revealed several 
similarities between the imperial discourses of the Qing Empire and the British Empire, argues that their 
differences lay not in the “methods of organizing and ruling empires” but in “military and commercial 
technologies”. See James L. Hevia, Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy 
of 1793 (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995), 26 and English Lessons: The Pedagogy of Imperialism in 
Nineteenth-Century China (Durham: Duke University Press, 2003), 166. 
2 Mark R. Peattie, “The Japanese Colonial Empire, 1895-1945,” In The Cambridge History of Japan Vol. 6: The 
Twentieth Century, ed. Peter Duus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 217. 
3 Mark R. Peattie, “Japanese Colonialism: Discarding the Stereotypes,” in Japan Examined: Perspectives on 
Modern Japanese History, ed. Harry Wray and Hilary Conroy (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), 
209-213. 
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image solidified by the notorious wartime conduct of the Japanese. The Japanese Empire 
intersected with the most powerful European colonial empire—the British Empire—on 8 am 
on 8 December 1941, when Japan invaded Hong Kong without warning while simultaneously 
attacking Pearl Harbour, the Philippines, and Malaya. With these attacks, the Japanese aimed 
at realizing their ambition to control East and Southeast Asia, imposing a military 
administration in each conquered territory that endured until 30 August 1945, when British 
naval units under Rear-Admiral C. H. J. Harcourt entered Victoria Harbour and re-established 
British authority fifteen days after the Japanese finally surrendered.    
The people of Hong Kong now largely base their knowledge of the war and 
occupation on versions of events presented in school textbooks, supplemented by occasional 
television programs and other mass media productions. Although a more in-depth 
understanding of the period can be acquired by reviewing the wartime accounts and memoirs 
that exist within various document archives and oral history programs, few access these 
materials. Moreover, the textbooks used in Hong Kong schools generally only offer a brief 
overview of Japan’s rapid economic expansion from the Meiji period before discussing how 
the rise of militarism and an aggressive nationalism ultimately led to the invasion and 
conquest of Asia. Most texts neglect discussing the significance or legacy of Japanese 
occupation in Hong Kong in full or part, particularly the manner in which it shaped the 
postwar colonial history of Hong Kong. In particular, most texts fail to describe how the 
Japanese military administration placed local Chinese civil servants in senior positions as part 
of a policy to “use the Chinese to rule the Chinese” and forced local Chinese to complete 
various training programs designed to develop skills and build character, both of which had 
lasting consequences in shaping the patterns of local organizations in Hong Kong.  
           This dissertation aims to address the gap in knowledge that has resulted from a lack of 
research into the effects of the Japanese colonial administration on Hong Kong in a manner 
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that neither praises nor blames any nation, institution, or individual. Although it criticizes the 
actions of the Japanese, it aims to provide understanding of the thinking that lay behind their 
actions, the ideas that motivated them, the goals that they hoped to achieve, and the successes 
and failures that attended their efforts. Specifically, it strives to provide the greatest 
understanding possible by identifying and examining the dynamics and interactions between 
the Japanese military administration and the local Chinese community at various levels from 
different perspectives throughout the occupation. 
1.2 Review of the Literature on Japanese-Chinese Collaboration  
 
Collaboration is an ever-present theme in world history whose examples are legion. 
Between 1272 and 1368, Han Chinese elites collaborated with their conquerors after the 
Mongols invaded China. In the Balkans of the fifteenth century, a number of Bosnian rulers 
and noblemen gained infamy by collaborating with their Turkish governors while their 
compatriots were rebelling against them.4 In the seventeenth century, Serb forces collaborated 
with representatives of the so-called “hated” Habsburgs against the forces of the Ottoman 
Empire.5 
1.21 Definition of Collaboration 
 
What is the fundamental meaning of collaboration? What types of collaboration have 
existed throughout history? How have historians viewed these types of collaboration? These 
important questions must be addressed before exploring specific examples of collaboration in 
greater depth. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to collaborate is to “work 
jointly . . . cooperate traitorously with the enemy”.6 This definition leaves many questions 
unanswered. First, how does one judge to what extent and the manner in which politicians and 
                                                 
4 N. Malcolm, Bosnia: A Short History (London: Macmillan, 1996), 21. 
5 M. Glenny, The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War (London: Penguin, 1992), 4. 
6 “Collaborate,” in Oxford English Dictionary Online, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/view/entry/m_en_gb0162340#m_en_gb0162340 (assessed August 9, 2010) 
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other figures cooperated “traitorously with the enemy” during certain periods in history? 
Clearly, these considerations are a matter of interpretation. Only a minority who have ever 
collaborated can be considered, or confess themselves to be, “traitors”. Many of the 
intellectuals and informers who have collaborated have done so on account of misguided 
ideas and ideology. Most have not “cooperated traitorously”, but rather worked with their 
occupiers because they had no alternative but to do so, being not inherent collaborators but 
rather ordinary people who had to compromise their safety and ethics to survive. In Hong 
Kong, only a minority engaged in full collaboration with Japanese, and an even smaller 
minority could claim to have avoided any contact with the Japanese administration. It is this 
ambiguous nature of collaboration that makes it such a fascinating theme.  
Although engaging in collaboration is a necessary part of an occupying power’s 
political repertoire, opponents have applied such terms as puppets to occupied states and its 
collaborators, thus banishing them into the netherworld of traitors. But this is not how 
collaborators would describe themselves or their decision to cooperate with the powers that 
be.7 From another perspective, occupation is the imposition of control by the military force of 
a state over a territory originally subject to sovereignty, with an occupation state defined as 
the political regime installed to administer that territory. Whereas occupation may lead to 
collaboration, the reverse is not true. Collaboration is a parasitic political engagement 
produced by a cancellation of sovereignty; the state emerges principally because the occupier 
wants it to emerge and takes steps to make that emergence happen, not because the 
collaborator takes steps to make it happen.8 
 
 
                                                 
7 Timothy Brook, Collaboration: Japanese Agents and Local Elites in Wartime China (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 13. 
8 Brook, Collaboration, 222. 
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1.22 Collaboration from the Chinese Perspective 
 
Chinese historians have largely viewed collaboration from the perspective of 
nationalism: most Chinese did not collaborate with the Japanese for patriotic reasons, and the 
few who did were craven, criminal, or corrupt. It is not difficult to understand this judgment. 
From the late Qing period, resistance to Japan marks the rise of China as something other than 
a defeated power. Given the weight of national pride that resistance is made to carry, most 
Chinese naturally find it difficult to accept evidence of collaboration. However, the historian’s 
task is not to assign blame to or make judgments against political actors in the past; instead, it 
is to investigate the norms and conditions that produced moral subjects in the place and time 
under study. Therefore, when examining why some local Chinese in Hong Kong chose to 
cooperate with the Japanese, it is important to explain why cooperation made sense to them at 
that time. 
Historians have drawn a distinction between collaboration (working with the enemy 
on a purely practical and logistical level) and collaborationism (providing unconditional 
ideological support), the latter term being reserved for committed, ideological identification 
with an occupier, such as French fascists’ collaboration with the Nazis in wartime France. 
This distinction serves as a useful starting point for consideration of the phenomenon of 
collaboration in China and Hong Kong. If collaborationism is to be understood as ideological 
identification with Japan, then the term has little applicability to wartime China and Hong 
Kong. However, the term collaboration—working with the enemy for a variety of reasons, 
whether out of self-interest or for sheer survival, but never out of ideological commitment to 
the enemy—is clearly relevant to the wartime situation. 
The most important consideration is whether an instance of collaboration, in the sense 
of working in some way with the enemy, is voluntarily or involuntarily. After the Japanese 
invasion of mainland China, only political elites and the wealthy were able to flee to the 
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interior. Therefore, all civilians forced to remain under Japanese occupation could be labelled 
collaborators, as no alternative term exists that could be applied to ordinary people who had 
no choice in the matter. As such, the use of the term collaboration has contributed to the 
labelling of people using black-and-white terms—the collaborators were “bad” and the 
resisters were “good”—particularly as the postwar situation is evaluated with knowledge of  
the outcome of the war. While we may speak with certainty today, the situation was very 
ambiguous at the time of Japanese occupation. Neither the masses nor the elites had a clear 
conception of how the war would develop or how their decisions and choices would be 
viewed and judged after the war had ended. Everything was uncertain and unknown during 
the war, a fact acknowledged throughout this dissertation. 
Overall, the reality of the wartime situation forced individuals, groups, and institutions, 
including political leaders and governments, to wrestle with an ethical dilemma that can be 
summarized in the following consideration: To collaborate or not or, alternatively, take up a 
position somewhere in between. This dissertation focuses on the nature of collaboration 
among both the elites and the masses in Hong Kong, and briefly examines the nature of 
collaboration in Singapore during the same period. 
1.23 Types of Collaboration 
 
As a broad concept, collaboration embraces many forms, which in itself may be 
problematical, as it is almost impossible to delineate all the types of collaboration possible. 
However, it is possible to identify several types of collaboration from the global literature, all 
of which were the result of many different factors, leading their nature to vary widely. The 
following sections describe the major types of collaboration identified in the literature. 
1. Unconditional Collaboration  
 
Unconditional collaborators, alternatively referred to as “die-hard” or “true” 
collaborators, are those who served directly in Japanese military organs and supported the 
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occupying power in every way. They later felt no need to apologize for or justify their actions, 
as they believed in the idea of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, a concept developed 
and promulgated during the Japanese Shōwa era that advocated creation of a self-sufficient 
“bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western powers”, 9  and were 
passionately committed to “long-term and unlimited cooperation”. 10  In short, these 
individuals wished to glorify their actions rather than excuse them. 
Collaboration in Europe during WWII generally referred to acceptance of Nazi 
ideology and of Hitler as an ideal future leader, an acceptance that accords with Werner 
Warmbrunn’s concept of voluntary collaboration and Werner Rings’ notion of unconditional 
collaboration.11 In essence, this type of collaboration concerned conviction and belief, and 
was perhaps genuine. The acceptance of Nazism among intellectuals and idealists was 
manifested in such institutions as fan clubs, groups of unfulfilled political activists who saw 
in the cataclysm of 1939 and the emergence of Hitler a once-in-a lifetime opportunity for both 
a national and a continent-wide renaissance. These collaborators genuinely believed in the 
national-socialist vision and, in more practical terms, in the “new Europe” that was taking 
shape under Hitler’s tutelage. As such, the “crime” that they committed took place in the 
realm of ideas rather than action. They had fallen in love with the Reich, but sadly and 
unfortunately, it was passion of an unrequited kind. Ideological collaborators were open in 
their disavowal of their own country, and proud to be associated with Nazi Germany or the 
Empire of Japan, however tenuous this attachment was in reality. 
 
 
                                                 
9 Bill Gordon, Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, March 2000. 
http://wgordon.web.wesleyan.edu/papers/coprospr.htm (assessed August 7, 2010) 
10 Peter Davies, Dangerous Liaisons: Collaboration and World War Two, (Harlow: Pearson/Longman, 2004), 21. 
11  W. Rings, Life with the Enemy: Collaboration and Resistance in Hitler’s Europe, 1939-1945 (London: 
Doubleday, 1982), 104-105. 
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2. Tactical Collaboration 
Tactical collaborators, who could be defined as those who wanted to protect their 
country and “avoid the worst”, 12  primarily desired to assist in the control of the local 
administration for the what they perceived as the greater good. As such, they performed acts 
of public service that facilitated the workings of society or the economy under the regime, the 
clearest example being the elites who engaged in relief work assisting refugee children. 
Tactical collaboration mainly concerned mundane problems such as supplying food, 
organizing transportation, and arranging security, the types of matters that local elites and 
officials had to resolve under any political dispensation to ensure social control and maintain 
power.  
Viewing collaboration from the perspective of the collaborators assists in viewing 
collaboration as a concept to be investigated rather than a moral failure to be labelled and 
condemned. This is not to say that moral considerations have no place in the study of 
collaboration, but that the conditions within which individuals made choices must not be 
overlooked. It helps in examining the tactical collaboration of Wang Jingwei, who supplied 
food to the refugees as well as prostitutes to the Japanese. Is feeding refugees an act of 
resistance or a way collaborating with the occupier? Is supplying prostitutes a way of 
protecting the majority of women by providing soldiers with nonviolent opportunities for 
sexual activity? Would the outcome of examination of Wang Jingwei’s collaboration be 
altered if his personal motivation was not to help or hinder the Japanese but to profit from 
unlooked-for opportunities? 
In practice, collaboration meant working faithfully with the occupiers and putting into 
effect all routine edicts that emanated from them. The Jews who served on Jewish Councils, 
administrative bodies established by the Nazis, believed in protecting their own kith and kin. 
                                                 
12 R. Bennett, Under the Shadow of the Swastika: The Moral Dilemmas of Resistance and Collaboration in 
Hitler’s Europe (New York: New York University Press, 1999), introduction. 
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The governments of Holland, Norway, and Belgium all made a point of conducting 
administrative duties but not legislating.13 It could be argued that Hans Max Hirschfeld, 
Secretary-General for Economic Affairs of the Netherlands, personified this type of 
collaboration. Despite criticism, he always maintained that it was important for his country to 
continue functioning properly during the occupation, and that his responsibility was to assume 
a role in its doing so.  
3. Conditional Collaboration 
Existing between resistors and complete collaborators, conditional collaborators were 
those who made efforts to strengthen their negotiating position during WWII to gain more 
power and maintain control while anticipating the return of the Allied forces after Japan’s 
defeat. The Indian National Army (INA) may be regarded as having engaged in conditional 
collaboration with the Japanese by maintaining its own separate institutions, choosing its own 
bureaucrats, and occasionally standing against the Japanese in support of a particular Indian 
interest. The conditional collaborator states, “I cooperate with the occupying power although I 
endorse only some, not all, of the ‘national interest doctrines’. Subject to the proviso, I am 
ready and eager to collaborate faithfully because I wish to change the circumstances that 
dictate my attitude.”14 According to Rings, there were many excellent examples of conditional 
collaboration: in Norway, where ordinary folk followed a “third way” between resistance and 
collaboration; in Holland, where the Netherlands Union blended pro-German and anti-
German sentiments; and in Denmark and France, where the governments made it official 
policy. He also highlights the case of “Red Army officials and Communist Party officials” 
who engaged in this specific type of collaboration after they had been taken prisoner.15 
                                                 
13 Peter Davies, Dangerous Liaisons, 24. 
14 Rings, Life with the Enemy, 106. 
15 Rings, Life with the Enemy, 106-7.  
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Senior-level civil servants and newspaper editors were particularly susceptible to this 
kind of collaboration. When attempting to justify what to most was unreasonable behaviour of 
the highest order, these collaborators provided the default excuse of having acted in the 
national interest. However, their argument was both nebulous and vague, leading others to ask, 
how could compromise and accommodation have served the nation? What example were you 
setting? To such questions these collaborators could not reply. 
4. Passive Collaboration 
For those who engaged in collaboration, to whatever degree, the key consideration 
was how they could rationalize and justify their behaviour to themselves and the outside 
world. Their instincts told them to obey the new authorities but their consciences told them 
that the new rulers were illegitimate, a dilemma underlined by a constant refrain: the 
circumstances of war and occupation had brought with them new and unpleasant dilemmas. 
The largest number of citizens were passive collaborators, those had who decided that life 
must continue and were determined to survive the war, and would conform in whatever way 
was necessary to do so without taking any specific action, whether consciously or not. 
Assuming an attitude known as passive acquiescence, they hoped for Japan’s defeat in their 
hearts only, hoping that when liberation came, it would vindicate their pragmatic positioning 
vis-a-vis the occupying power. 
 Passive collaboration concerned coming to terms with reality by recognizing outright 
political and military superiority. As such, it was equivalent to accommodation—acceptance 
of the status quo—which Gerhard Hirschfeld described as a type of staging post on the road to 
collaboration proper.16 Hirschfeld described Dr Hendrik Colijn, a noted Dutch politician, as 
one of the most accomplished exponents of accommodation. After his country had been 
invaded by the Germans, Colijn set up the Netherlands Union, a body that envisaged working 
                                                 
16 G. Hirschfeld and P. Marsh, ed., Collaboration in France: Politics and Culture during the Nazi Occupation 
1940-1944 (Oxford: Berg, 1989), 8. 
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with the occupiers rather than opposing them based on realism and practicalities. When it 
appeared that Hitler might win the war, the Union’s recruitment figures started to increase. 
In summary, regardless of the current dictionary definition of the word, collaboration has 
been interpreted in widely differing ways and has taken many forms throughout history. 
While history has witnessed genuine forms of collaboration, it has also witnessed actions 
termed collaboration that could be argued were not truly such.  
1.24 Literature on Collaboration in WWII Europe 
Defining collaboration as working traitorously with the enemy tends to underestimate 
the complexity of the phenomenon and its nuanced nature. As a historical topic, collaboration 
in Hong Kong is rich, exciting, and dramatic. Wherever the Japanese administration 
established a colonial outpost, there was the possibility of compromise and agreement 
between the Japanese and the local elites and masses. Despite its significance, collaboration in 
Hong Kong during the Japanese occupation has been an understudied and neglected area of 
inquiry. As such, it is rare to see it discussed among the resources covering WWII and the 
colonial history of Hong Kong. To fill this research gap, this dissertation examines 
collaboration in Hong Kong and Singapore during Japanese occupation from the perspectives 
of both the occupied and the occupiers.  
Before presenting the analytical framework upon which this study is based, it is 
necessary to discuss global perspectives on collaboration in wartime Europe, China, and 
Southeast Asia. Revaluations of wartime occupation in Western Europe, which began in the 
1970s with a focus on Vichy, have tended to conclude that many occupying powers had 
enjoyed support from broad segments of the community, either because they had pushed out 
dominant political and social classes or because they had facilitated the overthrow of 
previously dominant political ideologies. German anti-Semitism drew much popular support 
in occupied Europe because of the prominence, real or imagined, of the Jewish community in 
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economic and political life. Vichy France initially enjoyed strong popular support because it 
drew on widespread rejection of the liberal, secular, and supposedly Jewish-influenced Third 
Republic. In central and eastern Europe, a number of conservative regimes, often with a 
pronounced clerical admixture, adopted a public fascist style, and willingly linked themselves 
to Nazi Germany’s anti-Bolshevik, anti-Semitic ideology.17 
Recent scholarship has begun to demonstrate that the truth is more complex, lying 
somewhere between extreme collaboration and resistance. One overlooked example of such 
complexity is that of the Loire Valley of France, where the German occupiers initially 
behaved fairly well, with the first year of occupation characterized by a process of negotiation 
with local prefects and mayors. German savagery came later, when the war had begun to turn 
against Germany and control had shifted from the harsh but correct German military 
government to the Gestapo, whose sole object was repression. Although local notables 
cooperated with the Germans, they did not do so out of any appetite for treason; rather, the 
pressures of conquest had narrowed their loyalties such that the desire to care for their 
families, towns, and regions had come to eclipse any broader sense of national duty. Social 
life went on vigorously in forms ranging from charitable endeavours to sports, theatre-going, 
and religious processions, with resistance only occurring on the fringes. Therefore, liberation 
was marked by a high degree of administrative continuity. Concerned above all to avert social 
turmoil, the incoming Free French authorities preferred to leave established local leaders in 
their place. Dignitaries who had worked with the Germans were generally punished lightly, 
with major punishment reserved for lower-level administrators. By doing so, the locals could 
weave a comforting legend that everyone, with a few very minor exceptions, had been 
                                                 
17 Davies, Dangerous Liaisons, 12. 
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resisters at heart. Much of the picture, in other words, was not so much black and white as 
shades of grey.18 
A number of monographs on specific European collaborationist movements or 
regimes have been published, but comparative study of such phenomena has only recently 
begun. In the case of China, research has been conducted into the early years of the 
Provisional Government in Beiping (now Beijing) and the negotiations that led to the 
establishment of the Wang Jingwei government in Nanjing.19  Apart from a few articles 
written by scholars in English and Chinese (mostly in the latter) on specific aspects of 
collaboration, the study of collaborationist governments, both in terms of their intrinsic nature 
and the overall record of their collaboration, as well as comparison of the Chinese experience 
of collaboration with that of the European nations, remains an overlooked endeavour.20  
1.25 Literature on Collaboration in WWII China 
 
Every culture considers collaboration a form of moral failure. For those dedicated to 
the pursuit of a national identity, especially when they are able to argue that they tread the 
path of justice, it is impossible to conceive of collaboration as a legitimate alterative to 
patriotism. During WWII, China was divided into three zones—the Nationalist free zone in 
the South-west, with its base in Chongqing; the Communist zone in the North, with its base in 
Yanan; and Japanese-occupied China in the remainder of the country, centred around the 
coast and the big cities—and governed by two collaborating regimes—the Reformed 
Government (1938-40) and the Reorganized National Government (1940-45) led by Wang 
Jingwei. Traditionally, historians and politicians have taken extreme perspectives in their 
                                                 
18 See Robert Gildea, Marianne in Chains (London: Macmillan, 2002), 75. 
19 For the Beiping regime, see George E. Taylor, The Struggle for North China (New York: Institute of Pacific 
Relations, 1940). For the 1938-40 negotiations between Wang Jingwei and the Japanese, see John H. Boyle, 
China and Japan at War, 1937-1945: The Politics of Collaboration (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972) 
and Gerald E. Bunker, The Peace Conspiracy: Wang Ching-wei and the China War, 1937-1941 (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard University press, 1972). 
20 A number of documentary collections on the Wang regime have been published in China. For an introductory 
survey, see Cai Dejin, Lishi Guaitai: Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu (A Historical Malformation: The Wang 
Jangwei National Government; Guilin: Guangxi Shifan Davue Chubanshe, 1993). 
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analysis of the Chinese during WWII: collaboration was “wrong and bad” and resistance to 
the Japanese was “correct and good”. However, after gaining understanding of the thinking 
underlying the decisions and actions of the collaborators in recent years, scholars have begun 
to take a more nuanced perspective.21  
The most distinctive feature of the Wang regime, and one that clearly sets it apart from 
its European counterparts, was that it neither advanced a distinctive ideological agenda nor 
sought the allegiance of hitherto ignored social classes. Wang constantly claimed he 
represented orthodoxy (zheng-tong), both as the rightful head of the Chinese government and 
as the guardian of correct Kuomintang (KMT) ideology.22 Thus, he sought no break with the 
ideological directions and practical policies of the pre-1937 Nationalist Government of 
Chiang Kai-shek. Rather, his government sought to carry out these policies more effectively, 
realizing as it did the need to restructure Sino-Japanese relations under the rubric of a new 
order in East Asia. This restructuring would not constitute a redirection of party doctrine, 
Wang argued, as Sun Yat-sen had championed Sino-Japanese collaboration in the cause of 
Pan-Asianism.23 
                                                 
21 David P. Barrett and Larry N. Shyu, ed., Chinese Collaboration with Japan, 1932-1945: The Limits of 
Accommodation (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001). 
22 See the documents issued by Wang’s rival Sixth Congress of the Guomindang (September 1939) in Huang 
Meizhen and Zhang Yun, ed., Wang Jingwei Guomin Zhengfu Chengli (The Establishment of the Wang Jingwei 
National Government; Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshe, 1984), 324-57. 
23The theme is forcefully expressed following the Wang regimes’s declaration of war on Great Britain and the 
United States in January 1943. See Wang’s address to the nation, “Tashang Baowei Dongya Di Zhanxian” 
(“Stepping into the Battleline to Defend East Asia”) in Zhengzhi Yuekan 5, no. 2 (February 1943), 5-6.  
Sun Yat-sen (12 November 1866 – 12 March 1925) was a Chinese revolutionary and political leader. As the 
foremost pioneer of Nationalist China, Sun is frequently referred to as the Father of the Nation of Republic of 
China. Sun played an instrumental role in inspiring the overthrow of the Qing Dynasty, the last imperial dynasty 
of China, which began in October 1911. He was the first provisional president when the Republic of China (ROC) 
was founded in 1912 and later co-founded the Kuomintang (KMT) where he served as its first leader. Sun was a 
uniting figure in post-Imperial China, and remains unique among 20th-century Chinese politicians for being 
widely revered amongst the people from both sides of the Taiwan Strait.Although Sun is considered one of the 
greatest leaders of modern China, his political life was one of constant struggle and frequent exile. After the 
success of the revolution, he quickly fell out of power in the newly founded Republic of China, and led 
successive revolutionary governments as a challenge to the warlords who controlled much of the nation. Sun did 
not live to see his party consolidate its power over the country. His party, which formed a fragile alliance with 
the Communists, split into two factions after his death. Sun’s chief legacy resides in his developing a political 
philosophy known as the Three Principles of the People: nationalism, democracy, and the people’s livelihood. 
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 John H. Boyle noted that unlike the Europeans, the Chinese have felt the need to 
examine life under Japanese occupation, especially the collaboration that occurred during that 
period.24 However, Poshek Fu notes that research into collaboration in the People’s Republic 
of China (PRC) and Taiwan remains “parochially political”.25 In addition, the comparatively 
small body of work that has moved beyond examination of archival collections has been 
based on baldly moralistic frameworks, with scholars invariably attaching to individuals and 
groups epithets such as hanjian (traitor to the Chinese), kuilei (puppet), and wei (bogus).26 
Given the fact that many peoples and cultures have many times shown themselves capable of 
prospering under the control of outsiders throughout the course of Chinese history, such 
derogation may initially be somewhat surprising. Explaining this apparent attitudinal change, 
Boyle asserts that the stigma attached to collaboration after WWII was rooted in Chinese 
nationalism, a twentieth-century phenomenon and a powerful force, the final expression of 
which is still in the process of being realized. 
Given the wide experience of enemy occupation during WWII, it may initially seem 
surprising that the study of collaboration in wartime China only began in the 1970s. Although 
the American scholars John H. Boyle and Gerald E. Bunker published two path-breaking 
studies detailing Wang Jingwei’s covert negotiations with the Japanese from 1937 to 193927 
in 1972, it was not until the mid-1980s that Chinese scholars began to publish on the general 
theme of wartime collaboration. The documentary collections that first appeared were 
invaluable research materials, but could not be presented without interpretation by scholars. 
Although the steadily increasing number of articles and monographs that followed widened 
                                                 
24 Boyle, China and Japan at War, vii. 
25 Poshek Fu, Passivity, Resistance, and Collaboration: Intellectual Choices in Occupied Shanghai, 1937-1945 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1993), xi.  
26 Huang Meizhen, ed., Wang Wei Shi Hanjian (The Ten Traitors Of The Wang Regime; Shanghai, 1986) and 
Huang Meizhen and Zhang Yun, ed., Wang Jingwei Jituan Panguo Toudi Ji (The Traitorous Collaboration of the 
Wang Clique; Henan, 1987). 
27 Boyle, China and Japan at War; Bunker, The Peace Conspiracy. 
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the range of knowledge regarding wartime collaboration, their authors never countered the 
official judgment that all who worked with the enemy were traitors (hanjian). 
It was the end of Cultural Revolution in China in 1978 that set in motion the historic-
graphical changes that would make the study of occupied China at last possible. However, the 
first step taken in this direction was tentative. Throughout the early and mid-1980s, several 
collections of key documents on the peace movement and the various collaborationist regimes, 
along with the first chronology of the Wang Jingwei regime, were published.28 All these 
publications unreservedly condemned all collaborationists as traitors (hanjian), and made 
generous use of terms such as bogus (wei) and fascist to describe anything or anyone even 
tangentially concerned with collaboration. Nevertheless, once the topic of wartime 
collaboration had been broached, the range of literature expanded, with groundbreaking 
academic and anecdotal works appearing in the late 1980s and early 1990s that offered great 
amounts of new information and innumerable references to hitherto unknown sources.  
Still, the topic of Chinese collaboration during WWII remains understudied, primarily 
due to a lack of access to sources. The Chinese public has been unable to access information 
on many topics of political sensitivity, while the Taiwanese public was unable to do so until 
1996. During the war, Western-language sources were few in number and sketchy in character, 
especially in the years following Pearl Harbor, when Western access to occupied China was 
blocked. However, several Japanese sources, particularly memoirs, are available, and have 
been effectively used by Boyle and Bunker to reconstruct the origins of Wang Jingwei’s 
peace movement and government. At the same time, many Japanese documentary sources 
were lost during or immediately after the war, either destroyed in wartime air raids, as in the 
                                                 
28 The major documentary collections, as well as the first volume of topical essays, were produced by a group of 
scholars at Fudan University in Shanghai, foremost of whom was Professor Huang Meizhen. In Beijing, the lead 
was taken by the late Professor Cai Dejin, who compiled the first chronology of the Wang regime, and then went 
on to write many articles and monographs on its history. 
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case of the Greater East Asia Ministry records, or by systematic culling in the days 
immediately following the surrender, as in the case of many Army records.29 
Another major challenge to the study of local collaboration between the Chinese and 
Japanese is that such collaboration is an aspect of their history that most Chinese would like 
to forget, or even deny. Collective Chinese memory recalls this time as only a period of 
Japanese atrocities and Chinese suffering and resistance, And the traditional rationalization 
behind collaboration has been that collaboration was due to purely personal connections to the 
occupiers. Such connections are easy to identify. For example, the first person to run 
Zhenjiang under the Japanese, Liu Zhaoqing, graduated from a Japanese police academy. The 
head of the Nanjing Self-Government Committee, Tao Xisan, had earned a degree in law 
from Housei University in Tokyo, and most of his associates on the committee had also 
received Japanese educations. The head of the first collaborationist regime in Shanghai, Su 
Xiwen, studied political economy at Waseda University. Study in Japan meant that they, at 
the very least, shared a common language with the occupier, which made them likely to be the 
first whom Japanese agents approached in their search for local contacts. However, many 
Chinese who had personal ties with Japan chose to resist. Ma Chaojun, Mayor of Nanjing in 
1937, had studied aviation in Japan, yet chose to flee West with the retreating Nationalist 
government rather than collaborate.30 
Similar patterns have begun to emerge from the study of memoirs of the Japanese 
occupation of other parts of East Asia. Regarding newly conquered Shanghai, many have 
argued that the primary concern of the leading Chinese industrialists was to keep their 
                                                 
29 Sadao Asada, ed., Japan and the World, 1853-1952: A Bibliographic Guide to Japanese Scholarship in 
Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989), 26-27. 
30 Brook, Collaboration, 4. In this groundbreaking work, Brook breaks the silence surrounding the sensitive 
topic of wartime collaboration between the Chinese and their Japanese occupiers and, by showing how it 
parallels with the more familiar stories of European collaboration with the Nazis, demonstrates how the Chinese 
were deeply troubled by their unavoidable cooperation with the occupiers. The comparison provides a point of 
entry into the difficult but necessary discussion about this long-ignored aspect of the war in the Pacific. 
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businesses operating. They did not wish to have any more contact with the invaders than was 
strictly essential, but were prepared to cooperate so that their factories would continue to run 
under Japanese auspices. Several attempted to balance their decision to cooperate by sending 
family members to invest in Chinese Nationalist enterprises in the unoccupied western half of 
China.31 
In general, most Chinese remain reluctant and unprepared to look behind their 
collective memory of suffering and resistance to examine the actions of those in occupied 
China during the war. The myth of resistance has been a powerful moral weapon that political 
elites on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have used to sustain postwar dictatorships, each party 
claiming that because it alone defeated the Japanese, it alone has the moral legitimacy to rule. 
1.26 Literature on wartime collaboration in Southeast Asia: A different perspective 
Japan’s simultaneous attack on Singapore, invasion of Hong Kong, and raid on Pearl 
Harbor marked the inception of open hostilities between Japan, Allied Europe, and the United 
States. As such, the resulting Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia during WWII has 
become one of the most closely studied periods of the region’s history. Since the late 1940s, a 
considerable number of doctoral dissertations, journal articles, and monographs have 
analyzed the events of the war years from local, national, and regional perspectives. The 
complexity of Southeast Asia’s modern history has generally precluded the development of 
the neatly defined historical “problems” characteristic of undergraduate readings on Europe 
or America, with the war’s lasting political impact on Southeast Asian politics being one of 
the few considerations that has attracted sufficient academic research to achieve the status of 
such a “problem”. The literature on the wartime period has expanded to encompass the 
region’s major states, although differing schools of interpretation have been applied to several 
regions. 
                                                 
31 Parks M. Coble, “Chinese Capitialists and the Japanese: Collaboration and resistance in the Shanghai Area, 
1937-45,” in Wartime Shanghai, ed. Wen-hsin Yeh (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 62-85. 
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While the Japanese appeared to have been masters of force and counter-manipulation, 
they appeared to lack the diplomatic skills necessary to assume leadership in the region, and 
thus rarely achieved their ends. Even in Malaya, where war-time occupation unleashed 
communal antagonisms that have yet to be restrained, it is clear from the accounts of both 
Akashi Yoji and Cheah Boon Kheng that neither the Malay nor Chinese leadership were 
victims of Japanese manipulation but instead actively sought the opportunity for communal 
confrontation. By doing so, they led the Japanese to become either unwitting accomplices or 
ineffective arbiters. 
While the war was an experience of questionable significance for the region, it was 
also undoubtedly of major importance in the history of modern Japan. Unlike the large 
number of “impact” and “response” studies conducted to date, parallel examination of most 
aspects of Japanese policy, such as economic management, social policy, and civil and 
military relations, has yet to be conducted, leaving us uninformed regarding key aspects of the 
Japanese war effort and the society behind that effort. Once completed, such work will give 
us a far clearer perspective of Japanese operations, and will allow the study of the war's 
impact on Southeast Asia to proceed at a much higher level of analysis.32 
In East and Southeast Asia, the day-to-day expedients required for living under 
occupation were overlaid by a further complexity: Many of the territories that the Japanese 
conquered were already under alien rule. As such, the Japanese could claim that they were 
“liberating” these territories from European tyranny. It appears that their claim initially met 
with fairly widespread acceptance; indeed, in several parts of the region, Indian traders and 
auxiliary troops in the British service were inspired by the Japanese gospel,33 whereas other 
                                                 
32 Alfred W. McCoy, Southeast Asia under Japanese occupation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Southeast 
Asia Studies, 1980), 9. 
33See Fujiwara Iwaichi, F Kikan: Japanese Army Intelligence Operations in South-East Asia during World War 
II (Heinemann Asia: Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, and Singapore, 1983) and Peter Elphick, Singapore, The 
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ethnic groups, including the Malays and Burmese, appeared to have been prepared to accept 
the replacement of British with Japanese patronage. In Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew, an 
eighteen-year-old during the war who enrolled in a Japanese language course before 
becoming a broker on the black market, recalled thinking that as the Japanese were likely to 
remain in power for some years, armed resistance was out of the question, and the overriding 
priority was to survive.34 
Singapore had considerable geo-strategic importance because Britain’s Singapore 
Naval Base served as a centre of operations against Japan. Before the Japanese attack, 
manoeuvres had been conducted to demonstrate British readiness to withstand the impending 
Japanese aggression. However, the overall defence plan was executed half heartedly, as 
Britain was more concerned with her engagement in the European theatre than channelling 
essential military resources, especially aviation resources, to the Far East. The Japanese, on 
the other hand, had carefully planned their military strategy using intelligence collected 
directly or indirectly from the Japanese community in Malaya and Singapore, and thus 
required only fifty-five days to occupy Malaya. Owing to losses suffered from enemy action 
and lack of water, petrol, food, and ammunition, the British found themselves unable to 
continue the fight any longer, and, after seven days of defensive action, capitulated to the 
Japanese on 15 February 1942.  
The fall of Singapore, the impregnable fortress of the British Empire in the East, 
marked the beginning of a brief but tumultuous chapter in Singaporean history, as well as that 
of the entire region. The academic literature regarding this chapter in history mostly concerns 
military activities and the ordeals of Europeans held as prisoners of war or as civilian 
                                                                                                                                                        
Pregnable Fortress: A Study in Deception, Discord and Desertion (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1995), 71-2, 
95-106, 113. 
34 Kee Kuan-yew, The Singapore Story (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 1998), 61-77. 
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internees. 35  Still, compared with that concerning Hong Kong, the literature concerning 
different aspects of Japanese governance in Malaya, particularly the seminal works of 
Japanese historian Professor Akashi Yoji and Paul H. Kratoska, is much more 
comprehensive.36  
            Popular understanding regarding Japanese occupation of Singapore remains riddled 
with misconceptions, such as that the war caused Britain to abandon its colonial empire; that 
all Japanese ruled autocratically and used terror to control the population; that all Chinese 
were hostile to the Japanese; that all Malays collaborated; and that all Indians were won over 
by the promise of support for Indian independence.37 Such common interpretations reflect 
only partial truths and include much that is inaccurate. WWII certainly contributed to Great 
Britain’s decision to give up its empire, but events in Malaya had little to do with that 
decision, and colonial rule ended in Malaya twelve years after the Japanese surrender. After 
an initial period of savage repression, Japanese governance in Singapore was conducted 
through communal organizations and prewar administrative structures. Most Chinese 
cooperated with the Japanese, even if reluctantly; most Malays were neutral and disliked 
Japanese rule; and many Indians ultimately viewed Japanese backing for the independence 
movement as detrimental to their cause.38  
Although cooperation with the invader is almost always regarded as collaboration or 
treason when one country occupies another, the complex situation in the Southeast Asian 
                                                 
35 See Gerard H. Corr, The War of the Springing Tigers (London: Osprey, 1975); Ian Ward, The Killer They 
Called a God (Singapore: Media Masters, 1992); Joseph Kennedy Basingstoke, British Civilians and the 
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1989); T.P.M. Lewis Kuala, Changi: The Lost Years: A Malayan Diary, 1941-1945 (Lumpur: Malayan Historical 
Society, 1984).  
36 Yoji Akashi, “Japanese Military Administration in Malaya: Its Formation and Evolution in Reference to 
Sultans, the Muslim Malays 1941-1945,” Asian Studies 7, no. 1 (1969): 81-110; Yoji Akashi, “Japanese Policy 
towards the Malayan Chinese, 1941-1945” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 1, no. 2 (1970): 61-89; Yoji 
Akashi,“Education and Indoctrination Policy in Malaya and Singapore under the Japanese Rule, 1942-1945, ” 
Malayan Journal of Education 13, no. 1/2 (1976): 1-46; Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: 
A Social and Economic History (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1998). 
37 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 1.  
38 Ibid., 2. 
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territories that had been under British domination before falling under Japanese occupation 
demands a more nuanced examination. From a nationalist perspective, cooperation with Japan 
may have been seen as an act of patriotism, for it meant liberation from the West. Indeed, 
Southeast Asian political leaders who cooperated with Japan did not consider themselves 
traitors to the national cause; on the contrary, they tended to boast of their “strategic” 
collaboration with Japan, which they regarded as a useful means of preparing for national 
independence. Thus, wartime cooperation between Japan and the Southeast Asian states can 
be viewed as resulting from a complex relationship in which both parties were in the same 
vehicle but had different destinations.39 
1.27 Literature on Collaboration in WWII Hong Kong 
 
Over the course of the sixty-five years that have elapsed since the end of the WWII, 
most accounts of life in Japanese-occupied Hong Kong have been painted in simple colours: 
brutality and terror; collaboration and resistance; joyous liberation followed by the well-
deserved punishment of the wicked and the rewarding of the brave. Recent literature has 
begun to demonstrate that the truth is more complex, as this dissertation attempts to support. 
The perspectives on wartime Hong Kong can generally be classified into three groups. The 
first of these perspectives is that of the British. While G.B. Endacott’s Hong Kong Eclipse 
explored Hong Kong’s general situation and analyzed its societal transformation,40 little else 
has been written on the situation of local residents, especially the Chinese community, who 
comprised ninety-eight percent of the entire population. The second perspective is that of the 
wealthy Anglicized elite who dominated local Asian society before, during, and after the war. 
Their contribution has been a lack thereof: a profound silence that they have sustained for 
almost six decades, one that has obscured not only those aspects of their wartime record that 
                                                 
39  Goto Kenichi, Tension of Empire:Japan and Southeast Asia in the colonial and postcolonial world, 
(Singapore: Singapore University Press, National University of Singapore, 2003), 79. 
40 G. B. Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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might be thought worthy of criticism but also the genuinely public-spirited side of their role. 
Of the two memoirs that can be traced to elite families, only one describes life in the occupied 
urban areas with any detail. The second, written by a woman who spent the war alongside the 
British in a civilian internment camp, broadly accords with the British perspective.41 The third 
perspective is that of the Chinese as reflected in their literature, which includes the memoirs 
of mainland Chinese journalists and celebrities who left the colony in the early months of the 
Japanese takeover. These Chinese sources offer an illuminating corrective to the English-
language works, disclosing the unspeakable cruelties inflicted on the Chinese populace by the 
Japanese forces—cruelties far worse in both scale and severity than those endured by most of 
the British in Hong Kong, grim though the ordeal of the latter undoubtedly was.  
However, the Chinese accounts also have their limitations. They tend to overlook the 
real dilemmas and pressure faced by the local Asian leaders, and by emphasizing the vile 
misdemeanours committed by many Japanese officers and troops, are apt to portray the 
Japanese as uniformly fiendish, ignoring the humanity that was shown by some individuals 
and the occasional efforts made by the occupation regime to pursue a relatively moderate or 
constructive line of policy. The Hong Kong-published Chinese materials on the occupation 
period can generally be classified into the three categories of (1) accounts of the battle of 
Hong Kong, (2) accounts of the difficulties of life during the occupation, and (3) accounts of 
guerrilla activities in Hong Kong.42  
The majority of the existing literature on the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong has 
focused on how the Japanese exploited the occupied territories’ wealth, and have either 
underemphasized or neglected examination of the manner in which Japanese military rule 
                                                 
41 The two memoirs are Li Shu-fan, Hong Kong Surgeon (London: V. Gollancz, 1964) and Jean Gittins, Stanley: 
Behind Barbed Wire (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1982). 
42 See Xu Yue Qing, Huo Yue Zai Xiang Jiang: Gang Jiu Da Dui Xi Gong Di Qu Kang Ri Shi Lu (Hong Kong: 
Joint Publishing, 1993); Guan Lixiong, Ri Zhan Shi Qi De Xianggang (Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 1993); Xie 
Yong Guang, San Nian Ling Ba Ge Yue De Ku Nan (Hong Kong: Ming Pao Publishing, 1994). 
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varied according to the historical, cultural, and political development of each area and the 
manner in which local Chinese communities interacted with their occupiers. This dissertation 
aims to fill this research gap by exploring these topics comprehensively. 
1.3 Analytical Framework 
 
1.31 Research Gap Identification 
 
The majority of the literature regarding the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and 
Singapore focuses on political and economic factors and tends to praise resistance forces, 
whether overtly or by implication. Due to this overwhelming focus, it has failed to thoroughly 
identify and examine the factors that shaped and can explain the dynamics and interactions 
between the Japanese military administration and the local Chinese communities in Hong 
Kong and Singapore during the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia. The literature has not 
fully addressed these aspects on account of three factors. The first factor is that due to their 
difficulties in utilizing Chinese- or Japanese-language sources, Western scholars have relied 
heavily on Western historical archives and military intelligence reports, which are biased in 
favour of the Allies and cannot provide a detailed explanation of the economic and social 
activities of local residents. Second, scholars have tended to neglect examination of the 
historical development of the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong, leaving them unable to 
explain the interactions and dynamics between the ruling class and the ruled class (the 
Japanese and the Chinese community) at different stages of the occupation. Third, the existing 
literature on Japanese occupation in Hong Kong and Singapore describes little regarding the 
role of the different political actors,43 including the Japanese military government, the elites 
                                                 
43 For the concept of actor, see Barry Hindess, Choice, Rationality, and Social Theory (London: Unwin Hyman, 
1988), chapter 4; Susan Herbst, Reading Public Opinion: How Political Actors View the Democratic Process 
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Development, September 1994).  
An actor is a locus of decisions and actions. The decisions themselves may be formulated by the actor in 
advance of the action itself or at the moment of action, but may not be consciously made, or may be made on the 
 25
and prominent Chinese, and the masses whose support of the government was necessary for 
the Japanese administration to function. Recognizing the necessity of examining how 
different political actors performed and responded to each other from different perspectives 
during the occupation, this dissertation examines the nature of these dynamics and 
interactions in occupied Hong Kong and Singapore. 
1.32 Importance of Examining Collaboration in WWII Hong Kong 
 
The existing literature does not provide a vivid and accurate picture of the Japanese 
occupation of Southeast Asia during WWII, especially regarding the dynamics and 
interactions between the Japanese military administration and the local Chinese communities. 
Above all, the literature fails to conduct comparative analyses of the dynamics and 
interactions of the Japanese military administration and the local Chinese communities in the 
British colonies, particularly those in Hong Kong and Singapore, despite the fact that the 
Japanese would have experienced great difficulty implementing and maintaining their 
administration without local collaboration. The lack of attention given to the topic of WWII in 
general and collaboration specifically by Hong Kong historians may be traced to the 
particular circumstances in which the war in Hong Kong ended. In contrast to Europe, where 
Allied armies took control of the remaining German-held areas immediately upon German 
surrender, the sudden surrender of the Japanese left Hong Kong in a state of uncertainty; with 
Japanese forces still controlling the city, the British military government demanded that local 
Chinese elites return immediately to promote stability.  
                                                                                                                                                        
basis of practical knowledge that is difficult to formulate at the moment of action. In all these cases, actors’ 
decisions and the reasons for them have an important part to play in the explanation of what they do. Actors may 
also do things that could not be described as resulting from their decisions, and those things must be explained in 
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community organizations, and althetic clubs, that are all actors in the minimal sense that they have a means of 
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would be described as actions, but would not normally be described as making decisions and acting on them. 
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 This dissertation argues that the decision to collaborate was not simply a moral choice 
between patriotism and betrayal, and varied greatly in accordance with location and local 
context. Moreover, it varied according to the collaborators’ particular circumstances, 
particularly the roles that they played in social, political, and economic networks. 44 
Individuals assumed the identity of “collaborator” for a host of reasons shaped by personal 
aims and existential needs and pressures, all of which are explored in this dissertation. 
 During the three years and eight months in which one million local Chinese lived in 
Japanese-occupied Hong Kong, there was collaboration as well as resistance, the former of 
which was much more than simply the latter’s opposite. This dissertation examines the nature 
of this collaboration not to exonerate or condemn those who chose to collaborate but rather 
discover how the local Chinese community, including the elites and the masses, interacted 
with the Japanese occupiers. Through such examination, it will demonstrate the manner in 
which the experience of occupation is as much a part of the colonial history in Hong Kong as 
is the more familiar story of resistance.  
In December 1941, Hong Kong was wrenched from British control by the Imperial 
Japanese Army, which proceeded to assume its administration for their own purposes for 
almost four years. Conventional wisdom insists that this episode, while dramatic, had little 
lasting effect. When the British returned in August 1945 to resume where they had left off 
four years earlier, life proceeded in relatively the same manner as it had before Japanese 
occupation. Major developments, conventional wisdom asserts, occurred only between the 
late 1940s and the early 1950s, when the colony witnessed an influx of refugees from the war 
and revolution on the Chinese mainland. It is due to such conventional wisdom that study of 
wartime occupation in Hong Kong has been neglected.45 
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This dissertation argues that examination of Japanese military administration in the 
occupied territories will provide a deeper understanding of the uniqueness of Japanese 
colonialism. Although it may appear so from a comparative study of Japanese colonialism 
and Western colonialism, Japanese colonialism was far from homogeneous, taking different 
forms in different occupied territories. Therefore, a comparative study of Japanese military 
administration in two of the occupied territories can provide a more comprehensive picture of 
how Japan ruled its wartime occupied territories and how its rule differed among the 
territories. Specifically, this dissertation will investigate the nature of collaboration in 
Singapore and Hong Kong, as well the logic behind it, to compare whether the nature of and 
logic behind collaboration differed between these two territories and, if so, why. 
Most understand that Chinese co-operation was instrumental, both in the founding and 
the building of the “new Hong Kong”, but fail to grasp why men such as Shoushan Chou, 
Robert Kotewall, and Lo Man-Kam were willing to help the Japanese. The rhetoric among 
Chinese historians that the Chinese in Hong Kong and elsewhere in Southeast Asia were 
helpless victims of the Japanese has prevented them from examining what Japanese-occupied 
Hong Kong offered to the local Chinese who chose to live under Japanese rule. This 
dissertation takes a comparative approach to gain deeper understanding of the dynamics 
between the Japanese military government and the local Chinese elites in Hong Kong and 
Singapore during different phases of the occupation, based on the belief that the political 
actors and the historical development of the occupation were shaped by the changing of roles 
between the local Chinese community and the Japanese administration.  
Hong Kong and Singapore are the focus of this study for two primary reasons. First, 
because they served as important bases for Great Britain’s “free-trade policy” in Southeast 
and East Asia from the early nineteenth century until their independence, Hong Kong and 
Singapore were two of the most important colonies in the British Empire. As such, they share 
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certain characteristics in the context of British colonial history, and their prosperity was 
essential to the success of the British free-trade policy. Second, Hong Kong was important in 
the plan for the Greater Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The primary reason for the Japanese 
occupation of Hong Kong was to prevent strategic goods from being transported to the 
Nationalist government of China, with the secondary reason being the establishment of Hong 
Kong, together with the other territories, as a strategic military base to be incorporated into 
the Japanese Empire. It has been argued that if Hong Kong had been under the rule of the 
Japanese Navy rather than the Japanese Army, the value of Hong Kong to Japan would have 
been greater,46 as the Army failed to develop Hong Kong as a prosperous entrepot and an 
important economic link in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
The period of Japanese rule in Singapore was relatively brief in duration but 
significant in impact. The swift Japanese occupation of British Malaya and Singapore dealt a 
mortal blow to white superiority and Western supremacy in Asia. The subsequent Japanese 
occupation of these territories had a profound influence on the emergence and development of 
nationalism among their peoples, inspired by both Japanese encouragement of indigenous 
civic, paramilitary, and even political groups as well as the hardship of occupation, both of 
which provoked a new determination to break free of all foreign rulers. 
 Warwick and Osherson, who describe the use of the comparative method as “social 
scientific analyses involving observation in more than one social system, or in the same social 
system at more than one point in time”,47 explain that this method views society as the 
primary unit of analysis. As British colonial outposts, Hong Kong and Singapore shared 
similar backgrounds yet experienced Japanese occupation uniquely due to differences in the 
military administration, the degree of urbanization, and the size of the total and Chinese 
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population in each colony.48 As such, they provide excellent case studies for an in-depth 
comparative study of collaboration during WWII.  
1.33 Dissertation Organization 
 
The tentative organization of this dissertation is as follows: 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
Chapter 2: Prewar Singapore and Hong Kong 
Chapter 3: Singapore and Hong Kong in the Aftermath of Japanese Invasion 
Chapter 4: Dynamics between the Japanese and the Elites in Singapore and Hong Kong 
Chapter 5: Dynamics between the Japanese and the Masses in Singapore and Hong Kong  
Chapter 6: Collaboration at the Economic and Social Levels 
Chapter 7: Postwar Politics and Arrangements 
Chapter 8: Conclusion 
It is important to note that the scope of this dissertation extends beyond the period of  
the occupation to encompass the “pre-Japanese” period, which requires examination of long-
established relations between the British colonial government in Hong Kong and the local 
Chinese elites before 1941, and the “post-Japanese” period, which requires examination of  
the implications and legacy of collaboration. The rationale for doing so is recognition that 
even though the collaborationist government was a new regime established by a conquering 
power, it grew out of and was marked by the social, political, and economic developments 
and dynamics of the prewar years. Due to these dynamics, collaboration did not necessarily 
equate to betrayal, nor did resistance automatically connote nationalism. Gaining 
understanding of the context assists in evaluation of the nature and meaning of collaboration 
and resistance wherever it occurred.  
                                                 
48 The Chinese population represented about 75% and 98% of the total population of Singapore and Hong Kong, 
respectively, before WWII.  
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As part of fulfilling its goal to go beyond a simple moral interpretation of resistance 
and collaboration, this dissertation recognizes that if most key Hong Kong elites were not 
sufficiently motivated by national commitment and patriotism, explanation of their choices 
must be sought elsewhere. In particular, their life experiences, particularly those relating to 
their family, social, and professional networks and interests, can provide important insights 
into the dynamics of their decision to collaborate or resist. Their decisions also had a 
significant impact on the period of “postwar politics and arrangements” that began in August 
1945 and ultimately resulted in the decolonization of Hong Kong, a period that must also be 
examined to gain greater understanding of the lasting impacts of Japanese occupation. 
1.34 Research questions and objectives 
 
This dissertation aims to address one primary research question: 
 
Which factors shaped and can explain the dynamics and interactions between the 
Japanese military administration and the local Chinese elites and masses in WWII Hong 
Kong and Singapore? 
 
To address this question thoroughly, this dissertation also addresses the following sub-
questions throughout its examination of wartime collaboration in Hong Kong and Singapore: 
a. What was the meaning of the term collaboration for the local Chinese community in 
Hong Kong? (will be discussed in chapter 1 and 8). 
b. What was the nature of the interaction between the local Chinese communities and the 
Japanese military administrations in Hong Kong and Singapore? (will be discussed in 
chapter 2 and 3). 
c. To what purposes and how effectively did each side press its advantages? (will be 
discussed in chapter 4, 5 and 6). 
d. Did the Japanese military administrations in Hong Kong and Singapore receive the 
support from the local elites and masses necessary for the implementation of their 
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political, economic, and social policies? If not, why? (will be discussed in chapter 4, 5 
and  6). 
e. What have been the legacies or lasting impacts of Japanese policies towards Chinese 
elites and management at the district level? (will be discussed in chapter 7). 
f. Was the Japanese military administration in Hong Kong less harsh and more willing to 
satisfy the requests of the local Chinese community than was the administration in 
Singapore? If so, did this increase the impetus for collaboration in Hong Kong? If so, 
for what type of collaboration? (will be discussed in chapter 8). 
A central concern of this dissertation is how the Chinese of Hong Kong adapted to 
living under a foreign, usually repressive regime. Contrary to conventional wisdom, this 
dissertation argues that when compared to Singapore under Japanese occupation, Hong Kong 
under Japanese occupation was not such a harsh or poor place. To support this argument, it 
traces the historical roots of the relationship between the Hong Kong Chinese elites and the 
Japanese military government to demonstrate that the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong was 
not simply a function of Japanese imperialism. Rather, it was as much a function of the 
collaboration of local people, who cooperated with the Japanese to build the new economic, 
social, and political infrastructure.  
This dissertation aims to probe the processes by which such collaboration arose, how 
the Japanese elicited collaboration, and why and how the local Chinese community responded 
to Japanese overtures. This examination is based on the assumptions that all parties had 
limited or no knowledge regarding the extent of the Japanese invasion and subsequent 
occupation or of the complex nature of the intersection between Chinese and Japanese 
interests in Hong Kong. In accordance with this perspective, this dissertation examines case 
studies at both the national and local district level in Hong Kong and compares them with 
similar cases in Singapore.  
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 By examining representative cases in both territories from the end of 1941 to mid-
August 1945, this dissertation provides a detailed comparative analysis of the specific 
contexts, patterns, and dynamics of collaboration that existed in Hong Kong and Singapore 
during Japanese occupation. As it does so, it explores the connections between the local 
Chinese community and pre-occupation political, economic, and social trends and situations; 
the backgrounds and roles of the collaborating elites, as well as the interplay between them; 
the fate of collaborators in the postwar British colonies; and the politics and meaning of 
collaboration. 
1.35 Research Methodology 
 
As a historical and political phenomenon, collaboration is best understood when it is 
assessed from a local as well as a global perspective and when its expression in two different 
territories is compared, in this case its expression in Hong Kong and Singapore during the 
Japanese occupation. To perform such a thorough assessment and comparison, this 
dissertation conducted extensive review of primary sources, including newspapers, articles, 
books, and official documents published and/or produced in the United Kingdom, Japan, 
Hong Kong, and Singapore, and, when available, of various archival sources, memoires, and 
transcripts of personal interviews.49  
Two indispensable archives of primary sources served as the foundation of this 
dissertation. The Public Record Offices in London50 and the Archival Offices in Hong Kong, 
Singapore, and Japan are sources of excellent documentation produced during the wartime 
                                                 
49 See Bibliography. 
50 Most of the correspondence between the Hong Kong Government and the Colonial Office between 1842 and 
1951 can be found in the series CO 129, which all appear on microfilm and are available at the Hong Kong 
Public Records Office and the library of the University of Hong Kong. Although they are also archived in 
London, researchers are not allowed to inspect the original documents. An index has been prepared by the staff 
of the Public Record Office listing the title and subject of each file. A more complete and better index has been 
compiled by the Hong Kong Public Records Office. A copy of this index is available in the library of the 
University of Hong Kong. 
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period. The application of the thirty-year or the fifty-year-rule51 in different archives meant 
that in the normal course of events, confidential documents pertaining to the Japanese 
occupation were used, such as papers and correspondence from the Cabinet Office, Colonial 
Office, the War Office, with several documents from the Hong Kong and Japanese archives 
being used to construct the research plan.52 Of prime importance in this research were the 
records of the Cabinet Office, the organization that coordinates policy at the highest level in 
Britain, and is likely the most valuable official contemporary source of material regarding 
British political history during the two world wars. However, as not all decisions are not made 
in the Cabinet, and many records may be incomplete and missing, records from the Foreign 
Office and Colonial Office were also reviewed. 
With the sixty years that have passed since the Japanese occupation of Southeast Asia, 
the final opportunity to examine governance from a broader perspective through conducting 
personal interviews may have arrived.53 In Singapore, a number of people who could reflect 
and recollect upon the war years were interviewed by the Oral History Department between 
1981 and 1985.54 In Hong Kong, the Museum of History launched the Oral History Research 
                                                 
51 The “thirty year” rule is the popular name given to a law in the United Kingdom, the Republic of Ireland, and 
Australia that provides that the yearly cabinet papers of a government will be released publicly thirty years after 
they were created. On the other hand, the “fifty-year rule” is one of the most commonly accepted principles 
within American historic preservation: properties that have achieved significance within the past fifty years are 
generally not considered eligible for listing in the National Register of Historic places. An often misunderstood 
chronological threshold, the fifty-year standard was established by National Park Service historians in 1948. 
52 See “Archive Record” in Bibliography. 
53 Professor Goto Kenichi, interview by Lawrence Wong, December 5, 2002, Waseda University, Japan. 
54 The Japanese military administration in Singapore left almost no written records behind regarding its work. 
The newspapers and magazines that the Japanese authorities published present only one perspective on the 
occupation. A small number of personal memoirs written by Singaporeans and others after the war present a 
partial picture of life during that period of social, economic, and political turmoil. The Oral History Project on 
the Japanese Occupation in Singapore 1942-1945, which was completed between June 1981 and December 
1985, contains 655 recorded hours of interviews with 175 people that reconstruct life under the Japanese. The 
interviews focus on the prewar anti-Japanese movement, the various Japanese policies that were implemented, 
social reorganization, the Japanese defence of Singapore and the resistance forces, and the Japanese surrender 
and its aftermath. Interviewees were selected on the basis of their first-hand familiarity with the topics. Most of 
the interviews were highly structured to ensure consistency and uniformity in interviewing. The project 
progressed in two phases. During the first stage, recordings of interviews tended to be in detail and wide in scope. 
During the second stage, topics that had not been thoroughly explored were identified and areas that had been 
well covered were either not broached again or briefly touched upon. Thus, recordings conducted in the latter 
stage of the project tended to be briefer and the topics fewer but more specific. The project focused on recording 
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Project in 1995 to collect wartime experiences. The transcripts and recordings of their 
interviews, integrated with historical photographs, documents, and other materials, were 
examined and extensively utilized in this dissertation. This examination included review of 
sixteen tapes of the radio programme Time to Remember, which had been produced on behalf 
of Radio Hong Kong by Wendy Barnes. Moreover, in an attempt to relive the period of 
history under study, locations of particular significance to this dissertation, including the 
Shing Mun Redoubt, Pinewood Battery, the Lamma Islands, Wong Nai Chung Gap, and Luk 
Keng, were visited between April and May 2004.  
Personal remembrances of war are valuable in historical research, and not only as 
correctives to “officially sanctioned” remembrances. However, although some aspects of the 
Japanese occupation remain very vivid to those who lived through it, other aspects are less 
clearly remembered. Despite this limitation, this dissertation hopes to present a picture of the 
war and illustrate what WWII in Hong Kong and Singapore meant for those who lived 
through it. Achieving this aim is particularly important. Although many have learned much 
from listening to older people’s remembrances of the war, they were often left with gaps in 
knowledge that needed to be filled, leading them to read memoirs and essays of the hardships 
experienced under Japanese occupation. They soon found that exposure to a range of other 
people’s memories allowed them to learn a great deal about topics of which their circle of 
family and friends had no direct experience. In accordance with this finding, this dissertation 
proposes that one’s memories are primarily collections of one’s own memories as well as 
                                                                                                                                                        
the experiences of the local, mainly Chinese, population. Generally speaking, interviewees above the age of 50 
had clear memories of the period. Therefore, gaining knowledge of life in general during that time was not 
problematical; the real challenge lay with identifying interviewees who could describe specific experiences. 
Many of those who had been involved in running Japanese-controlled organizations and businesses or 
implementing Japanese policies were found to have passed away or be reluctant to discuss such sensitive topics, 
and very few survivors of the sook ching were still living. The secret nature of the anti-Japanese activities during 
that period presented difficulties in identifying the persons involved and, due to language and funding problems, 
the project was unable to include interviews with Japanese war-time administrators. However, Professor Akashi 
Yoji’s publications on Singapore likely fill many gaps. 
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those of others willing to share their reminiscences. Such varieties of memories are not, of 
course, brought together all at once; they can be formed at any stage of one’s life.  
The study of collaboration in Hong Kong during Japanese occupation can be likened to 
detective work, as it requires following promising leads in the archives in order to establish 
the relevant facts. Collections of private and official primary sources obtained from Wani 
Yukio, a journalist who has conducted research on Hong Kong during Japanese rule with 
Professor Kobayashi Hideo since the 1980s, proved particularly invaluable to this 
comprehensive, comparative, critical analysis of occupied Hong Kong and Singapore. 
1.36 Research Limitations 
 
This research effort faced several limitations. Foremost and most unfortunately, it was 
not possible to visit archives in the United States due to lack of funding. Second, the Japanese 
occupation led to the destruction of many records that would have provided great insight into 
historical Hong Kong, a problem compounded by the fact that unlike in Singapore, there are 
no long-established archives in Hong Kong. Specifically, each Japanese administration 
destroyed its records before a new administration assumed power, and those documents that 
remained were often burnt for fuel during wartime shortages of other fuel sources. 
 Third, some source materials in Hong Kong and Singapore posed difficulties for the 
serious researcher. For example, G. B. Endacott, the author of Hong Kong eclipse, has been 
accused of using official and government records without attempting to reflect the Chinese 
view, a view that is very difficult to reflect because the Chinese are generally reticent about 
discussing their families. At the same time, many firms are reluctant to provide access to their 
records in a very competitive business environment. Newspaper records were thus of great 
value in providing different points of view and criticism of the government. 
Fourth, it is difficult to obtain clear and reasonably unbiased accounts of the war years. 
Both the Japanese and the Allies made extensive use of false propaganda before and during 
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the war, and newspapers were little more than propaganda organs for the Japanese during the 
occupation. K. R. Menon, a journalist with Indo Shimbunsha in Singapore, decribed wartime 
journalism as “praising the Japanese . . . and praising their war efforts and running down the 
British and Americans.” 55  The editor of Hong Kong News, the only English-language 
newspaper published during the occupation of Hong Kong, was Japanese, and the staff 
members were mainly Chinese and Portuguese who had worked for the South China Morning 
Post since the war. Not surprisingly, this paper was an organ of Japanese propaganda and, as 
such, very inaccurate. 
              As a result, one challenge in preparing this dissertation was viewing the nature of 
collaboration from the perspective of both sides, a difficult task due to the disparity in the 
number of sources from each party. Part of the solution was keeping all cases in mind while 
researching the present case, hoping that the other cases would provide context and allow for 
the maintenance of objectivity regarding the case and all parties involved, while remaining 
aware of any gaps and inaccuracies in the relevant sources. The final major challenge was 
attempting to reconstruct life during the occupation with limited access to those who had lived 
through the occupation, as many have since died or are at an age at which they find it difficult 
to express themselves clearly. To the best of the author’s knowledge, no member of a local 
elite who could have been considered a collaborator in Hong Kong during the Japanese 
occupation has left a memoir, a diary, or even a letter from his time in Japanese service. 
Moreover, as most Japanese soldiers who took part in the invasion of Hong Kong battle were 
later killed in Guadalcanal, they left no personal recollections.   
Regarding interviews with eyewitnesses, there is in most cases little doubt that the 
events described actually took place. Allowances must be made for certain errors due to the 
passage of time, such as mistakes regarding dates or numbers. Although many interviewees 
                                                 
55 Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya, 9. 
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lack knowledge regarding particular parties or circumstances or are unable to describe them in 
great detail, most managed to recall a great deal of information, even though more than sixty 
years have elapsed since the events that they described.  
1.4 Significance and Expected Contributions of Dissertation 
 
This dissertation aims to contribute to the research and literature regarding the colonial 
history of Japan and Hong Kong in several ways. First, by examining comprehensive oral 
history projects and personal interview materials in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan, as well 
as data obtained from interviews with eyewitnesses, it presents the perspectives of those who 
lived through the occupation, allowing them to leave a record of their unique experiences.  
Second, by analyzing both published and unpublished primary data sources archived 
in the Hong Kong Public Records Office, the Singapore National Archives, and the Japanese 
National Archives, it presents collaboration from the perspectives of Hong Kong, 
Singaporean, and Japanese nationals who lived through the occupation who have presented 
their views in their respective languages. As few existing sources remain in English, it is 
particularly important to access Chinese and Japanese sources to present a full range of 
perspectives on collaboration. Although examining Japanese views is essential to gaining a 
full understanding of the context and nature of collaboration during Japanese occupation, it is 
a controversial endeavour that brings with it accusations of sympathy for right-wing causes.  
Third, this dissertation was the first to conduct a comparative study of politics of 
collaboration in Hong Kong and Singapore in order to provide a deeper understanding of the 
uniqueness of Japanese colonialism. Such a comparative study of Japanese military 
occupation in each of its occupied territories provides a comprehensive perspective regarding 
how Japan ruled its wartime occupied territories and how its rule differed from territory to 
territory. Although the Japanese military administered both Hong Kong and Singapore during 
the occupation, it administered each in a different manner due to differences in the territories’ 
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social and political structures. This dissertation identified these differences and analyzed the 
manner in which they affected the nature of Japanese administration and its impact on the 
territories.  
Fourth, this dissertation makes a theoretical contribution to the field of historical 
research. Most of the existing literature presents perspectives using a “straight descriptive 
mode” that describes little regarding the roles and interactions of the different political actors. 
To describe these roles and interactions in detail, this dissertation used a research framework 
that allowed for analysis of the dynamics and interactions between the Japanese 
administration and the local Chinese elites and masses at different stages of occupation, an 
endeavour that the author believes to be highly important in the study of the colonial history 
of Hong Kong, Singapore, and Japan. 
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the colonial history of Hong Kong by 
presenting information and perspectives untainted by the moralistic frameworks in which 
wartime history in Hong Kong has traditionally been viewed. If the conflicting motives, 
tactical concessions, sheer helplessness, and other existential uncertainties that characterized 
the lives of people living in occupied Hong Kong are to be understood and explained, all 
prejudgment must be eliminated despite the difficulty of doing so. The moralistic 
interpretation of history, which holds the historian’s task to be that of assigning “praise” and 
“blame”, has its roots in 2,500 years of Confucian historiography. Given the rise of Chinese 
nationalism in this century and the consistent identification of the Chinese state with 
nationalism, it is difficult for Chinese scholars to transcend categories that are not only 
officially mandated but fully accepted by many scholars themselves as correct judgements on 
wartime collaboration.  
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Chapter 2 
Prewar Singapore and Hong Kong 
2.1 Prewar Singapore  
2.11 A Crown Colony 
The Republic of Singapore was founded as a British trading post on the Strait of 
Malacca in 1819. Its location on the major sea route between India and China, its excellent 
harbour, and the free-trade status conferred on it by its visionary founder, Sir Thomas 
Stamford Raffles, inevitably led Singapore to become a major trading port in the British 
Empire.56 After years of campaigning by a small minority of British merchants who were 
chafing under the rule of the Calcutta government, the Straits Settlements became a crown 
colony on 1 April 1867.57 Under the crown colony administration, the governor acted as the 
senior military official of the Straits Settlements with the assistance of the Executive Council, 
which was composed of six other senior officials, and the Legislative Council, which included 
the members of the Executive Council, the chief justice, and four nonofficial members 
nominated by the governor. The number of nonofficial members and Asian Council members 
gradually increased over the years. Singapore dominated the Legislative Council, to the 
annoyance of Malacca and Penang.58  
                                                 
56 Barbara Leitch Lepoer, ed., Singapore: A Country Study (Washington, DC: General Publishing Office, 1989), 
introduction. http://countrystudies.us/singapore/2.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
57 The Straits Settlements were a group of British territories located in Southeast Asia. Originally established in 
1826 as part of the territories controlled by the British East India Company, the Straits Settlements came under 
direct British control as a crown colony on 1 April 1867. The colony was dissolved as part of the British 
reorganisation of its South-East Asian dependencies following the end of the Second World War. The Straits 
Settlements consisted of the individual settlements of Malacca, Penang (also known as Prince of Wales Island), 
and Singapore, as well as (from 1907) Labuan, off the coast of Borneo. With the exception of Singapore, these 
territories now form part of Malaysia. 
58 Ibid., section—crown colony. http://countrystudies.us/singapore/6.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
The Legislative Council was made of members in the Executive Council, the Chief Justice, and non-official 
members nominated by the Governor. These nominated members were intended to better represent the local 
people, including in its ranks Asian members. Consisting mostly of wealthy Asian business and professional 
leaders, they did not necessarily represent the collective will of the people, however. Beginning with just four 
members, it grew over the years, with Singaporean members increasingly dominating the council to the 
displeasure of politicians from Malacca and Penang. 
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The largest Chinese dialect group in the late nineteenth century was the Hokkien, who 
were traditionally involved in trade, shipping, banking, and industry. The next largest group 
was the Teochiu, who engaged in agricultural production and processing, rubber production, 
rice and lumber milling, pineapple canning, and fish processing. The Cantonese, the third 
largest group, were primarily artisans and labourers although a few made their fortunes in tin, 
and the two smallest groups, the Hakka and Hainanese, were mostly servants, sailors, or 
unskilled labourers. Because wealth was the key to leadership and social standing within the 
Chinese community, the Hokkien dominated organizations such as the Singapore Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce, and supplied most of the Chinese members of the Legislative Council 
and the Chinese Advisory Board. The latter, established in 1889 to provide a formal link 
between the British government of the colony and the Chinese community, served as a forum 
to air grievances but had no power.59  
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, China's ruling Qing Dynasty began to take 
an interest in the Nanyang Chinese. Seeking to attract their loyalty and wealth to the service 
of the homeland, the Qing Dynasty established Chinese consulates in Singapore, Malaya, the 
Dutch East Indies, and other parts of Nanyang, and appointed Whampoa as Singapore’s first 
consul in 1877. He and his successors worked diligently to strengthen the cultural ties of the 
Singaporean Chinese to China by establishing a cultural club, a debating society, Singapore’s 
first Chinese-language newspaper (Lat Pau), and various Chinese-language schools. One of 
the most important functions of the consul was to raise money for flood and famine relief in 
                                                                                                                                                        
Despite obvious control by British subjects of European descent, there was little opposition towards the system 
from the local Asian population, mainly attributed to apathy. There were a few exceptions. Tan Cheng Lock, a 
member of the Executive Council who had previously opposed several decisions made by the Legislative 
Council (such as the Aliens Ordinance of 1933 which restricted immigration) as anti-Chinese, called for popular 
representation through direct election, and for the number of non-official members to be increased to a majority 
of the Legislative Council. Initiatives like these were unsuccessful, however, as there was little support from a 
society widely apathetic to local politics, with the Chinese population paying more attention towards growing 
their commercial and professional interests and in events which were occurring in China, fuelled largely by the 
rise in Chinese nationalist sentiments. 
59 Lepoer, Singapore. http://countrystudies.us/singapore/6.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
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China and for the general support of the Qing government. After the upheaval of the Hundred 
Days’ Reform Movement in China and its subsequent suppression by Qing conservatives in 
1898, the Singaporean Chinese and their pocketbooks were wooed by reformists, royalists, 
and revolutionaries alike. In 1906, Sun Yat-sen founded a Singapore branch of the Tongmeng 
Hui, the forerunner of the Kuomintang (KMT), the Chinese Nationalist Party. Not until the 
successful Wuchang Uprising of 1911, however, did Sun receive the enthusiastic support of 
the Singaporean Chinese.60  
The Singapore economy experienced much the same ups and downs as did Western 
economies during the interwar period. A postwar boom created by rising tin and rubber prices 
gave way to a recession in the late 1920 when prices for both dropped on the world market. 
By the mid-1920s, fortunes were made overnight as rubber and tin prices soared once again. 
Tan Kah Kee,61 who had migrated from Xiamen (Amoy) at age seventeen, reportedly made 
S$8 million in 1925 in rubber, rice milling, and shipping, and Hakka businessman Aw Boon 
Haw62 earned the nickname the “Tiger Balm King” for the multimillion-dollar fortune he 
amassed from the production and sale of patent medicines. Although they never amassed the 
                                                 
60 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/6.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
61 Tan Kah Kee (October 21, 1874 to August 12, 1961) was a prominent businessman, community leader, and 
philanthropist in colonial Singapore. Tan was born in Jimei, Tongan county, Fujian Province, China (present-day 
Jimei District in Xiamen City) and went to Singapore in 1890 when he was sixteen to work at his father’s rice 
store. After his father’s business collapsed in 1903, Tan started his own business, ultimately building an empire 
from rubber plantations, manufacturing, sawmills, canneries, real estate, import and export brokerages, ocean 
transport, and rice trading. His business was at its prime from 1912 to 1914, when he was known as the “Henry 
Ford of the Malaya community”, both in Malaya and his native Fujian Province. Tan was one of the 110 
founding members of Tao Nan School, and established the Jimei Schools (now Jimei University) in 1913 and the 
Chinese High School (now named Hwa Chong Institution) in Singapore in 1919. In 1921, he set established 
Xiamen University and financially supported it until the Government of the Republic of China took it over in 
1937. In 1920, his daughter Tan Ai Li married Lee Kong Chian, who worked under him and later became a 
famous Singaporean philanthropist and businessman. See A.H.C. Ward, Raymond W. Chu, Janet Salaff. et al., 
The Memoirs of Tan Kah Kee (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1994). 
62 Aw Boon Haw (born in1882 in Rangoon, Burma and died in 1954 in Hong Kong) was a Burmese Chinese 
entrepreneur and philanthropist best known for introducing Tiger Balm. He was the son of Hakka herbalist Aw 
Chu Kin, whose ancestral home was in Yongding County, Fujian Province. Aw migrated to Singapore in 1926, 
where he founded Tiger Red Balm with his brother, Aw Boon Par. Aw also founded several newspapers, 
including Sin Chew Jit Poh and Guang Ming Daily, which are both based in Malaya today. Sing Tao Daily, 
which was founded in 1938, is currently based in Hong Kong. Aw moved to Hong Kong during the Japanese 
occupation of Singapore and managed the business from there, while his brother stayed in Singapore until he 
closed down the factory and moved to Rangoon. Aw returned to Singapore after the end of WWII and re-
established his business. 
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great fortunes of Singapore’s leading Asian businessmen, the prosperous European 
community increasingly lived in the style and comfort afforded by modern conveniences and 
an abundance of servants.63  
Much smaller and less organized than the Chinese community of the late nineteenth 
century was the Indian community in Singapore. In 1880, only 12,000 Indians, including 
Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, resided in Singapore. South Indians tended to be 
shopkeepers or labourers, particularly dockworkers, riverboatmen, and drivers of the ox carts 
that were the major forms of transport for goods to and from the port area, whereas North 
Indians tended to be clerks, traders, and merchants. Both groups came to Singapore expecting 
to return to their homeland, and were even more transient than the Chinese.64  
Malays continued to be drawn to Singapore from all over the archipelago, reaching a 
population of 36,000 by 1901. After losing in commercial competition with the Chinese and 
Europeans, most Malay traders and merchants, as well as later Malay immigrants, became 
small shopkeepers, religious teachers, policemen, servants, or labourers. The leadership 
positions in the Malay-Muslim community were assumed by wealthy Arabs and the Jawi-
Peranakan due to their facility with English. In 1876, the first Malay-language newspaper of 
the region, Jawi Peranakan, was published in Singapore. After other Malay-language journals 
supporting religious reform began to be published in the early twentieth century, Singapore 
became a regional focal point for the Islamic revival movement that swept the Muslim world 
at that time.65  
2.12 The Singaporean Chinese Community before WWII 
The Straits-born Chinese increased their share of Singapore’s Chinese population from 
twenty-five percent in 1921 to thirty-six percent in 1931. After passage of the Immigration 
                                                 
63 Lepoer, Singapore, http://countrystudies.us/singapore/6.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
64 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/6.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
65 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/6.htm (accessed August 11, 2010). 
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Restriction Ordinance of 1930, which limited the immigration of unskilled male labourers to 
combat the unemployment resulting from the Great Depression, the number of Chinese 
immigrants decreased from 242,000 in 1930 to 28,000 in 1933. Immigration was further 
restricted by the Aliens Ordinance of 1933, which set quotas and charged landing fees for 
immigrants. Executive Council member Tan Cheng Lock and others bitterly opposed the 
policy in the Legislative Council, claiming it was an anti-Chinese measure.66  
The administration of the colony continued to be carried out by the governor and top-
level officials of the Malayan Civil Service, posts that could be held only by “natural-born 
British subjects of pure European descent on both sides”. The governor continued to consult 
with the Legislative Council, which included several wealthy Asian business and professional 
leaders, who served as nonofficial members of the council. The mid-level and technical civil 
service positions were open to British subjects of all ethnicities. Very few Asians opposed the 
system, which gave the official members the majority on the Legislative and Executive 
Councils. In the 1930s, Tan agitated unsuccessfully for direct popular representation and a 
nonofficial majority for the Legislative Council, but most Chinese were satisfied to devote 
their attention to commercial and professional affairs and the growing nationalism in China.67  
The sympathies of even the Straits-born Chinese lay with their homeland during the 
interwar period. A Singaporean branch of the KMT was active for several years beginning in 
1912, and China-oriented businessmen led boycotts in 1915 against Japanese goods in 
response to Japan's Twenty-One Demands against China, a set of political and economic 
ultimatums that, if accepted, would have made China a protectorate of Japan. Mass support 
for Chinese nationalism became more evident in 1919 when violent demonstrations were 
staged in Singapore. In the early 1920s, Sun Yat-sen was successful in convincing 
                                                 
66  Lepoer, Singapore, section—Between the World Wars, http://countrystudies.us/singapore/7.htm (assessed 
August 11, 2010). 
67 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/7.htm (assessed August 11, 2010). 
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Singapore’s China-born businessmen to invest heavily in Chinese industry and donate large 
sums for education in China. Tan Kah Kee contributed more than S$4 million for the 
founding of Amoy (Xiamen) University in 1924, and the KMT sent teachers and textbooks to 
Singapore.68  
At the same time, the KMT encouraged the use of Mandarin (or Guoyu) in Singapore's 
Chinese schools. Although Mandarin was not the language of any of Singapore's major dialect 
groups, it was considered a unifying factor by the various Chinese leadership factions in both 
Singapore and China. Singapore's first Chinese secondary school, established by Tan in 1919, 
taught in Mandarin, as did a growing number of Chinese primary schools. In 1927, the KMT 
increased the number of promising students sent to China for university education and began 
a concerted effort to extend its control over Chinese schools in Nanyang by supervising their 
curriculum and requiring the use of Mandarin. In the late 1920s, the colonial authorities 
became increasingly aware of growing left-wing politics in the Chinese schools and sought to 
discourage the use of Mandarin. Despite their efforts, Mandarin had become the medium of 
instruction in all of Singapore's Chinese schools by 1935.69  
Following the breakup of the short-lived alliance between the KMT and the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), the communists established the Nanyang Communist Party in 1928. 
Outlawed and harassed by the Singapore police, the party was reorganized in 1930 as the 
Malayan Communist Party (MCP), cantered in Singapore. For the remainder of that year, it 
experienced some success in infiltrating teacher and student organizations and staging student 
strikes. In early 1931, however, police seizure of an address book containing information on 
the newly organized party and its connections with the Far Eastern Bureau of the Communist 
International (Comintern) in Shanghai led to arrests and the near destruction.  
                                                 
68 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/7.htm (assessed August 11, 2010). 
69 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/7.htm (assessed August 11, 2010). 
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The KMT also experienced problems during this period. The party's membership in 
Singapore had expanded rapidly until 1929, when the colonial administration banned the 
Singapore branch of the KMT and prohibited fund-raising for the party in China. Concerned 
about the increase in anticolonial propaganda, the Singaporean government censored the 
vernacular press, severely restricted immigration, and cut off aid to Chinese and Tamil 
schools. During the 1930s, attempts by the communists and the KMT to organize labour and 
lead strikes were also suppressed by the colonial government.70  
Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment in Singapore increased throughout 
the 1930s. The fortunes of both the KMT and the MCP rose with the Japanese invasion of 
Manchuria in 1931 and the start of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937. The CCP and the KMT 
formed a united front in December 1936 to oppose Japanese aggression. The KMT called 
upon the Nanyang Chinese for volunteers and financial support for the Republic of China 
(ROC), which had promulgated a Nationality Law in 1929 proclaiming that all persons of 
Chinese descent on the paternal side were Chinese nationals. Tan Kah Kee headed both the 
Nanyang Chinese National Salvation Movement and the Singapore Chinese General 
Association for the Relief of Refugees, as well as the fund-raising efforts for the homeland 
among the Malayan Chinese. Chinese government agents used the Singapore Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce and other local organizations to organize highly effective boycotts 
against Japanese goods. Singaporean Chinese also boycotted Malay or Indian shops selling 
Japanese goods, and extremist groups severely punished Chinese merchants who ignored the 
boycott.71  
The British authorities struggled vainly to control the tide of anti-Japanese feeling by 
banning anti-Japanese demonstrations, the importation of anti-Japanese textbooks from China, 
and the teaching of anti-Japanese slogans and songs in Chinese schools. They also became 
                                                 
70 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/7.htm (assessed August 11, 2010). 
71 Ibid., http://countrystudies.us/singapore/7.htm (assessed August 11, 2010). 
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increasingly alarmed at the communist infiltration of the Nanyang Chinese National Salvation 
Movement and other Chinese patriotic groups, with the banned MCP claiming a membership 
of more than 50,000 by early 1940. Although nominally partners in a united front in 
opposition to the Japanese, the MCP and the KMT competed for control of organizations,  
including the Nanyang Chinese Relief General Association. Nonetheless, Singapore's Chinese 
contributed generously to the support of the Chinese government.72 
 
2.2 Singapore’s Role in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
2.21 The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a concept created and promulgated 
during the Shōwa era by the government and military of the Empire of Japan to create a self-
sufficient “bloc of Asian nations led by the Japanese and free of Western powers”.73 The roots 
of Japan’s ideology of Asian co-existence and co-prosperity can be traced back to the reign of 
Jinmu-tenno, the first Emperor of Japan, who is said to have given the divine command to 
fulfil hakko ichium, the placing of the eight corners of the world under one Japanese roof.74 
The Japanese thus believed that they “had divine mission of conquering and ruling other 
countries”.75 During the Meiji period, Japanese philosophers added a new element to this 
early form of pan-Asianism when they advocated a common Asian cultural heritage to unite 
all of Asia against Western encroachment.76 
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The Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was a scheme for the mutual cooperation 
of all East Asians for the co-prosperity of all.77 As such, it advocated political, economic, 
cultural, social, and spiritual cooperation among the multitude of East Asian peoples for the 
advancement of their common welfare and their fair share in the fruits of their common 
labour.78 It argued that by doing so, the East Asian races could liberate themselves from the 
domination of the European races and fulfil the rights and interests of the various races of 
Asia on a fair and absolutely equal basis.79 Realization of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere was initiated by Prime Minister Fumimaro Konoe in an attempt to create a Greater 
East Asia comprising Japan, Manchukuo, China, and parts of Southeast Asia that would, 
according to imperial propaganda, establish a new international order in which Asian 
countries which would share prosperity and peace free from Western colonialism and 
domination.80 The military goals of this expansion included conducting naval operations in 
the Indian Ocean and off the coast of Australia.81 
2.22 Significance of Singapore in the Co-Prosperity Sphere 
Southeast Asia had not always been a focus of Japanese concern. Lebra explains that 
although Japan had always considered Far East Asia as pivotal to its national security and 
economic viability, it had not thought so of Southeast Asia82 until economic pressure led 
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Japan to consider the region a target of projected Japanese development.83 The main factor 
behind Japan’s desire to expand its empire or “sphere” into Southeast Asia was its protracted 
war with China. After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, Japan's relations with 
the United States and Great Britain became increasingly strained because of U.S. and British 
vested interests in China,84 a dire problem for Japan because it depended on these nations for 
the raw materials needed for its industries.85 Its increasingly strained relationship with these 
two countries prompted Japan to harbour the idea of establishing a self-sufficient system 
through gaining access to the abundant resources of Southeast Asia. As Lebra explains, “To a 
country impoverished by a protracted war and hard-pressed for foreign exchange to purchase 
the sinews of continued war, the sight of abundant war materials in a geographically 
accessible regions must be supremely tempting”.86 
Such a plan was given clear definition when Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yosuke 
openly expounded the concept of a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere in a speech given 
on 1 August 1940.87 Specifically, he advocated placing the Straits Settlements, comprising 
Penang, Malacca, and Singapore, under direct rule and making the rest of Malaya into a 
protectorate.88  Singapore’s significance to the Japanese was twofold: it could serve as a 
strategic naval base as well as an economic powerhouse. Strategically, Singapore was the 
British defence headquarters in Southeast Asia and the base of the 7th Area Army. In such a 
capacity, it was the centre of military operations over a vast area and the largest and best-
equipped workshop south of China Singapore’s economic significance lay in its position as a 
collection and distribution centre for Malaya and the surrounding regions. As such, the 
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Japanese intended to make Singapore a centre or a base for mobilization of the resources 
available in the Malay archipelago. Singapore was so important to Japan that it renamed the 
territory Syonan, which meant “the Brilliant South”, soon after its capture.89 
After war plans for the expansion into Southeast Asia had been finalized, the 
government held the Liaison Conference at Imperial Headquarters on 20 November 1941 to 
establish guidelines for the administration of the occupied territories. The conference’s 
ultimate output, a document that came to be known as the “Principles Governing the 
Administration of the Occupied Southern Areas”, expressed Japan’s policies towards 
Singapore simply and clearly.90 According to this document, military administrations were to 
be immediately established in occupied territories, with the final status of such areas to be 
decided by the central authorities at a later date; existing government structures would be 
utilized as much as possible to enforce the military administrations; and native customs and 
religions were to be respected.91 The document also stated that the military administrations 
would have three main objectives. First, they must restore and maintain peace and order as 
soon as possible. Second, they should work towards a rapid acquisition of resources necessary 
for Japan's war effort, with the army and the navy providing the required assistance in terms 
of transport. Third, they should strive for self-sufficiency of the occupation troops by using 
local resources to the greatest extent possible, ignoring the hardship that the natives were 
bound to face by the acquisition of their resources.92 The justification for self-sufficiency was 
that as Japan was at war, military needs must be satisfied before other needs could be 
considered.93  
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Japanese plans for Singapore’s long-term role in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere can only be hypothesized because the war ended before Japan could fully realize it 
intentions. However, Singapore’s projected long-term importance was reflected in Japan’s 
plans to incorporate it directly into Japan as a Japanese territory administered by a Japanese 
Governor-General. 94 In contrast, other components of the projected Sphere, including the 
Philippines, the former Dutch East Indies, and Burma, were to be granted “independence”.95 
Singapore’s importance is further reflected in Japan’s reference to the territory as the “capital” 
of the Southern region. As the territories of the Sphere were to engage in economic, political, 
and cultural cooperation, it can be assumed that Singapore would function as the coordinating 
centre for the complete integration of the southern region into the Sphere.  
For the duration of the war, Singapore’s immediate roles were more evident: as a base 
for military operations and a controlling centre for Japan’s exploitation of the resources of the 
Malayan Peninsula. In terms of strategic value, the fall of Singapore placed Japan in “an 
impregnable position to conduct the current war”96 by allowing the Japanese to use it as a 
base for the conduct of further military operations in the Dutch East Indies. Shortly after 
occupying Singapore, advanced troops left to invade the Dutch East Indies while fresh troops 
arrived to assume permanent responsibility for logistics.97 Singapore also functioned as the 
defence headquarters of the area. Economically, Singapore was to function as the centre for 
the collection and shipment of resources from the Malay Peninsula to Japan necessary for the 
Japanese war industry. Two conditions which were necessary for the fulfilment of this 
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responsibility were the restoration of public order and the establishment of the self-sufficiency 
of the military forces in the field.98 
2.3 Japanese Planning And Policy towards the Malayan Chinese Community from 
March 1941 to February 1942 
Long before the outbreak of the war, the Malayan Chinese posed a special problem to 
Japan, being the most politically conscious ethnic group, as well as one largely loyal to China 
and the Great Britain. Following the commencement of the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, the 
Malayan Chinese organized a national salvation movement that advocated boycotting 
Japanese goods and donating millions of dollars to the Nationalist Government of China, and 
later supported the United Kingdom after it declared war against the Axis Powers in 1939. 
Hostile as they were, the Chinese were important to Japan for the establishment of the new 
order that it envisioned for Asia. It is therefore not surprising that Japanese military planners 
deliberated on a policy for winning the hearts of the Malayan Chinese long before the 
outbreak of the war. 
The Japanese military considered the Chinese significant in its plans for three reasons. 
First, the Chinese in the British territories, as they were elsewhere in Southeast Asia, 
dominated the economic sphere due to their accumulation of much capital for investment in 
industrial and commercial enterprises. Second, for the Japanese military to reconstruct a war-
torn Malayan economy and establish an economically self-sufficient Malaya, economic 
cooperation with the Chinese and the recruitment of their commercial talents were absolutely 
essential. Third, the Chinese held a key to the solution of the “China problem” that had 
drained off Japan’s military strength since 1937. 
Mindful of the economic strength and political utility of the Malayan Chinese, the 
Army General Staff prepared a top secret study on the occupation and administration of 
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Southeast Asia in March 1941. In this document, military planners stressed the importance of 
gaining understanding of Chinese economic strength, expediting measures for the return of 
dislocated Chinese to their former positions once the war had ended, and helping them resume 
their economic activities as expeditiously as possible.99 Expanding on the March study, the 
Army General Staff prepared another top secret document in October that reiterated the need 
for “inducing and inviting Chinese capital to investment in principal industries, utilizing 
Chinese facilities for the collection and distribution of retail goods, and guiding Chinese 
banks in such a way as to cooperate with Japanese [monetary and economic] policies”.100 
Implicit in these prewar policies was a preferential treatment to be accorded to the Chinese, at 
least during the initial stages of the military administration. Review of these two documents 
indicates that the Army high command was prepared to be conciliatory towards the Chinese in 
order to exploit Chinese talents and resources for the realization of a new politico-economic 
order under Japanese domination.101 
When the Japanese experienced difficulty in carrying out this relatively moderate 
policy due to the pronounced hostility of the Malayan Chinese towards Japan, their focus 
shifted towards formulating policy regarding the treatment of anti-Japanese Chinese. 
Hardliner military officers had, of course, a ready-made solution: punish them severely. 
Specifically, the March document stated that to “destroy and eradicate their political 
organizations that were driving wheels of anti-Japanese and pro-Chiang [Kai-shek] 
activities . . . an appropriate and resolute action should be taken against Chinese harmful to us 
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in order to demonstrate our might”, and suggested “as a principle to confiscate their property”, 
though such recourse should not be taken before allowing them to recant.102 
With this position and attitude towards the Chinese, the Japanese military went to war. 
Although the Japanese military, foreign office, and private intelligence agents had 
accumulated a vast quantity of information about the Malayan Chinese over many years, 
Japanese preconceptions and stereotyped prejudices often distorted their analysis. They 
regarded the Chinese as being interested only in making money and coerced to support the 
Chiang Kai-shek Government. Few Japanese, military or civilian, who could claim to have 
knowledge of the Malayan Chinese were assigned to headquarters of the Southern 
Expeditionary Army (SEA) or to the Twenty-Fifth Army that was to invade Malaya, and only 
one officer, Captain Tarora Sadao, was assigned responsibility for Malayan Chinese affairs 
for the SEA command.103 
Despite their efforts, no Army or Naval intelligence agents had been able to establish 
contact with Chinese leaders to win them over to the Japanese before the outbreak of the war. 
For instance, when Captain Tarora had accompanied Teo Eng Hock, a former business leader 
in Singapore and an early Sun Yat-sen supporter, to Indochina in August 1941 to win the 
hearts of the Chinese and gain the support of leading Chinese in Saigon, Chinese anti-
Japanese feelings were so strong that they accomplished very little.104 The mission of the F 
Kikan, the code name of an agency responsible for espionage under the SEA command, was 
to “establish contact with Chinese” in order to organize them in an anti-British movement. A 
certain Tashiro, a longtime resident of Singapore, was given the assignment of organizing a 
labour strike among Chinese workers in order to paralyze shipping in Singapore Harbour, but 
could not put this plot into action due to strong anti-Japanese sentiment. Thereafter, the F 
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Kikan, otherwise a highly successful espionage agency, practically terminated its Chinese 
operations.105 Moreover, because none of the Twenty-Fifth Army’s Gunseibu staff officers 
could speak Chinese, they employed several Taiwanese to take charge of overseas affairs. In 
short, the military at both the central command and in the field had very inadequate 
preparation in personnel training and policymaking for Chinese affairs, despite recognition of 
this ethnic group as vital for the construction of a new order in Asia. 
As the war progressed, staff officers and soldiers of the Twenty-Fifth Army became 
increasingly hostile towards the Chinese in general. This fact is not surprising, as most were 
veterans of the Sino-Japanese War in China, where they had met increasing Chinese guerrilla 
resistance. Frequent Chinese obstructions on the Japanese supply line and military operations 
further hardened their feelings towards the Chinese, creating a psychological state of mind 
that resulted in the atrocities later committed by Japanese soldiers and climaxing in the 
infamous sook ching (“purge through purification”) in which they engaged after the fall of 
Singapore.  
               Preoccupied by immediate military operations, the field army failed to see “the 
Chinese question” in perspective. However, not all staff officers were unaware of its 
importance.  Major Fujiwara Iwaichi, Chief of the F Kikan, was one of a few officers who 
could see the issue from a broader point of view, as was reflected in his actions in the town of 
Alor Star. When Japanese troops occupied Alor Star, most Chinese residents fled, leading its 
economic activities to grind to a halt, while many Malays and Indians ransacked and pillaged 
Chinese stores, creating anarchy. Anxious to restore order and economy, Major General 
Manaki Keishin, Deputy Chief Of Staff of the Twenty-Fifth Army and concurrently Chief of 
its military government department, visited Fujiwara and requested the F Kikan's cooperation. 
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After accepting Manaki’s request, Fujiwara then asked him to perform two actions for the 
pacification of the Chinese. First, the Twenty-Fifth Army would declare forthwith that it 
would “not regard non-hostile Chinese, Indians, and Malays as enemy nationals” and would 
“guarantee their lives, property, and freedom”. Second, the Chinese and Indians would be 
allowed to hoist their respective national flags, provided that the Chinese attach a streamer to 
their flag inscribed with the words “peace and national construction” to indicate their support 
for the Wang Ching-wei Government. Manaki granted Fujiwara's request on his own 
authority. On entering Taiping on 25 December following the capitulation of the city, 
Fujiwara was pleased to find that Manaki had accorded with his wishes, as evidenced by the 
national flags flown in front of Chinese homes.106 
However, Fujiwara later reported that his requests had stirred up strong opposition 
among hardline staff officers under Yamashita’s command. They vehemently argued against 
allowing Chinese to display their national flag, insisting that Malaya would become a 
Japanese territory. Because the Malayan Chinese had been undisguisedly anti-Japanese, the 
officers maintained, they should be “made to display the Japanese flag” as a sign of their 
submission to the Japanese; it was outrageous to “permit them to fly the Chinese flag”.107 The 
Gunseibu subsequently rescinded the previous authorization and ordered the Chinese to fly 
only Japanese flags. Dismayed by this reversal, Fujiwara visited Manaki and lodged a 
complaint for breach of agreement, but found him unresponsive to pleas to reverse the new 
order and Fujiwara’s argument that the new order would make the F Kikan’s pacification 
campaign needlessly difficult. After having failed to change Manaki's view, Fujiwara declared 
that his organization would henceforth assume no responsibility for Chinese affairs.108 With 
this declaration, the voice of moderation fell by the wayside. 
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After the war, Fujiwara wrote that bad faith and unreasonableness on the part of the 
military had been contributory factors in the deepening Chinese distrust and hostility towards 
the Japanese that led most Chinese to fail to cooperate with the Japanese. It was this 
psychological state of the Chinese mind, Fujiwara believed, on which the British and the 
communists later seized, turning the latent hostile feelings of the Chinese against the Japanese. 
He attributed the Japanese soldiers’ later atrocities to Japan’s hardline policy and their 
encounters with hostile Chinese.109  
Although Fujiwara’s contention can never be proved with certainty, it appears that the 
decision regarding the flag was a short-sighted one resulting from the shortcomings of 
uninformed officers who could not conceive of the consequences of this minor but potentially 
important incident. Their inadequate preparation for dealing with the Chinese and their 
unfavourable image of the Chinese image, bred by wartime experience, hindered a proper 
understanding of the Malayan Chinese psychology. Such lack of preparation is reflected in the 
policy of the Twenty-Fifth Army Gunseibu , whose only policy regarding the Chinese was 
“Chinese residents shall be induced to defect from the Chiang Kai-shek regime and to 
cooperate and align themselves with [Japan's] policies”, 110  with the interpretation and 
execution of this policy largely left to the discretion of the Gunseibu of the theatre 
command.111 
The man responsible for the implementation of this policy was Watanabe, Deputy 
Chief of the Gunseibu , assisted by Takase. Watanabe, who was to become the architect of the 
Malay military administration, known as the Gunsei, was familiar with the Chinese, having 
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spent about ten years in Manchuria and North China as a member of the tokumu kikan, an 
agency engaged in intelligence and politico-economic affairs, prior to his appointment. 
Watanabe quickly realized the potential value of the Malayan Chinese, and, as no one in his 
staff spoke Chinese, sent for two Formosans to assist in Gunseibu Chinese affairs. 112 
Watanabe was strongly impressed by the diligence, acute business sense, cohesiveness, and 
independence of the Chinese. As he revealed in his diary, his first encounter with the Malayan 
Chinese had left a strong impression, characterized by both admiration and fear of their 
potential strength.113 However, as Chinese espionage and guerrilla activities also strengthened 
Watanabe’s conviction that, as were the mainland Chinese, they were untrustworthy, he 
became vigilant in combating Chinese treachery.114 His experience in Malaya had taught him 
an important lesson about the Chinese: that they should be treated with resolution.115 
It was with this frame of mind that Watanabe and Takase flew to Tokyo in early 
January 1942 to discuss unforeseen problems with the Chinese with the Army Central 
Command. In his report to the General Staff, Watanabe expressed his opposition to inducing 
the Chinese to support the Japanese-sponsored Chinese Government at Nanking and his 
support for allowing them to maintain their national identity and for the Nanking Government 
to establish a consulate in Malaya.116 It is clear that Watanabe’s desire for the Malayan 
Chinese to sever their political ties with China arose from his desire for the Malayan Chinese 
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to assume the position of a conquered. His position was therefore at variance with the spirit of 
the 1941 March-November policy, which had manifested some degree of moderation. 
In general, Watanabe set himself squarely against any conciliatory policy towards the 
Chinese on the grounds of the priority to fulfil military operational needs, a conviction, no 
doubt, derived from his encounter with Malayan Chinese obstructions, as well as with the 
Chinese in North China and the Chinese regime in eastern Hebei Province. Recalling his 
difficulties in procuring goods necessary for military purposes from the Chinese and the 
Hebei regime, he advocated adopting a “resolute, coercive measure” against the Malayan 
Chinese as long as military needs remained unfulfilled. The position of the Central High 
Command, finalized on the day before the fall of Singapore, was that the military would 
“separate ties of the overseas Chinese with the Nationalist government of China and suppress 
them as deemed necessary”.117 The military hardliners had won the first battle. 
The outcome of the “strong wishes of the general staff”118 forcing a moderate position 
to retreat in favour of a hardline policy was the adoption of the policies contained in the 
“Principles Governing Policy towards the Chinese” on February 14, 1942 at the Imperial 
Headquarter-Government Liaison Conference. Under these policies, the Malayan Chinese 
were to cut off ties with the Chiang Kai-shek regime and be induced to cooperate with Japan 
for the realization of the goals of the Great East Asia War, as well as for the production and 
acquisition of the resources necessary for the national defence of Imperial Japan, with the 
Japanese given license to “exert political pressures as needed”. While the Chinese were 
“allowed under Japan's guidance to maintain economic ties with the part of the Chinese 
mainland [under the control of the Nanking Government], their political ties with it were to be 
severed”.  
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In the occupied areas, the Army and the Navy would assume responsibility for 
executing the policies, while the Foreign Ministry in consultation with the military was 
responsible for the implementation of the policies in Thailand and French Indochina. In China, 
the Japanese embassy and local agencies of the Asia Development Board (Koain), in 
coordination with the China Expeditionary Army (CEA), were to guide the Nanking 
Government's relations with the Malayan Chinese. The administration of Malayan Chinese 
affairs was ordered divided among several government and military agencies, with the 
consequences of not only a lack of coordination among them but the jealous guarding of each 
theatre’s command of its own jurisdiction, making cooperation between the CEA and the SEA 
impossible on the Malayan Chinese issue119 
A concrete outline of occupation policies, which general staff of the Imperial Japanese 
Army did not produce until nine months before the actual outbreak of war, later provided the 
basis for a definitive policy statement issued on 20 November 1941.120 To fulfil the primary 
aims of “restoration of security, urgent acquisition of important resources for self-defence, 
and the making of the military forces self-sufficient”, local administrations were given 
permission to utilize “the existing structure of government”, based on the belief that the local 
inhabitants were “of low cultural standards, without much hostility towards us”.121  
The military perspective was reflected in General Tomoyuki Yamashita’s 20 February 
1942 proclamation that  
the people of Syonan must co-operate to establish the “East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere” and “New Order of Justice”. . . . [The] Nippon Army will drastically expel 
and punish those who still pursue bended delusions . . . those who indulge themselves 
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in private interests and wants, those who act against humanity or disturb the military 
action of the Nippon Army.122  
This proclamation also reflected the character of Japanese ethnic policy; that is, anti-British or, 
in a wider context, anti-Western. Although the Singaporean people were urged to establish an 
East Asian racial consciousness based on a theory of Asian “equality”, Japanese political, 
economic, and social policy certainly contradicted their theory.  
 
 
2.4 Prewar Hong Kong  
Hong Kong’s large population was to become one of the major problems confronting 
the British administration in its efforts to defend the colony. In 1931, 852,932 persons, 
including 20,000 non-Chinese, resided in the colony; by mid-1936, 988,190 resided in Hong 
Kong, of whom 21,832 were non-Chinese. The outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in the 
summer of 1937 marked the beginning of an influx of refugees from North and Central China 
into Hong Kong so great that on 8 December 8 1941, when the Japanese attack on Hong Kong 
began, the population of the city was close to two million, according to an official of the 
colonial government.123 
In 1940, Hong Kong was a commercial centre, though not yet an important 
manufacturing centre, for international trade; an entrepot highly sensitive to political and 
economic changes on the Chinese mainland; and an important military and naval base. The 
population then numbered approximately 1,846,000, of whom about 750,000 were refugees 
from the Sino-Japanese conflict.124 In that year, only about 800 factories, employing about 
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30,000 workers,125 were in operation, and only 4,400 private motorcars, 360 motorcycles, 385 
public cars and taxis, 1,200 commercial motor lorries, and 109 tram-cars were registered for 
use in the city. 126  When compared with present statistics, these figures demonstrate the 
provincial nature of prewar Hong Kong. 
The 1931 census indicates that few Chinese regarded Hong Kong as their home, with 
only thirty-three percent reporting that they had been born in Hong Kong. However, the 
Chinese community considered the establishment of a permanent Chinese cemetery at 
Aberdeen important, as “it was a significant proof of the existence of what one might call the 
Hong Kong Chinese”.127 Although no census was taken in 1941 to confirm this assumption, 
the population of Hong Kong Chinese had likely increased substantially by that year, which 
would naturally have increased China’s and the greater Chinese community’s stake in Hong 
Kong.  
In 1941, the Chinese community was represented by three unofficial members of the 
Legislative Council, Lo Man-kam, Dr. Li Shu-fan,128 and William Ngartsee Thomas Tam, and 
one unofficial member of the Executive Council, Sir Robert Horumus Kotewall. Although 
these Chinese non-officials were expected to advise the British Hong Kong government, 
especially regarding Chinese affairs, Robert S. Ward claims that “they were in fact little more 
than instruments of the British colonial government, and, whether as the result of deliberate 
selection, they were rarely highly regarded by be Chinese themselves, and often they were not 
                                                                                                                                                        
Sessional Papers, No. 5, of 1931. Some of the difficulties encountered by census takers in Hong Kong are 
discussed in the 1962 Annual Report, (Hong Kong: Government printer). Chapter 1. 
125 E. F. Szczepanik, The Economic Growth of Hong Kong (London: Oxford University Press, 1958), 135. 
126 Figures given to Sir Shouson Chow by the Traffic Department of the Hong Kong Government. See Hong 
Kong Centenary Commemorative Talks,1841-1941, (Hong Kong: World News Service, 1941), 70. The figures 
refer to 1939, but few cars were imported into Hong Kong after that year because of the war. 
127  Lennox A. Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia: a study of contemporary government and economic 
development in British Malaya and Hong Kong (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 390. 
128 The Hong Kong Government Gazette of June 20, 1941 announced that the Hon. Mr Li Tse-fong had been 
appointed “an unofficial member of the Legislative Council in succession to Dr Li Shu-fan”. There was also an 
unofficial member representing the Portuguese community, Leo D’Almada e Castro, who had first been 
appointed in 1937 as a successor to Jose Pedro Braga. 
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actually Chinese”.129 It has been argued that Eurasians, including Ho Tung and Kotewall, 
were never viewed by other Chinese, either in Hong Kong or on the mainland, as truly 
Chinese.130 Nevertheless, they were still chosen only after they had worked their up through a 
Chinese system of influence and power understood and accepted by the government itself. 
Thus, even before the elites had reached the Legislative or Executive Council, they had been 
vetted by the community. 
All the prominent Chinese who made public speeches in 1941 in celebration of Hong 
Kong’s centenary as a British colony praised the fruits of Sino-British cooperation. In a 
wireless broadcast, Sir Shouson Chow proclaimed, “Hong Kong’s development and growth 
may be attributed in a large measure to her sound and just administration and to the peace and 
security which she offers to trade, investment and industry”.131 Sir Robert Kotewall was even 
more explicit regarding the benefits of British rule:  
No less productive of good has been the relationship between Government 
and people. In this matter, one all important factor has been the principle of 
giving the Chinese community a voice in government through 
representation on the Executive and Legislative Councils. In 1925 the 
Executive Council was enlarged to include a member, representative of the 
Chinese community;132 while, on the Legislative Council, there are three 
Chinese members. In the urban Council, adequate representation for the 
Chinese has been provided. These provisions in the Colony's constitution 
are important; but still more important is the practice followed of 
consulting responsible Chinese opinion before a decision is made.133 
 
 
2.5 Hong Kong Elites in the Prewar Era 
In this dissertation, the term elites refers to groups of prominent Chinese political and 
business leaders who were all members of the new business class emerging from the colony’s 
                                                 
129 Robert S. Ward, Asia for the Asiatics? The techniques of Japanese occupation (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1945), 14. 
130 Ibid., 14. 
131  “An Octogenarian Remembers Hong Kong’s Progress and Prosperity,” Hong Kong Centenary 
Commemorative Talking, 1841-1941, 69. 
132 Sir Shouson Chow, who served two terms of office between 1926 and 1936. 
133 “Anglo-Chinese Co-operation: Past, Present and Future,” Hong Kong Centenary Commemorative Talking, 
1841-1941, 47. 
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commercial growth, which had resulted from the tremendous increase in Chinese and 
international trade that begun in the late nineteenth century. They included entrepreneurs, 
compradors, bankers, industrialists, and professionals such as lawyers and physicians. 
Sociologists and political scientists often use the term elites to describe groups whose 
members occupy the top positions of power and wealth in a society and exercise authority, 
influence, and control of resources within the society’s important organizations. Because they 
own the bulk of a society’s wealth, elites have the power to formulate and guide economic, 
political, educational, and other significant policies and activities, and, perhaps most 
importantly, impose their explanation and justification for the dominant political and 
economic system on their society.  
The term “elitist” expounded by such scholars as Vifredo Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, 
Ralph Miliband, and John Mills is grounded upon an assumption that elites have an inherent 
desire to serve the public interest by employing special talents that separate and make them 
superior to the masses, who, in contrast, are vast in number but limited in power, wealth, and 
prestige. Although there are obviously great differences in power, wealth, and prestige among 
the individual members of the masses, when addressing fundamental political and economic 
issues—who gets what, when, how—the most important distinction is between the elites and 
the masses as two distinct groups.134  
 In the figure 2.1, the first element (“basic requirements”) identifies members of the 
elite based on family and social background and success within a specific sphere of activity. 
Education, corporate links, and social connections form the basic qualifications for elite 
membership. In Hong Kong, individuals who had such attributes, either singly or collectively, 
                                                 
134 For more on the concepts of elites and masses, see Martin N. Marger, cited in Anthony Giddens, Sociology 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993), 333-341 and Ettore A. Albertoni, Mosca and the Theory of Elitism (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1987). For the case of Hong Kong, see Ernest Wing Tak, Chui, Elite-Mass Relationships in Hong 
Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 1993) and An Exploration into the Perception of Elite-Mass 
Relationships by Local Level Political Representatives in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: University of Hong Kong, 
1993). 
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and had experienced a degree of success within their sphere of activity were qualified to enter 
the talent pool of the advisory committees at this stage. The second element (“the talent pool”) 
allows selected individuals from the overall élite to participate in the pool of talent, where 
personal qualities are displayed, connections made, and reputations amplified. This “talent 
pool” carries a measure of stratification. Those components include the Legislative Council, 
the Municipal, and the central advisory committees. Elites were given an opportunity to 
participate in the administrative processes of Hong Kong while displaying their strengths, 
achievements, and abilities. The third element (“the power elite”) are those whose 
involvement and position allow for their direct input into and assumption of responsibility for 
setting the direction and policy of the government. This ruling group is composed of officials 
and unofficials. In Hong Kong, the officials were members of the power elite in positions of 
leadership in government branches or secretaries for the colony. The unofficials were non-
civil servants who were members of the Executive Council. This power group set the agenda, 
policy, and direction for society. As continuity is a paramount goal of elites everywhere, they 
spend much attention and time on protecting their position. In this context, a major function 









                                                 
135 Martin Marger, Elites and Masses: An Introduction to Political Sociology (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 
1981), 24-26. 
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Figure 2.1 Model of the Elite-Masses Relationship 
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Source: Jose O.de Barros, Elites and Democracy: The Role of Advisory Committees in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: 
City University of Hong Kong, 1989),10-12. 
 
Until recently, scholars assumed that in traditional Chinese society, local elites or 
gentry, referred to as degree-holders, rather than the official administration largely managed 
local affairs, acting as the bridge between the magistrate and the local community, settling 
disputes, conducting fund-raising campaigns, commanding local defence, providing education 
and welfare, and spreading a moralizing influence by upholding Confucian principles. 
However, some scholars now argue that in many regions, groups other than degree-holders 










defined as groups of local people who controlled wealth, power, and influence but were not 
necessarily degree-holders.  
The Hong Kong Chinese elite shared a common elite culture and identity. Like the 
bourgeoisie of Europe, the bourgeoisie of Hong Kong constituted a social stratum bound by 
common values, a shared culture, and a degree of prosperity based on property and earned 
income. The leaders of the Hong Kong bourgeoisie, who claimed to represent the interests of 
their colony, were conscious, indeed proud, of their contributions to economic development in 
Hong Kong and China. They were careful with whom they associated and how they 
conducted their professional and social lives and presented themselves to the rest of society. 
As elsewhere, the elites were united by a strong sense of themselves in regards to other 
classes. In Hong Kong, this bourgeoisie identified itself against a wide array of “others”, 
including the Chinese bourgeoisie in China, the local European elites, and the Chinese lower 
classes of the colony.136 
The dominant elites in the local Chinese community in Hong Kong saw themselves as 
different from, even superior to, the mainland Chinese, many of whom in turn viewed the 
Hong Kong elite as obsessed with making money and less than fully Chinese because they 
resided in a British colony.137 Although the Chinese were generally excluded from the highest 
levels of government in Hong Kong, with the first Chinese resident not being appointed to the 
Executive Council until 1926, and although the Europeans sometimes identified more closely 
with the colony’s Indian traders, colonial officials realized that peace and order in the colony 
always depended on the “loyal Chinese”. British officials often insisted that the Chinese of 
                                                 
136 John Carroll, Edge of Empires: Chinese Elites and British Colonials in Hong Kong, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2005), 14. 
137 This attitude persisted in both China and Taiwan after 1949. For example, a study of Chinese education in 
Hong Kong published in Taiwan in 1958 explained that “Hong Kong’s Chinese society is purely a commercial 
one. These permanent residents are almost all merchants or the sons and grandsons of merchants. Their main 
goal is accumulating capital, generating commerce, and amassing personal or family fortunes—to the point 
where they usually do not have the time for scientific or cultural development.” Ma Hongshu and Chen 
Zhemning, Xianggang Iluagiao Fiaoyu (Chinese Education In Hong Kong; Taipei: Haiwai Chubanshe, 1958), 5. 
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Hong Kong were incapable of any meaningful political representation, but generally 
considered the Chinese more “civilized” than many of the British Empire’s other nonwhite 
subjects. Likewise, these Chinese often saw themselves as members of a worldwide 
community of overseas Chinese who were financially and culturally superior to many other 
Asians. 
              In prewar Hong Kong, a Chinese resident who wished to progress politically could 
choose one of several paths. One was to become an unofficial justice of the peace, a member 
of the District Watch Committee or the Urban Council, or a director of the Tung Wah 
Hospital or a similar association. 138  The primary responsibility of the District Watch 
Committee, a body of some 120 Chinese constables and detectives maintained by private 
subscription and controlled by a committee of fifteen Chinese residents under the 
chairmanship of the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, was patrolling certain Chinese districts. 
Because of its institutionalized linkage to the government, the District Watch Committee 
quickly became even more powerful than the Tung Wah Hospital139 Committee. It enjoyed 
legal status and, unlike those of the Tung Wah Hospital, its members were appointed rather 
than elected, and were later included in the Civil Service List. District Watch members served 
                                                 
138 In 1946, it was decided that the District Watch system was out of date. The force now consists of fifty District 
Watchmen who are paid by the government to perform certain duties for the Chinese Secretariat that would 
otherwise be performed by the regular police force. In 1941, the members of the District Watch Committee were 
the Secretary for Chinese Affairs (Chairman), Sir Shouson Chow, Sir Robert Kotewall, Li Po-kwai, Ts’o See-
wan, Chau Tsun-nin, Lo Man-kam, Wong Ping-sun, Tam Woon-tong, Dr Li Shu-fan, William Ngartsee Thomas 
Tam, Li Jowson, Li Tse-Fong, Samuel Macomber Churn, Ngau Shing-kwan. In 1941, the members of the Tung 
Wah Hospital Advisory Board were the Secretary for Chinese Affairs, Sir Robert Kotewall, Lo Man-kam, Dr Li 
Shu-fan, Sir Robert Ho Tung, Ts’o Seen-wan, Li Po-kwai, Chau Tsun-nin,Wong Ping-sun, Tang Shiu-kin, Chau 
Shiu-ng, Lo Min-nun, and Yeung Wing-hong. The Po Leung Kuk (Society for the Protection of Virtue, i.e., for 
the protection of women and girls) was another key Chinese association. In 1941, the directors were the 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs (President), Sir Robert Kotewall, Lo Man-kam, Dr Li Shu-fan, William Ngartsee 
Thomas Tam, Li Po-kwai, Au Lim-chuen, Tam Woon-tong, Ts’o Seen-wan, Sit Robert Ho Tung, Chau Tsun-nin, 
and Tang Shiu-kin. Finally, in 1941 the Chinese members of the Urban Council in 1941 were Dr. Chau Sik-nin, 
Tang Shiu-kin, and Li Tse-Fong. Dr Chau was elected and the others were appointed members. See Hong Kong 
Civil Service List for 1941,(Hong Kong: The Government printer, 1941). 
139 The Tung Wah, a charitable association founded in 1870 with prominent Chinese as its directors, was mainly 
engaged in caring for the sick, but later assumed an advisory role and was consulted by the government.  
 68
for five years and were almost always reappointed, occasionally up to four terms, while Tung 
Wah members were appointed for only one year.  
By the early twentieth century, the District Watch had grown from an informal police 
force to an institutionalized advisory council frequently consulted by the colonial government 
to assist in the formulation of labour and trade policies and the resolution of labour and trade 
concerns, as it was during the tram boycott of 1912 to 1913 and the strike-boycott of 1925 to 
1926. Such development led political scientist Lennox Mills to conclude in 1942 that “in 
reality, the Committee is the Chinese Executive Council of Hong Kong and is consulted on all 
matters affecting them”.140 The Urban Council enjoyed a similar development, evolving from 
the Sanitary Board that had been established in 1883. With the introduction of elections in 
1887, the Board became a type of municipal council concerned primarily with the main-
tenance of public health. In 1936, the Board was replaced by the Urban Council, which was 
composed of eight unofficial members, three of whom were Chinese, who were nominated by 
the Governor. A wealthy Chinese whose income did not derive from the practice of one of the 
professions or who lacked inherited or landed wealth would often seek to be admitted to one 
or all of these associations in order to, together with a display of public munificence, enhance 
his status. 
It is important to note that a Chinese had to “buy” into various social positions by 
displays of munificence and participation in a wide range of charitable and welfare 
organizations known to the Chinese community in Hong Kong. In other words, to achieve 
high status, a Chinese had to prove himself by supporting public works. For example, in 1925 
Sir Robert Ho Tung (1862-1956), a millionaire before he was thirty, donated HK$50,000 to 
the University of Hong Kong and another HK$50,000 to the University Endowment Fund. In 
1931, he donated HK$200,000 to the Industrial School for boys at Aberdeen. In 1936, he 
                                                 
140 Carroll Lennox A. Mills, British Rule in Eastern Asia: A Study of Governnnent and Economic Development in 
British Malaya and Hong Kong (London: Oxford University Press, 1942), 398. 
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donated HK$50,000 to buy an airplane marking the fiftieth birthday of Chiang Kai-shek, and 
in 1945 donated HK$1,000,000 to the University of Hong Kong. Despite these and many 
other benefactions, Ho Tung was never nominated to either the Legislative or Executive 
Councils for reasons that remain unclear.141 
In The Prominent Chinese in Hong Kong (1939) 142 , an example of the type of 
hagiographic writing in which several Chinese scholars indulged, Professor Woo Sing Lim 
lists in order the following Chinese: Sir Robert Ho Tung, Sir Shouson Chow, Sir Robert 
Kotewall, Dr. Tso Seen-wan, Chau Tsun-nin, Lo Man-kam, Dr Li Shu-fan, Ho Kom-tong and 
Li Yau-Tsun. It appears that he gave precedence to Ho Tung because of his position as one of 
the wealthiest and most generous men in the colony, and placed Chow second by reason of 
his great age (he was born in 1861) and his distinguished official career in Imperial China and 
holding of numerous directorships. Chow’s appointment in 1926 as the first Chinese member 
of the Executive Council shows just how well he had proved his loyalty to the government. 
Woo appeared to place Kotewall third not because of his prominence as a wealthy 
businessman and his position as the only Chinese member of the Executive Council but rather 
because of his successful career in the Government of Hong Kong. In 1916, he was appointed 
Chief Clerk of the Colonial Secretariat, at the time one of the highest positions held by a non-
European in the government, at the age of thirty-six. Thus, although Woo used wealth as a 
primary determinant of status in Hong Kong, he also considered extra-economic factors, and 
Chinese notables in Hong Kong likely did so also in their estimations of their compatriots. 
                                                 
141 See his obituary in the Far Eastern Economic Review, May 3, 1956, and references in B. Harrison, ed., 
University of Hong Kong: The First Fifty Years 1911-1961 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 1962). 
There is also a sketch of his life in Woo, Sing Lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hong Kong (Hong Kong: Five 
Continents, 1939). 
142 Woo wrote his book in Chinese but included summaries in English. He explained that the order in which he 
listed the individuals “is merely what I believe to be the most satisfactory manner of arranging them, and was 
done with no intention of being partial to anyone”. See Woo, Sing Lim, The Prominent Chinese in Hong Kong,1. 
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It can be concluded that although aware of the currents of change, prominent Hong 
Kong Chinese engaging in trade and commerce clearly realized Hong Kong’s unique position 
as a Chinese economic outpost and, having a relatively honest administration compared with 
that of their homeland, as a political haven from the ever-present political strife in China. 
Despite these advantages, the local Chinese in Hong Kong desired representation of their 
interests in political and economic matters. As the leaders of the local Chinese community in 
1941 were mostly businessmen whose wealth and status was newly acquired, it is not 
surprising that several were prepared to work with the Japanese, at least during the early years 
of the occupation—indeed, had they not had been working with the British?—to maintain the 
positions that they had just recently won by dint of diligence, strategy, and a measure of luck. 
They hoped that their cooperation with the Japanese would provide an umbrella under which 
they could continue to operate their business and other interests while assuming leadership 
within the Chinese community. 
 It is extremely difficult to determine to what extent prominent and influential Chinese 
were satisfied with the state of prewar affairs in Hong Kong, with their status, and with the 
British colonial regime in general. What does seem clear is that when a clash occurred 
between their economic and patriotic interests, the former often won.143 In 1941, Lennox 
Nulls, an American political scientist, concluded after a period of research in the British 
colonies that “the racial bitterness which has caused so much trouble in India is not found in 
                                                 
143 For example, the 1925 general strike and boycott inspired by the KMT in Canton attracted little support from 
prominent Hong Kong Chinese. Speaking in support of an ordinance introduced to make political but not 
economic strikes illegal, Sir Shouson Chow stated (apropos KMT agitators), “It is this class of mischief 
makers . . . that this Bill is designed to deal with. Hong Kong is no place for them. We do not want Bolshevism 
or Communism. We cannot afford to have the economic and financial structure of the Colony periodically 
shaken or undermined. What we want are peace and good order, and the right to follow our callings without let 
or hindrance.” Sir Robert Kotewall also supported the government on this issue, and was instrumental in 
obtaining a special loan from London for assisting foreign merchants of the colony until normal trading had 
resumed. See Hong Kong. Legislative Council. Hong Kong Hansard, 1926 (The Government printer), 36-9 and 
44-5. 
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Hong Kong. . . . Patriotic loyalty in the sense in which it is found in Britain does not exist 
save in a few instances. The vast majority are loyal because their self-interest dictates it”.144 
Moreover, there had begun to appear certain pockets of unmistakable sympathy for 
Japan within local elites in Hong Kong. The Japanese had combined their call to arms against 
the European overlords with a firm stand against revolution in traditional Asian societies, a 
strategy that appears to have won a number of adherents among the propertied Asians of 
Hong Kong. One such adherent was Lau Tit-shing, a manager of the Bank of Communica-
tions. A graduate of the Law School of Tokyo Imperial University, Lau had returned to the 
colony convinced of the need to fight the “white peril”. To promote this objective, he 
assumed office as president of an association of Hong Kong Chinese who had studied at 
universities in Japan.145  
Another adherent, Chan Lim-pak, was more interested in the social plank of the 
Japanese manifesto. This ultra-conservative member of the elites, who had made a large 
fortune as a comprador of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, first gave evidence of his 
political outlook in 1924, when he served the British—in exactly the same way that Kotewall 
and Chow were to do a year later—by organizing an armed attempt to overthrow the 
Nationalist regime in Canton. While working for the bank in Canton in the late 1920s, Chan 
developed a friendly relationship with Wang Jingwei, the future puppet leader of mainland 
China, and Isogai Rensuke, a military attaché at the Japanese consulate. In the following 
years, he seems to have reached the conclusion that a Japanese conquest of China, including 
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Tiecheng in Mandarin). 
 72
Hong Kong, offered the best protection for traditional Chinese society against the twin evils 
of Nationalism and Communism.146 
2.6 Hong Kong Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Prewar Era 
In 1921, just over 1,500 Japanese resided in Hong Kong, most petty traders but some 
of whom were representatives of such major concerns as Mitsui Bussan, an offshoot of the 
great Mitsui trading house, and the Yokohama Specie Bank. They established their own club, 
temple, hospital, hotels, primary school, and newspaper, the Honkon Nippo. In September 
1931, a clique of three Japanese colonels framed the Chinese for the bombing of a section of 
the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway to provide the Japanese Army with an excuse 
to occupy the whole of Manchuria.147  
In Hong Kong, the British rulers and local Chinese reacted to these developments in 
strikingly different ways. The majority of the local Chinese seem to have identified 
passionately with the fate of the motherland. In 1915, the Chinese community had added its 
voice to the protest that rang around China at the news of the Twenty-one Demands, and 
supported the demonstrations that broke out in Peking four years later after Japan’s wartime 
gains in southern Manchuria and Shandong had been ratified by the Allies in the peace 
settlement at Versailles.148 In 1930, a Japanese writer who had stepped into a public lavatory 
was mortified to discover that the walls (as sure a gauge, perhaps, of grassroots opinion as any) 
were covered in Chinese graffiti denouncing Japan.149 
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In September 1931, the tranquillity of Sir William Peel’s governorship was abruptly 
shattered when the populace responded to a call from the Nationalist regime in Nanking for 
all Chinese to observe a Day of Humiliation at the loss of Manchuria. For six days, the colony 
was convulsed by the worst outbreak of rioting since the Nationalist revolution twenty years 
earlier. The windows of Japanese shops were smashed, and the goods inside them looted and 
burned; Japanese ships were stoned at the waterfront, and empty boxes of fish alleged to be of 
Japanese origin were thrown into the harbour in a sort of latter-day Boston Tea Party; fifty 
Japanese homes were destroyed; angry crowds gathered outside the Japanese Club and the 
Tokyo Hotel to chase and attack isolated Japanese; and, perhaps most alarmingly, six family 
members of a Japanese gardener were murdered at an outlying villa.150 
 Although Japan’s advance in Manchuria appeared distant from British Hong Kong, the 
trouble was edging closer. In July 1937, after years of local clashes between the Japanese and 
Nationalist troops in North China, Japan plunged into an all-out invasion of the Chinese 
interior. As the China Expeditionary Force advanced down the Yangtze valley, Shanghai fell, 
followed by Nanking, the Nationalist capital, a victory celebrated by the Japanese troops with 
the massacre of an estimated 300,000 Chinese civilians and the rape of perhaps 50,000 
Chinese women. Then it was South China’s turn. In October 1938, Major-General Tanaka 
Hisakazu landed the Twenty-First Army at Bias Bay on the coast of Guangdong Province, a 
short distance northeast of the New Territories. Tanaka’s objective was not Hong Kong but 
Canton, which he duly captured after a nine-day campaign, but the war had arrived at Hong 
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Kong’s gates; had, indeed, swept through them, as the Hong Kong population swelled by the 
influx of more than half a million mainland refugees. 
The Japanese invasion of China threw the contrast between the perspectives of the 
British and Chinese communities into even sharper relief. Hong Kong now became a principal 
centre of the Chinese resistance to Japan. As the Japanese captured the mainland ports and 
Chiang Kai-shek’s government retreated to Chungking in the southwestern Province of 
Sichuan, Hong Kong started to serve as the Nationalist lifeline to the outside world. Until 
early 1939, around sixty to seventy percent of the war materials reaching the Nationalists 
from overseas came through Hong Kong, at first on the railway that ran from Kowloon to 
Canton and then, after the Japanese had cut the railway route after the fall of Canton, on 
innumerable junks.  
With a view to increasing the speed of the transport of these supplies, the Nationalists 
moved back onto the Hong Kong stage, pouring into the colony in large numbers and bringing 
with them an entire administrative infrastructure. By 1939, a total of thirty-two Nationalist 
government organs were operating in Hong Kong on what the British Foreign Office 
described as an “official” or “semi-official” basis, including the Ministries of Finance, 
Railways and Communications; the Government Purchasing Commission; the Natural 
Resources Commission of the Bureau of Foreign Trade; the National Salvation Bonds and 
Flotation Committee; the Central Trust Bureau; and, most importantly an obscure-sounding 
body called the South-West Transportation Company, which not only played the leading role 
in arms procurement but also served as a cover for an elaborate intelligence network.151  
This network was supervised by some of Chiang's toughest henchmen, notably Wu 
Tiecheng, a former Nationalist police chief and mayor of Shanghai, and Du Yuesheng (“Big-
                                                 
151 Dispatch from Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British ambassador in Shanghai, to Lord Halifax, Foreign Secretary, 
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Eared Du”), kingpin of the Shanghai underworld, who assumed the innocuous position of 
Vice-President of the Chinese Red Cross. Officers of the network monitored the activities of 
the Japanese forces in occupied regions of South China while simultaneously monitoring 
Communists and other potential opponents through an agent whom they had positioned 
among the Chinese employees of the British Special Branch. Several chief figures in the 
Nationalist regime, including as Mme Chiang Kai-shek; her brother T. V. Soong, then serving 
as Chairman of the All-China Economic Commission; and her brother-in-law H. H. Kung, 
China’s topmost financier, treated the colony as a kind of offshore shelter where they 
retreated for weeks, occasionally months, at a time.  
 The British authorities had to balance the political risk of enraging the Chinese public, 
with whom they shared a good deal of sympathy for Nationalist China’s efforts to stand up to 
Japan, by suppressing all manifestations of resistance activity with the risk of enraging the 
Japanese. Sir Geoffrey Northcote, who had succeeded Sir Andrew Caldecott as governor 
shortly after the outbreak of full-scale war, wrote to the Colonial Office that while he wished 
to avoid giving the Japanese any “legitimate ground for complaint” against his administration, 
he was, on the other hand, “anxious to do nothing which would hamper the Chinese 
authorities in the defence of their own country”. Moreover, the British wanted Hong Kong to 
remain a neutral zone in the conflict; neutrality had been formally proclaimed in September 
1938, and the overriding priority of the home government in London was preventing the 
United Kingdom from getting dragged into a war with Japan at precisely the same time it 
found itself confronted in Europe by Hitler and Mussolini. There was still, it appears, a sense 
in which a threat to the Japanese was regarded as a threat to the British also. 
After the revamping of the censorship regulations in August 1939, all Chinese 
publications were required register with the authorities. Mainland journalists began to find 
themselves summoned to tense meetings with R. A. C. North, the Secretary for Chinese 
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Affairs, who would issue lists of expressions that their papers were not to use when referring 
to the Japanese. Taboo phrases included “enemy”, “dwarf pirates”, “dwarf slaves”, “dwarf 
barbarians”, “shrimp barbarians”, “island barbarians”, “Eastern slaves”, “Japanese pirates”, 
“savage pirates”, “savage Japanese”, “bestial acts”, “bestial nature”, “bestial troops”, 
“bandits”, “shameless burning and looting”, “rape”, “plunder”, and “butchery”.152 While the 
British authorities considered their approach to the Chinese to be one of “benevolent 
neutrality”,153 mainland activists and their local supporters took the opposite view.  
Was the Chinese community in Hong Kong responsive to anti-Japanese movements? 
Were most sectors of the Chinese community interested in the fight to save China on a purely 
theoretical level, or did they manifest their philosophy in action? The actions of several 
segments of the Chinese community appear to indicate that the community as a whole did 
indeed turn theory into action. For example, the Hong Kong Chinese Women’s Club, 
established on 10 October 1938, claimed to be “entirely devoted to service directly or 
indirectly connected with the war”.154 Indeed, from the time it was founded until Hong Kong 
was occupied by the Japanese, this organization organized fund-raising and relief campaigns 
in support of the resistance, donated medical supplies and ambulances to the Red Cross 
Society of China, and distributed food and clothing to civilians and soldiers in the war zones. 
Among the other women's organizations established to provide similar relief services was the 
Hong Kong Chinese Women Soldiers Relief Association, which mounted several fundraising 
campaigns between August 1937 and March 1938 that succeeded in securing HK$62,629 for 
the purchase of hospital materials to aid wounded Chinese soldiers.155 
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The concerted efforts of the Chinese merchants and businessmen in Hong Kong, a 
powerful constituent of the Chinese community, in support of the resistance should not be 
underrated. At a meeting on 7 September 1937, the executive members of the Chinese 
Chamber of Commerce passed a resolution to establish a Hong Kong Chinese War Relief 
Association for the purpose of soliciting funds to help wounded soldiers and war refugees in 
China.156 At an extraordinary meeting on 17 September 1937, the Association decided that the 
employees of all the commercial associations and business guilds in Hong Kong should 
contribute five percent of their monthly wages to the war relief fund until the hostilities 
ceased and all business firms, regardless of size, should contribute HK$5 per month.157 In 
addition, the Association decided to organize house-to-house subscription parties for raising 
funds, all of which were to be forwarded to the Hong Kong Chamber of Commerce for 
transmission to the Nanking government.158 
On a smaller level, in August 1938 some sixty owners of fruit stalls in the Central 
District and twelve owners of vegetable stalls in Shumshuipo started a charity sale to support 
the resistance.159 Owners of other shops responded enthusiastically. This patriotic movement 
soon spread far and wide throughout Hong Kong and Kowloon, and drew supporters from all 
trades and all walks of life. Within a month's time, they had raised HK$1 million.160 The Ta 
Kung Pao gave great publicity to the whole movement. In one editorial on the subject, the 
editor stated that “the success of this movement was a good indication that the attempt to 
educate the Hong Kong Chinese with nationalism and patriotism had been enormously 
rewarded with most effective results”.161 
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Regarding the medical community, the Chinese Medical Society of the University of 
Hong Kong was established on 7 September 1937 with the aim of distributing medical 
equipment and supplies to the war zones.162 A special committee was accordingly appointed 
by the Society to undertake fundraising efforts.163 At the school level, the Chinese Youth 
Movement of Hong Kong was established on August 1937 to inspire Chinese youth to take 
action to save the nation.164 The Hong Kong Students’ Relief Association was formed by 
students from all schools to defend the country from Japanese aggression.165 The extent of the 
concern of Chinese students in Hong Kong for the fate of their nation was highlighted by a 
public rally on 31 March 1937 jointly organized by Chinese student bodies throughout the 
colony to take an oath to resist Japanese aggression and observe the same discipline as the 
patriotic youth of China. 166  This patriotic endeavour deeply touched the editors of 
newspapers and periodicals. Writing in an emotional tone rarely used, the editor of Ta Kung 
Pao hailed this voluntary action as one of “admirable fortitude and determination of Chinese 
youths in Hong Kong in a concerted bid to save the nation”.167 
In retrospect, it can be seen that during the 1930s, various sectors of the Chinese 
community in Hong Kong demonstrated an overwhelming concern for the fate of China. 
Winning the war of resistance was no longer the concern of a few dedicated people; it had 
become the concern of the entire community. As discussed in this section, the entire  
community responded to the call of both schools and the press to commit themselves by 
contributing to the cause of saving China. It is thus difficult to deny that the Chinese 
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community in Hong Kong experience an upsurge of nationalism, as defined in this 
dissertation, during the 1930s. 
Local elites undoubtedly also made handsome gestures of support for mainland 
resistance. In 1936, even before all-out combat had started, Sir Robert Ho Tung donated a 
military aircraft as a fiftieth birthday present for Chiang Kai-shek, and after combat had begun, 
his son, Major Robbie Ho Shai-lai, signed up to serve as a staff officer with the Nationalist 
command. Sir Shouson Chow sat on a committee that had been established to promote the 
sale of Nationalist government bonds, and M. K. Lo chaired another committee tasked with 
raising money for mainland relief work.  
At the same time, the elites had a good deal to gain from the colony’s continued 
neutrality. The conflict on the mainland had given a tremendous fillip to the Hong Kong 
economy. With the mainland ports occupied, around half of China’s entire foreign trade had 
begun to pass through the colony, and the millions of dollars invested by refugee mainland 
tycoons had led to dramatic growth in the colony’s Chinese-owned light industrial sector. By 
1940, it is estimated as many as 7,500 factories may have been operating in Hong Kong, still 
mostly but by no means entirely on a small scale.168 Neutrality also permitted the gentry, like 
the expatriates, to continue enjoying an agreeable lifestyle. In 1938, Dr. Li Shu-fan, for 
example, travelled to French Indochina to shoot elephant, and travelled to Canada two years 
later to bag moose.   
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2.7 Japanese Prewar Planning and Policy towards Hong Kong 
In 1936, the Japanese Chief of Staff, Prince Kanin, presented Emperor Hirohito with a 
defence plan in which Britain was formally listed, for the first time, as a potential enemy 
country. The Emperor immediately raised several concerns regarding this plan. His visit to 
Britain in the course of his 1921 world tour had left him imbued with a certain amount of 
Anglophilia, and there were still some circles in Japan in favour of re-establishing an Anglo-
Japanese Alliance. Kanin explained that the listing of Britain as a possible foe was necessary 
“in order to provide for an emergency”, citing, among other reasons, the recent British refor-
tification of Hong Kong and Singapore.169 This shift in strategic thinking was manifested the 
following year when Japan embarked on its all-out invasion of China. Despite its claim of 
neutrality, Hong Kong was a problem for Japan. Even though some authorities have 
suggested that the volume of arms and supplies that reached Chinese Nationalists through the 
colony was not very large in absolute terms,170 and even after the railway link from Kowloon 
to Canton had been severed; after Japanese aircraft had conducted incessant bombing of 
suspect Hong Kong junks; after maximum diplomatic pressure had been exerted on the 
British government; and after Hong Kong’s share of China’s military imports had shrunk to 
twenty percent, in June 1940 General Staff Headquarters in Tokyo estimated that Hong Kong 
was channelling munitions to the interior at the rate of 6,000 tons a month,171 making Hong 
Kong a desirable target of invasion to stop the inflow of arms to the mainland. Moreover, 
many top Army staff believed that Hong Kong might be the key to a settlement; if the colony 
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could be taken, they reasoned, Chiang might be induced to recognize the futility of relying on 
help from the outside and might see the advantages of coming to terms.172  
In the meantime, events in Europe were forcing reconsideration of previously adopted 
positions. In June 1940, with France and the Netherlands subdued by the Nazi blitzkrieg and 
Britain under siege, the European colonies in Southeast Asia had been left headless. Japan’s 
opportunity to put an end to European power in the region via a thrust to the South seemed to 
have arrived. Such a thrust would also enable Japan to secure access to the wealth of the 
former European colonies by merging them into a great, Japanese-managed empire—the 
Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. Despite lacking the vast natural resources of 
territories like Malaya and the Dutch East Indies, Hong Kong was still a valuable target with 
its high concentration of Chinese and Western capital. 
2.71 Japanese Preparation for the Invasion of Hong Kong 
Before 1941, a certain Colonel Suzuki Takuji had arrived in Hong Kong to assume 
overall control of the local spy network under the cover of “learning English”, at which he 
made no discernible progress.173 At the same time, Japanese “tourists” arrived to photograph 
the beautiful dockyards and hunt and fish in the neighbourhoods housing gun emplacements 
and military roads.174 Other visitors included trainee diplomats, journalists, medical missions, 
teams of “economic investigators”, and even a troop of elderly Boy Scouts.175 
To prevent its agents from appearing unduly conspicuous, Japan recruited intelligence 
agents from the long-established Japanese colony of Taiwan. Since 1932, approximately 300 
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Taiwanese had moved to Hong Kong to find work as shopkeepers, farmers, and fishermen. 
Although speaking a form of Chinese different from the Cantonese dialect prevalent in Hong 
Kong, this linguistic challenge does not seem to have hindered their ability to blend into the 
Chinese community. The British authorities made no distinction between them and the rest of 
the Chinese population, and did not require them to declare their status as Japanese nationals 
on arrival in the colony. By 1937, a small contingent of Taiwanese had quietly established 
small farms at selected points in the New Territories, where the Japanese Army arranged for 
them to be provided with radio-transmission sets.176 Within two or three years, they were 
transmitting all the data that Japan could desire. In August 1939, General Staff Headquarters 
were able to distribute to their troops a map of the Defence Installations in the Vicinity of 
Hong Kong that was on a scale of 1:25,000.177 It has been conjectured that no target in the 
entire history of warfare was ever spied out with such thoroughness as had been Hong Kong 
in the run-up to the Japanese attack.178 
At the end of 1939, the intelligence drive began to be supplemented by an equally 
massive programme of covert operations. Ultimate control of this programme was exercised 
by the Eighth Section of General Staff Headquarters, which was in charge of the Army's 
propaganda and subversion work. 179  The officer immediately responsible, however, was 
Major Okada Yoshimasa, who had been transferred from the Eighth Section to the 
intelligence and subversion staff of the China Expeditionary Force. Okada was the founder of 
what came to be known as the Asia Development Organization or Koa Kikan, which was to 
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play the leading role in Japan's penetration of British Hong Kong by mobilizing the non--
European majority population to undermine British rule from within.180 
2.72 Japanese Cooperation with Local Triads 
After establishing the Koa Kikan, Okada accordingly set about recruiting local 
adherents. One method that he used was propaganda. Since November 1938, when the 
Japanese Premier Prince Konoye had unveiled his concept of a New Order in East Asia, Japan 
had been seeking to position itself as the champion of all the Asian peoples in a grand crusade 
against Great Britain and the other European imperial powers. To begin realizing this goal, 
Okada's men began to disseminate anti-British publications in Hong Kong under cover of a 
body called the Canton Toyo Culture Research Office, with their efforts aided by an 
established Japanese community paper, the Honkon Nippo, which now appeared in both a 
Chinese and an English edition.181 However, the Koa Kikan were not disposed to rely solely 
on their powers of conversion to build up the full-scale “fifth column” that they had in mind. 
Their principal target groups were the triad societies, groups of Chinese mafia that operated in 
many parts of South China, and were estimated to have not less than 60,000 members in Hong 
Kong Island alone.182 Although the triads nursed certain grievances against the British, who 
had tried somewhat ineffectually to curb their activities, their greatest asset was that they 
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could be bought. Indeed, hired triad gangsters had played a useful role in the Japanese capture 
of Canton in October 1938. 
In January 1940, Okada dispatched a subordinate named Sakata Seisho, who had 
studied in Peking in the 1920s and had subsequently worked for the so-called “China 
Development Company”. Basing himself at the Hong Kong Hotel under the Chinese alias of 
Tian Cheng, Sakata proceeded to make contacts among triad members, who ranged from 
seamen to the hotel’s attendant population of cooks, rickshaw pullers, and “boys”. With the 
help of triad bosses and the distribution of large sums, Sakata organized two underground 
squads known as the Heaven Group and the Help Group, named after the Chinese saying 
“success comes with Heaven’s help”, whose assignment was to foment anti-British 
disturbances on Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, respectively.  
However, before Sakata could proceed any further with his plans, his Japanese-
accented Mandarin gave him away, and on 12 May he was arrested and imprisoned by the 
Hong Kong police. Despite this small setback, within two weeks Sakata had escaped with the 
help of his triad connections, then slipped across the Pearl River delta to Macao.183 Ever since 
the 21st Army had arrived in Canton in October 1938, the Japanese viewed the Portuguese 
colony as a target due to its low level of vigilance against the Japanese and its high level of 
Japanese influence; indeed, the dentist who headed their local community had the run of the 
governor’s mansion.184 In Macao, Sakata enlisted the aid of Fung Yung, a leader of the 
powerful Wo Shing Wo Triad, whom the British had deported from Hong Kong with his 
followers the previous year. The services of at least 1,000 of Wo Shing Wo’s 5,000 members 
were purchased for Japanese service, and Fung was instructed to infiltrate them back to Hong 
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Kong with the task of engaging in arson and other disruptions when the critical moment 
arose.185 
Sakata believed that these various anti-British disruptions inside the colony would 
evoke an immediate response from the outside in the form of a Chinese army of liberation. As 
preparation for this event, the Koa Kikan established two divisions of mafiosi comprising 
between 10,000 and 20,000 men. Recruited from a different set of secret societies in the 
northern Province of Henan and placed under the leadership of Xie Wenda, this irregular 
force hovered on the edge of the Pearl River delta between Canton and Macao with a fleet of 
200 junks. In April 1940, a portion of the force slipped across the delta to the county of Baoan 
on the northwestern border of the New Territories, where they seized the petrol supplies that 
continued to be smuggled out of the colony to Chiang Kai-shek. Sakata reckoned that early 
October would be the right time for them to cross the border and strike at Kowloon.186 
From the very first day of the war, the irregular “troops” were active in the refugee 
camps, where tens of thousands of vagrants were waiting for erratic handouts of rice. As a 
result of their actions, “hooligans” at a camp in the village of Kam Tin stole all the available 
rice and beheaded the European superintendent.187 By 11 December, a full-scale insurrection 
was in progress. Shortly before noon that day, the British police came under fire in the 
neighbourhood of the Police Training School, located on the inner frontier that ran between 
the New Territories and urban Kowloon. The trouble was once again ascribed to “Japanese in 
plain clothes”, but a British sub-inspector of police observed that “he did not think the 
Japanese were the attackers”.188  At different points in Kowloon, British police cars and 
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ambulances had to battle their way through crowds of hundreds or even thousands of armed 
and hostile Chinese.189  
The crowds shot, stabbed, burned, rioted, and, above all, plundered: witnesses spoke 
of gangs emptying the contents of shops into lorries as though moving house and described 
“the roar of the looting in Nathan Road”.190 No random epidemic of burglary, this was a 
carefully organized operation designed to maximize the chaos by employing looters deployed 
by the largest triad faction, the Wing On Lok, wearing white identity armbands and issuing 
safe conduct, when it pleased them, to favoured Chinese citizens. They proclaimed their 
political allegiance by yelling “Victory! Victory!” (a slogan that earned them the nickname of 
the Victory Fellows),191 and described themselves as members of the Koa Kikan. Towards 
evening, the Rising Sun flag of Japan was suddenly hoisted on the roof of the Peninsula Hotel, 
the highest point in Kowloon, after which continuous sniping began from the hotel’s upper 
floors. Some Canadian troops who had been stationed at the northeastern approach to the city 
were reported to have taken fright and laid down their arms, believing themselves to be 
caught in a Japanese pincer movement, but indeed, still no Japanese forces had yet set foot in 
Kowloon at that moment.192 
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Chapter 3 
Singapore and Hong Kong in the Aftermath of Japanese Invasion 
 
3.1 Post-Surrender Japanese Policy towards the Singaporean Chinese Community  
 Sook ching, the Chinese translation of shukusei, literally means “purification through 
purging” in Japanese.193 As such, it was an ironic description of a massacre. Although Chin 
Kee Onn first used the term in 1946, it was not commonly used in the Chinese press 
immediately after the war, and was rarely used in other texts until the 1980s.194 Likely as a 
result of the Singapore Oral History Department’s massive project on the Japanese occupation, 
the Singaporean massacre has been referred to as a sook ching since the 1980s.195 However, 
from the 1940s to the 1960s, the terms “Chinese massacre” and “identification parade 
massacre” were much more prevalent in the English and Chinese press. 
The conventional explanations regarding the decision of Yamashita and his staff to 
engage in the sook ching are that (1) they faced the problem of maintaining security with an 
weak army; (2) they wanted to establish security as quickly as possible, and (3) they feared 
that the Singaporean Chinese would do to them what the guerrillas in China had done to their 
compatriots. However, this dissertation argues that the most basic and fundamental reason 
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why the Japanese Army decided to engage in a massacre in Singapore was its desire to inflict 
severe punishment (genju shobun) on the Chinese community. 
3.11 The Watanabe Gunsei  
After Malaya, which at that time included Singapore, had been conquered and 
occupied by the Twenty-Fifth Army under Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki, military 
administrative matters were assigned to Major General Manaki Keishin, Deputy Chief of 
Staff and Chief of Military Administration. However, real command of the military 
administration was in the hands of the Deputy Chief, Colonel Watanabe Wataru, who had 
served as a political officer in China during 1930s. As Watanabe had earned his trust, General 
Yamashita granted him authority to formulate and set administrative policies.196  
Watanabe’s experience in China and belief that it was necessary to “coerce the natives 
with resolution” played significant roles in his establishment of harsh rule during the first year 
of occupation. 197  To Watanabe, any concession to self-rule, particularly in matters of 
materials and supplies, could hamper military operations. In an interview with Professor 
Akashi, Watanabe explained, 
The fundamental principle of my policy to indigenous people is to make them aware 
of their past mistakes; they must atone and cleanse themselves of the past stains. They 
must be taught to endure hardship together with the rest of the Asiatic peoples for the 
construction of a greater Asia. This nationality policy was the essence that I derived 
from ten years of my political experience in China.198  
 
 After Watanabe had joined the Twenty-Fifth Army in Saigon in late November 1941, 
he had only ten days to develop military administrative policy and select and train personnel 
for military government duties before the invasion. As a result, he had neither established 
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policy for nor assigned personnel to the military administration, a situation very different 
from that of the later invasion of Java by the Sixteenth Army in March 1942, which included 
a religious department staffed with a number of Javanese Moslems.199 By late February 1942, 
Watanabe had assumed administrative control of Singapore and had placed his Civilian Chief 
of Staff, Takase Totu, as head of the Chinese section.200  These two hardliners had just 
returned from a successful trip to Tokyo to persuade the Army General Staff that their policy 
should be to sever the ties between the Singaporean Chinese and the KMT and to suppress 
them as necessary201, a policy confirmed by an order issued on the eve of the fall of Singapore. 
Takase had made an intelligence study of the Malay and Singaporean Chinese shortly before 
the war broke out, and his recommendations were incorporated into the document “Principles 
and Policies Governing Towards the Chinese”, which was published in mid-April 1942. 
Professor Akashi argued that this document provided the framework for the Watanabe 
regime’s governance of Singapore and other parts of Malaya until March 1943.202 Incidentally, 
this basic document stated that Malaya, the Philippines, and the Dutch East Indies were to 
remain “permanent possessions of Japan”.  
The day after the military-government liaison conference had adopted the polices 
contained in the document, the British administration in Singapore surrendered and the 
Japanese renamed the city Syonan. Immediately after these events had occurred, the Second 
Field Kempeitai (the military police), under the command of Colonel Oishi Masayuki, entered 
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the city to establish security, which, for the next several days, entailed entering Chinese 
enclaves to deal with “hostile Chinese”.203  However, many such “hostile Chinese”, who 
included women and children, were rounded up for no other reason than being Chinese, some 
with the help of Taiwanese and Chinese informers, and some later executed. When senior 
Gunsei officers at headquarters located outside the city, who at that time were unaware of 
what the Kempeitai were doing, were later informed of these indiscriminatory mass arrests, 
Major General Manaki, the Gunseibucho, intervened and immediately released innocent 
women and children, informing the Kempeitai that he was acting on General Yamashita's 
directive. Although men were still detained, Manaki believed that they were to be tried in 
military court, having no knowledge of the Kempeitai's plan to execute them, which had been 
concealed from him.204 
To the Japanese administration, success in Singapore and Malaya required utilization 
of Chinese economic power as an integral part of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 
which, accordingly, first required placation and reassurance that forming a common bond 
would allow for the mutual pursuit of profit.205 However, Japanese field troops on China were 
finding that Chinese resistance, not cooperation, was the reality. Estimates for troop strength 
in 1940 indicate that about thirty-five divisions with some 1,350,000 men were unable to 
defeat the KMT and the communist troops, leading 114,426 to be killed and 229,191 
wounded in 1941 with no victory in sight.206 It was later argued that Watanabe’s hardline 
position towards the vanquished inhabitants of Malaya and Singapore was a primary cause of 
Japanese difficulty in China.207  
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As the Japanese considered the Chinese community to be the most significant 
community in Singapore,208 the guidelines prepared for Japanese forces in Southeast Asia 
struck a moderate note with regard to the Chinese living in the region: “For the present, the 
overseas Chinese shall be utilized for economic purposes but their social power shall be 
gradually checked by the application of appropriate political pressure”.209 In fact, the prewar 
Chinese were oriented towards the culture and politics of their motherland, largely ignoring 
the internal politics of Malaya and becoming involved in nationalistic activities opposing 
imperialism in China. For example, by 1930 the Singaporean Chinese had established a 
branch of the KMT and the MCP, the latter of which was believed to be an overseas branch of 
the CCP. Moreover, prewar anti-Japanese activities by Chinese residents in Malaya and 
Singapore, such as strikes and boycotts of Japanese goods in protest of Japan’s invasion of 
China in 1937, and their increased financial support of China’s war effort had led the 
Japanese to brand them dangerous enemies who needed to be controlled and punished.210  
In fact, the Japanese Twenty-Fifth Army already held strong anti-Chinese feelings, 
being well aware that the Chinese of Malaya and Singapore had strongly supported China in 
the Sino-Japanese War. Professor Akashi argued that the sook ching was conducted because 
the Twenty-Fifth Army had come directly from the China campaign, where they had faced 
great difficulty fighting Chinese troops and the CCP, especially in rural areas of mainland 
China. 211  According to Professor Akashi, “A psychological state of mind for atrocity 
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developed on the battlefield and led to the infamous purge through purification (sook ching) 
after the fall of Singapore”.212 
Japanese punishment of the Chinese population appeared even more inevitable when 
the actions of the Dalforce Volunteers greatly increased.213 During the final battles of the 
Malayan Campaign ten days before the fall of Singapore, some 4,000 local Chinese joined 
British troops to fight in the defence of Singapore. Named the Dalforce Volunteers after their 
commander, Lieutenant Colonel John D. Dalley, Director of Intelligence for the Federated 
Malay States Police Force, these volunteers fought savagely against the invading Japanese 
troops despite the overwhelming odds against them.214 Before escaping to the Netherlands 
Indies on the eve of the fall of Singapore, the Singaporean Chinese leader Tan Kah Kee had 
stated to the communist and KMT leaders of the Dalforce Volunteers,  
You do not deserve any pity because you are prepared to make a self-sacrifice, but the 
whole Chinese population in Singapore will be wiped out when the Japanese come to 
the city. The British were malicious in dispatching the untrained Chinese to the front 
when the trained British troops were withdrawn behind the lines.215 
Tan’s assessment proved tragically correct. Mamoru Shinozaki later recalled that 
Colonel Masanobu Tsuji had proposed the idea of the sook ching for the “suppression of 
hostile Chinese” in retaliation for the tenacity of the Chinese Volunteers in Dalforce. Before 
the Twenty-Fifth Army moved into Sumatra after the capture of Singapore, Colonel Tsuji 
suggested that it should carry out a sook ching to eliminate all “Chinese anti-Japanese 
element”.216  
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3.12 Severe Punishment (Genju Shobun)  
 Despite all the potential Japanese reasons engaging in the sook ching that were 
described above, the ensuing madness and carnage would not have occurred without the 
establishment of genju shobun, the administration of “severe punishment”, 217 a factor that, 
according to Professor Akashi, has been understudied, despite its importance in understanding 
how orders to capture anti-Japanese elements degenerated into the large-scale liquidation of 
innocent people. In agreement, Onishi, who blames the massacre on the monstrous concept of 
allowing ordinary soldiers to administer “severe punishment”,218 writes, 
 
According to international law, we were to treat regular enemy soldiers, if captured, as 
prisoners of war. Volunteer soldiers and people who belonged to a people's army were 
not necessarily considered POWs. Spies and rebellious elements, on the other hand, 
were absolutely not to be harmed but dealt with the military law. 
 
 Despite the fact that since the Manchurian Incident in 1931, 219  where the 
administration of so-called “severe punishment” had taken place, “severe punishment” had 
been unacceptable according to international law, it had become acceptable among the 
Japanese, mainly because it had become difficult to distinguish “good soldiers” from “bad 
elements”, regular enemy soldiers, or, later in the war, guerrilla fighters. With its acceptance, 
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the first executions of “unruly elements” began to take place “on the spot”.220 Onishi points 
out, 
 
Even with the excuse of using “severe punishment” as a last resort, it was a serious 
mistake to authorize in writing that the local troops carry out “severe punishment”. 
Although it was later revised to “with the permission of the head of superior 
commanders”, the practice of “severe punishment” by frontline troops in remote areas, 
as well as by the Military Police and the Manchukuo police, still existed. 
 
Consequently, the concept of “severe punishment” was considered to lie outside the domain 
of international law. This notion, together with Japan’s justification that the China 
conflagration was an incident and not a war, led the infliction of “severe punishment” to be 
regarded as a normal practice, not only by authorized frontline soldiers but also high-ranking 
officers in the immediate aftermath of an occupation, to secure war-time order through mop-
up operations. The most unfortunate consequence of such acceptance was the purge of Shonan, 
where even those who did not resist and were not members of the Volunteer Army or anti-
Japanese elements faced “severe punishment’”.221 
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3.13 The Sook Ching 
In short, the objectives of the sook ching in Singapore were to (1) eliminate elements 
in the Chinese population that posed a direct threat to the Japanese and (2) punish the Chinese 
for their prewar and war-time anti-Japanese resistance. Three days after the British surrender 
on 18 February 1942, the  no. 2 field Kempeitai Group, under the command of Colonel Oishi, 
launched a mass screening of the Chinese population. To do so, they established five large 
“location points” within the urban area222 and ordered males between the ages of eighteen and 
fifty to gather at several locations in the city. Some were told to bring food and water, but 
others had to spend several days in the open with no food and inadequate sanitation while 
being checked and classified. Hooded collaborators, some of them captured criminals, helped 
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identify men whose names appeared on the blacklists, and those chosen were taken for 
execution.223  
  Five categories of men were defined by General Yamashita as dangerous elements to 
be purged: communists, anti-Japanese elements, members of the Dalforce Volunteers and 
other military forces, armed personnel or those who continued to resist the Japanese, and 
those who posed a threat to public security. Apparently these instructions were too vague, for 
the Kempeitai under the Kawamura-Onishi command expanded them into the following nine 
categories: 
1. Persons who had been active in the China Relief Fund; 
2. Wealthy men who had donated generously to the Relief Fund; 
3. Adherents of Tan Kah Kee, the leader of the Nanyang National Salvation Movement; 
schoolmasters, teachers, and lawyers; 
4. Hainanese, who, according to the Japanese, were communists; 
5. China-born Chinese who came to Malaya after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War; 
6. Men with tattoos, who, according to the Japanese, were all members of secret societies; 
7. Persons who fought for the British volunteers against the Japanese; 
8. Government servants and men likely to have pro-British sympathies, such as justices of the 
peace and members of the Legislative Council; and  
9. Persons who possessed arms and tried to disturb the public safety. 
          When the “identification” actually occurred, however, it degenerated into an 
indiscriminate and arbitrary process. 224  Among those arrested were leading bankers; 
community and political leaders, such as Dr. Lim Boon Keng, the Singaporean Chinese leader; 
Lim Chong Pang, the Singaporean KMT leader; and Wong Lai Tek, the MCP Secretary-
General. These detainees were divided into several groups depending on their importance.225 
While leadership groups were kept detained for “community reorganization”, the majority of 
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the detainees were transported by lorries to rural areas for execution.226 
On 18 February, three days after the fall of Singapore, the officers of Lieutenant 
General Yamashita’s Twenty-Fifth Japanese Army received orders for a general massacre of 
the Chinese. At the 1947 War Crimes Trial concerning what the British called the “Chinese 
Massacre”, Lieutenant Colonel Hishakari Takafumi, a Japanese war correspondent at 
Yamashita’s General Headquarters, testified that orders had come from Yamashita’s 
Operations staff; Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, Chief of Planning and Operations; or 
Major Hayashi Tadahiko, Chief of Staff, to identify and execute an estimated 50,000 “anti-
Japanese” Chinese adult males.227 Although Ward concluded that Yamashita should not be 
held responsible for the atrocities, he holds him responsible “for failing to guard against 
Tsuji’s manipulation of command affairs”.228  
Major-General Kawamura Saburo, the Syonan Garrison Commander, later testified 
that on 18 February, Yamashita had ordered that his garrison army conduct a military 
mopping-up operation without delay to remove “hostile Chinese”, and thus free the army 
from concerns regarding internal security. Yamashita had been ordered to deploy his forces 
immediately to Sumatra and Burma, but was concerned that many hostile Chinese were 
hiding in the city and planning to obstruct future operations. After describing the need to 
maintain law and order in general terms to Kawamura, Yamashita told him that Suzuki, his 
Chief of Staff, would provide the details regarding the mopping-up operation.  
 When Suzuki later explained that his concrete plans included an immediate genju 
shobun (“severe disposal”) of “hostile Chinese”, Kawamura was taken aback by his use of the 
term genju shobun, which in military parlance meant execution without trial. When he sought 
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clarification of the term, Suzuki cut him off and only stated, “You may have your own opinion 
on this matter, and it has been decided by the commanding general. It is essentially a military 
mopping-up operation. See that the work is duly carried out”. 229  Despite this use of 
terminology, the three generals never expected that the sook ching would end in a massacre. 
Yamashita was aghast at the thought that the “rape of Nanking” of December 1937 would be 
repeated in Malaya. 
Oishi Masayuki, Commander of the 2nd Field Kempeitai Unit, also questioned the use 
of the term genju shobun. Although Kawamura and Oishi agreed to carry out interrogations 
with “fairness and prudence” in accordance with the rules of war, the second phase of 
interrogations that occurred over the following weeks was conducted in a slovenly fashion, 
perhaps because the Kempeitai were relatively few in number. As identifying “hostile 
Chinese” from among tens of thousands within a limited time was impossible, it was 
inevitable that untold numbers of innocent Chinese would be executed. Yamashita may be 
judged guilty of the massacre to the extent that he authorized the genju shobun of “hostile 
Chinese”, as mopping-up operations are legitimate actions according to the rules of war.230 
Although he issued the order, Yamashita was not aware of the indiscriminate way in which 
the interrogations would be conducted. As his witnessing of the looting, rape, and massacre 
that had followed Japanese action in China led him to have little trust in the behaviour of 
soldiers intoxicated with victory, Yamashita had requested that the War Ministry augment 
military police units in order to maintain strict military discipline before the siege of 
Singapore began.  
 While Yamashita Tomoyuki, the commanding General of the Twenty-Fifth Army, was 
ultimately responsible, few doubt that Chief of War Operations Colonel Tsuji Masanobu was 
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the driving force behind the purge. Due to his familiarity with the decision-making procedure 
followed by Headquarters of the Twenty-Fifth Army, Onishi was encouraged by Tsuji to 
liquidate as many Chinese males as possible, certainly more than the one hundred Onishi 
currently had in custody by the second day of the screening.231 Onishi later claimed, “I think 
that Tsuji alone could be the initiator and stubborn director of the execution of this cruel purge 
of Overseas Chinese”.232 After detailed research into the origins and channelling of the order, 
Professor Akashi argued that the final decision to execute the purge was made before the 
Japanese army entered Singapore, probably in late January as the Japanese Army on the 
outskirts of Johore Bahru was closing in on the British at the tip of the Malay peninsula, and 
rubber stamped by General Yamashita.233 After the fall of Singapore, the order entered the 
chain of command via his Chief of Staff Suzuki Tsunenori, to whom was linked Deputy Chief 
Of Staff Manaki Keishin. From them the order proceeded to General Kawamura, the newly 
appointed first Military Governor of Singapore, by then renamed Syonan. From Kawamura 
the order passed on to Colonel Oishi (not to be mistaken with Onishi), the Chief of the Second 
Field Unit of the military police.234 Powerless to object and under pressure to participate in 
the stupendous victory to which so far the military police had only been insignificant 
bystanders, Oishi began direct screening of 700,000 Chinese with only 500 military police at 
his disposal. 
In its entry for 3 March 1942, the Japanese Imperial Headquarters War Diary states, 
“Soon after the occupation, we arrested and executed about 5,000 delinquent persons as the 
first clearing”.235 Mamoru Shinozaki, a Japanese official in wartime Singapore, later stated 
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that the Kempeitai had reported that 6,000 Chinese had been killed in “the operation”.236 
Likewise, a Japanese journalist told the War Crimes trial in Singapore that he had been 
informed by Twenty-Fifth Army intelligence Chief Colonel Ichiji Sugita that 50,000 Chinese 
in Singapore were to be killed.237 A Malayan Chinese source has estimated the number of 
deaths at between 50,000 to 60,000.238 
3.14 Effects of the Sook Ching on the Singaporean Chinese Community 
 The sook ching marked an important turning point in ethnic relations in Malaya. After 
witnessing Japanese treatment of the Chinese community, many Chinese joined the ranks of 
the resistance movement, while the Malays, Indians, and other ethnic groups became 
convinced that the Chinese had lost favour with the Japanese. While these groups were not 
necessarily anti-Chinese, any cooperation, whether forced or voluntary, that they rendered to 
the Japanese could have been easily construed by the Chinese as “collaborationist” and due to 
Japanese favouritism. Such an atmosphere fostered antagonism, rivalry, favouritism, and envy 
among the ethnic groups to a heightened degree.  
The sook ching clearly demonstrated that the Twenty-Fifth Army had targeted the 
Chinese for reprisals because of their anti-Japanese activities, which they believed to have 
inflicted heavy casualties on invading troops, something which the Japanese would neither 
forget nor forgive. This style of rule by terror inevitably alienated the bulk of the Chinese 
population from the Japanese administration in Singapore. The sook ching drove hundreds of 
Chinese youths and men into the jungles to join the communist-led resistance movement, the 
Malayan People’s Anti-Japanese Army (MPAJA). The Army continued to treat the Chinese 
population with the greatest severity throughout the war, but did not repeat such large-scale 
punitive measures. 
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Chin Kee Onn argues that the sook ching demonstrated the Japanese capacity for 
savagery as well as the shallowness of Japanese understanding, both of which prevented them 
from engaging in compromise and adjustment, indispensable ingredients in proper colonial 
administration.239 Indeed, the Japanese had a supreme opportunity to win over a conquered 
people by love and fair treatment, but chose to alienate and antagonize, and, by their later 
oppressive acts, confirmed the unutterable arrogance that led them to be viewed with veiled 
disgust.240 In light of these circumstances, the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) was able to 
increase its political influence in Malaya during the war and in the postwar period. As the 
only political organization prepared to conduct an active anti-Japanese insurgency, it attracted 
widespread support among Chinese who had suffered greatly from the brutality of the 
Japanese, allowing it to establish a strong politico-military resistance movement, the MPAJA, 
in the midst of the Chinese community. Because of its large guerrilla army, the MCP became 
a major political force in postwar Malay, despite lacking support from the Malays and Indians 
who had cooperated with the Japanese.  
Even from the Japanese perspective, the sook ching was damaging, as its 
consequences followed the Japanese for the remainder of the occupation. Referring to the 
effect of the sook ching on the Gunsei, Colonel Otani Keijiro, the first police chief of the 
Malayan Gunseibu , wrote that “the massacres frightened Chinese away from Japanese and 
provided them with a ready-made justification for sympathizing with the Communist Party”, 
which posed difficult security problems. Because of the indiscriminate slaughter of the 
Chinese populace, he wrote, the Chinese thereafter remained hostile towards the Japanese, 
and even opportunists Chinese who could have made large fortunes did not cooperate. Delay 
in the recovery of industry and commerce in Malaya could well be attributed to the bloody 
incident, which discouraged many Chinese businessmen from cooperating with military 
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authorities. Arriving at the same conclusions, Ogata Shinichi, Police Chief of the Syonan 
Municipal Administration, described the sook ching as one of the most serious “stumbling 
blocks for establishing good relations between Japanese and Chinese” during the 
occupation.241 
The Japanese reign of terror had its desired effect: the Singaporean Chinese had 
become fearfully submissive and the Japanese military were vindicated for the resistance that 
they had faced in the Chinese homeland. However, it also intensified Chinese hatred and 
alarmed the Malays and Indians. In a 1966 interview with Professor Akashi, Major General 
Manaki Keishin, former chief of military administration in Malaya, described it as “the 
biggest blow in the Malay military administration”.242 In tandem with their pursuit of a policy 
of discrimination against the Chinese community, the Japanese pursued a policy of favouring 
the Malay and Indian communities. Regarding the Malay community, the Japanese 
recognized that the Malay organization Kesatuan Muda Melayu had lent assistance to the 
Japanese in their invasion of Malaya and that budding Malay nationalism could be used to 
their advantage by directing it against the British and the Chinese. The Japanese even made 
some futile attempts to help the Malays realize the economic advantages of cooperation. 
Regarding the Indian community, the Japanese attempted to use Indian nationalism against 
the British by allowing the Indians to establish the headquarters of the Indian Independence 
League, the Indian National Army (INA), and the Provisional Government of Free India in 
Singapore until the decisive defeat of the INA at Imphal. Although spared from the massacres 
and economic hardship to which the Chinese had been subjected, the Malays and Indians 
turned against the Japanese during the latter period of the occupation after being subjected to 
milder forms of Japanese violence and economic blackmail. 
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242 Ibid., 69. 
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3.2 The Period of Anarchy in Hong Kong243 
Unlike that in Singapore, the Chinese community in Hong Kong was spared being 
subjected to a sook ching. However, in the immediate aftermath of its surrender, the colony 
sank into chaos, and even a period of anarchy. From the Japanese point of view, the outbreak 
of rape, looting, and lawlessness had an important effect: it made the local Chinese elites in 
Hong Kong become desperately anxious to collaborate with the Japanese to obtain 
concessions for the Chinese population and limit Japanese excesses. The price that the local 
Chinese ultimately paid for obtaining a measure of stability and law and order was the 
accusation of collaboration. 
3.21 Collaboration between the Japanese and Local Triads 
The British collapse of Hong Kong Island, as had that of Kowloon two weeks earlier, 
was followed by a strange interregnum of almost twenty-four hours. Chinese sources believe 
this period to have been the Twenty-Third Army’s “payment” to the triads in return for their 
contribution to sabotaging the British defence (refer to section 2.7).244 From Christmas night 
                                                 
243 The major authoritative sources for the military history of the Hong Kong campaign are 
1. S. W. Kirby, The War against Japan: Official History of the Second World War, Vol. I (London: H.M.S.O., 
1957-61), 107-56. Appendix 6 gives the Japanese order of battle. 
2. Major-General C.M. Maltby’s “Despatch,” Supplement to the London Gazette, January 29, 1948. 
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4. C. P. Stacey, Official History of the Canadian Army in the Second World War: Six Tears of War (Ottawa: 
Cloutier, 1955), 437-91, 590-4.  
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in the Battle for Hong Kong, December 1941 (Hong Kong: Lawspeed, 1953). 
244 See H. L. Mars, letter to Churchill, September 28, 1942, CO 129 590/25, 15-16. For the corresponding 
episode in Kowloon, see Sa, Xianggang Lunxian Riji, 177. Mars claims that the fifth columnists were allowed a 
full three days for plunder, but the twenty-four-hour period indicated by Sa seems to accord better with the 
accounts given elsewhere of the movements of the Japanese troops. 
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until the afternoon of Boxing Day, the victorious Japanese forces remained at a standstill 
while the triads rampaged, picking the European houses clean. Phyllis Harrop, a former 
police aide, later described how after returning to her flat, she “had never seen anything like 
the completeness of the looting”.245 In the Chinese quarters, bands of gangsters advanced 
from house to house demanding protection money.  
The so-called “Day of the Triads” culminated in an orgy of pillage punctuated by 
episodes of rape, arson, and murder, with fresh fighting breaking out after a Cantonese gang 
began battling a rival gang from the adjacent coastal Province of Fujian for the spoils.246 Paul 
Tsui, then a student at the University of Hong Kong, remembers, 
I was actually lodging in my sister’s place at Mosque Street, near Robinson Road. We 
could see looters carrying all sorts of items continuously, like ants, coming down the 
Peak. The looting started at that time when all the mansions up at the Peak were 
evacuated because the houses were not occupied: everybody just helped 
themselves.247  
When the first Japanese army lorries rolled down Queen's Road Central and the first Japanese 
sentries were deployed at the intersections, the British and Chinese communities may have 
                                                 
245 As Lady May Ride described, “on 8 December 1941, I was on my way to Bowen Road as a volunteer nurse, 
when the Japanese planes came over. I was walking along Pok Fu Lam Road to catch the bus, and, luckily for me, 
an army truck pulled up and took me to the hospital. I never went home again until 1945, when the war was over. 
When I did go home again, I found everything had been looted. I had lost everything I treasured, which was of 
no value to anyone else.” Harrop, Hong Kong Incident, 118. 
246 Sa, Xianggang Lunxian Riji, 140. 
247 Accoridng to Tsui, the dead lying in the streets would receive no respect; a corpse was a corpse and his 
clothes could be put to use to keep the cold and hungry warm. An unnamed Chinese spectator recalls, “I looked 
out of my veranda this morning and I saw the body of a man slumped in a heap in the middle of the road, right in 
front of our house. The street was full of pedestrians, many of whom would come cover and take a look at the 
body, to see if it was anyone they knew. One man walked off with the dead man’s woollen hat. Another 
absconded with his shoes and yet another stripped the body of its overcoat. Suddenly a man stepped forward 
from the crowd. He must have recognized the dead man because he carried the body to the side of the road. Then 
he hurriedly scribbled characters on a slip of paper which he placed on the body and then weighed it down with 
two stones. The paper read: ‘The body will be privately collected’. This was done because the man realized the 
Japanese collection van might come and remove it”. See Birch and Cole, The Captive Years, chapter 2. 
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viewed their conquerors with a degree of relief—one that they found sadly misplaced when 
they were subjected to the subsequent actions of the Japanese forces.248  
At an Imperial conference in Tokyo on 5 November, one month before the great 
southward offensive, instructions had been issued that the forces dispatched to the South 
should conduct themselves in an appropriate manner. The campaign was to be an historic one, 
for the liberation of the downtrodden peoples of Asia: the eyes of the world would be 
watching, and the excesses committed by the Japanese soldiers on the Chinese mainland 
should not be repeated. The essence of these instructions appears to have been conveyed to 
the chiefs of the Twenty-Third Army, and from them to the regimental officers. Major-
General Sano, the commander of the Thirty-Eighth Division, is said to have ordered his 
regiments to treat any British and other Allied prisoners whom they might take in Hong Kong 
with humanity and justice. A particular effort was to be made to spare the Indian auxiliaries 
who had been obliged to fight on the British side249 and, in accordance with the pan-Asiatic 
ideals of the expedition, all due concern was to be shown for the lives and possessions of the 
mass of Chinese civilians. Indeed, a studied attempt was made to show favour to the Chinese 
civilian populace, manifested in a “reassurance proclamation” declaring, ‘We protect Chinese 
property. The war in Hong Kong is a war against the Whites”,250 which had been signed by 
Lieutenant-General Sakai and posted in the Kowloon streets on the first morning of the 
conquest. 
                                                 
248 See Tang Hai, “Xianggaug Lunxianji”, 231; Wong Lin, “Xin Xianggang De Toushi” in Xin Dong Ya, (Hong 
Kong: Ta Tung Press, 1942) vol. 1, no. 1, August 1942, 66; Sa, Xianggang Lunxian Riji, 124. Of these three 
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249 Testimony of Captain Ushiyama Yukio, Kempeitai Commander for the Western District, trial of Major Shoji 
Toshishige, WO 235/1015, 17-8; report of William Poy, CO 129 590/25, 78. Poy claimed to have been informed 
after the surrender by his Japanese captors that the Imperial troops had been ordered to kill all the white soldiers 
but spare the Indians. For a similar account of Japanese policy in Malaya, see Fujiwara, F Kikan, 40-1. 
250 Quoted in Tang Hai, “Xianggaug Lunxianji”,245; Di Chen, “ Huiyizhong De Yi Nian” in Xin Dong Ya, vol. 1, 
no. 5, December 1942, 72. 
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 Clearly, these fine, chivalrous precepts were not successfully communicated by the 
officers to the rank and file, as following events demonstrated. On 28 December, Lieutenant-
General Sakai and Major-General Sano led a march of two thousand troops through the centre 
of Victoria to commemorate the most spectacular Japanese triumph over a European power 
since the defeat of Tsarist Russia in 1905. After the conclusion of the march, the conquering 
forces were granted a three-day “holiday”, in accordance with Army tradition, during which 
the troops, most of whom came from rural areas of a largely undeveloped nation, greedily 
helped themselves to all the material comforts that Hong Kong had to offer. As had the triads, 
they plundered, but with a narrower focus, being especially keen to lay their hands on up-
market Western consumer goods. Several soldiers were seen sporting Rolex watches that they 
wore up to the elbow, while one sentry deployed near the Peak was even observed to be 
wearing an elegant lady's mink coat.  
When finished with looting, they began they drinking, and, after becoming well 
primed with liquor, set off to take whatever liberties that they pleased with the local civilians. 
Over ten thousand Chinese women, from those in their early teens to their sixties, are reported 
to have been raped or gang-raped.251 While only Chinese women faced the risk of rape, all 
Chinese faced the prospect of death. When a band of troops discovered a plump and 
prosperous Buddhist sitting unclad in an armchair , whirling a prayer disc in the confidence 
that his religion would save him from harm, the sight of his naked paunch aroused a sadistic 
instinct that inspired them to slice him open with their bayonets in a kind of enforced hara-
kiri. 252  Despite such sadism, when observed objectively, the sack of Hong Kong was a 
relatively minor affair compared with the sook ching in Singapore, with killings in the 
                                                 
251 Li, Hong Kong Surgeon, 11. 
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hundreds rather than the tens of thousands. Nonetheless, it was, in the phrase of one British 
eyewitness, “a taste of Nanking”.253 
 Sakai, conqueror of Jinan, had been at the forefront of Nanking, as had his officers. It 
appears that their perception of the Chinese masses as less than human had not weakened 
over the ensuring years. The Chinese, left in a condition of abject terror, huddled in their 
apartments while the Twenty-Third Army made merry during their three-day rampage. Dr Li 
Shu-fan graphically described the pillaging of Hong Kong: 
Throughout the three-day celebration, Japanese soldiers strolled up and down the 
streets of the city, stopping cars and commanding the drivers to take them for joy rides. 
They seized whatever they wanted from stores, especially from the wine and clothing 
shops, sometimes tossing a few military notes on the counter in any quantity they 
liked. If a store was locked they broke in and helped themselves freely. On the night 
after Christmas I looked into the Shan Kwang hotel windows across the road from the 
hospital and saw Japanese soldiers dining, singing, drinking and dancing with one 
another. Parties like this swelled to orgies throughout Hong Kong. It seemed as though 
the soldiers had been specifically given licence to commit any act they wished. Their 
first thought was to put wine in their bellies, then they set out for excitement and 
mischief under the pretext of searching for arms or suspects. They broke into house 
after house at the point of a gun. Once in, they slapped, kicked, murdered, stole and 
raped. Throughout the night we heard people wailing and crying in the distance, “Save 
life, save life”, and the desperate beating of hundreds of gongs, tins and cans. The 
whole of Happy Valley rang from end to end with these pleas for help.254 
As the “holiday” drew to a close on New Year’s Eve, the Twenty-Third Army Chiefs 
finally set about implementing the guidelines that had been issued by General Staff 
                                                 
253 Wright-Nooth, Prisoner of the Turnip-Heads, 64. 
254 Birch and Cole, The Captive Years, chapter 2. 
 108
Headquarters in Tokyo three weeks earlier. The guidelines advised that their first task was 
“the restoration of order”, following by the imposition of a “strong military rule” in the 
newly occupied colony until the authorities in Tokyo had decided upon a more permanent 
form of administration. 255  On 29 December, Lieutenant-General Sakai closed down his 
combat headquarters in the Peninsula Hotel and replaced it with a military government 
office—the Gunseicho—organized into five departments for general, civil, economic, 
judicial, and maritime affairs. These departments were mostly placed under the care of the 
appropriate member of the Twenty-Third Army bureaucracy; thus, the Economics 
Department was headed by the Army's Chief Accountant and the Judicial Department was 
assigned to the officer in charge of the Army's legal section.  
By 10 January 1942, Sakai and his staff could contentedly report to their colleagues in 
the China Expeditionary Force that they were “in the process of carrying forward all 
preparations relating to the introduction of military rule”.256 A notice issued on the day of the 
Guseicho’s establishment declared: 
The Japanese Army seized Hong Kong with the object of sweeping out British and 
American influence from the Far East and establishing a New Order in East Asia, 
freeing the races of East Asia. The Japanese Army assumes responsibility for the 
protection of the lives and property of the Chinese people and they must resume their 
businesses, fearlessly placing their confidence in the Japanese Army.257 
                                                 
255Boeicho, Honkon-Chosha Sakusen, 327. 
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257 A second notice issued at the same time stated that the Hong Kong Government was now under the protection 
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Once again, however, a gulf became apparent between the proclaimed Army policy 
and the reality on the streets of Hong Kong. On 21 January, Sa Kongliao, a mainland Chinese 
journalist who had been stranded in the colony by the invasion, remarked in his diary that in 
spite of the imposition of military rule, “the disorder in the society had not only not been 
alleviated but was evidently growing still more profound”.258 Chaos would continue to rage 
unabated throughout the eight weeks in which the Gunseicho remained in charge. 
This dissertation argues that the Twenty-Third Army Chiefs operating the Gunseicho 
deliberately abetted this chaos due to their belief that several weeks of turmoil would 
persuade the bulk of the colony’s local elites and masses to not only submit to the Japanese 
but also collaborate with them.259 Three events supports this argument. First,  significant 
collaboration occurred between the triads and the Japanese. Principal violators of order, the 
triads were also, paradoxically, the great last-ditch source of order at this time of universal 
confusion when all other structures had broken down. In exchange for protection money paid 
by local householders, the triads organized a network of vigilante groups that, going by the 
name of the Street Guards, were the sole perceptible force that appeared to control petty 
crime in urban neighbourhoods. They erected bamboo barricades at the ends of the sidestreets 
that could be closed at night to fend off would-be burglars; they captured small-time looters 
and pickpockets, hung placards round their necks, and tied them to posts for the edification of 
passersby.260 The Gunseicho had little choice, for the moment, but to accept and encourage 
these poachers turned gamekeepers.  
                                                 
258 Sa, Xianggang Lunxian Riji, 190. 
259 See Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?, 6, 43. 
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To keep peace in the neighbourhoods, the Japanese sought the help of a number of 
triad leaders as well as that of Zhang Zilian, the Shanghai triad boss who had rescued the 
British the previous month. 261  They arranged for the Street Guards to be registered; 
dispatched a senior officer to inspect one of their headquarters in the Wanchai district; and 
established a permanent link with the triads in the form of a lieutenant by the name of 
Miyahisa Denichin, who had grown up in Taiwan, spoke two Chinese dialects, and went by 
the Chinese alias Li Zhiting.  
In return for their services the triads naturally exacted a price. At some point in the 
early days of the takeover, Miyahisa was approached by a certain Lam Moon, a Red Pole or 
high-ranking officer of the Fook Yee Hing Triad, who was eager to win permission for his 
organization to operate a chain of gambling dens. After Miyahisa gave his quiet consent, 
about ten establishments were duly set up in Sheung Wan towards the western end of Hong 
Kong Island. Similar approaches were then made to Miyahisa by the bosses of a series of 
envious rival gangs, and once again consent was forthcoming.262 The result, for a time, was 
to turn much of urban Hong Kong into a massive casino. In every convenient spot, from 
Queen's Road to the dingiest side-streets, the triad chieftains set up gambling joints. At the 
gambling tables that blocked the path of the traffic, the triad bosses displayed the names of 
their long-banned outfits and hoisted the Rising Sun flag as proof of the Gunseicho's blessing 
for their actions.263 
Second, in the countryside, the Gunseicho were also obliged to entrust much of the 
policing to the Chinese partisans of the puppet Wang Jingwei regime. Groups of these 
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partisans had been left behind to take charge when the Twenty-Third Army had moved into 
Kowloon one month earlier. Several accounts from the early weeks of 1942 testify to the 
presence of Wang Jingwei policemen equipped with white armbands and sticks and to the 
clashes that broke out in the Saikung District between the Wang Jingwei units and the rural 
brigands.264 One Parsee merchant who left Hong Kong at the end of January stated flatly that 
the New Territories were being controlled by “Wang Jingwei henchmen”.265 
Third, the Gunseicho supplemented the efforts of these auxiliaries with their own 
more drastic crime-busting techniques. One Chinese source remarked how in order to put a 
stop to the crime wave, the Twenty-Third Army “chopped off a few hundred heads a day for 
some time after their entry”,266 and a similar picture was given by a number of British 
eyewitnesses. On New Year's Day 1942, Phyllis Harrop walked past a former playing field 
piled high with the corpses of Chinese who had been bayoneted or shot by “supposed looters, 
we were told”.267 Gordon King, Dean of the Faculty of Medicine at Hong Kong University, 
reported seeing six Chinese looters being lined up against the wall on Ice House Street and 
“beaten to death one after the other by Japanese soldiers with heavy bamboo poles”.268 
Thanks to such measures, the Gunseicho slowly began to get the upper hand in the battle 
against local lawlessness. However, the remedy soon proved worse than the disease. 
3.22 Response of the Hong Kong Elites to the Japanese Military Administration 
Widespread feelings of betrayal and disgust regarding the looting were very cleverly 
exploited by the Japanese in their efforts to enlist Chinese cooperation in the control of Hong 
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Kong. Perhaps the best expression of the feelings of the Hong Kong elites appeared in a very 
bitter editorial published in the Japanese-controlled Hong Kong News of 14 January 1942: 
Today the British and Americans have a much greater respect for the Oriental soldier, 
for in Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines the outcome has been the same: the 
vaunted supermen of the white race have melted like butter… . In eighteen days of 
conflict it was all over—a horrible muddle of inefficiency and helplessness which has 
bequeathed a miserable aftermath.269 
It now appears obvious that Hong Kong was subjected to this unnecessarily prolonged 
period of anarchy as a “technique of control” to force the Chinese population to a realization 
of their position and that they would have to accept Japanese domination, as well as that their 
leaders would have to cooperate with the Japanese to obtain even the most basic essentials. 
The looting and rape had been exacerbated by the flight of many wealthy Chinese , which 
had left the community without shops or commercial services, and even those who remained 
could do no business because their stores had been sealed and their stocks confiscated. 
Professional men and leaders of integrity faded into the masses or slipped away. Food was 
very difficult to procure, and the small denominations of Hong Kong notes known to be of 
any value had largely vanished as the result of hoarding. 
Meanwhile, the special treatment accorded certain Hong Kong citizens and elites had 
begun having the intended effects. The first concrete evidence that the Chinese community 
had had enough of anarchy was a long petition drawn up by the Executive Committee of the 
Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, comprised of nineteen members under the 
chairmanship of Tung Chungwei. Under British rule, the Chamber had represented the 
wealthiest and most influential of the Chinese traders in the colony, and Tung, a typical 
traditional businessman, was its treasurer and a member of its executive committee. Perhaps 
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because of a latent hostility to foreigners or as a result of some earlier connection with the 
Japanese, Tung was one of the first, if not the most important, of the Hong Kong Chinese 
who, having grown fat on British favour, turned with unction to the Japanese. However, it 
must not be forgotten that the situation deliberately created by the Japanese was so intolerable 
and that if Tung had not come forward, someone else would have had to. 
The petition, formally presented to the Japanese military on 10 January after fifteen 
days of lawlessness, covered nine essential services in which the disruption of supplies 
gravely endangered the community: food, fuel, water, electricity, telephones, public safety, 
currency, communications, and prostitution. The last of these was regarded by the city fathers 
as one of the most important, as they calculated that as long as the brothels remained closed, 
the Japanese soldiery would demand the services of family women as their “flower girls”.270 
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“worked over” them. Later, as evidenced by a penalty of three-months imprisonment under military law for 
soldiers against whom charges of rape could be proved to the satisfaction of their superiors, there seems to have 
been some desire on the part of the authorities to lessen the evil, if not to eliminate it. There are, however, fairly 
well-authenticated cases as late as the latter part of August 1942. A Chinese man who left Hong Kong in the fall 
of 1942 reports that at that time the once-dreaded appellation “flower girl” had come to be more commonly used 
by the Japanese soldiers as a somewhat sheepish form of approach to Chinese girls rather than as a signal that 
they were about to rape them. It is believed that by that time some of the more attractive of the younger Chinese 
women had “accepted” the “protection” of particular Japanese men, preferring that form of servitude to the 
continual risk of rape and consequent disease.The Japanese seemed unable, in the eyes of Chinese, to distinguish 
between “good” girls (family girls) and prostitutes. One of the first statements issued by the Executive 
Committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce on 13 January 1942 demanded “protection for family women 
through the re-opening of brothels”. The Japanese complied by establishing special red-light districts, one in 
West Point for the Chinese and another in Wanchai for the Japanese. Segregated areas, euphemistically named 
“pleasure resorts”, were also established in Kowloon to which the same apartheid principles applied. On 16 
November 1942, Chan Lim-pak of the Chinese Representative Council announced that the Japanese were 
considering allowing a business syndicate to run such a centre in Shamshuipo (Kowloon). There was of course 
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3.23 Initial Dynamics between the Japanese and Hong Kong Elites  
After the Japanese had allowed the chaos to continue for a period sufficient to ensure 
at least a minimum of Chinese cooperation, they began the restoration of order by pursuing 
the revival of selected aspects of the community while imposing upon each the forms of 
control most likely to bind it to their purposes. One of their first steps after their entry into the 
colony was to corral all Chinese leaders of the Hong Kong community who could be found, 
together with any Chinese of national importance, as quickly as possible. These men were 
usually taken to one or another of the large hotels, although some kept incommunicado in 
their own homes, and subjected to every sort of pressure and every kind of appeal to enlist 
their “voluntary” support for the objectives of Japan in Asia. 
 The Japanese were more successful with Hong Kong residents of lesser stature. On 10 
January 1942, 133 Chinese described in the Japanese-controlled press as “former Chinese 
Justices of the Peace and other distinguished leaders representing all sections of Chinese 
society”, were brought together at a luncheon in the Peninsula Hotel hosted by Lieutenant 
General Takashi Sakai, Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese forces in South China and 
Commander of the army that had taken Hong Kong. In his speech to the assembled Chinese, 
General Sakai stated that the brave troops that he led had driven out “the evil forces of the 
British”. They had not been fighting the Chinese of Hong Kong, for whom he had the deepest 
sympathy and whom he hoped would understand the object of co-prosperity for all the races 
of Great East Asia. He described the British Colonial Administration as concerned with only 
its own profit, not caring about the life or death of the Chinese people, using “Chinese 
Volunteers, Canadians and Indians in the front line” while English soldiers “were hiding in 
the hills”; indeed, investigation of the casualty lists “showed mostly colored troops with very 
few Englishmen among them”. Describing the Japanese and the Chinese, including the many 
                                                                                                                                                        
money in vice, and the motives of some members of the two Chinese councils in agitating for the re-opening of 
the brothels were not entirely moralistic. 
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Chinese “in all the islands of South East Asia”, as belonging to the same Great East Asian 
race, he expressed his hope that all would “‘join in the establishment of a Greater East Asia”. 
Finally, he stressed that he would spare no effort to make Hong Kong and Kowloon a place 
“where people may reside in peace”, and asked his guests to form a local assistance 
committee in which to exert all their strength to help him. 
Replying on the behalf of the Chinese community in Hong Kong and as spokesman of 
those Chinese present, Sir Robert Kotewall stated that they had all been very pleased to 
receive the invitation of the supreme commander of the Imperial Japanese Forces in South 
China and strongly agreed with all that he had stated: 
The object of Imperial Japan is to release the races of East Asia. We know that the 
Japanese Army has avoided harming the people of Hong Kong or destroying the city. 
We are very grateful to you for this. . . . Japan and China have the same literature and 
are of the same people. As regards the maintenance of order and reconstruction, we 
will put out all our strength in Hong Kong to co-operate with the Japanese Army 
authorities, and we will ask all the Chinese people to arise and unite that strength, so 
that they may achieve your objectives of permitting people to dwell in peace and carry 
on their business so that all may recover prosperity. . . . We thank the Emperor of 
Japan and may he live forever.271  
Speaking after Kotewall, Sir Shouson Chow stated that he agreed “heartily” with all “Mr. 
Law Kuk-wo” had said.272 
                                                 
271 Hong Kong News, January 11, 1942. 
272 Ibid. In December 1941, Sir Robert Ho Tung celebrated his sixtieth (“diamond”) wedding anniversary. It was 
the largest private function ever held in the celebrated restaurant of the Hong Kong Hotel, which was known to 
expatriates by the mysterious sobriquet “The Gripps”. British Governor Young attended, as did General Maltby. 
When Ho Tung left for Macao two days later, it was variously explained that he was convalescing after the party; 
that he was returning the courtesy of the Portuguese governor, who had also been present; or that he was settling 
some philanthropic matters. The truth was that he had received a friendly tip-off from the Japanese consul, 
Kimura Shiroshichi. 
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Sakai then proceeded to provide a rough outline of his program for the reconstruction 
of Hong Kong. His first priority was the restoration of order, which he would provide via 
employment of the military authorities as well as reemployment of the Chinese police in order 
to “avoid inconvenience”, and suggested that his guests organize their own self-protection 
guards under the direction of these officials. His second priority was stabilizing the currency, 
describing it as the “blood of business” and stating that he had appointed people to address the 
matter. Regarding his third priority, the relief of business, he expressed the hope that his 
guests would “get together and help in settling the fuel and rice problems” and “devise 
methods for this, and apply to the Administration for permission to carry them out”. 
Regarding his fourth priority, a return to employment, he advised, “You should help in 
advising all classes of people to return to their employment at an early date”, and regarding 
the cleanup of the city, his last priority, he requested that they advise community leaders to 
start establishing order in their neighbourhoods to help the authorities restore sanitary 
measures.273 
                                                 
273Hong Kong News, January 11, 1942. 
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Chapter 4 
Dynamics between the Japanese and Elites in Singapore and Hong Kong 
 
4.1 The Overseas Chinese Association in Singapore 
The local elites of the prewar Chinese communities in Malaya and Singapore 
consisted of the main officials of associations representing merchants, petty traders, or 
artisans; English-educated professionals who served in the State Legislative Councils; and the 
leaders of various voluntary organizations. These individuals could be further divided into 
China-born and Chinese-educated leaders and Straits-born and English-educated leaders. The 
businessmen or towkay held high social status and influence within the Chinese communities 
as men of wealth, while English-educated professionals were politically influential in Chinese 
mediations with the British administration.  
Both groups of Chinese leaders were involved in the anti-Japanese movement that 
developed after the Japanese Army invaded northern China in 1937. When the Japanese 
attack on Malaya began, these groups threw their weight behind the British war effort and 
mobilized the Chinese community to fight the common enemy of the fatherland. When the 
fall of Singapore was imminent, several Chinese leaders sought refuge in India, Thailand, or 
Indonesia because their anti-Japanese record made them fear for their lives. While most who 
remained behind in Malaya were arrested and tortured, most escaped the massacre of Chinese 
after the fall of Singapore, assisted by the fact that the Japanese extended pardon to several 
leaders as a carefully considered tactic that became evident when all surviving Chinese 
leaders later emerged as heads of Japanese-sponsored organizations in Singapore. 
While the Kempeitai was mopping up and ferreting out undesirable Chinese, 
Watanabe and his Gunsei staff moved to downtown Syonan and set up Fullerton Building as 
Gunseibu headquarters. Until the Gunseibu could assume overall command, the Kempeitai 
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remained in command of the city's security and the restoration of order. The city had not yet 
recovered from the shock of the defeat, and remained in a chaotic state that did not permit the 
resumption of business operations. Because the city's economic life largely depended upon 
the Chinese community, obtaining the cooperation of Chinese was vital to restoring the 
economy. However, the Japanese could not initially locate any Chinese leaders who could 
help restore the paralyzed economy, as most were in hiding or detained by the Kempeitai, and 
no Chinese yet dared to be spokesman for his community. Finally, the Kempeitai identified 
Dr. Lim Boon Keng,274 a prominent retired medical doctor and academic whom the Japanese 
had rescued from a firing squad,275 as a potential leader of the Chinese community. With 
threats and coaxing, the Kempeitai induced Dr. Lim to assume leadership of Chinese 
community and to organize a new Chinese association embracing all dialect groups for the 
reconstruction of Syonan.276 
4.11 Formation of the Overseas Chinese Association 
The Chinese community was able to achieve its first priority, the appeasement of its 
conquerors, primarily through the establishment of the Overseas Chinese Association 
(OCA)277 in early March 1942. According to the account of Mamoru Shinozaki,278 after Dr. 
                                                 
274 Born in 1869, Lim Boon Keng was an extremely influential figure in the Straits Chinese community. After 
earning his medical degree at Edinburgh University, he became an active in business and politics, and was a 
founding member of the Straits Chinese Chamber of Commerce in 1906, a leader of the KMT in Malaya, a key 
figure in the Straits Chinese British Association, and a member of the Straits Settlements Legislative Council. 
Between 1921 and 1937, he served as Vice-Chancellor, the substantive head, of Amoy University. One account 
says that the Japanese spotted him at a concentration centre, and that he only agreed to cooperate after they 
threatened to harm his wife. Shinozaki claims to have sought out Dr. Lim and to have secured his cooperation in 
creating the OCA as a way of saving Chinese lives. He says nothing about Dr. Lim’s wife, but mentions that his 
son was being held in a screening centre, and that Shinozaki promised to send the young man home. According 
to Yap Pheng Geck, Lim Boon Keng “was drunk most of the time during the occupation”. 
275 Watanabe Nikki, February 19, 1942. From Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 69. 
276 N.I. Low and H.M. Cheng, This Singapore: our city of dreadful night, (Singapore: City Book Store, 1947), 
33-34; Y. S. Tan, “History of the Formation of the Overseas Chinese Association and the Extortion by J.M.A. of 
$50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya,” Journal of the South Seas Society 3, no. 1 
(September 1946), 1; Osaka Mainichi, February 28, 1942. Shinozaki Mamoru, who was to become Section Chief 
of Syonan City’s Welfare Department, persuaded Dr. Lim to accept the post, and then took him under his wings. 
With the outbreak of the war, the British police arrested him as a spy but then left him alone in Changi Gaol, 
while shipping all other Japanese to Australia. 
277 Who are the “overseas Chinese”? Tsuji explained that “six hundred and fifty years ago the Mongol Emperor 
Kublai Khan, and his invading army suffered almost complete annihilation when smitten by a divine storm 
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Lim, who was about seventy years old at that time, was brought to Shinozaki after his arrest 
by the Kempeitai in late February 1942, he decided to establish an organization that came to 
be known as the OCA with Lim as its president. While Lim chose the name of the 
organization, the organization itself was the brain-child of Shinozaki and was based on his 
goal, so he claimed, of freeing Chinese leaders who had been arrested. 
As Shinozaki later recalled, Lim did not accept the proposal readily, only deciding to 
do so only after he learned that the Chinese would be in great danger should he refuse:  
At first he [Dr. Lim] kept saying he could not do it. But later he asked what the 
Japanese would do to these people detained by the Kempeitai. I said Japanese Army 
Headquarters were very, very angry that after the Japanese had landed in Singapore, at 
the last moment, the Chinese volunteers fought against them. That was why the 
Japanese staff officers wanted to kill all Chinese people, especially those who had 
donated to Chungking and those who had been members of the Chinese volunteers. 
                                                                                                                                                        
(kamikaze) in Hakata Bay. Soon after this Kublai Khan sent an expeditionary force against what is now known 
as Java. Three hundred thousand troops, borne in a fleet of a thousand ships, landed on the north-east coast of 
Java with the object of seizing the rare treasures of South Asia, but withdrew again—thanks to the cunning of 
their enemies—with little or no booty. From about that time the Chinese began to emigrate in large numbers to 
South Asia, and gradually, rising from humble positions as clerks, errand boys or coolies, they became men of 
wealth, and by deceiving the naturally lazy natives and colluding with the British, Americans, French and Dutch, 
they increased their economic power, and today there are in this whole area some five million Chinese 
colonialists. They contribute military funds to Chungking, but most of them are either led astray by Chungking 
propaganda or are forced by terrorists, whether they wish it or not, to make those contributions. We must offer to 
these people an opportunity for self-examination and guide them over to our own side. Two points, however, 
should be noted; first, that these people, by a variety of clever schemes concerted with the European 
administrators, are steadily extorting money from the native population, and that the greater part of the natives’ 
resentment is directed against them rather than against the Europeans; and, secondly, that for the most part they 
have no racial or national consciousness, and no enthusiasms outside the making of money. Consequently you 
must realize in advance that it will be difficult, by merely urging them to an intellectual awareness of themselves 
as members of an Asian brotherhood, to enlist their cooperation in any scheme which does not promise personal 
profit. See Tsuji, Masanobu, Singapore 1941-1942: the Japanese version of the Malayan Campaign of World 
War II, (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988), 308-309. 
278 Shinozaki came to Singapore before the war as the press attaché to Japan’s consul-general. In 1940, he was 
imprisoned by the British for spying for Japan.  In 1942, when the Japanese Army occupied Singapore, he was 
freed and appointed a senior official in the Defence Headquarters. Unfortunately, some anti-Chinese members of 
the Japanese military authorities criticised Shinozaki as being pro-Chinese. When Colonel Watanabe took over as 
the Chief Military Administrator, Shinozaki was removed from his post as adviser to the OCA. He was replaced 
by Takase, who used the OCA to exploit the Chinese community. He was later credited as the “Japanese 
Schindler” for saving thousands of Chinese and Eurasians by his liberal issue of personal safety passes and the 
creation of safe havens during the Japanese occupation of Singapore. He was also instrumental as the key 
prosecution witness during the Singapore War Crimes Trial between 1946 and 1948. A book he wrote after the 
war, Syonan—My Story, continues to give invaluable insight into the Japanese occupation of Singapore. 
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They must be severely punished.279 “Aye, that means that all of us will be killed”, he 
sighed. It was then that he decided he would organize this organization. 
Obviously, Shinozaki’s words had exerted great psychological pressure on Lim, to 
whom the threat “to kill all Chinese people here” was only too real in view of the on-going 
sook ching. Having obtained Lim’s consent to head the OCA, Shinosaki drew up the rules and 
purpose of the association. 
When asked why Lim, who had been found to have a photograph of a Chungking 
military mission and a certificate of thanks from Chiang Kai-shek at the time of his arrest and 
was undoubtedly pro-Chungking, was singled out to lead a Japanese-sponsored association, 
Shinozaki replied that the Japanese military administration respected him “not so much as a 
political leader with great controlling influence” as for his being “a man of high moral 
character and education”. A more important reason was that as a leader of the Straits-born 
Chinese and former President of Amoy University, Lim was held in high esteem by both the 
Straits-born and the “alien” Chinese. Apparently, the Japanese hoped that Lim’s unique 
background would render the OCA more acceptable to both aspects of the Chinese 
community. 
            Initially, the OCA was composed of two hundred to three hundred influential Chinese 
leaders, including Lim as President, S.Q. Wong as Vice-President, Dr. Hu Tsai Kuen and 
Robert Tan Hoon Shiang as committee members, and Chan Kok Tong and Tan Yeok Seong 
(both graduates of Amoy University) as secretaries. Many had joined the OCA when released 
from detention, conceivably for reasons of security and through forms of subtle coercion. 
Although the Japanese military administration distrusted the China-born or “alien” Chinese 
for their prewar anti-Japanese activities, and despised the Straits-born for being “de-
Sinicized”, their distrust and contempt were not expressed in discrimination against either 
                                                 
279Ibid. chapter 4. 
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group, manifested in its equal treatment of all Chinese and representation of all dialect groups 
on the OCA Council, as shown in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.1: Members of the OCA Council280 
Chinese Group Councillors 
Straits-born  Lim Boon Keng, Robert Tan Hoon Siang, Lim Kian Beng 
Hokkien  Lu Tien Poh, Tan Eng Khiam,  
   Lee Choon Seng, Ng Kian Teck, 
   Chua Swee Oh, Li Qinglong 
Cantonese  S.Q.Wong, Ching Kee Sun, Lo Seng Tuek 
Teochew  Lee Wee Nam, Yeo Chan Boon, Tan Seik Kew 
Hakka   Lin Xi Ban, Hu Tsai Kuen 
Hainanese  Guo Xin, Lim Siow Chong 
 
Contrary to their declared intention to weed out all Chinese who had been active in 
prewar anti-Japanese activities, the Japanese military administration tolerated many who were 
OCA members, such as Councillors Ching Kee Sun, Lee Choon Seng, and Tan Eng Khiam, 
all of whom had held official posts in various China relief organizations. The Japanese 
apparently chose to spare their lives for utilitarian reasons, as these Chinese leaders, many 
wealthy and influential merchants, could be used to mobilize Chinese resources and keep 
Chinese activities under supervision. There is little doubt that the OCA was a carefully 
considered tactic of the Japanese military administration. 
                                                 
280 Chan Pek Kwan (Ch’en Pi jun), a younger sister of K.C. Chan (Ch’en Chi-tsu), was married to Wang Ching 
wei, President of the pro-Japanese Nanjing Government in China. One of his brothers, Ch’en Yaotsu, was 
Governor of Kwangtung Province until his assassination in April 1944, and another brother, Ch’en Ch’ang-tsu, 
was Chief Director of the Nanjing Government’s Aviation Department, while a nephew, Chan Kwok Kheong 
(Ch’en Kuo-ch’iang), held a senior position in Kwangtung Province. See the Penang Shimbun, December 29, 
1942 and  April 20, 1944. See Hara, Fujio, “The Japanese Occupation of Malaya and the Chinese Community”, 
in  Paul H. Kratoska (ed), Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese occupation, (Singapore: Dept. of History, 
National University of Singapore, 1995), 68-74. 
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4.12 Characteristics of the Overseas Chinese Association 
The OCA had several notable characteristics. First, the size of each dialect group in 
the OCA was proportionate to that of its size in the Chinese community. Second, most of the 
members were businessmen, which was not only reflective of the domination of merchants in 
Chinese society in Singapore but also their motives for joining the association. The fact that 
many Chinese businessmen established friendly relations with the Japanese military 
administration in order to obtain business permits or “good citizen passes” that would save 
them from harassment lends credence to this supposition.  
Another feature of the OCA membership was that most members were mostly middle-
aged or older; indeed, those under thirty and those holding “working-class” positions (e.g., 
clerks or shop-assistants) constituted only 11% and 4% of the membership, respectively. The 
low proportion of these two groups could be explained by two factors: the lack of interest on 
the part of the Japanese military administration in recruiting people of little influence and the 
unpopularity of the OCA among the Chinese community at large, which was inclined to 
condemn active leaders of the OCA, rightly or wrongly, as “collaborators”. The unpopularity 
of the OCA and its leaders was to have a long-term impact on postwar Chinese political 
leadership. 
As previously discussed, the most prominent feeling of the Chinese regarding the 
Japanese military administration was initially fear. To appease the Japanese as well as their 
fear of them, the OCA organized a wide range of activities, including the following: 
1. Celebrating the birthdays of the Japanese Emperor and Empress, for which even Chinese 
women were mobilized; 
2. Entertaining newly arrived employees of the Japanese military administration; 
3. Sending donations collected from the different dialect sections of the Chinese 
community to wounded Japanese soldiers; 
4. Holding Japanese language classes; 
5. Declaring support for all Japanese policies; 
6. Making pledges of political loyalty to the Japanese military administration; 
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7. Organizing processions, mobilizing large numbers of Chinese, and building triumphal 
arches in the city to commemorate the fall of Singapore. In 1943, 1,000 Chinese 
representing all sections of the community participated in the celebration, while 25,000 
people representing all ethnic groups participated in such processions in 1944; and  
8. Entertaining injured Japanese soldiers in military and naval hospitals with songs and 
dances by the women’s section of the OCA. 
 
 
4.13 Perspectives of the Japanese towards the Overseas Chinese Association 
Regarding how the Japanese military viewed the activities of the OCA, Shinozaki 
commented, “On the surface, the simple soldiers thought the Chinese people were now 
cooperating with the Japanese. That was the general feeling”. However, such a comment is 
too simplistic to be convincing. The Japanese military administration was certainly not the 
naïve and complacent on-lookers of OCA activities that Shinozaki seemed to imply they had 
been. It is hardly conceivable that an administration shrewd enough to question the sincerity 
of the Chinese in making a $50 million “gift” could have been easily taken in by such 
manifestations of loyalty. Even if the “simple soldiers” were indeed generally credulous of 
Chinese loyalty, such a feeling did not prevent them from treating the Chinese less harshly. 
There was no indication of mitigated Kempeitai terror or other signs of reduced military 
administration harshness towards the Chinese after the OCA was formed and became active. 
Far from viewing the OCA with complacency, the Japanese military administration 
actively utilized it as an instrument for the exploitation of local manpower and material 
resources. When the Japanese were in need of local labour, the OCA promptly responded, no 
doubt on Japanese instructions, by organizing a Labour Service Corps comprised of Chinese 
engaged in “non-essential” commercial services (e.g., waiters, salesmen, telephone and 
elevator operators, park and theatre employees, cooks, tailors, and hawkers). By August 1944, 
the OCA had mobilized 15,000 Chinese from among 20,000 local recruits for the Corps. In 
November, the OCA was ordered to launch an campaign recruit Chinese into the police force. 
By the end of the occupation, the Chinese had entered into police service, partly as a result of 
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this OCA effort, although how many were mobilized by the OCA is not known. Apart from 
collecting S$1 million for the Japanese military administration in 1942, the OCA was ordered 
to make a S$100,000 contribution for the purchase of a fighter plane to “atone” for their past 
“sin” of making similar contributions to Chungking. The burden of its cost, like that of all 
material and monetary contributions, was borne by the Chinese in the OCA in accordance to 
their financial strength, often with the Hokkiens bearing the heaviest load. 
So heavily reliant was the Japanese military administration on the knowledge, 
expertise, and efficiency of the OCA, as the OCA conducted such activities as researching the 
local economic situation and collecting scrap metal for the Japanese war industry, that in 1945 
Shinozaki recommended it be made responsible for mobilizing local people for the defence of 
Singapore, while the Japanese military administration would provide the financial assistance. 
However, this recommendation was ultimately never realized.  
Shinozaki ignored this interdependency between the OCA and the Japanese military 
administration when he later described the OCA as “a protecting body for the Chinese 
population” during the occupation.281 Indeed, the Japanese military administration depended 
as much on the OCA as the latter depended on the former. By serving as a form of “proof” of 
Chinese loyalty, the very existence of the OCA served the Japanese military administration as 
a form of propaganda and second, while utilization of its members’ talents allowed for the 
exploitation of local material and manpower resources. Shinozaki reflected the situation more 
truthfully when he added, “The military know that if they want anything they could go 
straight to certain Chinese leaders”.282 
4.14 Perspectives of the Chinese Community towards the Overseas Chinese Association 
Although advocating the unity of all Chinese against the Japanese, the Chinese 
involved in the resistance movement, the MPAJA, tended to regard the OCA members as 
                                                 
281 Shinozaki, Syonan—My Story, 68-80. 
282 Ibid., 83-4. 
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collaborators and, thus, enemies. A large number of young Chinese who refused to cooperate 
with the Japanese joined the MPAJA, in which they learned to regard the older leaders in the 
OCA as “traitors” and “collaborators”. Although they joined at an average age of nineteen, 
these young Chinese rapidly matured politically. As the resistance movement gradually 
gained strength within the Chinese community, local leaders who had become identified as 
spokesmen and apologists of the Japanese administration lost the prestige that they had 
enjoyed before the war. While it was known that many OCA leaders had initially been 
coerced into joining the association, their continued cooperation with the Japanese eventually 
cost them their credibility, and, as they became more closely identified with Japanese 
repressive measures, their lives.283 In only a few exceptional cases was there any cooperation 
between the MPAJA and the OCA at the local level. The MPAJA rationale for later killing 
OCA officials cannot readily be traced to their prewar political affiliation with the KMT or 
their status as “capitalists” but rather their role as “collaborators”.284  
However, this dissertation argues that although the aim of the OCA was clearly to 
marshal Chinese support for and cooperation with the Japanese regime, the OCA also acted as 
a shield for the protection of prewar Chinese leaders and their supporters. The OCA never 
became a political organization, as did the India Independence League, nor did the Japanese 
military administration make any attempt to link the OCA with the pro-Japanese government 
of Wang Ching-wei in Nanking. Therefore, although it is important not to overlook the 
collaboration of the OCA with the Japanese military administration, it is equally unfair to 
condemn the OCA as nothing more than a collaborationist organization. Indeed, by acting as 
                                                 
283 In Syonan—My Story, Shinozaki cites two instances of the MPAJA assassination of OCA officials at the 
Japanese-sponsored settlement at Endau (Johor). In Malaya Upside Down (106-7), Chin reveals how some local 
OCA officials were caught in a conflict of loyalties between the MPAJA and the Japanese authorities. 
284 With the exception of the KMT guerrillas along the Thai-Malay border, whom they regarded as bandits, the 
MCP and MPAJA tended to avoid political rivalry and the pursuit of class struggle among the Chinese, 
preferring instead to encourage Chinese of all classes to unify in the face of a common Japanese oppression. See 
Cheah Boon Kheng, “The Social Impact of the Japanese Occupation of Malaya (1942-1945)” in Southeast Asia 
under Japanese Occupation. 
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the primary intermediary between the Japanese and the Chinese, the OCA benefited the 
Chinese community by reducing direct Japanese interference in its daily life. Because the 
OCA was responsible for carrying out the orders of the Japanese military administration, it 
could somewhat cushion the harshness of the administration, which also benefitted the 
Japanese military administration from an administrative point of view. Moreover, the OCA 
played a significant role in helping to alleviate the economic hardship of the Chinese and 
sometimes that of the other communities, as is discussed in the following chapter. In the final 
analysis, while it was undeniably controlled and directed by the Japanese military 
administration, the OCA assumed the role of not only meeting the military needs of the 
Japanese but also assisting the Chinese community in Singapore. 
 
4.2 The 50 Million Dollar “Gift”  
On February 27, Dr. Lim was asked to go to Goh Loo Club, a meeting place for 
members of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the China Relief Fund. There he met 
several wealthy Chinese who had also been released from detention, including Wee Twee 
Kim, a Gunseibu interpreter and liaison between the military authorities and the Chinese 
community. After conveying a threatening message from the military authorities to the 
assembled Chinese leaders, Wee Twee Kim coaxed his frightened audience into framing 
proposals for cooperation to be presented to Colonel Oishi.285 
Meanwhile, the Gunseibu had begun to assume administrative control of Syonan and 
Malaya. Having prepared a study on the Nanyang Chinese for the Army General Staff before 
the war,286 Takase, the official in charge of Chinese affairs, spelled out his plans regarding the 
                                                 
285 Low and Cheng, This Singapore, 35; Tan, “History of the Formation of the Overseas Chinese Association and 
the Extortion by J.M.A. of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya,” 2. Wee Twee Kim 
posed as a friend and protector of the China-born Chinese. 
286 Interview with Takase, August 30, 1966. Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 
69. 
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Malayan Chinese in the “Principles and Policies Governing Towards the Chinese”,287 the 
document detailing the treatment of the Chinese from March 1942 to March 1943, a period 
referred to as “theWatanabe Gunsei”. Several of these principles and polices are notable. First, 
the Gunseibu was to adopt no measure that would ingratiate them with the Chinese simply for 
the sake of winning their support, as the Chinese would take advantage of any generous 
measure.288 Watanabe was opposed to so-called “positive inducement measures” for winning 
the hearts of the Chinese, in contrast to the Japanese pacification policy adopted in mainland 
China. Therefore, Watanabe had agreed with the Kempeitai’s initial mopping-up of hostile 
Chinese , as evidenced by the document’s statement that the hostile Chinese would “not be 
recognized” and its order to rely on “extremely severe measures”, such as property 
confiscation and deportation, to deal with recalcitrant Chinese. On the other hand, the 
Gunseibu promised “peaceful and comfortable existence” for those who would “pledge 
whole-hearted cooperation with Japan”. 
Second, recognizing the military’s “dependence upon their [Chinese] ability and 
experience for the delivery of war material and the flow of ordinary necessities”, the 
Gunseibu was prepared to refrain from interfering in details of Chinese business operations 
and allowing them to pursue these operations on their own “initiative”. The document 
explained, “The profits accruing from these activities will ensure a great source of future 
revenue . . . thus lightening Japan’s burden in the construction of the Southern area”. To 
achieve its goal of full utilization of Chinese commercial talents, the Gunseibu set itself 
against “the expediency of oppressing and rejecting the Chinese from participation in capital 
investment, industrial development, and acquisition of resources in anticipation of favouring 
                                                 
287 Dai Nijugo-Gun Gunseibu, Kakyo Kosaku Jisshi Yoryo, April 19, 1942. Marked “Secret”. Quoted in Akashi, 
“Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 69-70. An English translation of the document appears in 
Benda,  Japanese Military Administration, 178-81. 
288 The same idea was recorded in Watanabe Memoirs, 27-9, 36. Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the 
Malayan Chinese”, 70. 
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inroads by Japanese”. At the same time, the Chinese were not to be treated differently but 
“simply as Chinese in the same manner as other ethnic groups”, despite their superiority to the 
Malays and Indians in the financial and commercial spheres. 
Third, the Gunseibu hoped to utilize the “formidable” Chinese influence and position 
in Asia in the destruction of the Chiang Kai-shek regime and the settlement of the Sino-
Japanese War by making the five million Nanyang Chinese “a basic driving force in Japan's 
major policy”. Fourth, the Gunseibu demanded that the Chinese raise a minimum of $50 
million for its administrative funds. This idea had originated with His Holiness Otani Kozui, 
the spiritual head of the Higashi Buddhist Sect, with whom Watanabe had conferred in 
November 1941.289 The idea became attractive to Watanabe when the SEA command ordered 
him to “raise the money locally for paying military administrative expenses. 290  Another 
justification for the $50 million “gift” was that as the most anti-Japanese group, having 
staunchly supported Chiang Kai-shek and Britain, the Chinese deserved to be punished,291 as 
well as be provided with an opportunity to “atone” for their past sins against Imperial Japan. 
According to Takase, Premier Tojo Hideki was pleased with the idea when he informed him 
of it.292 This “gift” from Chinese community served as one of the principal sources of revenue 
for the military government during the first three months after the fall of Singapore.293 
                                                 
289 Interview with Watanabe, July 9, 1966. Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 
70. Otani drafted postwar plans for the administration of Malaya for Watanabe in “Draft Plans for the 
Disposition of the Malay Peninsula”. In this draft, however, he makes no mention of extorting money from 
Chinese communities. See Otani Kozui, Marei Hanto Zengo Shori Hoan, n.d. Marked “Secret”. 
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During the first week of March, the Gunseibu summoned the OCA to Watanabe's 
office, where they met Watanabe and Takase.294 After Takase condemned past Chinese anti-
Japanese and subversive activities, he asked “What have you got to say?” When Lu Tien Poh, 
the spokesman of the Chinese delegation, replied that they had come to pledge their support to 
the Gunseibu, Takase demanded to know what they meant by “pledge support”. Lu replied, 
“We mean that those of us who have money, give money. Those who have strength, give 
strength”. Scarcely had Lu finished when Takase angrily retorted, “All your money and even 
your lives are at our disposal. . . . Go home and think over how you are going to redeem the 
crimes of the Chinese community”. The Chinese visitors meekly left the office. 
When the Chinese representatives paid another respectful call upon Takase the 
following day, they told him that would place all their wealth and lives at the Gunseibu 's 
disposal. Pleased with the offer, Takase promised them that he would inform his superiors of 
the offer, and demanded to know how they would make good on their offer. On the following 
day, the Chinese leaders returned to the Gunseibu to inform Takase that they would present 
one half of the wealth of Chinese community to the Gunseibu and keep the other half in trust 
for the Gunseibu, a plan that greatly pleased Takase.   
After several days passed without word from Takase, tension mounted in the Chinese 
community, heightened by ominous reports of the sook ching in Johore and by arrests of 
wealthy Chinese merchants at the Gob Loo Club. Finally, much to their relief, word came 
from Takase that Watanabe would receive Chinese delegates at his residence in Nassim Road. 
At the meeting, Takase once again roundly denounced the past crimes of the Chinese against 
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Japan, but then described himself as a Confucian who had highest regard for benevolence, 
justice, and moral virtues, and even lied that he had “rushed to Malaya to save the Chinese”. 
Now presenting himself as the benevolent saviour of the Chinese, Takase “suggested” that the 
Chinese community offer $50 to $60 million in cash, and he would prevail upon a higher 
official to accept the gift in exchange for the release of expropriated Chinese property and the 
protection of Chinese lives.295  The hapless Chinese leaders accepted his suggestion with 
gratitude. 
Despite a report in the Shonan Times that the Chinese in Syonan-Malaya were 
“enthusiastically contributing donations to the Nipponese administration as a gesture of their 
loyalty and sincerity in co-operating with [the] Nipponese government”, 296  progress in 
collecting the money was so slow that by April 20, the deadline set by the Gunseibu , far less 
than the required amount had been collected.297 An angry Takase summoned the Chinese 
community leaders to berate them before ordering them to redouble their efforts to meet the 
next deadline of May 20. The Chinese, however, were once again hardly able to raise one-
third of the required amount when the extended deadline arrived. Takase again summoned the 
Chinese leaders and accused them of lying about their promise to raise the money, pointing 
out that they made the “voluntary” offer of $50 million, but nevertheless agreed to extend the 
final deadline to June 25. The OCA then established sub-committees according to dialect 
(Straits born, Hokkien, Teochieu, Cantonese, Hakka, Hailam, and North China) and, to ensure 
fairness, assigned the examination of properties belonging to one group to another (e.g., 
Teochieu properties were examined by the Hailam sub-committee, Hailam properties by the 
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Hokkien, and so on). Any Chinese with property worth more than S$3,000 was expected to 
donate eight percent of the value of that property.  
In Kelantan, the OCA imposed a levy on businessmen and went from door to door 
demanding donations from individual households. It required each leading Chinese 
businessman to contribute an amount equal to five to twelve percent of his total property and  
shopkeepers to contribute an amount equal to five to twelve percent of their inventory. At the 
family level, each family was required to contribute a “head-tax” of about S$3 per member. 
This levy was also extended to employees and servants employed by firms, guilds and 
companies. Although there was much duplication in payment, there was no means of 
redressing this problem.298 
Growing desperate with the last deadline fast approaching, the OCA sent out an appeal 
to those who had not yet contributed in the Shonan Times: 
Notice is hereby given that those who have not paid up their contributions MUST DO 
SO IMMEDIATELY and those who have omitted to send in their “RETURNS” must 
do so before the end of this month. Failure to comply with either of these two requests 
will incur a penalty at double the rate fixed by the Association. Any information 
leading to the detection of evasion will be treated as strictly confidential and will be 
suitably rewarded. 299 
Despite this appeal, the OCA had only been able to raise $28 million by late June, part 
of which was in gold articles and rubber. OCA leaders trembled at the thought of facing 
Takase’s wrath. However, having realized that further harassment would not produce the 
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desired effect and needing to save face for himself and the Gunseibu , Takase agreed with 
Wee Twee Kim’s suggestion that the Yokohama Specie Bank make a loan to the Chinese to 
make up the balance of the $50 million. On 25 June 1942, the OCA presented $50 million to 
General Yamashita in a solemn ceremony.300 
4.21 Japanese Responses to the $50 Million “Gift”  
How did the Japanese respond to the life-redeeming “gift” presented by the Chinese? 
They were clearly sufficiently shrewd to realize that it was presented to placate them, as 
reflected in an editorial in the Shonan Times: 
The Malayan Chinese have presented $50,000,000 to our government. . . . They have 
called it a gift—a voluntary gift. . . . If the payment of this $50,000,000 is merely 
“syrup” to placate our government . . . then the gift takes the form of a bribe. But, if it 
is a sign of the sincere regret felt by the local people for anti-Nippon activity, that is, a 
gesture of real repentance, then it is a gift. . . . But the giving of money is not enough 
as proof of atonement. True atonement cannot be expressed in terms of money, it must 
be expressed in terms of service, of complete cooperation. What is required now is a 
reorganization of the different committees into a strong body of people able to exert 
full control over the people and to bring pressure to bear upon to bring about a full 
measure of cooperation.301 
By such language, the Japanese military administration made clear that monetary contribution 
alone was insufficient to win Japanese hearts. 
Some officers in the Army Ministry did not like the way that Watanabe and Takase 
had collected the money and questioned the merit of such a discriminatory measure against 
the Chinese, fearing their alienation. They argued that $50 million was somewhat out of 
proportion and would upset their own plans for making the indigenous people share the cost 
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of defence within the Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.302 In reply, Watanabe insisted 
that $50 million was not an exorbitant demand because the Chinese had offered “voluntarily 
to donate a half of their wealth”. This contribution, Watanabe assured them, would not derail 
the Army Ministry's plan for making all native peoples share the burden of national defence 
expenditures.303 
However, disagreement then arose between Tokyo and Syonan regarding the specific 
use of the $50 million. While both agreed in late March on its general use as the Gunseibu’s 
reserve fund,304 the Army Ministry demanded to know exactly how the $50 million was to be 
dispensed. The Gunseibu subsequently produced an itemized list of allocations, which the 
Army Vice Minister approved on 22 May.305 According to the Gunseibu’s plan, the $50 
million was to be spent for the following purposes: (1) $15 million as a deposit in the national 
treasury; (2) $5 million as Gunsei supplementary funding for providing refugee relief and 
fulfilling other civil administrative matters during the first three-month period; (3) $3 million 
for conducting research into nationalities, culture, industry, economy, and other basic areas; 
(4) $10 million for the reconstruction of roads, harbour facilities, and bridges; (5) $3 million 
for the establishment and maintenance of a special school for training youths to participate in 
the construction of the southern area; (6) $10 million for funding floating “reconstruction 
bonds”; and (7) $4 million for the reopening of banks. 
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The $50 million “gift” was a logical outcome of the Watanabe Gunsei. Watanabe 
strongly maintained, as previously discussed, that the Chinese should be treated with 
resolution until they showed signs of repentance for their past crimes against Japan and of 
their willingness to engage in wholehearted cooperation. Years after the war, Watanabe still 
maintained, “I induced the Chinese to lay down their lives and offer their wealth to Japan. 
Only after they had demonstrated a genuine penitence was I prepared to save their lives and 
return their property”.306 Takase likewise insisted that what he did was right, describing the 
$50 million contribution as neither a form of extortion nor “an outright confiscation of 
Chinese wealth” but rather a sort of taxation in return for Chinese lives and the release of 
seized Chinese property. He concluded that the Chinese also received benefits from the $50 
million because the Gunseibu dedicated a large portion to increasing the well-being of all 
people, including the Chinese.307   
Watanabe’s claim that the $50 million gift was a short-term means of slowing 
inflation and preventing a financial crisis in the first few months of the Gunsei may be correct. 
As part of a long-term policy, however, the incident, together with the sook ching, was a 
blunder; indeed, appearing to the Chinese as extortion and a ransom, it came to be known as 
the most ignominious affair in the history of the Japanese Malayan Gunsei. The most severe 
criticism came from Colonel Otani, the Gunseibu Police Chief, who argued, “All anti-
Japanese feelings of the Chinese found their source in the sook ching and the $50 million gift. 
It gave the Communist guerrillas a propaganda windfall, contributing to their anti-Japanese 
solidarity and legitimatized for the Chinese their resistance”. Singling out the Chinese for 
suppression served, Otani averred, no purpose for the Gunsei, but planted the seeds of 
revenge in the Chinese; not only did it turn the Chinese away from the Gunsei authorities but 
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also stirred up a deep uncertainty in the Indian and Eurasian minority communities, who 
wondered if they would be the next targets of reprisal and wrath.  
Ultimately, the $50 million gift did not enable the Chinese to purchase freedom from 
future suppression. As General Yamashita warned at the acceptance ceremony, the donation 
“in no way redeemed the previous act of the Malayan Chinese in having supported Britain 
and Chungking”.308 Notwithstanding their repeated declarations of loyalty and cooperation 
with the Gunsei authorities, the Japanese continued to believe the Chinese to be anti-Japanese 
at heart, and their cooperation a passive one at best. Reflecting the mood of the Gunseibu, The 
Shonan Times upbraided local Chinese community leaders for having failed to carry out their 
duties:  
Law and order amongst the Chinese is far from satisfactory and . . . trade business and 
industry are nowhere near normalcy. . . . The law courts, which are now functioning, 
seem to deal with cases of food-profiteering and crimes committed, in a very large 
majority of cases, by Chinese. . . [who must] to put an end to the present 
unsatisfactory state of affairs . . . [and suppress] Communist slum rats.309  
By the application of ceaseless pressure interspersed with occasional magnanimity, the 
Gunseibuto induced the Chinese into active cooperation, without which the recovery of the 
Malayan economy would have been impossible. 
4.3 The Fujimura Gunsei 
While the General Staff and the Twenty-Fifth Army Gunseibu maintained their 
hardline policy, a voice of moderation for the Chinese slowly began to be heard at SEA 
Headquarters and in Tokyo. Captain Tarora and Lieutenant Colonel Otsuki of the SEA 
command advocated a lenient policy for the Nanyang Chinese, as did Lieutenant Colonel 
Takase of the General Staff, who recommended in his report to the First Bureau that the 
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present repressive policy towards the Chinese be gradually modified.310 Finally, pressure 
came from the CEA. Lieutenant Colonel Okada Yoshimasa's Koa Kikan urged Central 
Command in Tokyo to use the leading Chinese whom they had captured to induce the 
Nanyang Chinese to cooperate with Japan, and possibly even bring Chiang Kai-shek and 
Wang Ching-wei to the negotiation table.311 
It was under such circumstances, accompanied by the pressure of the deteriorating war 
situation, that the Army Ministry and the General Staff collided over the question of 
jurisdictional authority in the occupied southern region, more specifically on the question of 
modifying the current hardline policy. Concerned that the hardline policy would be 
detrimental to the implementation of the Co-Prosperity policy, the Army Ministry, headed by 
Premier General Tojo, tried to voice to the Gunsei administration their opinion that the 
Gunsei grip be relaxed for political effect, which was largely within the sphere of the General 
Staff. The General Staff, however, refused to relinquish its jurisdictional authority, and 
countered with the argument that the present hardline policy should be maintained to fulfil 
military operations.  
As a result of this wrangling, an Army Ministry-General Staff conference held in 
October failed to adopt the “Guiding Principle of Nationalities”, on which the General Staff 
had been working for the past several months.312 However, by the time a Gunsei conference 
met on 12 October, the Army Ministry and the General Staff appeared to have reached a 
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compromise. The General Staff prepared a new document, “Principles for the Administration 
of the Occupied Southern Region According to Local Area”,313 that established that each 
theatre command would formulate its own administrative policy according to specific local 
needs.314 
As policy implementation was left to the judgement of local chief executive 
administrators, the situation in Malaya remained unchanged. Watanabe continued pursuing 
his hardline policy. At a military administrators' conference in November, General Saito 
Yaheita, who succeeded Yamashita, and Watanabe reaffirmed their policy of applying 
ceaseless political pressure on the Chinese and of curbing Chinese social participation while 
utilizing their economic capabilities.315 However, the case for moderation, which had been 
prevailing in Tokyo and Syonan for some time, left Watanabe isolated. He had already been 
forced to send home his supporters partly as a result of the pressure exerted by opponents 
advocating moderation, and his Gunsei policy had come under increasing attack from civilian 
quarters espousing a moderate policy. Watanabe’s wish to be relieved of his post was soon 
granted. When reassigned to a new post in Tokyo in mid-March, he left Syonan to Major 
General Fujimura Masuzo with a mixture of relief and disgust.316  
The changing Japanese attitude towards the Chinese was also reflected in the role of 
the OCA during the latter part of the war. Notwithstanding the “considerate attitude of the 
Nippon Military Administration towards the overseas Chinese” in permitting remittances,317 
the Chinese showed no overt enthusiasm for cooperating with the Gunseikambu, remaining 
passive and, in many cases, rendering assistance to the Chinese-dominated communist 
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guerrillas who had been operating after the fall of Singapore. Despite the successful 
extermination of Chinese communist leaders at Batu Caves in Selangor on 1 September 1942, 
communist harassment continued, creating security problems in the countryside. The Gunsei 
authorities held the Chinese as a whole responsible for the situation, as demonstrated in a 
November 1942 Gunsei police report: 
It is unlikely that the Chinese will renounce over-night their anti-Japanese sentiments 
that had been inculcated into their minds for such a long time. They do not like the 
Japanese occupation of Malaya. . . . Some are known to be sympathetic towards the 
outrageous Communists and are ready to cooperate with them, while a great many 
Chinese possess an ideology that is contrary to Gunsei objectives.318 
However, a moderate voice prevailed in “Principles for the Implementation of 
Security Measures”,319  in which the Gunseikambu advocated a constructive and positive 
approach to dealing with the Chinese. Specifically, the document advocated improving the 
well-being of the Chinese by (1) assuring them a minimum standard of living, (2) eliminating 
discriminatory fees, and (3) maintaining respect for their religion and customs. To achieve the 
objectives, the document proposed the following: 
1. Holding the OCA and the Chinese themselves responsible for maintaining security, 
especially for initiating a programme for pacifying crime-infested areas and 
conducting a submission campaign and welfare programme; 
2. Providing assistance to the OCA for the care of refugees and the unemployed; 
3. Stopping coercive attempts to rid the Chinese of their anti-Japanese sentiment; 
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4. Encouraging the Chinese to participate in food production and in the operations of 
medium and small enterprises; and 
5. Guiding the OCA in transforming from an organization serving individual interests 
to one dedicated to cooperation for the prosecution of the war, and providing it with 
autonomy to carry out its programme. 
As these proposals demonstrate, the repressive policies of the Watanabe Gunsei had fallen out 
of favour and been replaced by a positive programme for soliciting Chinese cooperation. 
A week after the conference of police chiefs, Fujimura convened a meeting of 
governors320 at which, due to his unfamiliarity with his new post, he repeated general Gunsei 
principles that had been laid down by the Army. In reference to the Chinese question, he told 
the governors that he wanted to “implement for the time being a magnanimous policy in order 
to promote their activities”. Later in the same conference, Kawamura Naooka, the governor of 
Perak since March 1943, which had experienced the most severe difficulty with communist 
guerrillas of perhaps all states in Malaya, presented his opinion with respect to the 
administration of the Chinese: 
The Chinese are a cancer to the maintenance of security. Therefore, the military must 
spare no mercy in extirpating the hostile Chinese. Nevertheless, there has never been a 
successful case of thorough suppression, and it is impossible to repress the Chinese 
completely. The only alternative is to win their hearts, enabling them to work with us 
for increasing production and for obtaining goods necessary for national defence.321 
For the maintenance of security, Kawamura suggested that influential Chinese be 
asked to assist in law enforcement as part of his double-edged policy for the Chinese: offering 
economic opportunities to accommodating Chinese and suppressing hostile Chinese. 
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Kawamura’s ideas were not novel, for the Gunsei authorities under Watanabe had pursued a 
similar policy. What was new was that he was the first high official to criticize Gunsei policy 
in the presence of a somubucho by admitting the futility of a policy based solely on repression. 
It is also remarkable that in discussing the Chinese question, neither Fujimura nor any 
governor mentioned the assassination of Governor Kikuchi Shinzo of Selangor,322 whom 
Chinese guerrillas had killed in an ambush while on his way to Syonan to attend the 
governors’ conference, yet another sign in a shift towards accommodation. 
4.4  Dynamics between the Japanese and Hong Kong Elites during the Early Period of 
Occupation  
4.41 Representatives of Hong Kong Elites  
In the years after 1911, the British in Hong Kong devoted some effort to fostering the 
emergence of a trustworthy local elite. The Anglicized Chinese, many of whom were wealthy 
businessmen, were the natural allies of the British for obvious reasons: like their British 
counterparts, they were extremely conservative, and thus easily alarmed by the social 
radicalism that the Nationalist revolution had brought in its wake. One such Anglicized 
Chinese businessman was Sir Shouson Chow. Born in Hong Kong in 1862, he spent his early 
career on the mainland, where he held a number of posts in the Foreign Ministry of the 
declining Manchu regime. After 1911, he withdrew to the colony and devoted himself to 
business, becoming Chairman of the Board of (among other concerns) the Bank of East Asia. 
In the early 1920s, he spoke out against the attempts to rid Hong Kong of such traditional 
Chinese customs as the use of child labour in factories and the system by which young girls 
were sold by poor families to work as unpaid servants in wealthy homes. During the crisis of 
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1925 he declared, “We do not want Bolshevism or Communism. What we want are peace and 
good order, and the right to follow our callings without let or hindrance”.323  
The talented few who were able to win positions as compradors, agents employed by 
British firms to conduct dealings with Chinese businesses for which the British lacked the 
requisite cultural and linguistic skills, were often able to amass, quite legitimately, prodigious 
fortunes. The most celebrated of these compradors was Sir Robert Ho Tung. Son of a Dutch 
(or possibly Belgian) merchant and a Chinese mother, he attended the Central School, where, 
after performing spectacularly, he became the chief comprador to Jardine Matheson at the age 
of twenty. By the time he turned thirty, he had become Hong Kong's first millionaire on the 
strength of his lucrative interventions in the sugar trade in the Philippines and the Dutch East 
Indies, and he remained the wealthiest man in the colony for decades, a plutocrat whose 
wealth was suspected to place him in the Carnegie or Rockefeller bracket.  
In the earliest years of the colony, most Eurasians had been inclined to assimilate with 
the Chinese majority. Ho Tung at first conformed to this traditional pattern, wearing Chinese 
dress,324 but when his first daughter was born in 1897, he named her Victoria Jubilee in 
honour of Queen Victoria’s Golden Jubilee. By around that date, the most successful 
Eurasians had begun to diverge from their fellows at the clerks' desks, forming themselves 
into a tightly knit, intermarrying clique and, turning away from the rise of Chinese 
nationalism, identifying with the British to whose social status they aspired. In 1915, Ho Tung 
was awarded a knighthood. Three years later, Governor May honoured Ho Tung with his 
presence at the grand Eurasian society wedding of Victoria Jubilee Ho Tung to the brilliant 
lawyer M. K. Lo (1893-1959).325 After receiving his education in England, Lo had taken First 
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Class Honours in the Solicitors’ Final Examination for practicing law in the colony. He went 
on to serve on many commissions and public committees, most notably the Salaries Com-
mission of 1947, and was the unofficial member of both the Legislative Council from 1935 to 
1949 and the Executive Council from 1946 until his death in 1959. As a keen amateur 
sportsman, Lo did much to encourage Chinese to engage in Western sport.326 During the same 
period, Eurasians began to occupy one of the two seats reserved for Chinese on the 
Legislative Council on a near-permanent basis, thus allowing them to become de facto leaders 
of the Chinese community. 
In 1923, the occupant of this Eurasian seat was Sir Robert Kotewall. While his mother 
was Chinese, he was not, in the strictest sense, Eurasian, as his father was not European but 
Parsee. His career, however, fitted admirably into the classic Eurasian mould. Born in 1880, 
educated at Queen’s College, he advanced straight from school to a post in the government 
service, where he rose from one clerical job to another until 1916, when the British awarded 
him the post of Chief Clerk in the Colonial Secretariat, an office that had never previously 
been filled by a non-European. Resigning soon afterwards to embark on a business venture, 
he was formally thanked by the government for his “efficient and trustworthy services”.327 
Like other leading Eurasians, he became quite wealthy, although his main business activity 
seems to have been a curiously humble one: he occupied himself with the import and export 
of gramophones. Unlike other leading Eurasians, he had a marked intellectual bent, having 
been described as a “fine Chinese scholar” who had published bad translations of Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                        
Legislative Council, he complained about any sign of discrimination, bombarding the government with more 
questions than the rest of the Council put together. He successfully argued for the employment of Chinese nurses 
in hospitals, but in August 1936 pressed unsuccessfully for the abolition of the one-sided censorship that had 
been imposed on the Chinese press ten years earlier. It is difficult to determine to what extent Lo was acting as 
the spokesman for a unanimous gentry opinion. 
326 For further details see Who Was Who, 1951-60. Also see Lo’ radio talk, “Progress in Sport among Chinese in 
Hong Kong”, printed in Hong Kong Centenary Commemorative Talks. 
327 Professor Woo Sing-lim, Xianggang Hua ren ming ren shi lue,(The Prominent Chinese in Hong Kong, Hong 
Kong: Wu Chou Press, 1937), 7. 
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poetry.328 In 1921, he composed the play The Maid of the Hills, his adaptation of an old 
Chinese drama, and produced it in honour of the visiting Prince of Wales the following year. 
He was made a justice of the peace in 1916, an unofficial member of the Legislative Council 
in 1923, and an unofficial member of the Executive Council in 1936. Membership of the last 
meant that Kotewall had finally arrived at the top. In between these important assignments, he 
became a member of other important organizations, including the Court and Council of Hong 
Kong University and the Executive Committee of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce.329 
Known in Chinese as gentry-merchants,330 the members of this local elite of local 
Chinese and Eurasians came to play a key intermediary role, serving as interlocutors of the 
British Secretary for Chinese Affairs and assuming positions on the District Watch 
Committee and its ten sister bodies. Appropriately, they tended to live in the Mid-Levels, the 
area halfway between the Peak, where the majority of the British resided, and the city below, 
where the masses resided. Also like the British, the local elites in Hong Kong were divided 
among themselves, with full-blooded Chinese disdainful of Eurasian “half-castes”. For 
example, Sir Shouson Chow is said to have enjoyed mocking Sir Robert Ho Tung by 
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describing himself as the only living knight of pure Chinese descent.331 Some Chinese also 
viewed the Eurasians as suspect, maintaining that they frequently spied on others for their 
British bosses.332  
4.42 Winning the Cooperation of the Hong Kong Elites 
In contrast with that in Singapore, the Japanese military administration in Hong Kong 
seemed in no hurry to re-establish the law and order that had broken down after the British 
defeat. This was primarily due to their focus on the security and welfare of their own troops, 
and may have been part of a tactic to encourage the Chinese to become cooperative, as the 
disorder harmed the Chinese civilians more than the Japanese military. On 1 January 1942, 
the Japanese established the Civil Department of the Japanese Army, generally referred to as 
the Civil Administration Department, under Major-General Yazaki, which assumed 
responsibility for protecting the lives and property of the Chinese and non-enemy aliens. 
The Japanese believed it beneficial to support local leaders, as, accustomed as they 
were to foreign domination, they might adapt to the Japanese conquest with a somewhat 
better grace than their counterparts in China proper. “Seeing that the local people have 
hitherto been under British rule”, Yazaki remarked confidently in a memorandum, “they are 
not going to put up direct resistance to Japan”;333  indeed, they may even harbour anti-
European feelings that can be translated into feelings of active goodwill for the Japanese. 
Isogai aimed to turn Hong Kong into a “model district” of China, one exhibiting the 
harmonious partnership that would come about in the future when all Chinese were prepared 
to accept Japan's hegemony. Because of its ideal geographical position, he observed some 
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months into his governorship, the colony was “the most suitable place for a movement to 
work for better understanding between China and Japan”.334 The aim in Hong Kong, Isogai 
suggested, should be to avoid relying on repression and instead to secure the “cheerful 
cooperation” of the native inhabitants. To create this model colony, the conquerors should do 
their best to preserve, where appropriate, the more positive features of the British legacy. 
Care should be taken to maintain the liberal economic policies that had enabled the old 
colonial government to attract influential Chinese to invest in Hong Kong, in particular the 
prewar British tolerance of free movement and trade. By following the established forms of 
local administration, investors would be reassured that the new administration would “avoid 
causing any precipitate change in their lives”.335  
At the same time, the new regime should take care not to give local residents the 
impression that they had merely exchanged the domination of the British for that of the 
Japanese. Measures should be introduced to restrict the arrival of immigrants from the 
Japanese homeland who might establish businesses that compete with those of local citizens. 
The Hong Kong Chinese should not be forced to immediately acquire, as had the Chinese in 
Taiwan and Korea, the language and customs of their new Japanese rulers, but should be left 
to become “imbued gradually with the culture of the Empire”.336 In his first policy statement, 
Isogai even gave the saccharine pledge that in the absence of his two lost daughters, he would 
“regard the Hong Kong Chinese as my most beloved children”, accompanied by the 
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somewhat hardline rider to his subordinates that “unless we give them more than the British 
did it will be difficult to expect ideal governing”.337 
As to emphasize the opaqueness of the prewar British administration, the conquerors 
made a point of explaining each policy that they adopted in painstaking detail through a 
system of regular press conferences. Isogai spoke to the local media at the start of each month, 
and heads of the various government departments—even Colonel Noma of the Kempeitai—
granted interviews between press meetings.338 Their most important step in obtaining public 
support was to detain prominent members of the Chinese community in their homes or in 
hotels and subject them to great pressure to engage in “voluntarily” cooperation with the new 
administration. In a document appended to their list of mainland leaders and important figures, 
the Koa Kikan had recorded the names of a number of “well-known Hong Kong Chinese 
managerial personnel of British nationality”, who were sought within days of the takeover to 
extract from them a commitment “to cooperate in the future partnership between China and 
Japan”.339 Sir Robert Kotewall and M. K. Lo were detained on 27 December and handed over 
to Okada, and a series of other leading gentry figures were delivered to the Hong Kong Hotel 
throughout the course of the following week.340 Sir Robert Ho Tung was known to have fled 
to Macao, but the Koa Kikan had hopes of retrieving him with the help of several agents 
whom they were maintaining in the Portuguese enclave.341  
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It appears that the local elites were handled with even more forbearance than the 
mainland politicians. A work report compiled by the Koa Kikan in mid-February noted that 
the organization had “imprisoned several of their representatives for a day before allowing 
them to retire to their homes”. Other sources suggest that the period of detention may have 
been longer, but it seems in no instance to have lasted for more than three days to a week. 
Once again, the preferred technique was to convince them to “have a change of heart” and to 
agree to apply their “managerial” talents to the day-to-day business of running Hong Kong.342 
By 5 January 1942, the Koa Kikan had asked seventy to eighty of the most prominent figures 
in Hong Kong society to “step forward and help in the restoration of orders”.343  
Three days later, the entire body of gentry, which included 137 former justices of the 
peace and other civic notables, were informed that they were to be treated to lunch at the 
Peninsula Hotel by the Chief of the victorious Imperial Forces, Lieutenant-General Sakai, on 
10 January. At the lunch, Sakai inveighed against the rule of the British, and, after gently 
observing that “you gentlemen happened to form a part of it”, expressed his hope that they 
would “recognize the change that had come” and would, as the “influential and wealthy 
element of the population”, do all in their power to restore order to the colony. In particular, 
he asked them to form a “local assistance committee” to address the food shortage and to 
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encourage the public to maintain order, clean up their neighbourhoods, and return to their 
jobs.344 
These appeals were backed up by a general Gunseicho attempt to redress the elites’ 
grievances, particularly regarding the molestation of “family women”. Many meetings were 
subsequently held at the Twenty-Third Army's headquarters to discuss the epidemic of rape, 
and a number of countermeasures began to unfold over the following weeks.345 Lieutenant-
General Sakai lent his support to local efforts at joint self-defence, issuing an order that as 
soon as they heard the sound of a gong, the Kempeitai should send out a squad to arrest any 
soldiers who had broken into a private home.346 From as early as the first day of the sack, 
Colonel Eguchi, the Twenty-Third Army's chief medical officer, began making plans to avert 
any further violations of “family women” through the establishment of military brothels, for 
which the Gunseicho sought appropriate, “non-family” women as staff over the following 
month. Posters appeared on the streets advertising for “comfort women”, hundreds of whom 
were recruited locally and in the countryside of Guangdong Province, supplemented by the 
import of 1,700 Japanese prostitutes from Canton. 
Action was also taken to shield the local elites from the waves of organized raiding 
and expropriation that followed the sack. Official notices were posted on the doors of 
prominent citizens forbidding soldiers to enter their houses, reinforced by the on-the-spot 
interventions of Japanese officers when necessary. Colonel Eguchi, for instance, was asked by 
the Gunseicho to watch over his fellow medic, Dr. Li Shu-fan, who had been identified as a 
prominent member of the Chinese community. Most of the gentry appear to have escaped the 
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indignity of being turned out of their homes. One squad of troops was successfully dissuaded 
from taking over a house in Caine Road occupied by a younger brother of Sir Robert Ho Tung, 
whose immediate family was allowed to retain possession of their mansion.347 
Much the same policy was applied to Aw Boon-haw, an overseas Chinese magnate 
based in Singapore who had made his fortune marketing the hugely popular ointment Tiger 
Balm. So prodigiously rich that he claimed not to know his exact worth, the “Tiger Balm 
King” controlled an immense pharmaceutical and newspaper empire that stretched across the 
length of Southeast Asia, and for this reason had been identified as a key potential ally in the 
southern offensive. After being detained by the Koa Kikan with the rest of the gentry, Aw too 
was treated with a high degree of courtesy, “not subjected to any personal harshness, or 
deprived of the luxuries he had come to regard as his due”. He was released after a few weeks 
of hotel confinement in his Hong Kong mansion, where a chauffeur had driven him to and 
from his office every day.348 After Singapore fell to the Japanese forces in mid-February, 
Isogai started developing a plan to establish a puppet regime consisting of Aw and a number 
of his associates who had been captured in Hong Kong that, he hoped, could be used as yet 
another channel to Chiang Kai-shek.349 
On 1 January 1942, Yazaki's Civil Affairs Department decreed that all government 
officials, apart from British officials, were to return to their posts. On 7 January, a summons 
was issued to all Hong Kong Chinese who had studied at universities in Japan, and thus likely 
to be in a position to help the conquerors overcome the daunting language barrier, to report to 
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the Hong Kong Hotel to register with the Koa Kikan. On the following day, they were ferried 
across the harbour for a welcoming banquet at the Peninsula Hotel,350  where they were 
obliged to present themselves to the Koa Kikan to be earmarked for employment before 
enjoying the feast. In their Work Report, the Koa Kikan mentioned that they had “caused” the 
gentry to assemble together and “made them swear” to contribute to the future Sino-Japanese 
partnership before sending them home under “joint and several guarantees of 
responsibility’.351 The fact that no invitations were issued for a subsequent banquet for the 
gentry at the Peninsula Hotel during the second week of January—the guest list had been 
published in advance in the newly revived local press—appeared to imply that acceptance 
was taken for granted. 
Such actions point to the conclusion that the Japanese were pursuing a generally 
moderate policy in Hong Kong during the very early period of occupation, making a true 
attempt to promote the goodwill of the people, including the Chinese.352 Mainland Chinese in 
particular were struck by the contrast with their own past experience of Japanese conduct. 
One Nationalist assistant of Admiral Chan Chak who had escaped from the colony shortly 
after the takeover declared to a British newspaper in early February 1942 that the Chinese 
civilians in Hong Kong had been “unusually well treated by the Japanese”.353 
4.43 Responses of the Hong Kong Elites 
The lunch held by Lieutenant-General Sakai for the gentry in the Peninsula Hotel on 
10 January 1942 was attended by 133 of the 137 original invitees. At the top of the guest list 
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were Robert Kotewall and Shouson Chow, now relieved of their British titles in the interests 
of Asianization, and referred to in the official media as Mr. Lo Kuk-wo and Mr. Chow Shou-
son. Each in turn got up to respond to Sakai’s address. Kotewall began his remarks by 
expressing his appreciation “that the Japanese Army had avoided harming the people of Hong 
Kong or destroying the city” and noting that the object of Imperial Japan was “to release the 
races of East Asia”. With regard to Sakai’s appeal for help in reviving the colony, he stated 
that he and his colleagues would “put out all our strength in Hong Kong to cooperate with the 
Japanese Army authorities”, and that they were indeed “very fortunate” to have been “placed 
under the instruction” of Sakai and his senior officers. He concluded by proclaiming, “We 
thank the Emperor of Japan, and banzai [may he live forever]!” After expressing that he 
“agreed heartily” with everything that Kotewall had said, Chow stated that his long residence 
in the colony had shown him that the Hong Kong Chinese fully understood the need for 
cooperation between Japan and China that General Sakai had “so kindly” offered, and also 
concluded by proclaiming, “Banzai!”354  
Three days later Kotewall and Chow were appointed Chairman and Vice-Chairman, 
respectively, of the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee, whose other seven members were all 
conspicuous figures in the local elites and business world. Several had occupied the seats set 
aside for Chinese in the prewar Legislative Council, and most had served on the District 
Watch Committee and the other associated bodies that managed the Chinese community's 
internal affairs. They included M. K. Lo (now Asianized as Lo Man-kam); Li Koon-chun, the 
rice merchant, and his younger brother Li Tse-fong, the Managing Director of the Bank of 
East Asia355; Tung Chung-wei, the proprietor of the Dao Heng Bank, who was currently 
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serving as Chairman of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce; and Li 
Chung-po, the Chairman-Elect of the Tung Wah Hospital Group.356 
On 25 February, Kotewall and Chow presided again at a ceremony held at the King’s 
Theatre to celebrate the arrival of Governor Isogai357 that was attended by most of the local 
leaders who had attended the same stately venue five months earlier to welcome British 
Governor Young. Kotewall declared on behalf of the Chinese community that the one and a 
half million people of Hong Kong “shared in the reflection of the glory of the Imperial 
Army” and thus “enjoyed the benefits” of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. He 
then likened Isogai’s donation of rice to the public to “the gesture of a father towards his 
children” before concluding, “We all know that Your Excellency has been long in China. 
You fully understand our customs and have always entertained the utmost affection for the 
Chinese people. . . . We are thankful that you have come to govern this place, and we are 
extremely glad to await your instructions”.358  
On 30 March, the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee was replaced on Isogai's orders 
by two more permanent bodies, the four-member Chinese Representative Council and the 
twenty-two-member Chinese Cooperative Council, of which Kotewall was appointed 
Chairman of the former and Chow of the latter.359 The two Chinese Councils, as they became 
known, were joined by all the remaining members of former Rehabilitation Advisory 
Committee, while the Chinese Cooperative Council was also buttressed by the addition of 
several leading businessmen, including Tang Shiu-kin, Manager of the Tang Tin Fuk Bank 
and Vice-Chairman of the China Bus Company; Kwok Chan, Vice-Chairman of the Hong 
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Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce; and Ip Lan-chuen, Chairman of the United 
Chinese Industrialists Association. 360  Notably absent from the elite line-up were two 
prominent members of the prewar Legislative Council, Tso Seen-wan and T. N. Chan. 
Pleading illness or some other excuse, they had slipped away to the mainland and the shelter 
of neutral Macao, respectively.361  
With these two exceptions, every local Chinese and Eurasian notable who had loomed 
large in public life during British rule came forward in response to the Japanese call. No 
single motive is adequate to account for the near-unanimity of the elite's behaviour. One 
explanation that later emerged was that the local leaders had been granted permission for 
their behaviour by their old British chiefs. Kotewall and Chow later recalled that on 1 January 
1942, they had been approached in the China Building by R. A. C. North, the prewar 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs; J. D. Fraser, the prewar Secretary for Defence; and Sir Greville 
Alabaster, the prewar Attorney General, and asked to work with the new Japanese rulers to 
help safeguard the interests of the Chinese community. Although there are no grounds for 
questioning the granting of such permission, as the meeting in the China Building was later 
confirmed by surviving officials on the British side,362 the degree of cooperation it authorized 
remains unclear. Indeed, it seems doubtful that North and his colleagues had envisaged 
Kotewall’s and Chow’s warm expressions of gratitude to the Imperial Army or triumphant 
calls of “banzai!” 
                                                 
360 Hong Kong News, March 31, 1942. 
361 Translation of captured Japanese indictment of 1943, CO 129 592/6, 134, 137; Tse, San Nian,  62. 
362 Kotewall circular letter, May 1946, in private papers of Helen Zimmern; Kotewall testimony, Noma trial WO 
235/999, 273. See also Endacott and Birch, Hong Kong Eclipse, 242-3; Ching, The Li Dynasty, 107. For a 
similar claim in the case of M. K. Lo, see Gittins, Eastern Windows, 133; Stanley, Behind Barbed Wire, 122. 
Peter H. Sin is also said to have been authorized by the British to work with the conquerors. Snow’s interview 
with Charles Sin, June 29, 1995. For confirmation from the British side, see North’s remarks to Gimson quoted 
in Gimson’s internment diary, April 14, 1944; North’s public statement of October 1, 1945 quoted in the South 
China Morning Post, October 2, 1945. North informed Gimson that he had advised Kotewall to sign a document 
formalizing the imprimatur. According to Kotewall’s son, such a document was indeed drawn up and signed, a 
fact verified after the war. Snow’s interview with Mr Cyril Kotewall, June 26, 1995. However, no trace of it 
appears in either the London or Hong Kong archives. 
 154
What is clear is that the takeover was received with true enthusiasm by one or two of 
the local business leaders. After being released from internment, the merchant Chan Lim-pak 
lost no time in offering his services to the invaders and in renewing his prewar connection 
with Governor Isogai. He is believed to have suggested establishing the two Chinese 
Councils, and even to have provided the Governor with a list of possible members.363 The 
banker Lau Tit-shing, who, like Chan, had exhibited open support for Japan in the prewar 
years, now surpassed himself with his aggressive endorsements of the Japanese war effort. 
Both hard-core partisans were chosen by Isogai to join Kotewall on the Chinese 
Representative Council, the more senior and prestigious of the new consultative bodies. If 
Kotewall and Chow had been cast as the colony's Petains, these two were the Hong Kong 
Lavals. 
Further evidence of such enthusiasm may be found in those operating the local 
Chinese press. The Wah Kiu Yat Po (Overseas Chinese Daily), one of the principal Chinese-
language newspapers, had resumed operations the day after the British surrender, joined by 
two of the four leading Chinese papers by 3 January. One mainland Chinese reader observed 
that the editors of these papers were “doing their merciless utmost to find fault with all kinds 
of shortcomings in the former British administration”. Interpreting this behaviour as a 
reaction to the censorship of the Hong Kong Chinese media that the British had imposed for 
the past sixteen years, he deduced that local editors were seizing the opportunity to vent 
“their accumulated rage”.364 
One partial and, at first glance, rather startling exception to the general acquiescence 
was the case of M. K. Lo. Many observers had taken it for granted that Lo, the scourge of 
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British injustice, would be more zealous than anyone in his embrace of the new regime,365 
failing to recognize that Lo had always been something of an independent spirit. He took his 
seat successively on the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee and the Chinese Cooperative 
Council, but by all accounts made little effort to disguise his reluctance to hold any public 
office and his aversion to everything Japanese.366 He was reported to have registered his 
displeasure at sitting on the Cooperative Council by making no contribution to the Council's 
proceedings, confirmed by surviving records of Council sessions.367 Asked on one occasion 
by the Japanese military chiefs what the Army could do to improve its relations with the 
Chinese community, he broke his silence long enough to comment that it would help if the 
troops would desist from urinating in public places.368 
4.5 Factors in the Collaboration between the Japanese and Hong Kong Elites 
Several factors led the local elites in Hong Kong to collaborate with the Japanese. At 
the very beginning, fear was, of course, a significant factor; leading figures were haunted by 
the thought of what might happen to them and their families if they failed to cooperate. Even 
M. K. Lo was described by one British onlooker as having been “weak and frightened”.369 
Although the gentry might have been expected to follow the example of Tso Seen-wan and T. 
N. Chan and flee to Macao or the mainland, doing so would have been very difficult, as most 
were watched very closely and their movements severely restricted; indeed, several were not 
allowed to sleep anywhere other than their mansions without the knowledge of the Kempeitai. 
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Second, mixed with the elites’ fear was a fairly large dose of pragmatism. As most of 
the gentry and business chiefs had little opportunity to form a clear picture of the events 
taking place in the wider world,370 no one could be sure how the war would end. It was 
possible that the British would one day recover the colony, and some leaders may have 
thought it wise to insure themselves against such a scenario. Certainly Kotewall and Chow 
(unlike Lau Tit-shing) appear to have been rather careful to avoid denouncing the British 
explicitly in their public statements, confining themselves instead to vague references to 
“century-old aggression” and “the returning dawn”.371 Nevertheless, as the fall of Hong Kong 
was followed by the still more spectacular fall of Singapore and the newspapers celebrated 
Japan's triumphant assault upon one European possession after another, it seemed much more 
likely that British rule had been extinguished forever, and that Japan would remain in control 
of the colony for much time to come.372 Under such circumstances, the elites viewed it 
pragmatic to cooperate with the Japanese. 
Third, local leaders and elites wanted to hold on to the status that they had won, in 
some cases quite recently, as the chief figures of local Chinese society. As this status had 
accrued to them in large measure from their appointments to the councils and committees of 
the British colonial government, it appeared that one obvious way to preserve it was to accept 
similar appointments from the successor regime. One Japanese official who assumed his post 
in Hong Kong in the early months recalled leading citizens being drawn to “whoever was in 
authority”. 373  Moreover, wanting to restore order in the face violent activity by local 
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criminals who had gripped the colony in the aftermath of the takeover, they were naturally 
inclined to look to the Japanese troops as restorers of calm.374 
Fourth, they wanted, perhaps most of all, to resume their business operations. Within 
days of the conquest, the leading merchants voluntarily began to turn to the new regime for  
help in restoring a normal business environment. On 31 December 1941 , one week before 
Sakai had issued his lunch invitation, Chung-wei Tun and the Hong Kong Chinese General 
Chamber of Commerce submitted a petition to the Gunseicho seeking a repeal of a ban on the 
acceptance of any banknotes above the value of HK$10, which had ostensibly been imposed 
to control inflation, arguing that this currency measure had thrown the markets into confusion 
and crippled any prospects for the resumption of large-scale trade.375 Two weeks later, the 
Chamber went on to draw the Gunseicho's attention to another pressing financial need: If 
businesses were to recover, the authorities must arrange for an adequate money supply by 
allowing customers to draw on their deposits in the various British and Allied banks, which 
had been sealed off by the Imperial forces.  
In the meantime, leading firms were also attempting to ascertain if the Gunseicho 
would allow them to resume operations. By 20 January 1942, the four major Hong Kong 
Chinese department stores, Wing On, Sincere, Sun, and the China Merchandise Emporium, 
were “making preparations to resume business” by notifying the authorities of the quantity 
and value of their inventory and seeking to open their doors.376 On 27 January, the Hong 
Kong Chinese Chamber presented a range of proposals to Yazaki's Civil Affairs Department, 
one of which was reopening local banks. On the following day, one of the main Hong Kong 
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Chinese industrial enterprises, the Nanyang Tobacco Company, asked the authorities for 
permission to reopen.377 
 Lastly, they wanted to do what they could for the public, as their pursuit of wealth had 
not precluded their attention to the tradition of assisting the less fortunate,which they aimed 
to continue practicing. The gentry felt that they were duty bound to engage the new regime in 
a dialogue with a view to relieving the general hardship, and felt no need to await the 
prompting of North and other British officials to do so.378 Their efforts included an appeal for 
the restoration of public utilities and the improvement of public safety through such measures 
as providing assistance to the locally assembled Street Guards. Three days after the newly 
constituted Rehabilitation Advisory Committee submitted proposals to the Gunseicho for the 
restoration of “peace and security” on 13 January 1942, Kotewall and his colleagues called on 
Sakai to discuss ways in which the general anarchy might be brought to an end.379 In several 
areas, notably the restoration of order, the interests of the public coincided rather obviously 
with those of the gentry themselves, but there were also occasions on which the displayed a 
clear-cut concern for the less privileged.380  
Several scholars have ascribed the propensity for collaboration among the Anglicized 
Chinese and Eurasian gentry of Hong Kong to their colonial education, which had prevented 
them from developing an appropriate sense of national pride. Others have blamed the poor 
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treatment of the local elites by the British administration, which had left them feeling that 
they had little or nothing to lose from a change in regime. While each theory contains an 
element of truth, none can completely explain their actions. In spite of building sizeable 
business empires on the mainland and in Southeast Asia, the Hong Kong gentry were 
generally a parochial people. In accord with one autumn 1942 report that noted that they “did 
not take any interest in the general war or even in the war in China”,381 their concerns were 
focused on the small coastal enclave where they had been raised and lived and had founded 
their fortunes. As such, their loyalty was to Hong Kong, the colony that had allowed them to 
prosper, and Hong Kong alone. 
4.6 Using the Chinese to Govern the Chinese: The Role of the Chinese Councils 
The arrival of the new governor was the signal for important administrative changes, 
one of which was the formulation of the doctrine of “using Chinese to govern Chinese”.382 At 
the centre, the Civil Administration Department was replaced by the Governor's Office or 
Secretariat responsible to the Governor and headed by a high-ranking Japanese military 
officer, Major-General Ichiki, assisted by a Japanese civilian. It was organized into several 
bureaus and departments, including a Civil Affairs Bureau, which seems to have been a 
policy-framing body; the Bureaus of Communications, Information, and Repatriation, which 
were placed directly under the Chief of the Governor’s Office because they addressed the 
important matters of Japanese security, propaganda, and relations with the Chinese; and 
several functional departments addressing public works, water, medical and health services, 
and electricity (see Figure 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3).383  
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As the Japanese consolidated their rule, they recruited many of the same local leaders 
who had worked with the British to serve as members of the Chinese Representative Council 
and the Chinese Cooperative Council, both of which, as previously discussed, consisted of 
leading Chinese businessmen. 384 Impressed by Japan's rhetoric of “Asia for Asians”, several 
Chinese appeared enthusiastic to work with the Japanese. Although accusations of 
collaboration were generally unjustified for the majority of the Hong Kong Chinese, they 
were certainly more than justified for Chan Lim-pak, arrested by British authorities in the 
midst of the siege of Hong Kong on suspicion of leadership in fifth-columnist activities and 
later killed by an American bomber in 1944 while en route to Japan. Born in 1884 in Namhoi, 
Kwangtung Province, he became very wealthy as a Cantonese merchant and a comprador for 
various foreign firms. By 1920, he had become the Chairman of the General Chamber of 
Commerce of Canton; President of the Canton Chinese Silk Merchants Association, the 
Canton Mining Association, and the Guangdong Export Association; the Cantonese 
comprador of the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation; the manager of numerous 
Chinese firms; and a director of the Nanyang Brothers’ Tobacco Company. As a dangerous 
and altogether unscrupulous reactionary in his youth, he had organized the notorious 
Merchant's Volunteers of Kwangtung, which seized the city of Canton in 1924 in an effort to 
crush the adherents of the revolutionary party of Dr. Sun Yat-sin. After a brief period of riot 
and disorder, he was driven from Canton. Taking refuge in Hong Kong, he ended his 
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notorious career by leaving the colony to skip bail rather than answer charges before the court 
for embezzling the funds of the Nanyang Brothers' Tobacco Company. 
According to Henry Lethbridge, Lau Tit-shing was also “very pro-Japanese”, having 
been “thoroughly brainwashed by his early education in Japan”.385 Indeed, when Lau died in 
April 1945, he was honoured by the Japanese governor. Lau Tit-shing was a successful but 
relatively obscure Chinese merchant who had operated according to the traditional manner 
under British rule in Hong Kong. Educated in Japan, he maintained his connections with 
Japanese friends and served as president of the Chinese-Japanese Returned Students' 
Association. Little was heard of him until after the fall of Hong Kong, when he began writing 
to the Hong Kong News. In one of these communications prior to the fall of Singapore, he 
had written, 
The fall of Singapore will be of great benefit to overseas Chinese. . . . Britain has 
encouraged Japan and China to slaughter each other, hoping that she could profit by 
their wounds to swallow them both up at once. . . . We must fight there [in Burma] 
with the ferocity of animals. . . . Our method must be to add the totality of our 
Chinese forces to the Japanese Army and fight together. 
Holding beliefs so completely in accord with those of the Japanese made him a natural target 
for collaboration.  
Except for Chan Lim-pak and Lau Tit-shing, no Chinese leaders collaborated as 
actively with the Japanese as they had with the British. By mid-1943, many had realized that 
the war was no longer in Japan's favour, as well as “that in many ways Japanese colonialism 
was far more despotic, bureaucratic and corrupt, and less rational and efficient than the British 
variety”. On a 25 December 1943 radio broadcast in honor of the second anniversary of the 
Japanese occupation, Kotewall praised the progress made under the governorship of General 
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Isogai Rensuke, but demonstrated little of the enthusiasm that he had for the 1941 centenary 
of British occupation, comparing 1942 to the first weeks of chaos after the invasion rather 
than to the years of British rule.386 By 1944, local leaders had begun to avoid their duties on 
the two Chinese Councils, while Kotewall and Li-Tse-fong withdrew from public life for 
health reasons. 
From a broader perspective, most Chinese leaders in Hong Kong likely collaborated 
with the Japanese in the same manner as did the majority of Hong Kong's population: “with 
reluctance and misgiving, and as a matter of physical survival”. As no one knew how the war 
would end, especially with Japanese successes in China and Southeast Asia, fear and 
pragmatism, as well as preservation of one’s interests, were no doubt strong motivations for 
collaboration. 
4.61 Effectiveness of the Chinese Councils 
The main duties of the Chinese Representative Council and the Chinese Cooperative 
Council were to convey to the Governor, to whom they were directly responsible, complaints 
from the population as well as the decisions and policies of the government, and to advise the 
government on matters concerning the population. As previously described, the Governor 
appointed two men who had been members of the British Executive Council as Chairmen and 
men who had been prominent during British Rule within various fields and who maintained 
links with the general population through leadership or membership in various associations as 
members. Although meeting very frequently to discuss issues, the Chinese Councils had little 
power, being able only to make suggestions and to try to persuade the government to accept 
them. Representatives of the Councils, including the Chairmen, held regular meetings with 
the Governor, the Head of the military police department, and other heads of departments. 
Requests by these members were very often turned down. Whereas some civilian department 
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heads were quite sympathetic to their plea for better treatment of the Chinese, they were often 
deterred from supporting them by the presence of the Head of the military police department, 
Noma Kennosuke. In fact, Noma was mostly responsible for obstructing requests, and the 
Governor could never overrule him. Thus, from the beginning of their existence, the function 
of the Councils was limited to conveying and explaining governmental decisions and policies 
to the population while receiving little feedback from above.387 
From their position at the top of the social tree, the two Chinese Councils were given 
the task of serving as intermediaries between the conquerors and the public. The Cooperative 
Council compiled the complaints of the different sections of the citizenry and passed them up 
to the Representative Council, which conferred with Governor Isogai and his department 
chiefs on a regular basis. Isogai and his colleagues in turn briefed the Representative Council 
on their latest decrees, and the leading members of both Councils attempted to explain these 
decrees to the public through a system of press conferences that they held, as did the Japanese 
department chiefs, two or three times a month. 
Retrospective accounts tend to portray the two Chinese Councils as bodies that merely 
rubber-stamped Japanese policies. While they certainly had no part in major decision-making, 
their advisory functions, in the earlier stages at least, may not have been negligible. A survey 
of the colony conducted by the new regime’s Information Department observed that because 
the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants of Hong Kong were of Chinese origin, it was 
“certainly not the case that their opinion is ignored”.388 Several leaders who sat on the two 
Chinese Councils were also assigned a specialist advisory role. In February 1942, for instance, 
Lau Tit-shing was appointed Head of the newly organized Chinese Bankers’ Association, 
                                                 
387 Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?, chapter 6. 
388 Tōyō Keizai Shinpōsha hen; Honkon Senryōchi Sōtokubu Hōdōbu kanshū, Gunseika No Honkon:shinseisita 
Dai Tōa no chūkaku,(Hong Kong: Honkon Tōyō Keizaisha, 1944), chapter 3. 
 167
being one of the Hong Kong Chinese bankers whom the Japanese believed would “give them 
valuable help in the execution of various economic policies”.389 
Within the Councils, which the Japanese administration regarded as little more than 
listening posts in the population, institutes of public opinion, and gatherers of rumour, were 
corralled many prominent and influential Chinese to serve as administrative captives of the 
“New Order”. The Councils thus provided a façade of respectability, maintaining the illusion 
that the Chinese were now governing themselves under the eyes of a benevolent Japanese 
administration. Whenever they experienced difficulty in securing Chinese cooperation, the 
administration sent the relevant matter to the Councils for deliberation, which, after approving 
all measures “unanimously”, urged the Chinese to support the matter in a decree issued in the 
name of the Chinese leaders. On important holidays, such as the Mikado's birthday, the 
Council members were obliged to make public obeisance to Japan by marching en bloc from 
the Council Chambers to the Murray Parade Grounds, where they stood at attention facing 
north-northeast, the direction of the palace in Tokyo, then bowing continuously at the order of 
the announcer. 
Ostensibly for administrative purposes but in truth to gain control over them, the 
Japanese organized the various professions and secondary industries into associations and 
guilds, such as the Sino-Japanese Medical Association, the Bankers’ Association, the 
Lawyers’ Association, the Firewood Syndicate, and the Druggists’ Syndicate. If, for example, 
the Japanese wanted a thousand gallons of alcohol or a thousand ounces of quinine, they 
would simply order the Druggists' Syndicate to provide it. As the Chairman and his officers 
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knew who had it in stock and in what quantity, they would in turn order local suppliers to 
produce it.390 
Despite being granted no direct power by the Japanese military administration, the 
elites’ influence and that of their representative bodies was deeply felt throughout the Chinese 
community. Later commenting on her father’s participation on the Representative Council, Dr. 
Bobbie Kotewall stated that having no contingency plans of its own, the Chinese business 
community had been completely dependent on the leadership of her father. When helping him 
prepare many of the speeches that he delivered, she described how she and her father would 
search for the right words until satisfied that the community would understand what they were 
attempting to convey. Due to his influence, Kotewall appears to have assumed central 
leadership of the Chinese community, with which he was able to shield the community from 
the Japanese to a limited extent.391 
4.7  Dynamics between the Japanese and Hong Kong Elites during the Middle Period of 
the Occupation  
As the months passed, the gentry’s tentative acceptance of the New Order began to 
give way to a creeping disenchantment.392 The social status that they had enjoyed at the start 
of the takeover was undermined by the onset of Nipponization and the imposition of a 
Japanese ruling caste. Kotewall and Chow are reported to have been treated by the authorities 
in an increasingly “cavalier manner”, and some of their colleagues encountered behaviour that 
was much more demeaning. For example, at one banquet the government staged for the local 
community leaders, a Japanese officer, irked by a minor solecism, walked across the room to 
give one of the most conspicuous guests a resounding slap. Dr. Li Shu-fan, who was present, 
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described how “every Chinese there” felt that blow as though it had been dealt to him 
personally.393 
At a December 1942 colloquium of leading citizens that the Japanese media had 
organized to discuss Hong Kong's future role in East Asia, Li Chung-po, a member of the 
Chinese Cooperative Council, took the opportunity to slip in a discreet but unmistakable 
protest. “What we should like to ask the Japanese”, he declared, “is that they be kind enough 
to offer us considerable shares of business without monopolising the larger businesses”.394 
However, any opening the regime allowed to develop was liable to prove a mirage. In April 
1943, for example, the Governor’s Office the Association of Chinese Lawyers of Hong Kong 
were finally given permission to stage an inaugural ceremony one year after delivering their 
first petition requesting permission to do so. Prominent among the members was Peter H. Sin, 
the so-called ”Mayor of Hong Kong”, who hoped to return to his prewar legal practice after 
his year-long service as Chairman of the Central District Bureau. His hope was subsequently 
disabused when the Chief of the General Affairs Department in the Governor's Office 
reminded Sin and his fellow solicitors that their function could only be to “assist in the proper 
administration of martial law” insofar as it impinged on civil matters.395 
Surviving records of a number of the routine weekly meetings held by the Chinese 
Cooperative Council during the summer of 1943 disclose that the members had been 
formulating a series of appeals. Via these appeals, they pressed for the release of goods from 
the godowns (warehouses), and called on the government to allow time for inquiries that 
might prevent the deportation of persons of substance as the result of “mistaken arrests” and 
to take steps to decrease the suffering of the population by such means as increasing the rice 
ration while decreasing its soaring price and improving the distribution of such staple 
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commodities as firewood, cooking oil, and salt.396 All of these entreaties were submitted to 
Kotewall and his three colleagues on the Representative Council, who then pursued them at 
their regular audiences with Governor Isogai.  
Their subsequent failure revealed that Kotewall and the others no longer retained 
their early ability to wrangle concessions out of the Japanese. Isogai's responses amounted to 
little more than a peevish reiteration of the celebrated British refrain of the period: “Don't 
you know there's a war on?” He explained that he could not permit the release of large stocks 
from the godowns because they would quickly be used up by businessmen intent on 
pursuing their own selfish aims; that deportations were being conducted most stringently, 
and while abuses had been committed, the victims were necessary sacrifices in the interests 
of the majority; that the current price of rice, whose ration he could not increase, was already 
excessively low, and that the government had incurred a huge loss by maintaining it; and 
distribution depended on increasing the import of petrol, which the Governor's Office was 
actively seeking to do.397 
At the end of July 1943, local society was shaken by the disappearance of Dr. Li Shu-
fan. For some months, Li had been hosting lavish parties, frequenting racecourses and dance 
halls, and in general doing his best to convey that he enthusiastically supported the New 
Order—while quietly planning his escape. Early one morning, he crept out of his house 
dressed as a fisherman and slipped off on a pre-arranged sampan around the headlands of the 
New Territories to the Chinese-held zone of Mirs Bay, abetted by several Japanese soldiers 
whom he had bribed. A more ambiguous note was struck by Aw Boon-haw, the Tiger Balm 
magnate from Singapore. At a rally commemorating the overthrow of the British, he 
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“expressed deep sympathy” with the reconstruction of Hong Kong and said he knew how 
terrible it was to be under the rule of the invaders.398 On 20 February 1944, the second 
anniversary of the founding of the Governor’s Office was celebrated as the first function held 
in the newly completed Government House. Although the festivities had to be toned down in 
keeping with the colony’s reduced circumstances, Governor Isogai had told Kotewall and his 
colleagues to ensure that the public did not get the misleading impression that the war was not 
progressing well for the Japanese. Over the course of the next year, the U.S. advance across 
the Pacific would be portrayed as draining the life-blood from the American forces, and the 
fire-bombing of Tokyo was announced in a statement of incoherent mendacity worthy of 
Bunter: “Tokyo had not been bombed, the damage was very slight and only a few fires had 
been started. Three American planes brought down over Tokyo were on exhibition. No raid 
had taken place”.399 
 The regime took several initiatives in response to the groundswell of discontent to 
recoup the support of the gentry and middle classes. In October 1943, Isogai announced the 
establishment of a new civilian law court divided into a civil and a criminal branch. The 
previous exclusive reliance on martial law, he observed to Kotewall and the other Chinese 
representatives, had been ineffective in reassuring people and “enabling them to live in peace 
and work contentedly”.400 In December, he proclaimed a general drive to cut down on red 
tape and announced that all the decrees issued since the takeover would be re-examined, in 
particular those regarding the close supervision of residents and every change of residence 
inside its limits. 
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4.8 Dynamics between the Japanese and Hong Kong Elites during the Final Period of 
the Occupation  
4.81 A New Governor Arrives 
On 24 December 1944, it was suddenly announced that Governor Isogai was being 
transferred to a post in Japan to be replaced by Lieutenant-General Tanaka Hisakazu, who 
had directed the Japanese landing in Guangdong Province in October 1938. In the subsequent 
years, Tanaka had continued to head campaigns in the Province, and he now occupied Sakai's 
former post as commander of the Twenty-Third Army in Canton. In February, Colonel Noma 
was recalled to be succeeded as Chief of the Kempeitai by Lieutenant Colonel Kanazawa 
Asao, a Kempeitai officer who had served for the previous six months in the Governor's 
Office as assistant to the Chief of Staff. 
Up to a point, this change over was a matter of straightforward court politics. In July 
1944, Premier Tojo, upon whose patronage Isogai and Noma were entirely dependent, had 
fallen from power in Tokyo as a result of the loss of Saipan.401 However, there were also 
signs that the change was inspired by the Army’s wish to check the power and abuses of the 
Kempeitai in Hong Kong, whose performance had been described as “deteriorating” by both 
the Army Ministry in Tokyo and the Army garrison in the colony. Indeed, Colonel Noma was 
reported to have been recalled to Japan “partly for this reason”, 402  and the new 
administration’s systematic drive to decrease the power of the Kempeitai appears to support 
this reason. Over the course of February 1945, Governor Tanaka replaced about 150 
members of the Kempeitai in the colony with new personnel from Canton. At the end of that 
month, he stripped the Kempeitai of the additional power that they had assumed in directing 
routine police affairs and confined them to their proper functions of military policing and 
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countersubversion. Kanazawa, who was now assuming the dual role of Kempeitai Chief and 
Police Commissioner, seems to have made some attempts to correct the abuses of Noma's 
reign. Corruption and torture, he later claimed, were curtailed, and the gendarmes were 
instructed to be “kind and bright” in performing their duties.403 Local testimony that random 
killings had decreased and that a number of citizens who had been imprisoned for years were 
released support Kanazawa’s assertions.404 
As the arrival of Governor Tanaka brought no substantial improvement, simply 
placing Hong Kong once again under the firm control of the Twenty-Third Army in Canton, 
it marked a belated victory for the China faction in the Army. However, this no longer 
implied, as it had three years earlier, that the colony would be coddled in the hope of creating 
a political opening to the Nationalist regime. Hong Kong was no longer packed with 
Nationalist politicians who might be persuaded to make overtures to Chungking on Japan's 
behalf. Even if it had been, there was no longer any prospect that Chungking would have the 
remotest interest in peace talks with Tokyo.405 The resumption of control by the Twenty-
Third Army was instead prompted by strictly operational thinking. With U.S. forces now 
entrenched in the Philippines, Hong Kong was becoming vulnerable to a seaborne offensive. 
Allied forces were also gathering strength in the Chinese interior, and it was conceivable that 
Tanaka's troops might soon be obliged to abandon Canton and fall back on the colony in a 
last-ditch stand. By absorbing Hong Kong, the Twenty-Third Army would be able to organize 
a unified defence of the entire Guangdong region.406 It was recognized that the time had come 
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to deprive Hong Kong of its anomalous special status, a status that had become all the more 
meaningless now that the colony was dependent on Guangdong for such little food as it had. 
Terminating Hong Kong’s special status indeed made an impact, but the most obvious 
consequence was not, as would be expected, reform, but rather neglect. Governor Tanaka 
spent the bulk of his time in Canton, coming down to the colony for a maximum of one week 
per month, thus allowing the occupation regime to grow increasingly feeble. After his return 
to Japan the previous July, Chief of Staff Suganami had been replaced by a string of 
successors whose tenures became ever shorter as more and more officers were recalled to 
take part in the defence of the Japanese homeland.407 Many of the key civilian heads of 
departments were transferred in the same way, and by early 1945, as one Japanese witness 
commented, the Governor’s Office was “unable even to look after itself”. 408  Tanaka 
complained on one of his rare visits that the number of civilian officials was now too small to 
keep the government going. The creation of the No. 1 and No. 2 Departments was not in 
reality so much a mark of efficiency as an effort by Tanaka and his team to maintain control 
within a sharply reduced sphere of operations. 
The regime now had neither the means nor the inclination to attend to the finer details 
of administering Hong Kong, which had become nothing more than an appendage of Canton. 
By the summer of 1945, grass was growing on the streets. The old focus on public health was 
visibly wavering, as the Governor's Office failed to maintain the cleaning of filters and the 
chlorination of drinking water. Even some of the most cherished Japanese prestige projects 
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were being discontinued. Progress on the grand war memorial in the Wanchai Gap slackened 
under the impact of failing government finances, a shortage of local construction materials, 
and American bombing. Ultimately, orders came from Tokyo that all work on the scheme 
was to stop.409 
In February 1945, shortly after the new governor assumed office, small increases were 
announced in the membership of the two Chinese Councils: the Chinese Representative 
Council was increased from four to five members and Chinese Cooperative Council from 
twenty-two to twenty-four. The rationale for the increases, according to the official media, 
was “to strengthen the civil administration of Hong Kong”.410 The gentry were now expected 
to help in not only importing and distributing food but also preserving the crumbling 
infrastructure and, more importantly, preserving order. In April, a Police Affairs Committee 
composed of sixty “prominent citizens” was established under the chairmanship of Sir 
Shouson Chow, one of whose functions was to advise Kanazawa, who “felt the necessity of 
getting in touch with the real voices of the general populace”.411 Its main function, however, 
was to maintain the services of the local police by raising funds for their upkeep and that of 
their families. 
4.82 Responses of the Elites  
Many local Chinese leaders reacted physically to the reversals of the Japanese military 
administration. Sir Robert Kotewall became subject to repeated bouts of angina pectoris,412 
while Li Tse-fong developed hypertension. Li Koon-chun, Li Tse-tong’s elder brother and  
Vice-Chairman of the Chinese Cooperative Council, came down with an unspecified illness 
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that was aggravated by a direct encounter with the colony's crime wave in the form of a 
break-in at his office.413 In some cases, their physical symptoms were accompanied by clear 
signs of mental anguish. Over the course of 1944 to 1945, several members of the Li family 
took advantage of the regime’s lifting of controls on religion to seek consolation and guidance 
from the Christian faith, including Li Tse-fong, who was baptized in March 1945 under the 
name of Peter.414 
While there is no reason to doubt the authenticity of these afflictions, whether physical 
or mental, it is evident that many of the top leaders used them as a pretext for maintaining the 
maximum distance possible from the Japanese. From 1944 onwards, members of both 
Chinese Councils increasingly tended to “slacken off” and excuse themselves from meetings 
with the Governor’s Office on grounds of ill health. 415  Kotewall seems to have been 
especially prone to absenteeism. In the spring of 1944, he was “indisposed” for the best part 
of three months. When the new Governor Tanaka invited him and his fellow Council 
members to a special interview in February 1945, he was “unable to be present owing to 
illness”. At the beginning of August, he was once again “convalescing”. In a statement put 
out by the two Chinese Councils, he explained that he had been attending to Council business 
by telephone or through “personal contact at his residence”, but had now been advised by his 
doctor to have “a complete rest”. He was, therefore, “reluctantly compelled to give up all 
public duties for one month”.416  
Li Koon-chun also exploited his own ailment for maximum gain. By the beginning of 
1944, he had stepped down from his post on the Chinese Cooperative Council and taken to 
his bed.417 Most of the leaders were still too prominent and too closely watched to have any 
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realistic chance of fleeing the colony, but after several months of bed-ridden seclusion, Li 
Koon-chun believed himself sufficiently unobtrusive to attempt an escape. In September 
1944, he fled with his family on a rickety boat to Macao, and was soon followed by Tung 
Chung-wei, Chairman of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce, who 
made a similar exit.418 
Under these circumstances, the bulk of the broadcasts and public appearances were 
increasingly made by the leaders who had inextricably committed themselves to the Japanese 
cause. Their presence, however, was also beginning to fade. After issuing an appeal to the 
public to remain calm and place their full confidence in the occupation authorities in mid-
December 1944, Chan Lim-pak, the far-right businessman, applied for and was granted a 
month’s sick leave, which he used to prepare for flight to Macao. He never made it; on 24 
December, he fell in a hail of machine-gun bullets from U.S.. fighters attacking his steamer 
as it was crossing the Pearl River Estuary. Chinese legend has it that he drowned trying to 
rescue his concubine, who was sinking on account of a bag of gold she had tied to her 
waist.419 After Lau Tit-shing, the pan-Asiatic enthusiast, dropped dead of a heart attack the 
following April, the Japanese lost their last fervent supporter from the elites. That the 
Japanese realized such a loss is reflected in the special letter of condolence brought to the 
dead man’s family by a staff officer representing Governor Tanaka, a unique honour 
conferred in token of “the meritorious services given by the late Mr Lau”.420  
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Although the Chinese Councils continued to function on into 1945, their members 
had begun to feel less completely certain of Japanese victory in early 1944, as is suggested in 
the slightly tremulous ending of a declaration issued on the second anniversary of Isogai’s 
appointment to the governorship: 
In the past two years, the living conditions of Hong Kong inhabitants have been 
rather strained, but compared to other places, Hong Kong stands out as faring very 
well. On entering the third year of the war, the hardships will perhaps be even greater 
than in the past two years, but we hope that our brothers and fellow-countrymen will 
respect this period of trials, withstanding tribulations and hardships; to surge forward 
in the spirit of ever greater effort, in order to harvest the greater benefit, not only for 
the inhabitants of Hong Kong, but for China and Japan. 
In light of Japanese losses, the local elites had begun to prepare for the return of the British.  
4.9 Comparison between the most prominent local Chinese leaders in Hong Kong and 
Singapore during the Japanese occupation 
 
 An examination of the most prominent local Chinese leaders in Hong Kong and 
Singapore during the Japanese occupation reveals that the Japanese sought to use Chinese to 
govern other Chinese in the territories they captured. These leaders shared similar Western 
academic backgrounds and had enjoyed good reputations since the pre-war era of the British 
colonial government. However, the nature of the administration in each colony affected their 
treatment by the Japanese.     
4.91 Background of the two leaders—The Loyal British Subject 
Sir Shouson Chow (周壽臣 爵士, 1861–1959) was a Hong Kong-born businessman 
who was a Qing Dynasty official and a notable figure in the Government of Hong Kong. His 
father was comprador of the Hong Kong Steamship Company. Among the third group of 
Chinese overseas students in the United States in the 1870s, Chow studied at Phillips 
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Academy, Andover (class of 1880) and Columbia University. After graduation, he worked in 
the Qing government. In 1881, he joined the Korean Customs Service under Yuan Shi-kai. 
Later, he was the president of Tientsin China Merchant Steam Navigation Company from 
1897 to 1903 and was the managing director of Peking-Mukden Railway in the Imperial 
Chinese Railways of North China between 1903 and 1907.421 He was the Customs and Trade 
Superintendent and Counsellor for Foreign Affairs in Newchwang (牛庄) between 1907 and 
1910. During this period, he was promoted to Mandarin of the Second Rank. He left the Qing 
government after the 1911 Revolution and became the director of various companies in Hong 
Kong.422 
Chow was appointed Justice of the Peace in Hong Kong in 1907. In 1918, he founded 
the Bank of East Asia with three Chinese partners. He was the Chairman of the bank’s board 
of directors from 1925 to 1929. In 1922, he was appointed a member of the Sanitary Board, 
the precursor of the Urban Council and Legislative Council, where he served until 1931. In 
1926, he became the first Chinese member of the Executive Council in Hong Kong and was 
knighted. In 1933, he earned an honorary Doctorate of Laws from the University of Hong 
Kong.423 
In circumscribing the role that Hong Kong played in the Chinese resistance, the 
government mirrored the attitudes of the bulk of the British trading community. However, 
Chow, as one of the prominent members of the gentry in Hong Kong, undoubtedly made 
handsome gestures of support to the Mainland resistance. In 1936, even before all-out fighting 
had started, Chow sat on the committee that had been set up to promote the sale of nationalist 
government bonds.424 At the same time, in January 1941, Chow appeared at the broadcasting 
station to deliver addresses marking the centenary of British rule in Hong Kong. He praised 
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the ‘sound and just administration’ of the British and the security that British rule offered to 
trade, investment, and industry.425 
Similarly, Lim Boon Keng (林文慶, 1869-1957) was a second-generation Straits-born 
Chinese. Born on 18 October 1869, Lim attended Raffles Institution, where he proved a 
precocious student with an insatiable appetite for learning. His headmaster, RW Hullett, was 
so impressed by him that he personally tutored him with a view to his winning one of the two 
Queen’s Scholarships in 1887. His receipt of this scholarship enabled him to study medicine 
at Edinburgh University, where he graduated in August 1892 with a Bachelor of Medicine 
and Surgery, gaining first class honours.426 
Both Chow and Lim worked for the Qing government after graduation. While Chow 
was a diplomat in Korea, Lim was appointed Medical Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior 
under Prince Su in 1911. Additionally, Lim represented the Chinese government as a delegate 
to international medical conferences in Paris and Rome. When Dr. Sun Yat-sen became 
provisional President of the Chinese Republic in 1912, Lim was appointed Sun’s confidential 
secretary and personal physician. However, when Sun gave in to internal bickering and 
allowed Yuan Shi-kai to become President, Lim resigned from Chinese government 
service.427 
Beyond establishing himself as a reputable medical doctor, Lim became very active in 
public affairs, serving five terms on the Legislative Council from 1895-1921. In 1897, he was 
made Justice of the Peace (attaining the same status as Chow in Hong Kong) at the 
unprecedented young age of 28. 428  As the Chinese community’s representative on the 
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Legislative Council in Singapore, Lim was ever mindful of his loyalty to the British Crown. 
His family had been in the Straits for three generations, and he benefited from the British 
scholarship and education system. Lim never lost an opportunity to demonstrate this loyalty. 
In 1900, he founded the Straits Chinese British Association (SCBA) to promote interest in the 
British Empire and loyalty to the Queen. The SCBA was also charged with advancing the 
welfare of Chinese British subjects in the Colony and encouraging higher education. Lim was 
the president of the SCBA in 1904 and 1906.429  
4.92 Role in the Chinese Cooperative Council of Hong Kong and the Overseas Chinese 
Association of Singapore during the Japanese Occupation 
Sir Shouson Chow in Hong Kong 
It seems likely that the Japanese wished to show favour to Chow, with whom they had 
conducted business in the pre-war years. The families controlling the Bank of East Asia had a 
history of contact with Japan going back many decades.430 Sir Shouson Chow, for example, 
was chairman of the board of directors of the Bank of East Asia during the Japanese 
occupation. Chow was also one of the directors of the China Merchandise Emporium. By the 
summer of 1942, Chow appeared to have been benefiting commercially from Japanese favour. 
Specifically, Chow was obliged to lend himself to the efforts of the Japanese Army 
chiefs to wear down the will to resist on the Chinese Mainland. Time and again, he was 
mobilized to appeal to the Nationalist Chinese leadership to come to terms. At a welcoming 
lunch in the Peninsula Hotel, Chow declared that ‘from now on Japan and China would join 
hands more and more.’431 As the top local leader in Hong Kong, he was visibly distressed by 
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the need to take a public stand incompatible with the nationalist war effort. Chow, the one-
time Mainland diplomat, is said to have cut ‘a pathetic figure, attempting repeatedly to 
communicate to the Chungking government his entreaty that they withhold judgement on 
him’.432  
In April 1943, on the Emperor’s birthday, Chow and his colleagues on the two 
Chinese Councils were required to bow reverently to the north-north-east in the approximate 
direction of the Imperial Palace in Tokyo. At the time of the Yasukuni Shrine Festival, which 
was held to commemorate the Japanese war dead, all Hong Kong residents, wherever they 
happened to be, were obliged to stand and observe a minute’s silence to express respect.  
In February 1945, shortly after the new Governor assumed office, Chow was  expected 
to help not only in importing and distributing food, but also in shoring up the crumbling 
infrastructure of Hong Kong, particularly in terms of the preservation of order. In April, a 
Police Affairs Committee composed of sixty ‘prominent citizens’ was set up under the 
chairmanship of the aged Sir Shouson Chow. Its main function was to keep the local police on 
the beat by raising funds for their upkeep and that of their families.433 
In May 1945, in his capacity as head of the Police Affairs Committee, Sir Shouson 
Chow announced the establishment of a Cooperative Society to raise money from each social 
group so that rice and other essentials could be purchased at low prices and distributed to all 
members of the police.434 In July 1945, the Cooperative Council held a meeting to discuss 
ways of working with the police in Tanaka’s new drive for the deportation of ‘undesirable 
characters’.435 
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Even with such actions on Chow’s part, in the post-war era, the British government 
insisted that Chow had been ‘a loyal servant of the British’ and was ‘violently anti-Japanese’. 
In any event, he was ‘too old to matter much now.’436 Chow was received with ‘high favour’ 
at Government House and ‘formed the backbone of the group of VIPs at all functions’.437 By 
choosing, when the British surrendered, to work with the Japanese rather than rallying to 
Chungking like model Chinese citizens, they proved that their loyalty was to Hong Kong 
exclusively. They were thus, paradoxically, the segment of society on whom the returning 
British could now best rely in the face of the intensified threat from the Mainland.438 
Lim Boon Keng in Singapore 
In Singapore in 1937, Lim founded and chaired the Straits Chinese China Relief Fund 
Committee of Singapore to support China in her war efforts against the Japanese. He made 
scathing attacks against Japanese imperialism on a number of occasions, incurring the wrath 
of the Japanese authorities.439 
In late February 1942, shortly after the invasion of Singapore, Lim’s family was 
interned at a Japanese concentration camp on Arab Street. According to Shinozaki Mamoru, 
Lim was so shocked that his voice was inaudible. However, he was able to get home with 
Shinozaki’s protection cards. Lim was asked by the Japanese to become the leader of the 
OCA (Overseas Chinese Association), an association created to serve the needs of the local 
Chinese community with the approval of the Japanese. Lim refused, claiming that he was too 
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December 24, 2010). 
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old to take up the role of a president. Lim’s wife was then made to kneel down in the 
scorching sun for 4 hours at a stretch, in addition to bearing other insults. Under the 
persuasion of Shinozaki, who assured him that his role as president was merely to be a 
figurehead who performed little work, Lim finally relented. The Japanese also appointed Lim 
the Chinese consul-general in Singapore and Chairman of the Chinese Chamber of 
Commerce.440 
In March 1942, Lim was ordered by the Japanese to raise a ‘donation’ of fifty million 
dollars for Japan. However, he was only able to raise twenty-eight million dollars with much 
difficulty. In response to the anger of the Japanese, Lim made an emotional speech: ‘We 
never told a lie. When we promised to give the military contribution, we mean to do it. 
Financial conditions are now such as to be beyond our control. If we are unable to pay, then 
die we will. I wish to point out, however, that the manner in which the Government raised this 
military contribution is without any parallel in any country.’441 In the end, the Japanese agreed 
to a loan for the remaining sum through the Yokohama Specie Bank. Until the end of the 
occupation in 1945, the association acted as a go-between for the Chinese community and the 
Japanese authorities.  
Known as the grand old man of Singapore’s Chinese Society, Lim Boon Keng 
appeared to support the Japanese Military Administration. In actuality, he practised passive 
resistance. Lim knew that he was powerless to fight the Japanese, but he stood his ground by 
taking little part in any of the OCA’s activities. Often, he would pretend to be drunk so that he 
would not have to deal with the Japanese. After the War, he was exonerated from all blame by 
the British authorities.442 
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Chapter 5 
Dynamics between the Japanese and the Masses in Hong Kong and Singapore 
 
5.1 Winning the hearts and minds of the Chinese in Singapore: The Role of the Advisory 
Council and the Epposho 
Until the end of 1942, the only local people who played a role in the Japanese 
government of Singapore were the few who held subordinate positions in government offices. 
Political considerations were subordinate to military and economic needs and contingent upon 
the restoration of “peace and order”. Thus, not surprisingly, the military’s monopolization of 
the government left little room for anyone other than officers. However, as the Allies began to 
fight back, more and more attention had to be paid to political considerations as part of an 
overall defence strategy. By the spring of 1943, when Japanese expansion had reached its 
outer limits, Japan had depleted a substantial proportion of its naval and air power and 
resources in the operations in Guadalcanal and New Guinea, although it had not yet suffered 
any decisive defeat. In the shift from an offensive to a defensive strategy, the new acquisitions 
were no longer served as stepping stones to further expansion but simply the outer perimeter 
of a defensive shield. The Japanese military administration’s overriding concern became 
identifying a strategy to consolidate and “protect gains already made” and avoiding a 
complete defeat.443  
It was with this concern in mind that in a June 1943 speech to the Diet, Tojo promised 
“participation in politics within this year to Malaya, Sumatra, Java, Borneo and the Celebes, 
according to their cultural conditions”,444 proposing that local inhabitants be appointed as 
                                                 
443 F. C. Jones, Borton, H., and Pearn, B.R., “The Far East 1942-1946,” in Survey of International Affairs 1939-
1946, ed. A. Toynbee (New York: Oxford University Press, 1955), 111. 
444 W. H. Elsbree, Japan’s role in Southeast Asian nationalist movements, 1940 to 1945, (Cambridge, Mass.: 
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government officials as much as possible, with those of superior ability being promoted as 
often as possible. Realization of this proposal began on 3 October 1943, when the Malayan 
Gunsei announced the formation of Consultative Councils in the provinces and the cities and 
the participation of local people in the administration to secure greater cooperation from the 
people in the war effort. Only one Japanese, either the Governor or the Mayor, would serve as 
on the Councils as the Chairman to select the number of honorary Councillors that he deemed 
appropriate from among the local inhabitants to serve an unspecified term, submitting their 
names for approval to the Gunseikan. The Councillors should be men of wide knowledge and 
influence; prepared to cooperate with the Gunsei; and numerically representative of their 
ethnic groups in a manner roughly proportionate to their population in respective areas, with 
weight being given to the Malays. There were no fixed days for meetings; the Chairman could 
call a meeting whenever he deemed necessary, and could invite his staff to participate in the 
proceedings. 
The Syonan Consultative Council established on 7 December, 1943 consisted of six 
Chinese, four Malay, three Indian, one Eurasian, and one Arab Councillor.445 The Mayor 
asserted that the Council was established to advise the Tokubetsu-si in the execution of its 
general policies and to enable the people to participate in the administration of their own 
affairs. The Council was therefore to discuss (and only discuss) matters of public interest, 
with the agenda of each meeting being decided by the Government and then circulated to the 
Councillors, who were to submit written opinions upon them before coming to the Council for 
discussion. The final decision on issues rested with the Government. Reports of the first and 
second meetings of the Council on 21 January 1944 and 7 August 1944, respectively, and the 
address of the Mayor to the first meeting indicate that the matters discussed were primarily 
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identifying ways and means of strengthening the war effort, and concerned the welfare of the 
people only insofar as it was incidental to strengthening the war effort.446  
The establishment of the Syonan Consultative Council was followed by that an 
Information and Publicity Committee had been formed 447 whose members had been chosen 
from among the “leading” citizens of Syonan, with the Mayor acting as Chairman. The 
Committee primarily engaged in two actions—providing information to the Chairman on 
public matters at its monthly meetings after studying and investigating public tendency and 
thought and, in turn, explaining the policies and actions of the Government to the public by 
various means, such as lectures, round-table conferences, pamphlets, and public broadcasts—
both of which, the Mayor hoped, would encourage the people to “co-operate with the 
government voluntarily”. 
War setbacks compelled the military to re-evaluate its policy towards the Chinese, 
which, as previously discussed, was particularly important as changes in the attitude among 
high Gunsei officials in Tokyo and Syonan continued to emerge. It was under such 
circumstances that the Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference of 31 May 
1943 adopted the policies contained within the document “General Principles Governing the 
Political Guidance of Great East Asia”. As part of the programme for solidifying the unity of 
Asian countries, the Japanese government decided to allow indigenous peoples of the 
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southern region to participate in local political affairs according to their ability.448 On the 
question of Chinese political participation, however, there soon emerged an intra-factional 
conflict between the hardline and moderate factions within the Army, with the hardliners 
continuing to oppose the moderates’ calls for appointing Chinese to higher posts.449  
In the end, compromise was reached when the document “Political Participation of 
Indigenous Peoples” of 26 June was approved by the Liaison Conference, which contained 
the clause, “The decision for the [timing] of their [Chinese] political participation should be 
determined in accordance with the progress of the political participation of indigenous 
peoples [Malays, Indians, and Eurasians]”.450 However, the hardliners were by no means 
happy with this compromise, as indicated by the remarks of Fujimura and Major General 
Isoya Goro, a new Gunseikan. Fujimura, who had returned from Tokyo after attending a 
meeting of military administrators, conveyed the hardline faction’s view by stating, “[The 
hardliners] in the Army are not desirous of stimulating the political consciousness of the 
Chinese. Therefore, they must not be appointed to higher administration posts in central and 
provincial governments. Malays are preferred to fill these posts”. 451  Addressing the 
Somubucho of Malayan state governments, Isoya stated that the hardliners wished to limit the 
number of Chinese in the political council to “a minimum level”, but only so far as their lack 
of representation would not “constitute an obstacle in getting their cooperation”.452  
Within the Army in general, a strong antipathy towards the Chinese remained apparent. 
Commenting on the lack of an understanding within the Army of the Nanyang Chinese, 
General Inada Masazumi, Deputy Chief of Staff of the SEA, wrote that the Army had not yet 
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“seriously grappled with the problem”.453 However, the opposition appeared to subside over 
the following months. When advisory councils were organized in Syonan and in each Malay 
state in December, not only were Chinese representatives included in the councils, but the 
representation of the Chinese community was higher in proportion to other ethnic groups, 
including the Malays, as shown in table 5.1 . Professor Itagaki Yoichi, former member of the 
Gunseikambu research section in charge of political affairs, noted that the larger Chinese 
representation reflected the growing Gunsei realization of the importance and strength of the 
Chinese. 454  The general integration of the Chinese might, as Professor Willard Elsbree 
observed, “serve to blunt Chinese opposition and prevent it from being the core of an anti-
Japanese movement. [However] the fact that other racial groups, such as Eurasians, Arabs, 
and Indians, were included in the new effort would indicate that it was not just another tactic 
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Table 5.1 
Proportionate Representation according to Ethnic Groups in Singapore (Syonan) and State 
Advisory Councils, 1943456 
 Malays Chinese Indians  Eurasians Arabs Total 
Syonan 4 6 3 1 1 15 
Malacca 7 5 2 1 0 15 
Penang 5 7 3 0 0 15 
Johore 7 3 2 0 0 12 
Negri 
Sembilan 
7 3 2 0 0 12 
Selangor 4 6 4 0 0 14 
Pahang 5 3 1 0 0 9 
Perak 14 4 2 0 0 20 
TOTAL 53 37 19 2 1 112 
 
5.11 The Epposho  
While Hamada was forced to follow the established Japanization programme in 
education, he accomplished, in large measure, his objective of establishing communications 
with the Chinese and improving relations with Chinese communities. It seems that Hamada 
expended a large part of his energy in achieving this goal during his brief tenure as the 
Somubucho. Prior to the delivery of his 31 May address to company representatives and 
rikenyas, Hamada had held meetings with a number of influential Chinese about how to 
improve Japanese-Chinese relations. Their suggestions provided him with useful ideas for 
organizing an Epposho, an information office modelled after Sun Yat-sen’s Yueh pao she, an 
innovative institution that provided a completely new direction to Chinese policy in Penang. 
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Many civilian Gunsei officers involved in the project hailed it as the most constructive 
programme, giving the credit without hesitation to Hamada for its initial success.457 The 
Epposho was designed for “establishing a self-sufficient Malaya, restraining and controlling 
monopolistic Japanese firms and kumiais, relaxing suppressive measures toward the Chinese, 
utilizing, under the slogan of a unified community spirit, Chinese labour and capital resources, 
winning Chinese public sentiments, and promoting a Chinese cooperating spirit”.458 The idea 
grew out of Hamada's conviction that the Nanyang Chinese “could not be ignored for the 
solution of the China problem”,459 which had been sapping Japan’s national and military 
strength for the past seven years. 
Hamada organized the Epposho as an agency charged with gathering and 
disseminating information to “enlighten” the Chinese, studying their conditions to identify the 
means of winning their hearts and cooperation, and providing a channel through which the 
Chinese could cooperate voluntarily with the Japanese. Theoretically, the Somubucho of the 
Penang State Government was the Head of the Epposho. However, personnel from the 
Gunseikambu Research Department, a group of scholars recruited from the Tokyo College of 
Commerce, actually ran the organization under the general supervision of Professor Akamatsu 
Kaname, Chief of the Research Department, to whom Hamada and Captain Hidaka Shinsaku, 
Commander of the Penang Naval Base, had entrusted the entire programme. Based on a 
preliminary study of recruiting Chinese for the Epposho prepared by Mukai Umeji, one of the 
Department's researchers, a number of candidates were interviewed, and thirteen intellectual 
young Chinese were selected on the criteria that they were of good family and trustworthy. In 
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addition, the Gunsei authorities appointed twelve Chinese, prominent in business and 
community circles, as advisers to the Epposho,460 all of whom, at Hamada's suggestion, were 
guaranteed a means of livelihood and immunity from arrest.461 
The Epposho initially served as a venue for receiving and addressing complaints from 
Chinese residents. According to Kirita Naosaku and Hotta Takeo, coordinators between the 
military authorities and the Chinese, most Chinese complaints dealt with the expropriation of 
businesses and factories by Japanese firms, the high-handed actions of provincial government 
bureaucrats, and Kempeitai arrests. 462  The Gunseikambu acted immediately upon these 
grievances, sometimes over the objections and demurs of state officials and the Kempei. 
Epposho workers at times appealed directly to the naval base command to prevail upon 
obstinate bureaucrats, thus cutting through the otherwise unavoidable red tape. Although the 
Epposho displeased provincial bureaucrats, Hamada and Hidaka approved its work, thus 
insulating it from bureaucratic interference.463 
As part of its programme to win the hearts and minds of the Chinese, the 
Gunseikambu authorized the Epposho to provide recreational facilities for Chinese mariners, 
transport rice by junks from Thailand, and distribute rice and other daily necessities to the 
destitute at a reduced price in the Epposho’s name. As Kirita observed, the programme 
prioritized establishing economic self-sufficiency over realizing high-minded theories or 
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engaging in propaganda for constructing the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.464 
Having a special permit to possess their own vehicles, Epposho workers travelled extensively 
throughout the state to listen to complaints, returning with valuable information that assisted 
the Gunseikambu in administrative matters and in maintaining security. Because they were 
immune from arrest, Chinese workers were able to discuss and criticize the Gunsei free from 
fear of reprisal by the Kempei. The Gunseikambu respected their candid opinions, many of 
which were translated into actual policy to the greatest extent possible.465 
As the Epposho became a centre of political action, offering opinions and proposals 
for reform in the Gunsei, it proved problematical for Fujimura, Hamada’s immediate superior 
as Gunseikan and concurrently Chief of Staff of the Twenty-Ninth Army at Taiping. Fujimura 
appeared not to be a whole-hearted enthusiast for the rapid expansion of Epposho activities, if 
not for the institution itself. After the Epposho movement had spread from Penang to Syonan 
and Kuala Lumpur by August, Hamada tried to introduce the programme on a much larger 
scale to Taiping, an urban centre with a large Chinese population and the seat of the Malay 
Gunseikambu. Being the Gunsei Executive Officer, Hamada was much concerned with 
winning popular support for the military, which was vital in the event of an enemy invasion.  
Conflict between the two officers was perhaps inevitable. While Fujimura viewed the 
Epposho strictly as part of short-term military strategy and operations, Hamada viewed it 
broadly from a long-term Gunsei objective. “Military necessity” had once again reared its 
head. The disagreement ended in Hamada's reassignment in October 1944.466 With Hamada's 
departure from the pivotal position, this worthy programme came to a standstill, and, not 
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surprisingly, Epposhos founded in Syonan and Kuala Lumpur “did not produce the desired 
result”.467 
Despite its relatively brief period of influence, the institution of the Epposho was 
responsible for several beneficial outcomes. First, it created a better understanding between 
the Japanese and the Chinese, removing considerably, although not entirely, the barrier of 
distrust the Chinese in Penang had been harbouring. An extraordinary episode of Chinese 
defence for Japanese defendants during postwar trials in Penang illustrated the extent of 
understanding and friendship that had been created by the Epposho venture.468 Second, the 
Epposho was largely instrumental in maintaining the rice transport from Thailand and in 
collecting and distributing other foods and necessities for Malaya. Under the Epposho’s 
guidance, a group of Chinese rice merchants operated a junk traffic in rice from the North that 
imported more than three thousand tons of rice per month at a time when Japanese overland 
and seaborne traffic was largely paralyzed. The Chinese were now indispensable in supplying 
rice, vegetables, and other goods for the military. In this manner, the Japanese-controlled 
economy became largely dependent upon the Chinese, allowing them to play an increasingly 
important role in the Malayan economy.469 
Third, the successful Penang Epposho venture inspired Malays to petition the 
authorities to organize their own Epposho. The first Malay Hodosho (Office of Help and 
Guidance) was established in Penang in May 1945 as “the most suitable measure for the 
understanding of the people in Malaya”.470 Most important in the creation of the Hodosho is 
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that the Gunsei authorities integrated the Epposho with the Hodosho in an attempt to 
administer the Chinese and Malays as one Malayan people instead of dividing and ruling 
them. As Elsbree and Benda point out, although the hostility between the Chinese and Malays 
increased during the occupation, it was not “the result of deliberate Japanese policy”.471 
Indeed, the objectives of the Hodosho were “to foster and promote the spirit of mutual 
understanding and cooperation of all communities, to eliminate antagonistic feelings and 
racial prejudices through collaboration in the Hodosho, and . . . to re-create social unity in 
Malaya by the people's awakening to common social responsibility and common 
consciousness of their own homeland”.472 A postwar Chinese characterization of the Hodosho 
as nothing other another form of police control under the cloak of maintaining law and order 
is neither accurate nor just. 473  The Hodosho and Epposho were, instead, a desperate 
experiment to win the popular support of all Malayan people irrespective of their ethnicity, 
one that came too late to realize its objectives and ideals. 
 
5.2 Winning the Hearts and Minds of the Chinese in Hong Kong: The Role of the 
District and Area Bureaux and Wards 
5.21 District Bureaux and Wards 
The delegation of functions at a local level began in mid-January 1942, when the 
Gunseicho assigned responsibility for maintaining the food supply in Hong Kong to the 
prominent lawyer Peter H. Sin.474 Within several days, Sin presented his proposal: The entire 
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population should be registered by household, and each household issued a rice ration card; 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon should be divided into districts, and each district should 
operate a rice-rationing station from which card-carrying citizens could collect their supplies. 
The Gunseicho not merely accepted Sin’s scheme but assigned him the leading role in its 
implementation, earning him the appreciative sobriquet of “the Mayor of Hong Kong” from 
the Chinese public.475 
Building on the framework envisaged by Sin, the authorities established twelve 
District Bureaux for Hong Kong Island and six for Kowloon between January and July 1942. 
The districts in Hong Kong were Central, Wanchai, Bowington Canal, Happy Valley, Cause-
way Bay, Shaukiwan, Sheung Wan (Western), Saiyingpun, West Point, Kennedy Town, 
Aberdeen, and Stanley, administered by P. H. Sin, Ho Yat-yue, Ho Tak-Kwong, Ng Man-
chak, Kwok Hin-wan, Tsang Sau-chiu, Siu Wai-ming, Li Kai-sun, Suen Kwong-Kuen, Kwok 
Man, Wan Siu-po, and Li Chung, respectively. The districts in Kowloon were Tsimshatsui, 
Yaumati, Mongkok, Shamshiupo, Hunghom, and Kowloon City, administered by Leung Kai, 
Fung Ho, Chung Yung, Ng Yee-kong, Lee Lan-sum, and Tai Yeuk-lam, respectively. 
In addition to the basic tasks of household registration and rice rationing, the Bureaux 
were assigned a wide range of responsibilities within their jurisdictions, including health and 
welfare, the preparation of an annual budget, and the determination of the rights and duties of 
the local inhabitants. Their most striking feature was their composition; starting with Sin, who 
was placed in charge of the Bureau for the Central District of Hong Kong, all the Bureau 
Chiefs, their deputies, and the twenty-odd members of their staff were local Chinese. 
Moreover, each Bureau was advised by a District Assembly consisting of between five and 
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ten Chinese householders.476 As if to emphasize their importance, the Bureau Chiefs were 
granted the privilege of direct access to the Governor's Office. Although initially obliged to 
support them with direct financial aid from the central government, the Japanese envisaged 
making them self-supporting at a later stage. 
The increase in local representation did not end with the Bureaux. On 9 February 1942, 
the Hong Kong News reported that 131 ward leaders had been elected in the Central District, 
and predicted that two thousand ward leaders would, in due course, be elected to represent 
wards throughout the twelve districts of Hong Kong Island. In theory, the establishment of 
wards, each comprised of thirty households, conferred a degree of authority on local citizens 
at the grassroots level. By September, the constituencies had been redesigned, and although 
no more mention was made of elections, the drive to organize grassroots representation 
continued. Street committees were established to represent the householders, and an initial 
777 residents of Hong Kong Island had been designated as leaders of the individual streets. 
By February 1943, 1,366 street chiefs on Hong Kong Island and 1,462 in Kowloon were 
serving as representatives of the householders.477 
On 20 July 1942, new regulations for the District Bureaux mandated that the Chiefs 
and Vice-Chiefs be appointed by the Governor and the remaining staff by the Chief. District 
Councils of from five to ten members were to be selected by each District Chief from among 
the residents to approve his decisions. These unpaid councillors were to serve for two years 
and could resign only by permission of the Governor. The regulations also provided for the 
means by which residents would contribute to the expenses of their District Bureaux, with the 
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Bureaux were stated to be wholly Chinese. See Hong Kong News, March 5, May 25 and July 27, 1943. The 
Chinese heads of the various District Bureaux are listed in the document “Scheme of the Present Japanese 
Government at Hong Kong” drawn up by the British through their Indian censorship office and circulated 
August 25, 1943, HS 1/171, 2. For information on the District Assemblies, See Hong Kong News, July 22, 1942; 
Li, Hong Kong Surgeon, 156-7; Tse, San Nian, 80, 82. 
477 Hong Kong News, February 24, 1943. One street chief on Hong Kong Island represented forty households 
and one in Kowloon ten to twenty. 
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amount and method of collection being subject to the Governor’s approval. At the same time, 
the two Chinese Councils were empowered to advise the District Bureaux and help them 
communicate with the Secretariat so that Chinese habits and customs could be given more 
consideration. The names of the District Chiefs and Vice-Chiefs were announced on 23 July 
1942.  
The regulations also explicitly stated the functions of the District Bureaux. They were 
“first-line administrative bodies carrying out decisions of the Government at a level of direct 
contact with the people. Secondly they were autonomous bodies with power to raise funds 
locally and vote them for local purposes. Thirdly they should assist and supplement the work 
of the two Chinese Advisory Councils”. Nevertheless, the District Bureaux never became 
fully autonomous, for the Governor’s Office continued for to pay all their expenses and, 
naturally, retain control. It was not until June 1943 that the Secretary-General announced at a 
press conference that the District Bureaux were to become self-supporting, and invited 
suggestions as to how funding would be raised.  
In December 1943, all the District Bureau Chiefs met to discuss plans for compulsory 
education, and in June 1944 established means of registering all births and deaths. The first 
real pressure to allow the Bureaux to raise their own funding came from the Bureaux 
themselves, and then not until October 1944, when the rise in the cost of living brought 
demands for increased salaries. However, the Japanese administration refused to treat the 
officials of the District Bureaux differently from other Government employees. After the new 
Governor, Lieutenant-General Tanaka, had taken office, the administration finally agreed in 
March 1945 that each District Bureaux should fund its own expenses by mandating that each 
family contribute roughly MY30 per month and business firms up to MY300 a month. Such 
was the situation until the defeat of Japan several months later brought the Bureaux to an end. 
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A similar devolution took place in the New Territories. Looking to the New 
Territories’ elders to maintain order, the Japanese established District Bureaux in the 
important centres, and covered administrative costs by levying a tax on agricultural produce 
collected at barriers on the roads to the towns. Generally, they recognized Chinese law and 
custom, and seem to have treated the villagers justly if strictly. The New Territories were 
vital in the declared policy of making Hong Kong self-supporting; nevertheless, the Japanese 
imposed no production targets, preferring to improve farming in the New Territories as part 
of a development policy. In the absence of any effective Japanese control during the early 
weeks of the takeover, authority in the New Territories had been assumed in a haphazard 
fashion by the village elders and the leading traders, who ran the chambers of commerce in 
the market towns. Uneducated and even more ignorant than the urban elites of the events 
occurring in the outside world, these rural leaders for the most part acquiesced to Japanese 
rule without a struggle. The Japanese accordingly confirmed their authority, and in some 
ways enlarged it. The village elders were organized into self-governing committees, and the 
chambers of commerce were recognized as components of a newly formed network of ten 
rural District Bureaux. Like their counterparts in the cities, these rural bodies were 
responsible for allotting rice rations, but were also expected to act as purchasing agents for 
the Japanese troops in the neighbourhood and provide labour for local construction 
schemes.478  
In November 1943, an Agricultural Training Institute opened at Fanling into which 
thirty-four students eventually matriculated. In March 1943, a Hong Kong Fertilizer 
Syndicate was formed and the Taipo Experimental Farm established under the Taiwan 
Engineering Company, which also prepared large irrigation schemes; distributed first-grade 
                                                 
478 See David Faure, “Sai Kung: The Making of the District and its Experience during World War II”, Journal of 
the Hong Kong Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol.22, 1982, 122-4. The author is also indebted for this 
paragraph to Mr. Chan at the Hong Kong Museum of History for his lecture of October 18, 1995. The 
establishment of the first rural District Bureaux is reported in Hong Kong News, March 27, 1942. 
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vegetable seeds; and, in March 1944, an improved rice strain. Fish ponds for good supply 
were promoted, and construction of roads such as that to Saikung, later to be completed by 
the British, were begun. 
Despite these measures, the New Territories experienced hard times. The Japanese 
imposed restrictions on movement, required visitors to obtain a permit or an identity card, 
and banned the export of rice. Lack of transport affected delivery of vegetables, which had to 
be brought in by hand-carts, and fishing was hazardous. Not surprisingly, many young men 
drifted off to join the guerrillas as the only alternative to remaining at home semi-starved and 
in rags. The villagers, particularly the Hakkas, were subject to communist propaganda, 
leading to a rift between the communist youth and the elders, especially when the latter 
promised to aid the Japanese in dealing with British agents, an undertaking that they probably 
had no intention of honouring.  
5.22 A Case Study—Central District Bureau in the Japanese Occupation of Hong Kong  
 On 21 January 1942, the Japanese set up new government agencies in Hong Kong 
called District Bureaux; there were twelve for Hong Kong Island and six for Kowloon. Each 
of these entities, under a Chinese official, was responsible for public health, business, 
repatriation, and welfare for the residents of the district, as well as for representing residents’ 
needs and wishes to the Japanese authorities. For instance, prominent Chinese lawyer Peter H. 
Sin (Sin Ping-hei; 冼秉憙) was appointed head of the Central District Bureau and was 
popularly referred to as ‘the Mayor of Hong Kong’.479 Early in February 1942, a scheme for 
dividing each district into wards was announced, on a basis of thirty families for each ward. 
The Central District Bureau immediately named 131 Chinese ward leaders. 
                                                 
479 See Hong Kong Administration, Office of Strategic Services, U.S. Department of State, Office of Intelligence Research, 
dated January 12, 1945, reproduced in Appendix 8. 
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 The Central District Bureau underwent significant development at this stage. As early 
as 1 March 1942, it was made responsible for rice rationing; the census on which the rationing 
was based followed automatically. From 15 April 1942, it gave residents free assistance and 
advice related to the completion of the numerous forms by which the Japanese sought to 
control every aspect of Hong Kong life—a service that had to be prolonged beyond the two 
months originally suggested.480 
 The Central District Bureau was even responsible for all ‘migration’ inside the district. 
People wishing to move were required (under the threat of ‘severe punishment’ for non-
compliance) to report the move to the District Bureaux in charge of their old and new 
neighborhoods in addition to the local branches of the Kempeitai. Further, the change in 
residents’ whereabouts was recorded on boards that were hung up outside every building to 
indicate the names of the occupants. Residents’ physical progress around town was also 
impeded by checkpoints and barriers. When the Governor swept from one place to another, a 
senior officer passed through on a tour of inspection, or some secret troop movement was 
being conducted, all traffic in the Central District was brought to a halt. Pedestrians were 
expected to ‘freeze’ where they stood until the cortege had passed and were sometimes 
obliged to remain in their ‘frozen’ posture for up to eight hours.481 
 Peter H. Sin, the ‘Mayor of Hong Kong’, hoped to revert to his pre-war legal practice 
after his year-long service as chairman of the Central District Bureau. In April 1943, one year 
after their first petition to the Governor’s Office, the members of the Association of Chinese 
Lawyers of Hong Kong were finally given permission to stage an inaugural ceremony. But 
what kind of law could be practised under a military regime? The chief of the General Affairs 
                                                 
480 The chief of the Civil Affairs Department of the government explained that the District Bureaux were the ‘same as those 
in towns and villages in Nippon; they cannot be regarded as autonomous bodies as they are being supported by the 
Governor’s Office…apart from the distribution of rice, the bureaus will henceforth look after the distribution of other 
essential commodities of the populace and look after public health and other welfare work.’ See Hong Kong News, July 20, 
1942. 
481 Snow, Fall of Hong Kong, 151. 
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Department in the Governor’s Office reminded Peter Sin and his fellow solicitors that their 
function could only be to ‘assist in the proper administration of martial law’ insofar as it 
impinged on civil matters.482  
 At the end of June 1943, staff of the Central District Bureau petitioned the head of 
their Area Bureau for an increase in salary and extra rice rations. As a result, in the spring of 
1944, the authorities made it clear that rice rations would still be maintained for those people 
directly involved in the war effort and the reconstruction of the ‘new Hong Kong’. In practice, 
this provision applied to the members of the two Chinese Councils, the staff of the Governor’s 
Office and the District Bureaux, and the employees of firms working closely with the 
Imperial forces. Rice supplies were also to be kept up for the families of people in these 
categories.483 
             Low-grade functionaries also seem to have done their share of good works. Beginning 
at the end of 1943, the Bureaux chiefs were said to be spearheading a renewed effort to 
organize free schooling for children of the poorer classes. The Central District Bureau was 
reported to be operating free medical centres and to be raising funds for the rescue of newborn 
babies and invalids who were being found abandoned at the roadside. 
 New emphasis was placed on the role of the District Bureaux. On 12 January 1945, the 
day after Tanaka took over, the Governor’s Office declared rather peevishly that although 
Hong Kong people had been accustomed to having their street cleaning and refuse clearance 
done for them, ‘they should try to do this work themselves.’484 The task was promptly handed 
down to the District Bureaux. By the end of February, the Central District Bureau had been 
                                                 
482 Hong Kong News, April 16 and 17, 1943. 
483 In November 1943, the garrison troops joined hands with the South China Expeditionary Force on the mainland to clear 
the Nationalists from the stretch of the Kowloon-Canton railway line between Shenzhen on the border and the town of 
Shilong, and the following month the line was formally declared open for the first time in six years. Hope was now held out 
for new shipments of rice and vegetables overland from Guangdong province, which would offset to some extent the colony’s 
near-total inability to bring goods in by sea. In the meantime, the elite were to be shielded from the worst effects of the 
regime’s decision to abandon the distribution of rice to the Chinese masses. See Snow, Fall of Hong Kong, 209. 
484 Hong Kong News, January 12, 1945. 
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divided into fifty-two sections, each of which was supposed to raise funds from householders 
to pay the wages of the local ‘sanitary coolies’.485 Moreover, the Central District Bureau was 
also called upon to maintain order by backing the police and by helping to rid the colony of its 
destitute masses. Two or three Chinese from the Central District were asked to join the gentry 
on the Police Affairs Committee, and Bureau staff are said to have been present regularly at 
police stations. However, the Hong Kong News went so far as to publish a critical editorial 
opposing the Tanaka administration’s plan to let the Bureaux raise their own funds and 
denouncing them as ‘sanctuaries of complacent egotists’ that had ‘outlived their 
usefulness’.486 
 Nevertheless, in late March 1945, the Central District Bureau was assigned the job of 
distributing Residents’ Certificates, a new device that had been introduced to help track down 
subversives and vagrants, and it was given the power to issue exit permits ‘to simplify the 
procedure for people wanting to leave.’487 In May 1945, Chan Kwai-pok, who had taken over 
from the ‘Mayor of Hong Kong’ in the Central District, appealed to the rice merchants to 
desist from their habit of profiteering and to play their part in providing affordable food. By 
July, they appear to have been on the point of inheriting almost all of the routine functions of 
local administration. In the middle of that month, a meeting of District Assemblymen was 
held at the Central District Bureau for the purpose of discussing the ‘work of self-governing 
by residents’ and to examine a plan that had been drawn up to that end.488 
 From the perspective of the public, there is some evidence to suggest that the Hong 
Kong people were by and large fairly comfortable with the schoolmasters, storekeepers, and 
                                                 
485 Hong Kong News, February 28, 1945. Within two weeks, the Bureau was said to be employing thirty ‘coolies’ to sweep 
the District’s roads. Hong Kong News, March 11, 1945. 
486  Hong Kong News, March 17, 1945. 
487 Hong Kong News, March 24, 27, and 28; May 7; and June 11, 1945. See also testimony of Lieutenant-Colonel Kanazawa, 
Kanazawa trial, WO 235/1093, 347-8. Kanazawa appears to confuse the Residents’ Certificates and exit permits. 
488 Hong Kong News, 18 July 1945. The District Bureaux were also earmarked as key sounding-boards through which the 
authorities might ‘obtain a full knowledge of the people’s opinion’. See Hong Kong News, July 21 and 29 and August 8, 1945; 
Endacott and Birch, Hong Kong Eclipse, 133. 
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other obscure worthies who were selected to serve as their local chiefs in the Central District. 
It was widely recognized that the staff of the Central District Bureau were in a difficult 
position, and they were not generally viewed as collaborators.489 The Bureau staff continued 
to maintain in post-war testimonials that their Bureaux were ‘organizations for the people’, 
and that ‘therefore we had the closest connection with the population’.490 
 Peter H. Sin worked under Major-General Yazaki Kanju in the Civil Affairs 
Department and provided an alternate channel, a check and balance against the two Chinese 
Councils under Robert Kotewell and Shouson Chow. Therefore, Peter H. Sin came to be, after 
Kotewell and Chow, the third most responsible Chinese in Hong Kong and among the 
English-speaking Chinese of the ‘captured territory’. He was also called the ‘Mayor’, 
although this title implies the possession of powers that, as a minion of the Japanese, he did 
not enjoy.  
5.23 Area Bureaux 
For the Japanese, the objective of delegation was not, of course, to surrender control 
of the colony. On the contrary, the Japanese were doing all in their power to exert control as 
intensively as conditions allowed. In creating new Chinese-run bodies, for instance, they took 
care to provide against any danger that those bodies might evolve into genuine centres of 
power. Supervisory structures were simultaneously established to severely limit the freedom 
of action that the new Chinese bodies in theory enjoyed. In April 1942, for example, Isogai 
and his colleagues introduced a still further layer of local government in the form of the 
establishment of three Area Bureaux in Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and the New 
Territories491 headed by Japanese officials492 that acted as checks on the Chinese-run District 
                                                 
489  David Faure, ‘Sai Kung: The Making of the District’, 123-4. 
490 Testimony of Lo Chung-ching, head of Stanley District Bureau and near-identical testimony of Kwok Hin-wang, head of 
Causeway Bay District Bureau and Kan Man, head of Kennedy Town District Bureau, Noma trial, WO 235/1999, 300, 305, 
307. The British prosecutor, Major D. G. MacGregor of the Black Watch, expressed agreement with these assertions. See 
Ibid., Prosecutor’s Opening Address, 12-13. 
491 Hong Kong News, April 16 and 22, 1942. See also Endacott and Birch, Hong Kong Eclipse, 129. In the Hong 
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Bureaux. As such, their Japanese chiefs were given authority over the District Bureaux in all 
major fields of activity, including education, health, and the rice supply, and went on tours of 
their Bureaux to ensure that they were functioning as intended.  
It was the Area rather than the District Bureau Chiefs who selected local householders 
to sit on the District Assemblies, appointed “responsible citizens” to serve as street leaders, 
and organized the Street Committees according to detailed regulations regarding their duties 
and personnel. Each maintained the three sub-offices of a General Office to address matters 
regarding general business, finance, education, and culture; an Economic Office for those 
regarding the economy, communications, transport, and the development of raw materials; 
and a Health Office for those regarding public health and medical services. They were 
comprised of a Chief, a Deputy Chief, and three Assistant Chiefs, who were all Japanese, and 
forty-two Chinese personnel.  
As the three Area Bureaux were responsible to the Chief of the Governor’s Office for 
the execution of the decisions of the administration, they formed an essential part of the 
machinery by which the Japanese governed the Colony. The Japanese could learn of Chinese 
opinion on matters of general policy through the two Chinese Councils, which had advisory 
powers only, and the impact of the administration on the life of the people through the District 
Bureaux. The District Bureaux were expected to work through the Area Bureaux, where the 
authority truly rested, but their Chinese Heads enjoyed the right to communicate with the 
Governor’s Office directly, and therefore never became simply puppets. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Kong News, the Area Bureaux are often confusingly referred to as “District Bureaux” or simply “Bureaux”. I 
have followed Endacott and Birch in using the term “Area Bureaux” to distinguish them from the District 
Bureaux set up to implement the rice rationing scheme of Peter H. Sin. In Chinese quite distinct terms are used, 
viz. diqu shiwu suo for the Area Bureaux and qu zheng suo for the District Bureaux. 
492 Even here, however, Chinese staff were employed at a junior level. See, for example, Hong Kong News, June 
11, 19, and 23, 1943. 
 206
5.24 Significance of the District and Area Bureau System  
The District Bureaux were important elements in the Japanese administration of Hong 
Kong. Although they became more self-sufficient only just before the Japanese defeat, they 
proved themselves able to establish collective local responsibility for individual behaviour 
and obedience to Japanese regulations. As such, they were hated by the local inhabitants. 
However, the Area Bureaux were not intended to supersede or displace the Chinese-staffed 
District Bureaux and their ward leaders but rather work along with them while enjoying much 
greater actual authority. In practice, the District Bureaux were only supplementary to the Area 
Bureaux, although the former always enjoyed a channel to higher Japanese authorities 
independent of the Area Bureau in which they were encompassed. As the existence of the two 
forms of organization tended to create a certain amount of confusion as to which held 
ultimate responsibility, they provided a means of checks and counterchecks in accordance 
with the suspicious nature of Japanese rule. 
The Japanese administrative model clearly contrasted with the British model, under 
which only a relatively small number of Chinese was allowed to serve on the Executive and 
Legislative Councils. In the Japanese model, actual control was exercised by (1) the Governor 
and his office, the latter comprised of administrative departments directed by a group of 
Japanese experts and administrators who numbered no less than eight hundred and probably 
well over a thousand; (2) the Area Bureaux, which were directed by about two hundred 
Japanese officials; and (3) the gendarmerie. Few doubt that the British model was 
incomparably the better one; the rule provided by the Japanese administrative bodies was 
completely ruthless, interested in the lives of the governed only as much as they could further 
Japanese aggrandizement and power, and unhindered by any concerns regarding freedom, 
justice, or popular representation that could possibly arise to embarrass their single-minded 
pursuit of the aims of the Japanese Empire. 
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However, a closer examination reveals that a large number of Chinese were associated 
with this rule: the leaders of the Chinese community formed the four-man Representative 
Council; the major trades and activities of the colony were represented on the twenty-two-
man Cooperative Council; the eighteen District Bureaux, each with a Chief, a Deputy Chief, 
and a Chinese staff, employed several hundred Chinese in responsible advisory positions; and 
likely as many as three thousand “ward leaders” served their respective wards. Among the 
many motives for allowing Chinese “representation”, the most compelling was as a technique 
of control. Every Chinese with whom the Japanese associated with their administrative 
machinery was answerable to his superiors, and his defection could be the more readily 
detected and punished because of the responsibilities that he had assumed. By this means, the 
Japanese increased the strength of their hold on many of the most prominent Chinese, for 
whom adequate performance of the tasks assigned to them was required to “save face” in the 
community, and their self-respect thus inextricably associated with successfully serving the 
Emperor of Japan. 
Whereas the two Chinese Councils were primarily used as a type of megaphone for 
transmitting orders from the Governor’s Office to the general public, the District Bureaux 
were used to place Hong Kong under the minute supervision of daily life that had been 
exercised in the towns and countryside of Japan since the mid-1920s. As such, their main 
tasks were to collect information on the residents through the household registration process 
and “make all the people cooperate fully with the authorities”.493 The Street and Village 
Committees were designed to extend Japan’s grip to the grassroots by enforcing the old and 
draconian East Asian principles of mutual policing and collective responsibility,494 while the 
                                                 
493 Hong Kong News, October 6, 1942. See also Li, Hong Kong Surgeon, 156-7. 
494 See remarks of Lau Tit-shing quoted in Hong Kong News, December 20, 1942 and of Kotewall quoted in 
Hong Kong News, December 29, 1942; Tse, San Nian, p. 81. The policing system referred to as the baojia or 
“household guarantee” system was first introduced in China under the Tang dynasty (AD 618-907), and from 
there imported into Japan. In this context, its imposition in Hong Kong was a reintroduction consistent with the 
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major function of the Street Chiefs and the Village Representatives was to spy on their 
neighbours and report any suspicious activity to the District Bureaux or the Kempeitai. 
Having been established to facilitate administration on the local level, the Area 
Bureaux were directly under the control of the Civil Administration Department. Their role 
was never clearly defined, leading some to speculate that they were a type of parallel 
organization to the District Bureaux. This dissertation proposes that they were equivalent to 
organizations headed by Army men who supervised the work of the civilian administrators at 
the local level that, responsible for duties so general and all-embracing, seemed to have no 
specific function. 
As the true executive organs, the District Bureaux were responsible for conducting the 
census, rationing daily necessities, repatriating the excess population, organizing defence and 
health campaigns, registering inhabitants, transmitting information, and overseeing the wards 
and ward leaders in their districts. Their responsibility to maintain the ration shops was 
especially important, as these shops not only provided the bulk of the food supply to the 
population but also served as the main information centres for transmitting new governmental 
rules and regulations. The functions of the wards and the ward leaders, the grassroots aspects 
of the bureaucracy, were widely publicized and commented on by Japanese authorities in the 
press. Among the many perspectives on the wards, the most succinct analysis of their 
functions may have been given by a member of the Chinese Representative Council, Lau Tit-
shing, who asserted that whereas the military police were negative and covered time, the 
ward leaders were positive and covered space. By this he meant that whereas the tasks of the 
military police were to monitor the inhabitants in the streets and punish those who broke the 
law, those of the ward leaders were teaching people to respect the law and monitoring them in 
                                                                                                                                                        
conqueror’s pan-Asiatic ideas. 
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their homes. The functions of the military police and the ward leaders were thus 
complementary.495 
5.3 Dynamics and Interactions between the Japanese and the Different Classes in Hong 
Kong Society 
The dynamics and interactions between the Japanese and the Hong Kong public 
between 1942 and 1943 differed according to social class.496 In response to the Gunseicho’s 
call for their services, a large numbers of Asians who had occupied junior posts in the British-
run civil service returned to their posts after the Japanese military administration had been 
established. By 5 January 1942, the only remaining obstacle to the return of the Asian police 
was a “dispute over conditions”, whose subsequent resolution resulted in two thousand 
Chinese policeman, seventy-five to eighty percent of whom were members of the old colonial 
police force, serving on the beat two weeks later. At the same time, eighty-five percent of the 
prewar fire brigade returned to their duties, as did about seventy-five percent of the previous 
government’s clerical staff.497 
                                                 
495 Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?, chapter 4. 
496 One result of the extension of Japanese military operations to South China in 1938 was a massive influx of 
refugees into the Colony seeking safety in its traditional security. The Colonial Secretary estimated that during 
the twelve months ending July 1938, a quarter of a million persons entered the Colony by railway and steamer 
alone, and that 30,000 of them were sleeping in the streets. A census of the urban population taken by the air-raid 
wardens during the two nights of 14 and 15 March 1941 gave a total of 1,444,337 persons, of whom 20,000 were 
sleeping on the streets. Adding 200,000 for the New Territories, this gives a total Colony civilian population at 
that date of about 1,650,000, compared to an estimated 997,982 in December 1937 and 988,190 in December 
1936. This huge increase severely taxed available living accommodations and strained the Colony's resources in 
every sphere while greatly increasing the diversity of the population. When the Japanese arrived, they found, in 
addition to the local people, people from neighbouring Kwangtung Province; the Chiu Chow or northern 
Kwangtung people; the Hakka or guest families; the Hok Lo or Fukinese, who were mainly a fishing community; 
the Tanka or Egg families, who lived permanently on boats; and the Shanghainese and other Northerners. These 
Chinese communities lived side by side, having almost as little to do with each other as they had with the 
foreigners. The Chinese remained Chinese at heart, and few were absorbed into the Western community. Most 
came to Hong Kong seeking economic opportunity and looking forward to returning to China when they could 
afford to do so; in the meantime, they asked only that they should be left alone and were quite prepared to shift 
for themselves. Basically law-abiding, they gave little trouble to the authorities, and as they asked for no share in 
political control or for any form of State aid, and they did not expect the government to make any demands on 
them beyond the normal land dues, rates, and indirect taxation on luxuries. 
497 Sa, Xianggang Lunxian Riji, 122-3; Hong Kong News, January 19, 1942; Lieutenant J. D. Clague, Intelligence 
Summary no.1 from Qujiang, May 28, 1942, CO 129 590/24, 161, report on Hong Kong, June 4, 1942, HS 1/171, 
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Equally noticeable was the delegation of functions to petty civil servants and clerical 
personnel, whose skills the Japanese lost no time in utilizing. Reports reaching British 
intelligence in the spring of 1942 stated that while Japanese bureaucrats occupied the more 
senior positions in the new Governor’s Office created by Isogai, all others were held by the 
Hong Kong Chinese.498 Not all of these jobs were entirely menial: one Chinese is known to 
have been employed as Director of the Department of Postal Affairs. It is also apparent that 
many posts were filled by new recruits and prewar civil servants who returned to their posts. 
Quite a number of prestigious new appointments were dispensed to the Hong Kong Chinese 
alumni of Japanese universities, who had assembled during the first fortnight of the takeover 
at the summons of the Koa Kikan. One former clerk who was a Japanese speaker was 
installed as an interpreter in the main Kempeitai office on the Victoria waterfront at the end 
of February.499 
With the return to order came the return to business. In the first weeks of the takeover, 
business operations were largely confined to small enterprises, such as restaurants and barber 
shops, that had few fixed assets and, consequently, few worries regarding looting. By spring, 
a general revival of trade had become apparent, and by mid-1942, 23,812 shops had applied 
for permission to operate again.500  Several small Chinese traders managed to earn hefty 
profits in the midst of general want. Pawn-broking establishments enjoyed a sudden revival, 
with more than thirty having reopened by September 1942, and most firms engaged in what is 
now called recycling doing well. Furniture dealers, for instance, were said to have done good 
business throughout 1942, buying old articles and restoring them to look like new ones, and 
                                                 
498 Calcutta Censor Station, Further Notes on Conditions in Hong Kong, May 13, 1942, CO 129 590/24, 190. 
“Hong Kong Chinese” in this context should be understood to include the Eurasians and Portuguese. 
499 Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, 159. In the same way Luo Jiyi, a Chinese who had worked as a Japanese 
translator for a Hong Kong newspaper, was rapidly put in charge of one of the districts in Kowloon. Sa, 
Xianggang Lunxian Riji, 161. 
500 Hong Kong News, May 3, July 31, and August 19, 1942; Tse, San Nian, 161. Many new businesses were 
reported to have started in the spring, including large numbers of restaurants and teahouses. By the latter part of 
the summer, over 40,000 applications had been submitted for the continuation of trade or the establishment of 
new firms, and 34,000 for the reopening or establishment of shops and stalls. 
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second-hand clothes dealers in the Wanchai District reported good profits for the year. Dyeing 
enterprises were busy, as people poured in to have their clothes darkened, whether for reasons 
of economy or to dodge the attention of the Japanese troops. Quite a number of traders went 
into the freight business, transporting second-hand clothes, medicines, and cooking oil to 
Macao and the mainland and returning with grain. Naturally, business was brisk for coffin 
merchants, about sixty of whom were observed to be functioning. 
5.31 Collaboration with Triads and the Hong Kong Chinese 
The triad organizations also played an important role in the back streets of Hong Kong. 
The Japanese administration stated that if residents still considered Street Guards to be 
necessary, they could “apply to the Governor’s Office for their recognition”. Three weeks 
later, the residents of the Shamshuipo District in Kowloon had organized their “own group of 
watchmen”.501 In September, the conquerors themselves were once again reaching out for 
triad support. Having decided to convert a large section of Wanchai into a red-light district as 
part of their programme for channelling the lusts of the soldiery, they sent out triad gangs to 
evict the inhabitants—and bear the brunt of whatever odium the evictions might entail.502 
Under the Japanese administration, most of the triads were organized into a group 
known as the Hing Ah Kee Kwan (Asia Flourishing Organization), in which the Wo Triad 
played a prominent role. The principal role of the Hing Ah Kee Kwan was to serve as a 
“Peace Aid Corps” responsible for maintaining order and reporting anti-Japanese activities. 
Collaboration was encouraged by Wang Ching Wei from China, and the Ng Chau Hung Mun 
(Five Continents Hung Family) was formed with the purpose of integrating all societies. 
Local societies were willing to collaborate because they were invested with power over local 
citizens and shared in the open organization of prostitution, narcotics, and gambling, which 
had always been the main sources of triad revenue. The Peace Aid Corps obtained payment 
                                                 
501 Hong Kong News, May 22, 1942 
502 Zhang Sheng, Xianggang Hei Shehui huo dong zhen xiang, (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books, 1979), 60-1. 
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from a company known as the Lee Yuen Company, which controlled twelve large lottery 
establishments in the colony.  
Such favoured treatment during the occupation enabled the local triad organizations to 
strengthen their system of organization, which had been suffering from a lack of co-
ordination, and explains why they were able to quickly corner monopolies in vice and certain 
sections of the labour force in Hong Kong on the defeat of the Japanese.503 They might have 
become even more powerful if they could have established more effective central control 
during the occupation, but the Japanese administration had strictly monitored their activities 
and maintained a check on their power by overthrowing various leaders when their individual 
influence became too great. 
As the weeks passed, the Kempeitai found it steadily harder to track down important 
mainland Chinese figures, who were increasingly slipping out of the colony or melting into 
the general populace. They therefore established a body composed of Hong Kong Chinese 
detectives who had been employed by the British Special Branch that, by mid-February, had 
been “activated in all quarters”.504 In addition, a motley assortment of between 1,300 and 
4,000 local citizens were attached as agents to the Kempeitai and the garrison or worked for 
them as freelance informers. They included the low-life characters who had helped the 
Japanese before and during the invasion, such as George Wong, Howard Tore, and Millie 
Chun and her ring of female spies. Wong in particular came to loom increasingly large 
among the murkier underpinnings of Japanese rule. Starting out as a driver for the Political 
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Section of the Koa Kikan, he was hired as one of the garrison’s Chinese secret agents before 
eventually becoming the Kempeitai’s chief “local tough”.505 
In the interests of putting an end to the general turmoil, the Kempeitai had also 
assumed management of the colony’s routine policing work from the Civil Affairs 
Department. For the successful performance of their policing functions, Colonel Noma’s 
small outfit of 150 officers and NCOs were compelled to rely heavily on the services of a far 
larger number of local Chinese police, who were among the many former government 
employees who had resumed their posts under the Japanese. While the local Chinese police 
were present at interrogations, all questioning and torture were performed by the Japanese. 
One Chinese man who had joined Admiral Chan Chak’s organization described receiving 
HK$2 per day for his services for running a gambling house for the short time allowed by the 
Japanese. He then used the two ships that he owned to trade buy rice in his native Heung Sah 
to sell to the Japanese at a quarter or fifth of what he paid, and then recouped his losses by 
selling matches, oil, and soap obtained from the Japanese to the rice farmers at a large profit. 
One manufacturer of metal ware recalled working for the Japanese for eight months before 
they closed his factory and bought the machinery. Although several policemen were re-
enlisted members of the old prewar force, a great many others were the new recruits who the 
Kempeitai turned out regularly at their “very active” police training school. Noma later 
recalled having had between 2,300 and 2,400 local Chinese and Indian policemen at his dis-
posal. The importance attached to these Kensa, as the Japanese called them, is suggested by a 
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report that stated that they were the only local employees of the new regime who were paid in 
cash.506 
The attitude of the Chinese general public in Hong Kong towards their Japanese 
masters has never been in any serious doubt. In the words of one survivor, “the hatred was 
immeasurable”.507 Many people who managed to avoid the attentions of the Kempeitai death 
squads seethed nonetheless at the daily round of humiliation to which they were subjected. 
Much anger was aroused, for example, by a ruling that all visitors to government buildings 
should first wash their hands in a basin of antiseptic, which no doubt made good sense in the 
context of the regime’s drive for hygiene but was widely perceived as implying that the 
Chinese were dirty. Still more keenly resented were the continual slappings. Decades later, an 
airport cleaner named Lee Lap recalled of the Japanese, “They made me feel low, very 
low”.508 By the last months of 1942, a senior Japanese official who had been installed in the 
Matsubara Hotel was complaining that he had to order Western dishes rather than Chinese 
ones for fear that the Chinese chefs might poison his food (Europeans on the staff were 
apparently free from suspicion) and that he did not dare sit in his room with the windows 
open to the street.509 The increasing brutality that the Imperial Forces displayed as the war 
began to turn against them discouraged any attempt to pursue normal life, and by the middle 
of 1943 most of the Chinese public were said to have sunk back into the mood of fear and 
withdrawal that had followed the British surrender.510 
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The conquerors expected little trouble from the mass of Chinese shop assistants, 
waiters, factory hands, stevedores, hawkers, and vagabonds, many of whom had poured into 
Hong Kong precisely in order to get away from the Imperial Army. Like the Nazis who 
marched in to “liberate” Ukraine from the Soviet Union, they had the advantage of taking 
over a society already under alien rule, granting them scope for appealing to restive enclaves 
and beginning with, as Li Shu-fan described it, a few “iotas of goodwill”.511 With more tact 
and greater discipline, they might have taken advantage of this goodwill to appeal to the 
locals, but, like the Nazis, they wasted the opportunity to do so. 
5.32 Dynamics and Interactions between the Japanese and the Local Masses during the Final 
Stage of the Occupation 
Throughout 1944, the Governor continued to play on the old theme of pan-Asiatic 
fraternity and the ideal of Hong Kong as a testing-ground for developing a model friendship 
between the Chinese and Japanese peoples.512 During a brief tour of the New Territories in 
spring, he paid his respects at a shrine commemorating a number of local ancestors who had 
been killed resisting the British occupation of the area half a century earlier. In October, he 
once again displayed his enthusiasm for Chinese culture by buying the work of a local painter 
that had been included in an art exhibition at the Matsuzakaya department store. 
 Fitful efforts were now at last made to address the mass complaints about Kempeitai 
lawlessness. Isogai told Colonel Noma to carry out “some rectification” of the way in which 
arrests were being conducted as part of the mass deportation scheme, foreseeing that the 
random arrests of respectable citizens would “affect the feelings of the population very 
much”.513 He voiced similar mild reproaches about the widespread use of torture in Kempeitai 
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prisons the following year. On three occasions between September and November 1944, the 
Governor passed on complaints to Noma and asked him to tighten up on the conduct of his 
gendarmes.514 In the meantime, the elite were to be shielded from the worst effects of the 
regime’s decision to abandon the distribution of rice to the Chinese masses. In spring 1944, 
the authorities made it clear that rice rations would be maintained for those people directly 
involved in the war effort and the reconstruction of the “new Hong Kong”, which in practice 
referred to the members of the two Chinese Councils, the staff of the Governor’s Office and 
the District Bureaux, and the employees of firms working closely with the Imperial Forces 
and their families. 
The authorities were eventually forced to fall back on the support of the triad gangs. In 
spite of Isogai’s attempts to curb triad activities, from late 1943 onwards the triad-based 
Street Guards gained increasing power with the slackening of the Japanese grip on the colony. 
Officially reckoned “necessary to assist the administration of the District Bureaux”,515 the 
Street Guards had been used to spearhead a series of censuses conducted with brutal 
thoroughness for the purpose of flushing out vagrants and resistance elements. In March 1945, 
they were earmarked by Tanaka and Kanazawa as the basis for a new corps of vigilantes 
formed to supplement the regular police, the Protective Guards Body, who would be elected 
by the Street Guards in each district to keep order under the auspices of the District Bureaux. 
Armed with batons and basic police training, the Protective Guards were deployed in the 
following months around the neighbourhoods of Kowloon and Victoria to guard against theft. 
By mid-June, the Protective Guards had been consolidated into a standing force of around 
two thousand in each of the cities, and by early July an auxiliary corps of a further two 
thousand was being recruited in the Central District of Victoria. To discuss plans for 
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maintaining order, the Chairmen of the Police Bureau and the Police Committee for the Island 
invited the Heads of the Protective Guards on Hong Kong Island to a dinner. Highlighting 
their importance still further, Kan Man, a District Bureau Chief who had recently been 
promoted to a seat on the Chinese Cooperative Council, acted as their spokesman. Together 
with the more exalted local organizations, the Protective Guards were called upon to 
contribute to the maintenance of government in a broader sense by assuming responsibility 
for such functions as rubbish disposal and the reporting of any outbreaks of infectious 
diseases.  
Through running the black market, itself organized by the triads, the Protective 
Guards assumed responsibility for almost all distribution of food to the populace during these 
months of collapse. The basic needs of these gangsters were met by the triad leaders 
themselves, with one of the main triad chieftains, a certain Wan Yuk-ming, even organizing 
and funding a Hong Kong Law and Order Assistance Group to look after their welfare.516 The 
same pattern of stress and withdrawal can be made out in the conduct of the middle classes. 
The petty functionaries employed by the Governor's Office were well aware that Japan was 
heading for defeat. Chinese and Indian constables in the police force had been thrown, their 
employers remarked, into “mental chaos and worry” and hence “were not eager in 
discharging their duties”.517 
The great mass of the Chinese were, as Police Chief Kanazawa remarked 
deprecatingly, “not bright and cheerful”.518 Tucked away in the newspaper columns most 
weeks were reports of anonymous individuals who had opted to put an end to their 
wretchedness by jumping off buildings or ferries. Many residents who contrived to avoid 
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starvation were picked off instead by the frequently misdirected American air raids. On 18 
April 1945, for example, American planes machine-gunned a crowded ferry crossing from 
Hong Kong Island to Yaumati in Kowloon, and on 12 June fifty-nine American raiders 
dropped incendiary bombs on the Central District. Despite the deaths of almost 10,000 
Chinese civilians in these attacks, the bulk of the populace steadfastly refused to blame the 
United States. They laid blame for the attacks squarely on the Japanese military, and even 
seem to have been welcomed the attacks as evidence that the occupation was nearing its 
end.519 The Chinese public could sense the impending fall of the Japanese as surely as they 
had sensed that of the British four years earlier. As one asked, “How long will the Japanese 
forces be able to hold on? . . . How long will people go on accepting the military yen?”520 
Their view was reflected in an epigram ascribed to the poet Dai Wangshu that was circulating 
throughout the colony: 
Greater East Asia,  
What a surprise— 
All that hot air 
Was a pack of lies.521 
5.4 The Japanese: Friend or Foe? 
The overall Chinese reaction to Japanese domination was one of sullen acceptance, 
borne of dazed surprise at the British debacle and subsequent sad disillusionment with British 
rule. Large numbers who had flooded into Hong Kong to escape the Japanese now found 
themselves in an even worse position than that they had left. As an editorial in the Hong Kong 
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News described, “The vaunted supermen of the white race have melted like butter. In eighteen 
days of conflict it was all over, a horrible muddle of inefficiency and helplessness which has 
bequeathed a miserable aftermath”.522 
Nevertheless, disillusionment with the British did not mean acceptance of the 
Japanese, despite their dissemination of the ideal of “Asia for the Asians”. Outwardly, 
Japanese rule was accepted, by some with hope, but the ruthlessness with which the Japanese 
conducted operations against China, the rape of Nanking, and the arbitrary shootings and 
bayoneting of Chinese offenders in Hong Kong created a hatred for the Japanese that 
expressed itself in the form of subtle obstruction, requiring continuous modification and 
simplification of administrative bodies. 
Despite this need, there is no reason to believe that these administrative bodies did not 
adequately serve Japanese objectives. While the Chinese could nominally express their views, 
control rested firmly with the Japanese. As war pressures permitted the military 
administration in Hong Kong little discretion in carrying out policies decided in Tokyo, the 
ability to act on Chinese wishes was likely strictly limited. At the same time, the use of the 
District Bureaux as their main forms of local government clearly showed that the Japanese 
had no intention of riding roughshod over the Chinese community. This intention was also 
demonstrated by the intense pains that they took to publicize and explain their policies, which 
took the form of a regular series of press conferences given by the Governor; the Heads of the 
Administration, the gendarmerie, and various central government offices; and members of the 
two Chinese councils. 
The Chinese had but a slight feeling of belonging to Hong Kong, scant loyalty to the 
state, and little willingness to sacrifice for the community. To them, the defence of Hong 
Kong was a matter for the British. Hong Kong was an artificial society composed of primarily 
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temporary residents seeking economic advantage or escape from Japanese attack. Only the 
Eurasians and Portuguese, as well as some Chinese and Indians who had become Westernized, 
regarded Hong Kong as a home worth fighting for. The British knew little of the background 
of the refugees, and were understandably hesitant about appealing for cooperation from the 
resident Chinese community. Therefore, the Hong Kong Government had had only partial 
success when it sought their participation in defence preparations, generally from those 
educated at the University or in the Anglo-Chinese schools run by European organizations.  
The Hong Kong Chinese masses were, understandably, less impressed by the gospel 
from Tokyo. Many had come to the colony precisely in order to escape from the Imperial 
troops who were devastating their country. Even there, however, certain enclaves collaborated 
with the Japanese. After Wang Jingwei deserted the Nationalists at the end of 1938, his 
partisans used Hong Kong as their initial headquarters, and a significant Wang faction 
subsequently emerged that published its own newspaper, Nan Hua Ribao (South China Daily) 
and ran its own underground network.523 Its ranks were augmented by the arrival of several 
hundred supporters, some partially armed, who had slipped into the colony alongside the 
mainland refugees. 524  By mid-1940, the British authorities had come to view the Wang 
faction as a potential source of revolt. 
As always occurs when war leads to shortages of food, clothing, and fuel, a vigorous 
black market emerged. One local citizen recorded his experiences with the market that 
emerged in Hong Kong: 
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At that time I was the bread-winner for the whole family, although I was eight years 
old. I managed to make friends with the Japanese and climb in and out of the barracks 
very often. The Japanese soldiers were like any other soldiers, they needed money and 
many other things. So we did a little business with them—blackmarket business. 
There were lots of things in the barracks, lying about, that the Japanese wished to get 
rid of so I was the person to go up there to contact them and get them to sell. The 
goods were delivered to us in the middle of the night by Japanese soldiers and then 
were thrown over the wall and we had to go down to the street to pick them up. The 
next morning we’d take them to the market and sell them.525 
The greatest dilemma facing prominent Chinese, and even some less prominent 
Chinese, was that if they remained in Hong Kong to protect their own interests, or even to 
protect those of the community generally, they would appear to be traitors. This dilemma 
became even greater after several leading figures had been astutely appointed by the Japanese 
to head local representative committees and District Bureaux to give the appearance of local 
representation while ensuring local responsibility for any misdeeds of resistance against the 
occupiers. Ironically, several men who appeared to be collaborators had been asked by 
officials of the defeated Hong Kong government to assume these difficult roles. It is therefore 
not surprising that many refuse to talk about their experiences even today. Dr Zia, one of the 
few willing to speak, described his experiences with the administration: 
While classes for Japanese lessons were still going on, there was a circular issued by 
the medical department inviting applications from doctors to take up medical posts in 
Hainan Island. I went to the bureau the next day and interviewed the Director, who 
introduced me to the chief interpreter and the head of the department, a Japanese 
returned student. They let us fix up my monthly family allotment, rice allowances, 
                                                 
525 Birch and Cole, Captive Years, chapter 9. 
 222
gave me all the information about the nature of the work and told me to get in contact 
with the office as often as I could. I returned home and told my wife that I had 
accepted the job. My wife took the news half-heartedly, with an expression of 
consolation combined with perplexity. She was consoled because the family got 
protection but she was worried because my future was in absolute darkness. After 
pausing for a while she spoke impressively, “Can't you withdraw your application? 
How am I going to look after the home and the children and pass the lonely years?” I 
replied, “This is a time of emergency and as long as you have got enough money for 
the family we should all be content. The Japanese have great respect for doctors and, 
when you work for them, they treat you as one of their own men. The Jap soldiers 
fought because they were under orders from the Generals not because they had 
personal hatred against all Chinese. If you have fair feelings for them they do not kill 
you without reason, like savages do. In this wide world it is the language bar and 
politics which make people of different nations treat each other like aliens. I can 
withstand a hard life, and loneliness will vanish when you understand that there is a 
group of doctors and nurses going together” I explained, and convinced her.526 
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Chapter 6 
Collaboration at the Economic and Social Levels 
 
6.1 Japanese Economic and Social Policy towards the Chinese in Singapore 
 The 1930s witnessed the spread of the ideology and vocabulary of Pan-Asianism and 
the official national policy of a “New Order in East Asia” throughout Japan (see chapter 2). 
The main features of this New Order were the creation of a tripartite bloc connecting Japan, 
the leader of this bloc, with Manchukuo and China based on recognition of their ethnic 
affinity and cultural ties. Such ties would serve as the bases of their engagement in close 
political, economic, and cultural cooperation with each other and against Western 
imperialism.527  
Southeast Asia had not always been an area of such Japanese concern.528 It only 
assumed great importance after 1937, when Japan’s attempt to incorporate China into the 
New Order in East Asia through the Second Sino-Japanese War led to serious tension with the 
United States, as such aggression on the Asian Continent was incompatible with the 
traditional American Open Door policy. Unprepared to relinquish its existing economic and 
social ties with China, the United States sent aid in the forms of cash, munitions, and military 
advisors to assist China in its fight against the Japanese. The Americans next sought to check 
Japan’s expansionism in China through economic sanctions that deprived Japan of raw 
materials essential for its war machine.529 In 1940, the United States prohibited the export 
without license of petroleum, petroleum products, and scrap metal, and placed an embargo on 
the export of aviation gasoline to all countries outside of the Western Hemisphere. In the 
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same year, Great Britain joined the United States in placing an embargo on the export of scrap 
iron and steel, which the United States followed by freezing all Japanese assets held in its 
banks in July 1941.530  
In desperate need of access to materials and markets, Japanese Foreign Minister Arita 
made the following historical announcement on 29 June 1940:  
The countries of East Asia and the regions of the South Seas are geographically, 
historically, racially and economically very closely related. The uniting of all these 
regions in a single sphere on a basis of common existence, insuring thereby stability, 
is a natural conclusion.531 
Arita’s open advocacy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was soon supported by 
consolidation of the various ties already existing between East and Greater East Asia. At the 
Liaison Conference between the Japanese Cabinet and the Imperial Headquarters on 2 July 
1940, a resolution was passed officially approving the creation of the greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere as envisaged in Arita’s speech.532  
Economically, the Sphere would operate according to the principle of the international 
division of labour, with the economic specialization of products and industries being based on 
geographical, economic and “other relevant factors”.533 Central and South China would be de-
industrialized and reorganized to engage in a form of self-sustaining agricultural production 
that would supply raw materials and surplus food to the other components of the Sphere. 
Manchukuo and North China would provide the materials that would serve as the basis for 
Japan’s industrial complex. Japan would thus relocate many of its heavy industries to 
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Manchukuo and the greater part of its light industries to North China, while centring all high-
technology industries, such as the precision tool, arms, and chemical products industries, in 
Japan. 534  Japan would also act as the financial controller of the Sphere, supervising all 
financial affairs; hold a monopoly on the shipping and fishing industries; and become the 
supplier of scientifically trained and technically skilled labour.535The remaining components, 
namely Australia, New Zealand, and India, were to become a vast market for the 
manufactured goods produced in the Sphere.536 
The stated goal of this economic structure was to “work with the opportunity of 
sharing in the profits of industry that is afforded everybody” such that the native peoples were 
to receive a fairer share of the fruit of their labour than under the colonial regimes. This 
principle and the following principles were outlined in the document “Draft of Basic Plan for 
Establishment of Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”: 537 
1. The Southern region would be freed from colonial rule, with the politically 
dominant influence of Europe and America to be gradually eliminated. 
2. The desire of native peoples for their independence would be recognized. After 
consideration of its military and economic requirements and its specific historical, political, 
and cultural elements, each newly independent state would, dependent on the approbation of 
Japan, adopt the form of government most appropriate for its existence within the Greater 
East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
3. Military zones and key points necessary for the defence of the Sphere would be 
established and directly or indirectly controlled by Japan. 
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4. Serving as the nucleus of the Sphere, Japan would forge a new common identity 
among the various peoples. 
It can be seen from the second principle that Japan’s conception of independence was 
not based on liberalism and national self-determination. The so-called “independent” areas 
would be subject to policies laid down by an Upper Council of the Greater East Asia Co-
Prosperity Sphere under Japanese leadership and supervised by Japanese advisors, while 
military and diplomatic affairs would remain in Japanese hands.538 The direct or indirect 
control of military bases by Japan would prevent any area from breaking away from the 
Sphere, as it would have no armed forces to back its cause. With the division of labour, the 
components of the Sphere would be mutually dependent on one another for their economic 
survival and would enhance their political integration, leaving little cause for political 
separation from the Sphere. 
The Greater East Asiatic War was thus the logical consequence of Japan’s ideology of 
Asian co-existence and co-prosperity. Since Japan needed the resources of the Southern 
region to win the Greater East Asiatic War, it had to ensure that they would be channelled 
accordingly. As a wartime measure, military governments or Gunsei were established to 
administer each occupied area in the South, restore public order, engage in the rapid 
acquisition of resources, and secure the self-sufficiency of the military forces in the field.539 
The first and the last objectives were preconditions for the fulfilment of the second objective, 
as the establishment of public order would create an environment conducive to the collection 
of each region’s resources. As the occupied areas would become self-sufficient in terms of 
food and other necessities, Imperial shipping would not be burdened with supplying these 
                                                 
538 IMTFE, Exh. 675A. Quoted in W. H. Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 1940 
to 1945, 28. 
539 The English translation of the document “Principles Governing the Administration of Occupied Southern 
Areas” (“Nampo Senryochi Gyosei Jisshi Yoryo”) can be found in H. Benda, J. K. Irikura, and K. Kishi, 
Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents,1. 
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resources, leaving it free for the transport of the massive amounts of resources from the 
Southern Region to Japan to feed its defence industries. 
Imbued with war propaganda, the rank and file of the Japanese Army were strongly 
prejudiced against the overseas Chinese, seeing them as mercenary and having “no racial or 
national consciousness, and no enthusiasms outside the making of money”. 540  Military 
planners, on the other hand, were well aware that Chinese commercial talents were essential 
for the realization of economic self-sufficiency in the occupied territories. The “money-
making” abilities of and the economic infrastructure created by the overseas Chinese were 
even more indispensible in the case of Singapore, as the island was to be the capital and 
defence headquarters of the Southern Region. For this reason, the Japanese military 
administration was anxious that the Chinese resume their economic activities as soon as the 
war ended. 
6.2 Japanese Socioeconomic policy towards the Chinese in Singapore 
6.21 The Endau Settlement 
When Singapore’s trade with other countries was disrupted due to the war,541 a great 
strain on was placed on the island’s one million inhabitants, as most of Singapore’s food 
supply had been imported. To increase food production, the Japanese authorities encouraged 
the population to become self-sufficient by growing their own food, which required resettling 
part of the population outside of Singapore in areas where they could farm and live off the 
                                                 
540 Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 61. 
541 The first signs that the war was beginning to turn against Japan were seen in August 1943, when the Japanese 
administration in Singapore launched a “grow more food” campaign and conceded it was necessary “because of 
enemy activity” that was depleting even the scanty food supplies available to feed Singapore's population. 
On 11 February 1943, after six months of bitter fighting, the Americans drove the Japanese out of Guadalcanal in 
the Solomon Islands, which lie to the north of Australia. The following month a large segment of the Japanese 
Navy was destroyed in the Battle of the Bismarck Sea off New Guinea. In November, the Americans invaded 
Bougainville bland off New Guinea as the Japanese were pushed back towards the north. American and British 
submarines sunk ships carrying food supplies to Japanese forces in Southeast Asia (including Singapore) and 
remote islands in the South and Central Pacific. The Japanese confiscated all food produced in occupied 
territories for consumption by their armed forces and to build up reserve supplies resulting in severe food 
shortages for civilian populations. 
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land. Preoccupied with the defence of the territories in Southeast Asia, army strategists in 
Tokyo decided to use the shortage of food as an excuse to move as many Chinese as possible 
out of Singapore. The High Command in Tokyo feared that if the British or Americans 
invaded Singapore, the entire population, especially the Chinese, would give their fullest 
cooperation to the Allied forces. The Seventh Area Army, which was in charge of the defence 
of Singapore, was ordered to evacuate 300,000 Chinese immediately, to be followed by more 
evacuations as soon as possible.  
The responsibility for the evacuation lay with Mamoru Shinozaki542, Head of the 
Welfare Department in the Syonan Municipality, who in turn approached the OCA to build a 
settlement for Chinese migrants. Shinozaki persuaded the OCA to agree to the project by 
promising that the new settlement would be self-governing, that no Japanese would set foot 
within it, and that it would receive supplies of rice until it became self-sufficient. A New 
Syonan Model Farm Construction Committee established under the chairmanship of Lim 
Boon Keng was then was dispatched to Malaya to identify a suitable site. After examination, 
it selected Endau in Johore as the site for the new settlement. 
When the evacuation order was issued in August 1943, Naito had recently been 
appointed Mayor of Singapore. Knowing little about the people and conditions in Singapore, 
he assigned responsibility of carrying out the evacuation order to Shinozaki, who then 
consulted the OCA about his plans. Of all the communities with whom Shinozaki was 
expected to discuss the evacuation plan, he approached the Chinese community first. As the 
Chinese community was the most closely watched by the Kempeitai due to their anti-Japanese 
activities before and during the occupation, it appears that Shinozaki wanted to spare them 
                                                 
542 Before the war, Shinozaki was a press attaché of the Japanese consulate in Singapore. During the Japanese 
occupation of Singapore, he showed his sympathy for the plight of the local people, especially the Chinese. In 
the early period of the occupation, he risked his life securing the release of many Chinese and Eurasians who had 
been detained by the Kempeitai. Because of his activities, he was closely watched by the Kempeitai and “hated 
and ostracized in certain Japanese circles”. 
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from further hardship. In an OCA meeting in which he unveiled his plan of creating a new 
settlement for the Chinese in Malaya, Shinozaki stressed that if the Chinese accepted 
evacuation to the settlement, it would be autonomous, out of bounds to the Kempeitai, and 
receive supplies of rice until self-sufficiency had been achieved. The OCA responded 
favourably to the evacuation proposal, viewing it as an opportunity for freedom. Whereas the 
Japanese saw the scheme as a means to alleviate the food problem in Singapore, the Chinese 
saw it as a means to obtain freedom from the Kempeitai.543 
Construction work began soon after the OCA raised $1 million to develop the 
settlement. Workers cleared the jungle and built roads and houses in preparation for the 
arrival of the migrants. To entice Singaporeans to participate in the scheme, pioneer settlers 
were promised an allotment of four acres of land; free supplies of rice, sugar, and salt; and a 
small monthly cash payment for the first six months. The first migrants who arrived at Endau 
in September 1943 were forced to live in crude huts made of opeh leaves until the 
administration allocated land for them to build their own houses. The pioneering work was 
challenging to many, as most did not have construction or farming experience, and all were 
forced to be resourceful and make necessity items such as soap, coconut oil, and condensed 
milk.  
Despite the difficult new environment, many were attracted to the settlement because 
of the promise of a supply of rice and, more importantly, the fact that the affairs of the 
settlement would be administered by the OCA with no interference by Japanese authorities. 
By the end of the first year, twelve thousand settlers had arrived in Endau, which had opened 
a school, a bank, a paper factory, a sawmill, and several restaurants. However, life at the 
settlement was disturbed by activities of Chinese anti-Japanese guerrillas, who claimed the 
                                                 
543  See Rodziah Haji Shaari, Japanese Resettlement Schemes: Endau and Bahau, 1942-1945 (Singapore: 
National University of Singapore, 1986-1987) 
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lives of several settlement officials and civilians. Peace was only restored after Shinozaki 
entered into a secret pact with the guerrillas, offering rice in exchange for peace.544 
After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, twelve thousand families returned to 
their homes in Singapore, and the Endau Settlement was taken over by the MPAJA. Besides 
Endau, the Japanese also created a settlement in Bahau (in Negri Sembilan, Malaya) for 
Eurasians and Chinese Roman Catholics and a settlement in Pulau Bintan for Indians.545 
6.22 Educational System and Policy 
When the occupation commenced, the Gunsei authorities closed all public and private 
schools until further notice. Once order was restored in April 1942, they gradually authorized 
the reopening of public primary schools, but not private schools. Thus, Chinese schools, 
which had largely operated on private funds, could not reopen, while public schools for 
Malays and Indians could do so. 546  Only in October, after petitioning by the Chinese 
community leaders for the opening of privately financed Chinese schools, did Watanabe 
permit the reopening of Chinese grade schools, provided that the Mayor or Governor 
approved of their curriculum and teachers' qualifications. At the same time, he authorized 
schools to teach Chinese as an auxiliary language.547 
Although the number of reopened Chinese schools increased after October, only 185 
schools enrolling 24,078 pupils, compared to prewar figures of 1,522 schools enrolling 
137,328 pupils, were in operation by January 1943.548 By June, the number had increased to 
                                                 
544 A few members of the settlement’s committee were shot and killed by guerrillas of the Malayan Peoples Anti-
Japanese Army (MPAJA). Shinozaki realized that if the killings continued, people would begin leaving. To 
prevent this from occurring, he made a secret agreement with the guerrillas, giving them rice supplies in return 
for stopping the killing. 
545  Chia, Joshua Yeong Jia, Endau Settlement, (National Library Board Singapore, August 23, 2006), 
http://infopedia.nl.sg/articles/SIP_1221_2006-12-29.html (assessed August 18, 2010). 
546 Syonan Gunseibu, Shogakko Saikai No Ken, April 18, 1942; Nayaga Yuji, “Marai Ni Okeru Shiritsu Gakko 
Taisaku,” Chosabuho, no. 3 (June 5, 1944), n.p. Later secondary and vocational schools reopened. See Akashi, 
“Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 84. 
547 Ibid., 84.  
548 Marei Gunseikambu, Bunkyoka, Marei Kyoiku Jijo (March, 1943), 26, 61-2. Many Chinese private schools 
were no more than the terakoya-type schools of Tokugawa Japan (1616-1868). For instance, in prewar years “in 
 231
only 208 public and private Chinese schools. 549 This deliberately discriminatory educational 
policy towards the Chinese caused Governor Kawamura of Perak to voice concerns at the 
May 1943 meeting of governors and mayors: 
Not enough number of Chinese primary schools in Perak has reopened. As the result, 
many Chinese are beginning to harbour the idea that they are being discriminated. 
There is a mood of restlessness [in Chinese communities], contributing a great deal to 
the problem of preserving security.550 
An official study into the educational situation in Perak confirmed Kawamura's statement; 
whereas 90.7 percent of Malay language schools and 76.9 per cent of Indian (Tamil) language 
schools had reopened by May 1943, only 11 percent of Chinese schools had reopened.551 
Elsewhere in Malaya, the percentage of Chinese schools reopened was also much lower than 
that of Malay and Indian schools.552 This low percentage reflected a deliberate measure to 
chastise the Chinese for their anti-Japanese activities and to purge “evil thought” from the 
curriculum.553 To inculcate the Japanese spirit into the minds of Chinese children, fourteen 
weekly hours of Japanese language instruction were required, while Chinese- language 
instructional hours were reduced from fourteen to seven. The Chinese resented Japanese 
                                                                                                                                                        
Malacca there were more than 200 registered Chinese schools, but only a half of them might be justified as bona 
fide schools. Many were terakoya-type schools renting a space on the second floor of stores”. This led to a 
reduction in school openings and student enrolment. Nagaya Yuji, Senryogo No Maraya Rro Shoto Kyoiku, 
December 1943,12-13, 18. Marked "Secret." Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 
84. 
549 Nagaya, Chosabuho, no. 3, n.p. Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 84. 
550 Kawamura, Marei In Okeru Gunsei Shikko Ni Kansuru Iken, n.p. 
551 Perakku Shucho, Perakku-Shu Gaiyo, May 1943, n.p. Marked "Top Secret." Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese 
policy towards the Malayan Chinese”, 84. 
552 Nagaya, Senryogo No Maraya No Shoto Kyoiku, 11-19. General Fujimura reported that as of January 1945, 
only twenty to thirty percent of Chinese schools had reopened. Japan, Dai-ichi Fukuinsho, Marei Gunsei Gaiyo, 
n.p.; cf. Nan ch'iao Tsung-hui, Ta-chan yu Nan ch'iao, 103-104. Quoted in Akashi, “Japanese policy towards the 
Malayan Chinese”, 85. 
553 Bunkyoka, Marei Kyoiku Jijo, 62, 90. The disintegration of Chinese families, stagnant economic conditions, 
and high tuition fees charged in Malacca and Selangor delayed the recovery of the Chinese educational system. 
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interference, comparing it negatively to the freedom in the selection of curriculum and 
textbooks that they had enjoyed under British rule.554 
The document “Educational Policy Concerning the Chinese”, released in March 1944, 
reflected a hardline policy that had little respect for native customs.555 The policy abolished 
Chinese private schools and banned “Chinese language instruction at public schools in favour 
of strengthening the Japanese language programme”, although the use of Chinese for teaching 
the Japanese language was still permitted. To strengthen the Japanese language programme at 
Chinese public schools, the Gunsei authorities required all Chinese teachers, who were the 
most anti-Japanese among all the Chinese, to attend a reorientation course at training centres.  
The new policy appeared illogical in many respects. Requiring that instruction in 
Chinese be replaced by instruction in Japanese was not a way to increase “the affection 
consequent upon the leading of daily life” and win “the respect and loyalty of the local 
inhabitants”, 556  as Hamada had earlier admonished representatives of Japanese firms. 
Furthermore, the Gunsei authorities implemented the new policy at the time when the old 
educational policy concerning Chinese schools, which had been promulgated in October 1942, 
was working well. The discriminatory policy of not permitting the Chinese to teach in their 
own language while allowing the Malays and Indians to do so would lead the Chinese, as one 
Japanese educational official said, to believe that they were being treated unfairly, 557 
undermine the established educational system, and breed distrust among the Chinese 
regarding the sincerity of the Japanese.558 The Gunsei authorities were painfully aware of the 
difficulty of implementing the policy, as evidenced in the foreword of the document: “A 
                                                 
554 Nagaya Yuji, "Syonan Kakyo Shigaku Chosa," Chosabuho, no. 5 (July 5, 1944), n.p. The result of this 
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558 Ibid., no. 5, n.p. 
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special consideration must be given in implementing the policy not to create the impression 
that the authorities are discriminating the Chinese against other ethnic groups”. To offer the 
Chinese Japanese citizenship at an unspecified future date as an inducement for the 
Japanization programme, of which the language policy was part, was a very clumsy 
justification for the new policy, as the Chinese were less than eager to acquire Japanese 
citizenship.  
6.23 Chinese Responses to the Educational System and Policy 
Although the Chinese generally tried to appease the Japanese military administration 
by fulfilling its orders via the OCA, they exhibited remarkable indifference or passive 
resistance to Japanese educational policy. Education was recognized by the Japanese as the 
most powerful means of extirpating Western influence, inculcating the Nippon-Seishin of 
total obedience to authority and loyalty to the Japanese Emperor, replacing English with 
Japanese as the lingua franca in Singapore, and developing a skilled work force to service the 
Japanese war machine and support the growth of local industries. Education was therefore of 
utmost importance to the successful execution of the war and the expansion of the Japanese 
Empire. To achieve these multiple aims, Chinese and English schools were ordered to reopen 
in April 1942 and renamed after the streets in which they were located to eradicate any traces 
of Chinese and English culture from their names. Japanese language and Japanese military 
discipline were taught and in March 1944, the teaching of Mandarin for one hour each day, 
which had hitherto been tolerated, was banned altogether.559 
Despite all these efforts, the Japanese educational policy towards the Chinese was a 
complete failure. The enrolment of Chinese students during the occupation compared 
miserably with that in 1941, as shown in Table 6.1. 
                                                 
559 Fundamental Policy Concerning Education in the Southern Sphere. Headquarters of Southern Expeditionary 
forces, January 12, 1942. From Akashi, ‘Education and Indoctrination Policy in Malaya and Singapore under the 
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Table 6.1560 
 Enrolment of Chinese students before and during the Japanese Occupation 
Year  No. of English schools and students No. of Chinese schools and students 
1941             81;   27,000                370; 38,000 
1942                536; 5,000     21;   2,543 
The indifference of the Chinese to the Japanese educational system contrasted to the 
enthusiasm of the Malay and Indian communities, as shown in the table below: 
 
Year     No. of Malay schools and students  No. of Indian schools and students 
1941     29;   5,800     18; 1000 
1942        522; 4,572       9;   789 
 
Student enrolment during the occupation was 18.5%, 6.6%, 78.8%, and 78.9% of the 
prewar level for English, Chinese, Malay, and Indian schools. Being treated less harshly by 
the Japanese military administration, the Malays and the Indians were less hostile towards it, 
and exhibited enthusiasm for Japanese-sponsored education. Although the Chinese were in no 
position to abolish the Japanese educational system, which in their perception functioned to 
enslave their children, they expressed their disgust by boycotting the schools.561 
The negative response of the Chinese towards Japanese educational policy constituted 
the only significant indication of noncooperation. Much as they hated the Japanese for their 
aggression in China and their atrocities in Singapore, the Chinese were, on the whole, 
compelled by the sheer necessity of survival to appease the Japanese military administration 
through OCA declarations of “loyalty”, seeking employment in Japanese firms and schools, 
and cooperating with Japanese merchants. To the Chinese, appeasement often implied 
collaboration, as they believed there to be a very thin line between the two. However, only a 
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very few Chinese were “collaborators” or “traitors” in that they conformed to one of two 
categories established by the British after the war: (1) those who had held key positions of 
power in Japanese-sponsored organizations and expressed loyalty to the Japanese in their 
public statements and actions, excluding those forced to collaborate, and (2) those who had 
worked as spies and intelligence officers and whose actions had caused the loss of property, 
serious mutilation, or death of individuals. 
In short, except a negligible few who actively participated in the underground 
resistance movement, the Chinese in Singapore were generally outwardly compliant with the 
Japanese military administration while inwardly seething with hatred for the Japanese and 
eagerly awaiting the return of the British. 
6.24 Factors in the Failure to Win Chinese Loyalty  
The failure of the Japanese military administration to win the loyalty of the Chinese 
despite its use of propaganda in the mass media and educational system can be attributed to 
several factors. First, the Japanese military administration made no sustained and consistent 
overtures to win Chinese loyalty. The curricula of the small number of schools opened for the 
Chinese focused on physical education, technical training, and the Japanese language rather 
than on the inculcation of those Japanese values that were deemed desirable, and it is doubtful 
that simply teaching the Japanese language inculcated any Japanese ideals.  
In terms of mass media efforts, three Chinese books were published in 1942 for the 
purpose of propaganda, but no similar efforts were made thereafter. Two magazines, the 
Syonan Pictorial and the Chinese-language Southern Light Weekly, initially popularized the 
concept of the Co-Prosperity Sphere, but later became more informative than 
propagandistic.562 A strict censorship on firms initially imposed was later eased to allow the 
distribution of prewar Mandarin films, while Chinese operas were allowed to continue 
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throughout the occupation. The press and the radio station were less preoccupied with 
propagating the Japanese spirit than with reporting Japanese and Axis war victories, the truth 
of which was often doubted by the Chinese. Moreover, Chinese exposure to this relatively 
ineffective Japanese propaganda was too short-lived—three and a half years—to make any 
significant impact on Chinese political thinking and loyalty.563  
The most important reason that the Japanese failed to win Chinese loyalty was that 
former’s actions sharply contradicted their professed aims of bringing justice and co-
prosperity to the occupied territories. The despotism of the military administration, the 
atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers, and the economic hardships resulting from the 
Japanese rule were stark and harsh realities that negated whatever impact that Japanese 
propaganda might have made on the Chinese. A telling instance of Japanese intransigence 
was the abolition of Chinese private schools and the imposition of the ban on Chinese-
language instruction at public schools in favour of strengthening the Japanese-language 
programme in March 1944, the same period when Japanese policy towards the Chinese was 
seen to have taken a “softer” turn. This seeming contradiction was but a reflection of the 
incompatibility of ruthlessly exploiting a conquered people and ensuring their welfare. The 
Japanese had attempted to use the stick and the carrot, but their sticks were big and frequently 
applied, while their carrots were small and difficult to come by, and this was the chief reason 
for the failure of Japanese efforts to win the hearts and minds of the local Chinese.564 
In retrospect, it is possible to detect significant similarities between the Japanese 
educational programme and that of the former British regime. 565  First, they were both 
deliberately elitist: the Queen`s Scholarships were paralleled by a scheme introduced and 
financed by Marquis Yoshichika Tokugawa that awarded scholarships to three young men, all 
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graduates of Raffles College, and two young women selected for their “character and 
accomplishments” to pursue a course of study in Japan, the intention being to create a small 
group of leaders sympathetic to the Japanese regime. Both systems were essentially authori-
tarian, imposed upon a population without reference to the wishes of parents and with only a 
slight regard to the needs of the community.  
Most significantly, both systems were used to impart the cultural values of alien rulers. 
The major difference between them lies in the fact that the British system was shaped within 
the liberal-arts tradition of the West, and thus tended to produce a literate population with 
goals identified in terms of academic rather than technological achievement, while the 
Japanese system was frankly utilitarian, geared to the imperatives of a wartime situation and 
promoting the concept of a future in which Singapore would play a role very different from 
that of its entrepot past. As an agent for change, the significance of the Japanese educational 
policy lay in the consideration that it forced upon the minds of future educators and 
politicians. An educational system designed to preserve the colonial status was no longer 
acceptable, and both leaders and led came to wonder whether fulfilling the educational needs 
of Singapore, which were distinct from those of some alien power, might not provide the 
basis for a new educational system.566 
 
6.3 Collaboration or Cooperation? Dynamics between the Japanese and Local Elites in 
the Implementation of Socioeconomic Policy in Hong Kong 
6.31 Role of Hong Kong in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
In accordance with an economic policy aimed at furthering Japan’s political goals for 
Hong Kong, Yazaki argued that the Japanese military should use Hong Kong to obtain access 
to the wealth of the southern Chinese provinces, in the same way that it used Dairen to obtain 
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access to Manchuria and Shanghai to the Yangtze valley. If the railway line from Kowloon to 
Canton could be brought back into service and a new line constructed from Canton to the 
Yangtze port of Hankou, iron, coal, copper, manganese, tungsten, antimony, and other 
strategic minerals could all be extracted from the interior of South China and shipped out 
through Hong Kong to supply Japan's wartime industries. To achieve this end, however, help 
must once again be sought from the Hong Kong elites, the repositories of large resources of 
capital and know-how. A string of joint ventures should therefore be established with Hong 
Kong Chinese interests, including a new Bank of Commerce and Industry to provide capital 
and a shipping firm to replace the Taikoo Steamship Company of the old British trading 
house Butterfield and Swire.567 Isogai seemingly sympathized with this concept of integrating 
Hong Kong economically with the Chinese hinterland. In his first policy statement delivered 
from Tokyo on 21 January 1942, he predicted that the colony would “rapidly take its place as 
the heart of south China”.568 
For a time, the regime’s policy for the colony resulted in limited economic progress. 
As a military base in conditions of all-out war, Hong Kong was expected to strive for the 
maximum possible degree of self-sufficiency. One way in which it could do so was by 
becoming “a supply depot for industrial production”. 569  Manufactured goods could be 
exported to the South in exchange for foodstuffs and key raw materials, and local produce 
would replace a wide range of inessential imports. Isogai and his colleagues accordingly 
attempted to sustain the prewar upsurge in the colony's light industrial sector. By March 1943, 
around eight hundred factories had been brought back into service, including the bulk of the 
existing textile mills. A large number of rubber footwear plants were returned to service to 
recycle old tyres and process the occasional shipments of raw rubber that arrived in the 
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colony from Indochina and Malaya, and soap making became a significant industry for the 
first time.570 
With the same aim in mind, a robust operation was launched to exploit the food-
producing potential of the New Territories. A racetrack on which the British had diverted 
themselves at Fanling was converted to pasture for rice-growing experiments, and rice began 
to be planted in virtually every available square inch of arable land. The New Territories 
Agricultural Association, which the British had fostered so sleepily in the dozen years before 
the invasion, was revived with a view to increasing the output of fruit and vegetables. Model 
farms were created to alert local peasants to the latest methods of cultivation, and in August 
1943 an Agricultural Training Institute opened its doors at Fanling. 
 The Japanese remained aware that other groups in the colony might have a part to play 
in the new war against Britain and the United States. In particular, they might help to facilitate 
the Army’s conquest of the European empires in Southeast Asia and beyond. As Hong Kong 
had been one of the historic springboards for the southward expansion of the overseas 
Chinese trading communities, many Chinese entrepreneurs in Hong Kong were based in 
Singapore, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, or other points to the South. Sensitively handled, 
they might help to reconcile their relatives or business partners in those territories to the new 
reality of Japanese rule.571  
6.32 Collaboration during the Early Stage of the Occupation 
The organization that had ultimate responsibility for Hong Kong’s economy was the 
Economic Section of the Civil Administration Department of the Japanese Army. After it 
began operation following the surrender of Hong Kong, it immediately attempted to gain the 
cooperation of the leading industrialists and businessmen by pleading that their cooperation 
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was essential to the restoration of order and the distribution of essential goods. However, they 
initially received little response to their pleas. On 21 January 1942, the Chief of the Section, 
Colonel Ikemoto, called a meeting of the representatives of the most important Chinese firms 
in Hong Kong to discuss the revival of trade. Although the purpose of this meeting, at which 
the representatives of the Japanese military took their customarily prominent places, was not 
reported, it is believed that it was called in connection with other initiatives of the Economic 
Section that had earlier been taken through the indigenous group of Chinese merchants that 
was to become the Section's principal instrument in Hong Kong: the Chinese General 
Chamber of Commerce.  
Perhaps the first group to contemplate cooperation with the Japanese after their 
capture of Hong Kong, and certainly the one “possessing the greatest material stake in the 
colony”, the Chamber served the Economic Section as what may be called a “control-trans-
mission board” through which the Section could reach the merchant guilds whose leaders 
comprised the Chamber’s memberships. Every distinct type of trade or commerce in the 
colony in which the Chinese were engaged had, as in China, its own guild. Typical of the 
various press references illustrating this function of the Chamber is a report that appeared in 
the Japanese-controlled Hong Kong News on 14 January1942: 
The Chinese Chamber of Commerce called a meeting of representatives of the various 
business guilds yesterday for the purpose of discussing proposals to submit to the 
Japanese authorities for the reopening of business in the Colony. There were over fifty 
persons present, and Mr. Tung Chung-wei, Chairman of Chamber, spoke to them of 
the necessity of reopening business and invited them to forward any suggestions in 
this direction. Matters dealt with included public safety, rice, and currency, and 
suggestions were made to ask the Japanese authorities to release goods which had 
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been sealed and to open more centres for the sale of rice. The proposals adopted will 
be submitted to the Japanese authorities today for consideration, it is understood. 
As Tung, here referred to as Chairman of the Chamber of Commerce, came forward to 
end the period of looting as one of the first of Hong Kong’s so-called “collaborationists”, he 
was likely acting on instructions that the Japanese had issued at this meeting. 
On 24 January 1942, the Economic Section requested the Chamber to submit 
proposals for the revival of business in Hong Kong and to respond to six specific questions: (1) 
How did the members of the Chamber propose to import goods? (2) How did they propose to 
transmit money to the exporters? (3) How would they go about restarting their businesses? (4) 
How was the allocation of shipping space to be arranged? (5) What general suggestions did 
they have? and (6) What arrangements were they prepared to make the release of stocks in the 
godowns? In its 27 January reply, the Chamber stated that the first priorities for the revival of 
business in Hong Kong were the reopening of shipping lanes and the immediate release of 
stocks from the godowns.572 As Hong Kong’s trade was primarily conducted in North, Central, 
and South China, Tokyo might serve as the financial centre of this trade, with the yen as the 
medium of exchange and Hong Kong notes accepted at par with the yen until trade could be 
restored and a new currency issued for the entire area under Japanese control. Goods imported 
into Hong Kong should not be taxed; the number of ships operating between Hong Kong and 
Japan, Formosa, Thailand, and Annam should be increased; banks should be reopened; the 
public should be afforded better protection; and charges for electricity and water should be 
reduced. 
                                                 
572 The lists forwarded by the Chamber to the Japanese are stated to have included a great variety of goods, 
including piece-goods, glassware, tea, chinaware, electrical equipment, peanuts, chemical products, matches, 
machinery, tinned goods, building material, gasoline, motorcar parts, paper, wine, stationery articles, woollen 
goods, gunny bags, rice, flour, precious metals, dyes, leather, rubber goods, silk, foreign medicines, preserved 
seafood, candles, salt, tobacco, sugar, printing materials, and materials for railway construction. 
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Despite its response, the Chamber was answering questions that it did not have the 
competence to address, as the answer to each depended on what the Japanese planned to do, 
of which the Chamber had little knowledge. Such lack of knowledge is reflected in the fact 
that the Chamber’s reply did not consist of answers to the questions asked but rather a 
statement of what it believed to be in its immediate interest to have the Japanese do. This is 
perhaps a good example of the type of cooperation that the Japanese received in Hong Kong; 
even those Chinese who sincerely preferred Japanese to British rule simply accepted their 
situation and hoped to make as much out of it as they could. 
As a result of the discussion that followed the presentation of this reply, the Chamber 
was authorized to notify the various Chinese firms in Hong Kong holding goods in the 
colony’s godowns to submit detailed lists of those goods, which the Chamber would in turn 
submit to the Japanese authorities with a view to securing the release of the goods. The 
merchants concerned were obliged to join the Chamber and prepare the lists by 24 March 
1942. The Hong Kong News of 30 March reported, “The Chamber has received an enormous 
number of applications for the release of goods. If the authorities agree to release, it is 
estimated that there will be sufficient material to last a long time”.573 
6.33 Treatment of the Local Elites 
In response to protests regarding the withdrawal of large banknotes from the currency, 
the Gunseicho announced on 11 January 1942 that banknotes of denominations HK$50 to 
HK$1,000 would once again be allowed to circulate. In the following weeks, it arranged for 
the Hong Kong Bank, the Shanghai Bank, and a number of other British and Allied banking 
houses to open for short periods so that limited withdrawals could be made574 and granted 
                                                 
573 Hong Kong News, March 30. 
574 Hong Kong News, January 19, 23, and 29 and February 15, 1942. The other institutions were the Chartered 
Bank of India, Australia and China, the Nederlandsch Indische Handelsbank, the Chase Bank, the Mercantile 
Bank of India, the Banque de l'Indochine, the Netherlands Trading Society, and the National City Bank of New 
York. 
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approval for the reopening of many local business enterprises. Early in February, the Bank of 
East Asia and eight other Hong Kong Chinese banks resumed operations,575 followed by the 
department stores Wing On, Sincere, Sun, and the China Merchandise Emporium by early 
March. The Nanyang Tobacco Company restarted production at the end of January, followed 
by the Fook Hing Oil Refinery Company in May. The reasons why the Japanese approved the 
reopening of these businesses remain unclear, but it seems likely that they felt the need to 
show favour to several businessmen with whom they had maintained business relations in the 
prewar years. The families controlling the Bank of East Asia had, as previous discussed, a 
history of contact with Japan going back many decades.576  
There also appears to have been a certain correlation between the ownership of these 
favoured firms and the leadership of the new advisory bodies. Sir Shouson Chow, for 
example, had been Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Bank of East Asia for the past 
twenty years. Li Koon-chun, the rice merchant who had been appointed Chow's Deputy on 
the Chinese Cooperative Council, was a fellow Director of the Bank, and his younger brother 
Li Tse-fong, the fourth member of the more select Representative Council, was the Bank's 
long-time Manager. Chow, Li Tse-fong, and Chan Lim-pak were all directors of the China 
Merchandise Emporium, and Chan Lim-pak was the owner of both the Nanyang Tobacco 
Company and the Fook Hing Oil Refinery Company. 
By the summer of 1942, a large part of the local elites appear to have been benefiting 
commercially from Japanese favour as more and more local businesses were returning to 
operation. In the first half of July, nineteen Chinese insurance firms reopened, and almost two 
                                                 
575 Hong Kong News, February 7, 1942; Sinn, Bank of East Asia, 66. The eight other banks were the Hong Nin 
Savings Bank, the Hua Chiao (Overseas Chinese) Bank, the Yien Yih Bank, the Wing On Bank, the National 
Commercial and Savings Bank, the Fukien Provincial Bank, the Chu Hsin Chen Bank, and the Young Brothers 
Banking Corporation. 
576 A historian of the Bank records that in consequence of the “vital” prewar connection, the Japanese authorities 
in general “did not treat the Bank of East Asia severely”. Sinn, Bank of East Asia, 14, 72. 
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hundred Chinese factories requested permission to reopen.577 Reports from the colony during 
the following six months testify to a general bullishness in large business circles. “Prominent 
Chinese merchants” whose companies dealt in foodstuffs and other imported necessities were 
quoted as declaring that they had been having “a good and profitable year”. “Wealthy 
Chinese” were reported to have begun investing their funds in “safe enterprises”. Shares in 
Wing On, Sincere, and the other department stores were observed to have increased 
“considerably”, together with shares in many Chinese-managed commercial concerns. 578 
Much new money was also being invested in real estate; many businessmen jumped at the 
obvious opportunities for speculation following the collapse in property prices in the 
aftermath of the take-over, leading to a “roaring land boom”.579 However, as some of these 
rosy accounts emanate from official Japanese sources, they should be regarded as suspect. On 
12 January 1943, however, the overall picture was confirmed in a letter sent from Hong Kong 
to California that was intercepted by British wartime censors. The writer, Kan Yuet-keung, 
who was likely the son of Kan Tong-po, one of the founders and the chief managers of the 
Bank of East Asia, wrote the following: 
As to the conditions regarding the bank, compared with when you left Hong Kong 
things are brighter: some money is being deposited every day, thus showing public 
confidence. Banks with Chinese capital will soon be free with regard to the paying out 
of money. Chinese business is now showing good results. The value of shares is 
rapidly rising. A share originally worth $10 has now risen to $25. “East Asia” shares 
that were originally worth $100 have now risen to $140 and more. Property generally 
in Hong Kong is rapidly improving in value (like bamboo shoots after rain). In the 
Central District it has risen to double the value. . . . At present joint stock land 
company business is increasing daily.580 
 
                                                 
577 Hong Kong News, July 6 and 9, 1942. See also Wong Lin, “Xin Xianggang De Toushi”, 69. 
578 Domei news agency in English, October 24, 1942, quoted in Extract from Far Eastern Economic Notes, CO 
129 590/24, 28, 29; Hong Kong News, December 20, 1942 and February 4, 1943; Hahn, Hong Kong Holiday, 
265. Encouraged by the more settled conditions, stockbrokers had apparently got together and created a kind of 
informal stock market. Sinn, Bank of East Asia, 72. 
579 Li, Hong Kong Surgeon, 136.  
580 Letter from Kan Yuet Keung in Hong Kong to Mrs. Nancy Eu of Palo Alto, San Francisco, California, 
January 12, 1943, CO 129 590/22, 106. 
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Some official encouragement also seems to have been given to local entrepreneurs 
who aspired to take on Japanese business partners. On 11 November 1942, the Hong Kong 
News reported that the Hong Kong Trust Company, a joint Hong Kong Chinese-Japanese 
venture with starting capital of HK$1 million, had been established three weeks earlier. This 
Japanese appropriation of the Hong Kong economy did not take place solely at the expense 
of the British. In the first months of Isogai’s reign, the Governor's Office appropriated most 
of the light industrial enterprises, including the rubber and textile factories, wooden 
boatyards, and sawmills, that had been set up by Chinese businessmen over the past two 
decades. The Governor’s Office bought several outright in exchange for a very small amount 
and in other cases forced the owners to take on Japanese partners as part of a new system of 
“guided management”.581  The new Japanese business elite were accorded permission to 
operate well in advance of most local firms, and it soon became clear that they were enjoying 
opportunities not offered to the Chinese and other Asian communities. In July 1942, the 
Governor’s Office proclaimed the establishment of the Hong Kong Commercial Federation, 
a type of chamber of commerce. Consisting of ninety-two leading Japanese businesses, it 
was empowered to supervise all trade that occurred between Hong Kong and the ports in its 
immediate neighbourhood, and enjoyed exclusive right to engage in long-distance trading 
beyond the South China coast.582 In January 1943, a group of Hong Kong Chinese merchants 
joined forces with Japanese interests with a view to opening a large soy factory in the 
Mongkok District in Kowloon. 
To a certain extent, the new rulers also showed themselves willing to accept the local 
elites’ more public-spirited representations. On 2 February 1942, the Gunseicho announced 
                                                 
581 Report on Hong Kong, June 4, 1942, 3, and report of K. E. Mogra January 27, 1943, 6, HS 1/171. 
582 For the Hong Kong Commercial Federation, see Hong Kong News, October 9, 1942, March 23, and October 9, 
1943; German newspaper article of summer 1943 quoted in extract from Far Eastern Weekly Intelligence 
Summary no. 48 for week ending November 26 , 1943, CO 129 590/22,  63; Domei news agency report quoted 
in extract from Daily Digest of World Broadcasts, December 25, 1943, CO 129 591/4, 64; Kathleen J. Heasman, 
“Japanese Financial and Economic Measures in Hong Kong,”, 68. 
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that in light of the complaints received from Chinese community leaders, charges for water 
and electricity would be reduced. Kotewall confirmed the next day that the reduction had 
largely been achieved through the efforts of the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee.583 The 
appeal over tram fares was less successful: the Communications Department insisted that the 
fare increases were necessary to prevent congestion on the trams. However, and more 
importantly, the Japanese Chiefs complied with the gentry’s request to put a stop to the crime 
wave. On 14 March, Kotewall announced that there had lately been a general re-imposition of 
order, a development for which the public had much to thank the authorities, and cheekily 
acknowledged, “I may say I contributed a little towards this result”.584 
All these gains were, however, were secured at a price. To extract what they wanted 
from the new regime, the local elites had to be prepared to allow themselves to be used in 
some measure for the purposes of Japanese propaganda. In mid-March, the elusive Sir Robert 
Ho Tung unexpectedly reappeared from Macao after, claimed the rumours in circulation, 
having lost HK$16 million as a result of the war.585 Reported to have been particularly 
worried about the fate of his HK$1,100,000 balance with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank, 
he seems to have been lured back to Hong Kong by being promised access to his British and 
Allied bank accounts by the Japanese. In a later description of the visit, he explained that he 
returned for the humble purpose of “withdrawing money from the bank for household 
expenditures”.586 In return for this privilege, Ho Tung clearly felt that he had to make one or 
two formal nods to the new administration. On 23 March, he paid a courtesy call on Governor 
Isogai. At an interview he granted to a team of local reporters after the meeting, he expressed 
                                                 
583 Hong Kong News, February 3 and 4, 1942.  
584 Hong Kong News, March 15, 1942. 
585 Report of Mrs. A. J. Martin, September 11 1942, CO 129 590/24, 95. 
586 Telegram of Sir R. Campbell, British Ambassador, Lisbon, to Foreign Office, May 16, 1942, CO 129 590/23, 
131; “The Ho Tung Saga (Part 1)”; Hong Kong Inc., March 1990, 105. 
 247
his desire to help the authorities build up the New Hong Kong and to contribute to the 
establishment of Japan’s projected Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.  
However, Ho Tung was far too canny to allow himself to be drawn into an outright 
endorsement of the Japanese conquest. Pressed for his views on the war, he declared that as 
he had devoted his entire life to business, he was not qualified to give an opinion.587 He 
subsequently declined to take a seat on the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee, and by early 
May had returned to Macao. Some further necessity, however, drove him across to Hong 
Kong once again in the course of the summer, where he once again appears to have towed the 
Japanese line. He was reported to have delivered a speech in praise of Japan, and it is 
possible that he may also have found it expedient to make a token investment in the 
occupation regime. On June, he was referred to by the Hong Kong News as the “chief 
organiser” of a Tai Tung Publishing Company being established to produce pictorial 
magazines with titles like New East Asia.588 
Few of the local elites appear to have been perturbed by the need to make such 
statements. With the British removed, their allegiance showed little sign of drifting, as might 
have been expected, to the beleaguered rulers of Nationalist China. Even M. K. Lo joined his 
colleagues in appending his name to a 26 January cable pledging the support of the Hong 
Kong Chinese community to Wang Jingwei and the puppet regime in Nanking.589  
                                                 
587 Account of Sir Robert Ho Tung visit given in Hong Kong News, March 29, 1942. See also telegram of Sir R. 
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589 Hong Kong News, January 28, 1942. See also report by Professor Gordon King March 18, 1942, CO 129 
 248
In contrast to the pure-blooded Chinese leaders, the Eurasians appeared visibly 
distressed by the need to take a public stand incompatible with the Nationalist war effort. 
Chow, the one-time mainland diplomat, is said to have cut “a pathetic figure, attempting 
repeatedly to communicate to the Chungking government his entreaty that they withhold 
judgement on him”. The lawyer Peter H. Sin was reported to appear “thin and pale” as he 
sought to rebut the suggestion that his decision to help the Gunseicho with rice rationing had 
discredited him in the eyes of Chungking.590 In addition, he turned over the running of the 
government's new Opium Sale Syndicate to his former classmate Xu Chongzhi, an elderly 
warlord from the Chinese mainland. Xu, who had declined to act as Isogai's envoy to 
Chungking, was quite happy to receive the lucrative monopoly, evidence that the refusal of 
mainlanders in Hong Kong to collaborate in a political sense did not necessarily rule out 
collaboration in a commercial sense, and the Governor was reported to have taken a cut of 
the proceeds.591 Such dealings led a British observer to comment that the Japanese rulers of 
Hong Kong were “a queer mixture of official rectitude and unofficial corruption”.592 
The elites’ policy of compromise was followed in most respects by Aw Boon-haw, the 
Tiger Balm King, who agreed to establish a company called the Kok Sui Kai to accept “token 
imports” of rice from Southeast Asia, most for the benefit of the Imperial forces. He also 
agreed to permit the newspaper that he published in Hong Kong, Xing Dao Ribao (Sing Tao 
Daily), to be used as a vehicle for Japanese propaganda. He changed the title to Xiang Dao 
Ribao (Fragrant Isle Daily) because, he later explained, all his “true” newspaper titles 
contained the word “star”, and he wished to avoid sullying the purity of the original brand. 
Aw was also named, along with Ho Tung, as a “chief organiser” of the new Tai Tung 
                                                                                                                                                        
590/23, 139. 
590 Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?, 15; Hahn, China to Me, 328. 
591 Report by Major Y. H. Chan on Trading in Opium in Hong Kong, February 3, 1947, appended to file on 
Isogai trial, WO 325/135; Hirano, “Women zai Xianggang de Kezheng Yu Baoxing”, 53. 
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Publishing Company. In return for these gestures, he was allowed to continue operating his 
Tiger Balm business and raking in profits from his newspaper.593 
The Japanese tended to cede authority regarding spheres in which they did not wish to 
become involved to the two Chinese Councils and the local elites. One such sphere was rent 
management. In the months following Isogai’s accession to Governor, the Chinese Councils 
were used to mediate the squabbles that had arisen between local landlords and tenants 
following the collapse of the property market.594 Ichiki Yoshiyuki, an official who had taken 
over as Chief of the reorganized Civil Affairs Department, flatly declared in August 1942 
that the government had “no intention whatever” of fixing the rents. Any disputes should be 
settled by the landlords and tenants themselves, and if they were unable to reach an 
agreement, the matter should be referred to the Representative Council for a definitive 
ruling.595 
Certainly, not every member of the local elites chose to collaborate. Dr. Li Shu-fan 
described his reasons for declining to do so: 
Taking office as the official representative of the medical profession would 
automatically make me a member of that collaborationist organization, the Chinese 
Guilds Council. The thought of taking an oath of allegiance to the Japanese Mikado 
and kowtowing to the Rising Sun flag was galling to me, who had once lived in the 
light and the glory of Sun Yat-sen. I felt that my oath and my kowtow would 
                                                 
593 Sam King, Tiger Balm King, 328-9; Hong Kong News, June 8, 1942. A third “chief organiser” referred to in 
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594 In mid-April, the Chinese Representative Council instructed the Chinese Cooperative Council to “consider 
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symbolize, at least to me, the last bitter dregs of China's humiliation. I decided to 
escape before that fateful first of August.596 
Although many Chinese capitalists were left in possession of at least some of their 
property and their plants, and their businesses remained operational, even if at only a fraction 
of capacity, they paid a steep price for such advantages at the end of the war: being labelled 
collaborators. Overall, few Chinese businessmen and industrialists had been eager to join the 
Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and had fled unoccupied Shanghai if they had the 
ability to do so. However, when later trapped in Shanghai or Hong Kong in December 1941, 
their options were limited. For most, the lure of regaining their enterprises was such that, with 
great reluctance in some cases, they began to work with the Japanese and the Wang Jingwei 
government. Unfortunately for them, many found their enterprises confiscated at war’s end 
when the returning KMT condemned them as “enemy property”. 
6.34 Collaboration during the Final Stage of the Occupation 
Much publicity was given to a policy seemingly designed to improve the conditions of 
the local business community during the final stage of the occupation.597 One major feature of 
the policy was a relaxation on trade restrictions, which was announced in December 1943. 
Permits would no longer be needed to bring foodstuffs into the colony from most outside 
ports, although the shipments would still have to be reported to the authorities on arrival. 
                                                 
596 Li, Hong Kong Surgeon, 131-2. 
597 It is possible to distinguish among three periods in the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong closely connected 
with financial and political events. The first was from the capitulation to June 1943, during which the Japanese 
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Merchants wishing to launch a new company would still have to submit the particulars to the 
Governor's Office, but would no longer need to obtain the approval of the Kempeitai. In a 
typically cloying simile, Isogai likened the regime’s policy towards local business to the 
“handling of an infant who has to be given a special diet of milk etc. at first until it is able to 
assimilate other food, after which a change is then made”.598 
This new liberal policy was implemented throughout 1944 amid the lifting of a series 
of irksome constraints. In February, compensation at last began to be paid to the gentry for 
the goods that had been sealed off in the godowns, and continued intermittently throughout 
the first half of the year. “Nothing like this”, the Hong Kong News observed proudly, “has 
ever occurred in any occupied territory during wartime”.599 At the start of September, the 
Japanese-only Hong Kong Commercial Federation was abolished and replaced by a new 
Trade Association in which local Chinese firms were allowed to take part. Prominent local 
businessmen now had the opportunity to engage in transactions outside the colony’s 
immediate neighbourhood.600 In mid-November, it was announced that Chinese banks were 
now free to accept remittances for the public from Shanghai and other nearby ports. Some 
days later it was revealed that this particular privilege had been extended only to the Bank of 
East Asia, but all Chinese banks could now finance mortgages and loans.601 In the first 
months of 1944, the authorities lifted all the remaining curbs on the import of firewood and 
textiles, and in November no longer required governmental approval for the import of goods 
of any kind. 
 Export as well as import procedures were also beginning to be simplified. In February 
1945, clearance was given to export virtually anything from the colony except precious 
                                                 
598 Isogai quoted in Hong Kong News, January 11, 1944. 
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metals, machinery, and electrical equipment. By this stage, the regime appears to have 
“abandoned any attempt at interference or control”. 602  In March, the apparatus of the 
Governor’s Office was streamlined when the various sections that had handled civil affairs, 
finance, communications, and so forth were amalgamated into two super-sections, a No. 1 
Department and a No. 2 Department, whose principal tasks were to increase production and 
promote communications and trade, respectively. More and more effort was focused on 
importing food supplies from Guangdong Province, and Tanaka went on record advocating 
the economic  “unification” of Hong Kong and Canton.603 
At the same time, mounting discomfort could be detected within the colony’s middle 
class. By 1943, there were signs of widespread unhappiness with soaring prices, a trend 
blamed at least partly on the imposition of the military yen. In early June, one of the 
journalists at Isogai’s monthly press conference pointed out to the Governor that since the 
recent ban on the use of the Hong Kong dollar, the cost of virtually all goods had rocketed. 
Many people were suspicious that the new currency was not worth what the authorities 
claimed. At another press conference held later the same month, Nakanishi, Chief of the 
Finance Department, was forced to defend the military yen, explaining that it was backed by 
the home government in Tokyo and “placed on the same basis as banknotes,” as well as that 
the Governor’s Office was keeping a record of the notes issued “to prevent any inflationary 
tendencies”.604 The uncontrolled surge in prices hit local Asians employed in government 
service particularly hard, who complained incessantly that their salaries were no longer 
keeping pace with the high cost of living. At the end of June 1943, various District Bureau 
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staff petitioned the Heads of their Area Bureaux for an increase in salary and extra rice 
rations. 
Small businessmen experienced their own frustrations with military rule. Traders 
complained that their business plans were often strangled in a mass of red tape and that the 
new business profits tax was arbitrary, allowing the government to levy any amount that they 
saw fit rather than assessing the tax in a uniform way on the basis of the profits reported by 
each firm. By the first half of 1943, the optimism that had buoyed many merchants during the 
previous year had perceptibly faded. Even pawnbrokers were finding conditions increasingly 
difficult and furniture dealers were having a “quiet time”.605 
6.35 The Price of Collaboration 
Despite the fact that Yazaki had recommended that the Japanese follow the British 
example of allowing free trade and that the new rulers were, in principle, keen to revive 
economic life in the colony, their actions did not accord with their words and beliefs. The 
new administration required official approval for the resumption of business and launched an 
inquiry to determine which of the 1,027 companies registered with the prewar government 
were hostile to Japan. Although 250 of these registered companies were eventually 
authorized to resume operations, their scope was greatly reduced by a ban on the holding of 
meetings, which made it effectively impossible for them to hold an AGM.606 As a further 
control measure, each line of business was placed under the management of a syndicate 
charged with collecting taxes and disseminating the orders of the regime.  
Eventually, every stage in the regular trading process became encumbered with 
bureaucracy. In March 1942, Isogai introduced controls on the transport and sale of virtually 
all types of goods. Traders wishing to export goods had to obtain special permission from the 
Finance Department of the Governor’s Office and report any imports within five days of their 
                                                 
605 Heasman, “Japanese Financial and Economic Measures,” 68; Hong Kong News, March 6, 1943. 
606 Far Eastern Economic Review, September 10, 1947. 
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arrival in Hong Kong.607 Five months later, Arisue announced that similar restrictions would 
be imposed on the output of the newly reviving factories, explaining that free trade was 
incompatible with the needs of a wartime economy.608 
 A top priority of Isogai and his team was gaining control of the HK$22 million 
believed to have been circulating at the time of the British surrender. The first step in this 
process had been the initial takeover of the British note-issuing banks. At the start of the 
conquest, the Twenty-Third Army troops had marched into the banks and seized all the Hong 
Kong dollars in the bank vaults. The second step had been summoning all citizens who had 
owed debts before the invasion to the banking halls, where they were expected to pay off their 
debts under the supervision of Sir Vandeleur Grayburn and his captive colleagues. The 
regime then used all the hard currency collected to pay for its war preparations and general 
administrative expenses.  
Not content with these efforts to round up the dollars already in circulation, the 
Governor’s Office hit on an inspired method of generating a fresh supply of currency. A 
search of the bank vaults had revealed a huge stock of additional notes, most in denomi-
nations of HK$500 or HK$1,000. This was currency that the bankers had not yet validated 
according to the cumbrous fashion of the period, when each individual note had to be signed 
by hand, and had not had the opportunity to destroy before the Japanese forces invaded. In 
spring 1942, the unfortunate Grayburn and his colleagues were accordingly put to work 
signing these unbacked, unlawful notes, which were distinguishable from genuine notes only 
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by their serial numbers. Over the following years, some HK$65.5 million of these “duress 
notes”, as Grayburn called them, were released into the Asian market.609 
 In the meantime, the authorities were trying to wean the public on to a different 
currency altogether. Within two weeks of their capture of Hong Kong, the Twenty-Third 
Army had set to work introducing the “military yen”, the cause of which Isogai and his 
entourage advanced with great vigour. The introduction of the military yen had been 
practiced by conquering Japanese troops in the regions that they occupied since the defeat of 
Tsarist Russia in 1904-5. It was also one more form of organized pillage. As unbacked notes 
marked with no serial numbers whose quantity in circulation was never disclosed, these 
military yen had no more inherent value than the bogus “duress notes”. Their deployment 
facilitated the gouging of resources out of the colony in two distinct ways. First, it afforded 
another means of inducing the locals to part with their holdings of Hong Kong dollars. 
Citizens were encouraged to trade in the old currency for the new one, at first at a rate of 
HK$2: M$1, and then from July 1942, when the Hong Kong dollar was “devalued” by Isogai, 
at a greedier rate of HK$4: M$1. With the help of this Monopoly money, the Imperial forces 
could also requisition any supplies that they needed from the colony, as well as acquire land 
and property from the local population effectively free of charge. 
One way in which the Japanese successfully exercised control over the Chinese banks 
in the colony without imposing extensive banking regulations was forcing the leading officers 
of those banks to remain in Hong Kong under their surveillance, holding each of them 
responsible under the penalty of death for the good conduct of all the others. It has been 
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authoritatively reported that whenever one of the leading Chinese banking officials in Hong 
Kong attempted to escape, three of his colleagues were put to death by Japanese military 
fiat. 610  Under this system, few attempts were made to escape. Despite being forced to 
continue the nominal operation of their banks, the Chinese bankers ceased almost all of their 
large-scale commercial activities. Although there was a revival of speculative activity among 
small native banks in Hong Kong, informed banking circles in Chungking reported that such 
activity constituted a very small percentage of Hong Kong’s banking business. The larger, 
modern Chinese banks, such as the Shanghai Commercial, suffered from losing all their 
business contacts, and, unsure of the outcome of the war, were afraid to engage in any 
substantial ventures. Even if they desired to engage in any substantial ventures, they were 
confronted with a virtually impregnable Japanese monopoly and bureaucracy. They therefore 
became simply banks of deposit, holding the cash reserves of their depositors until the day of 
liberation. 
6.4 Dynamics and Interactions between the Japanese and the Local Population: 
Population policy and Charity Services during the Occupation 
As they assumed administration of the conquered Southeast Asian territories, the 
Japanese were confronted with similar social and economic problems, leading them to apply 
similar policies to different territories in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
However, Hong Kong presented the Japanese with a unique challenge—feeding a densely 
populated city that had very limited food supplies—that required a unique policy.  
6.41 Background 
The huge refugee immigration into Hong Kong that began after the Macro-Polo 
Bridge Incident in 1937 had undermined military security; created a massive food shortage; 
and hindered attempts to enlist the Chinese in the war effort, as so few of the new immigrants 
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regarded themselves as “belonging” to Hong Kong. Recognizing that effective defence 
demanded a drastic reduction in population, and having no intention of feeding the 
approximately 800,000 refugees from mainland China whom the British had allowed to drift 
into Hong Kong in the years leading up to the war, the Japanese immediately introduced 
measures to repatriate the Chinese that they continued throughout the occupation.611 As they 
could not distinguish between the Chinese who had been in Hong Kong for several months 
and those whose families had lived there for generations, they immobilized those Chinese 
who were loyal to Hong Kong and had become reconciled to British rule, even though they 
also sought to exploit their unquestioned potentialities for the defence of the Colony.  
6.42 Repatriation Policy  
Shortly after the surrender of Hong Kong and before the establishment of the Civil 
Administration Department of which it was to become a part, a Repatriation Bureau was 
established by the Japanese military administration to organize the evacuation of a 
considerable proportion of the Hong Kong population. Early in January 1942, the Bureau 
successfully advocated for the organization of a Chinese Repatriation Committee composed 
of representatives of the various district and provincial guilds that had long functioned as 
social and mutual societies for the Chinese in their respective districts or provinces. The 
Japanese asked the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee to give press interviews urging 
people to return to China voluntarily, and assured the public that no one would be forced to 
return. Even at this early stage of their administration, the Japanese were able to expatriate 
about 554,000 people to China. 
 During the first week of January 1942, the military government issued a warning 
through the Repatriation Bureau that persons in Hong Kong who had “no employment or 
place of residence” or had to “beg for their food” would be repatriated to their cities or 
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villages of origin in China after obtaining a repatriation permit from the District Bureau. As 
applicants for a permit came under the scrutiny of the Kempeitai, many preferred to leave 
Hong Kong secretly if they could pay the protection money required to do so to the 
guerrillas.612 Some property owners who could not abandon their houses managed to preserve 
an anonymous existence in Hong Kong, accepting the risk that the alternative to compliance 
might be starvation. 
 As different routes into the interior of Guangdong Province became possible routes of 
escape, refugees sought help in obtaining transport and protection from bandits from the 
various residents’ groups that had been organized by immigrants from the same mainland 
province or district. Patrick Yu remembered that “there were two available routes which 
people leaving Hong Kong could take. One was by land and on foot through Shenzhen. 
Another was by sea through Macau to Guangzhou Bay”.613 Most who returned to China by 
land did so either via the railway or by crossing the border into Shenzhen. Recalling the 
situation on the Sha Tau Kok Highway, Tsang Yuen Tai, a Hung Leng villager, described, 
“At the beginning of the occupation, a large number of people were repatriated back to China 
through Sha Tau Kok Highway. When I cycled to Kowloon, I saw a lot of dead bodies along 
the highway and they were so skinny”.614 Ramon Lavalle, Consul in Hong Kong of neutral 
Argentina, reported that the refugees rarely received a promised ration of rice on their journey, 
and were almost invariably set upon and robbed by gangsters who lay in wait for them as 
soon as they crossed the border.615  
 Although the return of a large number of repatriates created great social and economic 
problems in China, it benefitted many of the repatriates themselves, especially professionals 
and skilled labourers, who were able to find employment in Free China. It was reported that 
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the local government immediately placed the three hundred machine operators who had been 
repatriated from Hong Kong to Shaoquan into factory positions.616 Kwan Siu Yee, a doctor at 
Queen Mary hospital during the prewar period, recalled his story: 
At first, my wife and I did not want to leave, because the situation in the mainland was 
not very secure, and there were bandits and guerrillas controlling the repatriating 
routes. When more people left and the route became safer, we decided to leave. We 
joined a repatriation group and went to Shenzhen by train. From there, we went to 
Dongguan on foot. Then we travelled to Shaoguan, where there was the headquarters 
of the British Army Aid Group (BAAG) through Laolung. When we got in touch with 
the BAAG, as a civil servant, I received our salary paid back. Finally, I went to 
Zhongshan University and became a lecturer.617 
During the first year of occupation, the Japanese employed relatively gentle methods 
to clear Hong Kong of “useless people” of their own accord via the Repatriation Committee. 
However, the process did not proceed as smoothly as the Japanese military government had 
hoped, mainly because the “useless people” preferred to take their chances in Hong Kong 
rather than risk starvation in the Guangdong countryside, and partly because of the 
complexity of the exit process that the Japanese themselves had imposed. Finding that the 
population was still around one million in the first months of 1943, the Japanese authorities 
introduced a new repatriation scheme in March 1943. Governor Isogai announced, “The 
Japanese administration of Hong Kong plans to reduce the population by another three 
hundred thousand. . . . At present the population of Hong Kong is one million, while the city 
affords work and shelter for only seven hundred thousand”.618 Homeless people would be 
given free passage to their places of origin as long as did so by the end of April 1943, after 
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which “drastic measures” would be introduced. Luff recalled that “the method by which the 
Japanese conducted their deportation campaign was to cordon off certain areas of the town, 
and follow up with surprise raids. People found without rice cards were packed aboard junks 
which sent them in remote areas on the mainland. Many of these junks did not reach their 
final destination. Some of them were sunk off at Stanley”.619 
By July 1943, the regime realized that its earlier efforts to persuade vagrants to leave 
Hong Kong of their own accord had been unsuccessful. After the deadline had been extended 
and ignored three times, the regime began all-out deportation. Once again, Isogai left the 
mechanics to Noma and his aides, resulting in the Kempeitai patrolling the streets in special 
trucks looking for people in shabby clothing and snatching them “like fowl”.620 Most derelicts 
rounded up in this fashion were packed into a transit camp in the North Point District before 
being put aboard motorized junks and dropped off, at the rate of around two thousand a week, 
on the plague-ridden coast of Guangdong or on one of the barren and uninhabited islands on 
the fringe of the colony to fend for themselves. Local fishermen explained why they did not 
dare to go near Lo Chau Island off the Stanley Peninsula: 
On this island it was said people ate each other and it was very noisy there. . . . The 
people there were calling for help and there was another island in front of that island, 
but the water was running very fast and they could not reach the other island by 
swimming. They shouted for help and it could be heard by the village of Hok Tsui 
which was in front of the island because of the east wind.621 
Because no complete census of the population of Hong Kong was taken in 1941, it is 
not possible to accurately state the number of people whom the Japanese military 
“repatriated”. However, if the semi-official British estimate of slightly less than 1.5 million 
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living in Hong Kong at the time of Pearl Harbor is accepted, it seems the repatriation policy 
was quite “effective”. A quarter of a million were reported to have left Hong Kong in 
February 1942, and in March 1942 Chinese sources estimated that approximately 529,000 
repatriates had returned to China from Hong Kong.622 By September 1942, the population of 
Hong Kong had decreased to approximately 975,500.623 It was estimated that by October 
1944, nearly one million had been repatriated. The August 1945 estimate of a population of 
500,000 indicates a reduction of about 23,000 per month throughout the entire occupation, or 
slightly under the target of one thousand a day. 
6.43 Effectiveness of the Population Policy 
The effectiveness of the Japanese bureaucracy was also manifested in its successful 
conducting of the census and waging of inoculation campaigns, primarily through its 
successful mobilization of people and resources. Regarding an understanding of the 
composition of the Hong Kong population as very important, the Japanese conducted two 
censuses during their short occupation, one in September 1943 and one in May 1944, in order 
to collect the data necessary to conduct rationing and repatriation operations. The main 
responsibility for conducting the census was entrusted to the Military Police Department, 
while the General Affairs and the Civil Administration Departments, together with the Area 
Bureaux, supervised the census work of the District Bureaux and the wards. Their efforts 
were aided by the Chinese Councils, which urged the population to cooperate. 
The Japanese conducted two censuses within such a short period because their method 
of conducting the first census—collecting data from the residential permits issued by the 
government and from ration cards—proved unsatisfactory. The method of conducting the 
second census—ordering the military police to cordon off a section of a street and, with the 
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help of ward leaders and District Bureaux staff, record the demographic data that they 
collected from the inhabitants—proved much more successful. The results of the second 
census revealed that 115,400 people had been unregistered in the first census, that several 
thousand had reported two or more times, and that some were illegal residents. 
Claiming that the British had never been able to enforce population-wide inoculation, 
the Japanese demonstrated their superiority in this respect by holding inoculation campaigns 
three times a year. While these efforts also demonstrated the successful mobilization of 
people and resources by the regime, buttressed by the urging of the Chinese Councils for 
cooperation, they were also backed by the military police, who warned of the consequences 
of noncompliance and required that anyone not carrying the necessary inoculation papers be 
inoculated on the spot. More than three hundred doctors and nurses were divided into 
stationary and mobile units to provide free inoculations. In addition to all these measures, the 
military and civil police would often cordon off an entire area and force all inhabitants to be 
inoculated. 
While the census and inoculation campaigns appear to indicate that the Japanese 
military administration’s control of the population was very well structured and, depending on 
the criteria one uses, very effective, such structure and effectiveness resulted from the 
totalitarian nature of the administration. Such an administration can implement policies much 
more effectively than can a representative government, but at the cost of personal freedom 
and rights.624 
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6.44 Charity Services during the Occupation 
In addition to feeding a large proportion of the population, a second, more extensive 
sphere of official disinterest was that of relief work. From the outset, the Japanese showed 
themselves anxious to delegate such work to the Tung Wah and Kwong Wah Hospitals and 
similar local elite-run bodies that had traditionally assumed responsibility for the care of the 
destitute. The Gunseicho gave notice that while the Twenty-Third Army were temporarily 
providing rice and gruel to the poor, the latter were “very numerous” and “it was hoped that 
charitable organizations would hasten to extend their activities”. In the same spirit, Isogai 
advised the Representative Council that any scheme for relieving local unemployment should 
be worked out by “the people themselves”.625 
Widespread Japanese delegation of functions permitted many local elites to play an 
increased public role in comparison to their roles under the British administration. True to 
their strong tradition of social duty, the local elites accepted the invitation to extend their 
charitable work with vigour. Their first major effort manifested in the summer of 1942, when 
the Japanese requested contributions to an East Asia Construction Fund from leading citizens 
as a kind of “loyalty” test. When Kotewall proposed, seemingly on his own initiative, that 
approximately HK$160,000 that had been raised for this fund be used to alleviate hunger in 
the colony, Isogai graciously acceded.626 The Construction Fund monies were converted into 
a government grant that the two Chinese Councils were instructed to manage. When the 
Councils were more generally ordered “to take full charge of plans to give relief to the poorer 
people of Hong Kong”, they formed a body known as the General Association of Chinese 
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Charities (GACC), the first central welfare agency in the colony's history,627 to distribute the 
grant among the various individual charities and coordinate future efforts to raise money for 
charitable purposes from the colony's wealthy. Kotewall was elected Chairman and the Bank 
of East Asia was appointed to oversee the distribution of the funds.628  
On 14 November, the GACC presented MY40, 000 to Governor Isogai, which he 
immediately appropriated for charities. In response, Aw Boon-haw629 donated MY 12,500, 
which was followed by further public donations. At its inception, the GACC decided that top 
priority should go to emergency relief work, defined as feeding and clothing the destitute, and 
delegated this task to the Roman Catholic Church and the Chinese hospitals. One of the first 
grants it released was MY 5,000 to Tung Wah and Kwong Wah Hospitals for the medical 
treatment of one hundred refugees for one month and the distribution of one thousand 
wadded jackets to the poor through Regional Affairs Offices and District Service Bureaux. 
As did almost all organizations, the Tung Wah Group was experiencing financial 
difficulty. It could draw on its bank reserves only in small instalments, and then only by 
special permission from the Japanese authorities. Aw Boon-baw’s donation of MY12, 500 in 
mid-1942 was slightly more than the amount that the Group spent in a month. As few new 
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members were willing to assume directorship of the Group, the 1941 board of twelve 
directors were re-elected for 1942, with a new board thereafter elected annually until the war 
ended.630The other major Chinese charity organization, the Po Leung Kuk, was in similar dire 
straits. It accommodated at least 125 orphans, but kept its admission under very strict terms. 
Kuk officials had to ensure that only genuine orphans were admitted, destitute families being 
too eager to send their children disguised orphans. In mid-1942, Aw Boon-haw donated 
MY28, 000, hoping to double the number of children that the orphanage could accommodate. 
The orphanage was able to increase the number to 225 before the end of 1942, and after 
receiving a subsidy from the government, to 300 in early 1943. One firm in particular, the 
Yue Ching Company, which had a Japanese-approved monopoly on the sale of opium, 
donated to the public readily and invariably. As instructed by the Civil Administration 
Department, the Yue Ching Company donated MY10, 000 in December 1943, MY20, 000 in 
early 1944, and MY 20, 000 in May 1945. Ironically, the Tung Wah Hospital, with the 
financial support of Aw Boon-haw, set up two wards to treat 40 patients each for in-ward 
treatment period of two weeks. 
In early 1943, the GACC embarked on the first in a series of major fundraising drives 
that led to considerable donations from local business leaders. Among the more prominent 
donors were Li Tse-fong, Manager of the Bank of East Asia, and Ho Kom-tong, the Master of 
Ceremonies. As the wealthiest among his contemporaries, Aw Boon-haw made the most 
handsome contribution of all, fortifying both the GACC and the individual charities that had 
been brought under its umbrella with cash injections of up to HK$125,000. As well as trying 
to meet the basic need for food, the GACC launched an appeal for cotton padded jackets to 
see the poor through the winter, while the member charities stepped up their attempts to 
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provide free medical treatment to the poorest residents and take orphaned children off the 
streets. 
The local elites also assumed the responsibility passed to them by the Japanese. In 
response to Isogai’s admonitions, the Cooperative Council prepared a scheme for 
unemployment relief that it passed on to the Representative Council and the Governor’s 
Office. The Council also made a sustained endeavour to respond to the glaring deficiencies in 
education, always a sector of paramount importance for the Chinese. In January 1943, the 
Cooperative Council decided to ask wealthy families to contribute funding towards the 
education of disadvantaged children. The Chinese Councils then formed the Education Sub-
Committee to supervise the process and assigned a portion of the GACC’s grant to endow 
places for disadvantaged children in primary and secondary schools. By September, about one 
thousand pupils in selected schools had benefited from the scholarship programme.631 During 
the prewar years, several free schools had been operated by charities, but no scholarship 
system had existed to give poorer children a foothold in the regular teaching establishments. 
In this context, the elite's educational thrust represented a real innovation in spite of the 
modest numbers involved, one which one postwar British historian described as “a significant 
social welfare project”.632 
Through such endeavours, the colony's upper and middle classes stepped forward 
where needed to fill the void created by the Japanese abdication of responsibility in certain 
areas. Responding to Japanese promptings to help with the food supply and on the initiative 
of Au Boon-haw, in November 1943 the elites formed a Hong Kong People's Food 
Cooperative Association, whose task was to negotiate with the authorities in neighbouring 
centres for the import of rice, and the Chung Kiu Company, whose task was to arrange the 
                                                 
631 Hong Kong News, September 28, 1943. See also Heasman, “Japanese Financial and Economic Measures in 
Hong Kong,” 86. 
632 Endacott, Hong Kong Eclipse, 155. 
 267
import of any rice that might be secured as a result of these efforts. Au Boon-haw was the 
largest shareholder in the Chung Kiu Company, with a stake of MY500, 000 of a total capital 
base of MY10 million. “Most of the wealthy Chinese” in Hong Kong also bought shares, 
which were underwritten by the Bank of East Asia.633 Over the following year, a succession 
of gentry leaders were sent to Canton to take advantage of any new opportunities for 
importing goods that might have arisen from the tentative reopening of the Kowloon-Canton 
Railway. Prominent among them was the Wang Jingwei supporter Kong Kai-tung, who was 
twice dispatched to persuade his counterparts in the Chinese puppet government of 
Guangdong Province to relax the various restrictions that they had imposed on the shipment 
of rice to the colony.634 
6.45 Reasons for Elite Participation in Charity Services 
Two reasons lay behind the elites’ visible willingness to assist with public charity. 
First, it provided a means of earning profit. Beth Woo, a Chinese woman who returned to the 
colony in the spring of 1944, referred to observing “those making millions”.635 Even if they 
were not actively making millions, they were sitting on millions: the Governor's Office 
explained that the reason that the Bank of East Asia, unlike the rest of the Chinese banks, had 
been given the privilege of handling remittances to Shanghai and its sister ports was that no 
other bank had so large a capital base or so many facilities.636 Empowered by those millions, 
many top tycoons were able to enjoy a remarkably good lifestyle in the midst of the general 
deprivation.637 The Comte de Sercey, a Frenchman formerly employed in the Chinese Postal 
Service who left the colony at about the same time as Beth Woo entered it, reported that 
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although the cost of living was higher there than it was in Chungking, “with money anything 
could be had”.638 As late as July 1945, advertisements were being placed in the Hong Kong 
News by the Alex Chocolate Shop in Ice House Street. The gentry quickly realized the 
potential for gain from the newly issued Japanese invitations to import rice, and they 
immediately seized the chance to improve their position still further. Indeed, the rice 
imported into the colony by the Chung Kin Company was earmarked “primarily” for the 
company’s shareholders.639  
It followed equally that the gentry had much to lose from a drift into complete social 
chaos, and their efforts to shore up the colony's crumbling police force should therefore be 
seen in this context. In July 1945, the Cooperative Council held a meeting to discuss ways of 
working with the police as part of Tanaka's new drive for the deportation of “undesirable 
characters”.640 The Council members regretted that the lower-grade police still showed a 
tendency to rope in “respectable persons” by tearing up residence permits and identity cards, 
but agreed—and continued to state in postwar testimonials—that the idea underlying the 
scheme was a good one.641 
Second, the local elites still retained their traditional sense of duty to the public at 
large. Even if most of the rice imported by the Chung Kiu Company was to go to the 
shareholders, the remainder was to be put on the market at a favourable rate, and as the 
shortages worsened, more strenuous efforts were made to ensure that such rice as came in did 
reach the masses. Soon after the suspension of the government’s rice rationing scheme at the 
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beginning of May 1944, “a number of wealthy members” of the United Christian Church of 
Hong Kong were reported to have formed a Consumers’ Cooperative for the exclusive 
purpose of bringing rice into the colony and selling it at a low price. The office of the 
Consumers’ Cooperative was in the Bank of East Asia.642 In November, and again with some 
help from the Bank of East Asia, a Hong Kong Wholesale Rice Merchants' Association was 
organized in an effort to keep the rice price as low as possible. The experiment foundered 
after only two weeks, as the bulk of the rice merchants were unwilling to agree to “losing all 
the time”.643 Undaunted, Kotewall pleaded with them to cooperate, and the two Chinese 
Councils embarked on a week-long series of conferences with the merchants in the hope that 
the Association might be revived. 
Throughout these months, the local elites continued pleading for concessions from the 
Japanese, some of which seem to reflect a desire to promote their own businesses and 
maintain their own comforts. In September 1944, for instance, the two Councils submitted a 
proposal to Isogai that an Enquiries Section should be attached to the newly created Hong 
Kong Trade Association so that help could be given to Chinese merchants now entitled to 
join the Association and take part in long-distance trade. The Councils also pressed for a 
resumption of the electricity supply so that “the numerous factories” could remain 
operational.644 In November, Kotewall and his colleagues appealed to Isogai to reconsider a 
suspension of the water supply that had been imposed on certain districts in the upper levels 
of Victoria, where, naturally, most of them lived.  
Various other overtures, however, reflected a genuine concern with the public interest. 
After the regime began to substitute beans for rice in the government rations in November 
1943, the Council members urged the regime to stop doing so because the Chinese population 
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did not consider a diet of beans to be good for their health. After the rice rationing scheme 
was discontinued in summer 1944, Li Tse-fang held a press interview to propose that workers 
in factories and business firms be given a pay increase and that those who did not receive 
food and lodging as part of their compensation should continue receiving a certain quantity of 
rice every month.645 Following a sudden drastic surge in the price of rice in December, 
Kotewall and the other Chinese representatives paid several calls on the Governor's Office to 
ask the authorities what they intended to do.646  
No doubt gentry interests were involved here—Chan Lim-pak commented that the 
price increase had caused much anxiety to Council members “as it not only affected the 
poorer classes but even the rich”—647but it seems fair to conclude that the gentry leaders 
were also trying their best to save lives. From the autumn of 1944, efforts were also made to 
induce the regime to reopen the air-raid shelters so that the public could have some protection 
from the American bombing. Keen though they were that the colony should be rid of its 
“vagabonds” in the interests of social order, the gentry leaders attempted to prevail upon the 
Japanese to improve the conditions of destitute repatriates. In November 1943, the two 
Chinese Councils asked the Harbour Department to allow repatriates to take with them a 
small bag containing their personal effects, and a year later Kotewall and the other 
Councillors requested the abolition of the compulsory stool tests and vaccinations that had 
been required of repatriates before their departure. 
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Postwar Politics and Arrangements 
 
7.1 The Legacy of Japanese Occupation in Singapore 
National heritage, according to David Lowenthal, is often constructed according to 
present-day concerns with fostering nationalism, and with little regard to accurately 
representing the past.648 Enshrining an ideology of common suffering into a national history is 
a form of heritage regularly used by states to unify their peoples. Ernest Renan suggests that 
people different in “race and language” can be bound together by an ideology of having 
“suffered together. . . . Indeed common suffering unites more strongly than common 
rejoicing . . . for they impose duties and demand common effort”.649 The collective memory 
of common suffering creates an image “that a nation is a great solid unit, formed by the 
realisation of sacrifices in the past, as well as of those one is prepared to make in the future”. 
The atrocities committed in Singapore during the Japanese occupation present 
interesting case studies for testing Lowenthal’s and Renan’s theses within a Southeast Asian 
context. In postcolonial Singapore, the remembrance of common suffering under the Japanese 
provided the foundation of a collective memory that was nurtured by Singapore’s political 
leaders, who “found themselves in possession of a state without a nation”. Encouraging a 
collective experience of historical suffering was thus a means of binding the diverse peoples 
of the newly emerging nation-state together. After Malaya was granted independence in 
August 1957 and Singapore was granted complete autonomy in July 1959, the Federation of 
Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah was established in 1963. Singapore only remained in 
the new federation until August 1965, when it became a separate independent republic. Thus, 
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between 1945 and 1965, the modern nations of Malaysia and Singapore emerged from the old 
British Malaya through a complex process of independence, annexation, and separation.650 
In this sense, the Japanese occupation of Singapore was important because the change 
of regime and the violence of war had altered the pattern of race relations and raised the 
political stakes. To the local population, politics in the broad sense became a life-and-death 
struggle. Local responses to Japanese policies, especially those that led to changing Malay 
and Chinese perceptions of one another during the Japanese occupation, helped to determine 
the direction of Malaya and Singapore’s postwar political development. 
 Historically, the occupation of one state by another generally results in political and 
economic stagnation. The Germans who pulled out of France in the wake of the Normandy 
landings not only left nothing constructive but nothing different. The social discourse that 
thereafter resumed in France appears to have been much the same as that which broke off in 
1940.651 In East Asia, however, the Japanese conquests, for all the misery that they inflicted, 
had a dynamic effect; the Japanese left behind them societies that were not only brutalized 
and desolated but irreversibly changed. The occupation not only disrupted Malaya’s society 
and economy but also brought about profound changes among its peoples. It awoke a new 
consciousness within them by injecting seishin (“spirit”) while simultaneously intensifying 
communalism and racial conflict by leaving them ill-equipped to develop a consistent racial 
policy. While some Malayan institutions had maintained continuity throughout the war, the 
occupation had pre-empted many of their functions. 
7.11 Postwar Collaborators  
On 5 September 1945, 708,000 Japanese soldiers surrendered to the British military 
authorities in the Far East, and all Japanese military forces in Southeast Asia surrendered to 
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the British in Singapore on 12 September 1945. The British high command issued directives 
to the British military authorities on the ground to detain those Japanese who were in charge 
of the POW camps, the members of the Kempeitai, and others believed to be responsible for 
war crimes against Allied POWs and peoples of the occupied territories. To investigate these 
detainees, the high command sent three war crimes investigation teams to Malaya and 
Singapore, with Singapore serving as the centre of the British war crimes program in the Far 
East. Soon nine thousand war crimes suspects had been rounded up among a Japanese 
population that had dwindled to 203,000 by February 1946 as a result of mass repatriation.652 
Apart from those who had joined guerrilla forces operating in the jungle, nearly all the 
population had in some way collaborated with the Japanese. Recognizing this reality, the 
British, while reserving the right to punish serious offences, adopted a conciliatory attitude 
towards collaboration. In setting down his policy for the military administration of Malaya, 
Admiral Mountbatten specified, “The first guiding principle to be observed is that no person 
shall suffer on account of political opinions honestly held, whether now or in the past—even 
if these may have been anti-British—but only on account of previous crimes against the 
criminal law or actions repugnant to humanity”.653 Instructions prepared by the SACSEA 
Security Intelligence for Planning Section cautioned, 
Pro Japanese and anti-Allied opinions expressed publicly by prominent citizens during 
the Japanese Occupation should not be taken invariably at face value. Many such 
individuals have co-operated under pressure, and have acted as intermediaries on 
behalf of their respective communities. Similarly, reports of “donations” made by 
local citizens to the Japanese war funds should be treated with reserve.654 
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The Civil Affairs directive regarding collaboration enunciated the administration’s 
policy regarding working with those who had collaborated: 
It is the aim of His Majesty's Government to dissipate as speedily as possible whatever 
pro-Japanese sentiments may still remain, and to promote conditions under which the 
territories concerned may resume their position in the Empire on a basis of goodwill. 
To this end, and subject to what is said below, treatment of those who have 
collaborated with the enemy should be founded on a tolerant view of their conduct, if 
this will encourage the loyal support of men on whom (by reason of their 
administrative qualities) we must necessarily depend, but who in view of their position 
have in the past been employed by the Japanese.655 
In January 1946, the Eurasian leader Dr C .J. Paglar was put on trial for treason. His 
defence argued that community leaders such as Paglar had acted under duress, while Mamoru 
Shinozaki, the former Head of the Welfare Department in Singapore, testified that he had 
drafted a message, claimed by the prosecution to be treasonable, that Paglar had read during a 
ceremony to celebrate the Japanese Emperor’s birthday, adding that leaders of the other 
communities had been given slightly different versions of the same message. Although the 
Court decided not to proceed with the trial, the case was simply adjourned without the charges 
being withdrawn, leaving a shadow hanging over Paglar but sparing him any punishment. 
Similar charges against other community leaders were also dropped.656 
Members of the INA posed a different problem, for they had taken up arms against 
Great Britain, and some had done so in violation of oaths taken as members of the British 
armed forces. Force 136 officers sent into Malaya during the occupation had been directed to 
attempt to persuade INA members to desert, but not to make any promises regarding future 
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treatment.657 After the war, INA soldiers who had surrendered were transferred to India, 
where their fate became embroiled in the politics of independence. Jawaharlal Nehru, who 
had opposed the INA in 1942, now issued a statement of support, and public opinion in India 
hailed INA members as heroes. Responding to this situation, the British allowed many 
soldiers to rejoin their old units, and simply dismissed most of the rest from service. A small 
number of key figures were tried and sentenced to life imprisonment, but these sentences 
were commuted to simply dismissal from the army.658  
7.12 Japanese and British system of administration and the question of Independence for 
Malaya 
 In contrast with the prewar British practice of having a dual form of government, that 
of direct and indirect rule, the Japanese governed Malaya as a single intergrated colony under 
one supreme government headed by the Malaya Military Administration (MMA) in 
Singapore.659 In doing so the Japanese reduced the status of the Malay Sultans to that of 
minor officials, heads of the State Islamic affairs bureau, in contrast to their position under the 
British when they enjoyed the prestige of being, at least nominally, heads of their own states. 
With the exception of Singapore, which became a Special Municipality with a Mayor, all 
Malay States—plus Malacca, Penang and Province Wellesley—were converted into provinces 
administered by Japanese Governors. The Sultans also lost part of their authoriety over 
matters concerning the Islamic religion until 1943-44, while in pre-war days these 
responsibilities had been left entirely in their hands.660 
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 With these significant exceptions, the Japanese administration in Malaya resembled 
the British administrative system it superseded. In the early months of the occupation, the 
Japanese made relatively few changes in prewar personnel, but later pursued a policy which 
favored Malay appointees over Chinese and Indians. The most important changes occurred at 
the higher levels, where the Japanese replaced British civil servants, while the provincial and 
local government staffs remained much as they were before the war. In the Straits Settlement, 
where a larger number of non-Malays had been employed in the British civil service, prewar 
officials of all races continued to hold office in 1942 and 1943, but Malay officials increased 
in numbers and rose more rapidly through the service. One of the main instruments of the 
‘pro-Malay’ policy were the Koa Kunrenjo (leadership training schools) which were 
established at Singapore, Malacca and Penang. Seventy percent of the trainees were Malays 
and graduates were given relatively high appointments.661 
 Japanese military officers occupied a few top position such as Governors, while 
Japanese civilians, among them former residents of Malaya and technical experts or 
representatives of large Japanese companies, were chosen as heads of departments, mayors, 
governors, and appointees for important staff positions. Due to insufficient data, it is not 
possible to state whether the number of Japanese administrators in Malaya exceeded the 
prewar number of British administrators.662 
Although the Japanese Army administered Malaya as a colony throughout the war, 
Tokyo did consider the question of granting independence to Malaya. In February 1945, a 
study group in the Political Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs examined the 
possibilities of granting political independence to Malaya, and in a working paper suggested 
three possibilities: 
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a) To incorporate the four Sultanates of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah and Perlis into 
Thailand, and the rest into China. 
b) To grant autonomy through the creation of a political administration with the 
cooperation of the Chinese, the main race in Malaya, and the Malays. 
c) To make Malaya a state of a federated Indonesia.663 
The incorporation of the four northern sultanates into Thailand had already occurred in 
October 1943. The idea of integrating the remaining states of Malaya into China was based on 
a change in the colony’s demographic balance following transfer of the four northern States to 
Thailand. The Chinese population thereafter constituted 47%, the Malays 34%, and the 
Indians and others 18%. Based on these estimated figures, the study group concluded that the 
‘main race’ in Malaya was the Chinese. 
Therefore, in granting independence to Malaya it is impossible to ignore 
the Chinese on population grounds alone, even without taking into 
consideration their economic activities...... These days, the present Malayan 
Military Government is starting to show signs of changing the policy enforced 
in the early stages of military administration and which had been claimed to 
stand for principles emphasizing the position of Malays, because it has become 
impossible to ignore the power of Overseas Chinese merchants in various areas 
such as commerce, industry and labor.664 
 
However, in reconsidering the question, the group concluded in another document that it was 
not feasible to grant independence to Malaya owing to the low level of political sophistication 
and the conditions of the indigenous people (i.e., the Malays).665 
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 Table 7.1 Total Population of Malaya, including Singapore, 1936 
Malays 2,095,217 44.6% 
Chinese 1,821,750 38.8% 
Indians and others 779,299 16.6% 
  
Table 7.2 Total Population of Malaya, including Singapore, but excluding the Four Northern 
States ceded to Thailand in 1943 
 
Malays 1,210,718 34.3% 
Chinese 1,699,594 47.7% 
Indians and others 651,948 18% 
 
The idea of granting independence to Malaya and other occupied territories in 
Southeast Asia had been secondary to the Japanese aim of using these areas to supply 
resources vital to the war effort. Tokyo began to consider the idea only when Japan suffered 
major reverses in the war at the battle of Midway in June 1942 and later when the U.S. Navy 
inflicted heavy losses on the Japanese naval fleet. After defeats at Guadalcanal and at Buna in 
Papua in January 1943, Japanese strategy became largely defensive666 and the military began 
to justify the continuing hardship to the Japanese people as sacrifices in the cause of ‘the 
liberation of Asian peoples’.667 There was also hope that, if and when Southeast Asia became 
a battleground, its inhabitants would fight with the Japanese rather than the Allies. This could 
only be the case if some major political concession such as independence was granted. 
Once these considerations began to influence Tokyo the question arose: which of the 
occupied countries of Southeast Asia was ready for independence? One criterion for 
determining this was the prewar record of the nationalist movements in each of the occupied 
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territories. Certain ‘lobbies’ within the Japanese armed forces and the government, each 
having some prewar contacts with and commitment to certain nationalist groups, now began 
to assert themselves. In January 1943, moved by such pressures and their need for the front 
line cooperation of the ruling oligarchy in the Philippines and the pro-Japanese groups in 
Burma, Tokyo promised to grant early independence to both these countries. Indochina was 
still under the Vichy French administration, but contacts with pro-Japanese groups were 
stepped up as part of Japanese political maneuvers to establish an independent Indochina 
within the Greater East Asia sphere. The IIL was also encouraged through formation of the 
Indian National Army aimed at liberating India from British rule. But in the Netherlands East 
Indies and in Malaya no moves were made in early 1943 to promote movement towards 
independence. Soon forced by the deteriorating military situation to act on its promises, 
Tokyo granted independence to Burma on 1 August and the Philippines on 14 October 1943. 
Nine days later Tokyo extended recognition to the Provisional Government of Free India, an 
act prompted by the military imperative of launching a counteroffensive in Burma. In 
November the heads of these governments, as well as those of Thailand and of the pro-Japa-
nese government in Nanking, attended a Greater East Asia Conference in Tokyo. 
In February 1945 the question of granting independence to Malaya was raised as part 
of this continuing discussion. Two considerations now seemed to assume great importance. 
First, the greater the geographical isolation of an occupied territory from Japan, the greater 
the need to accelerate the movement towards independence. Second, there was the hope that 
Southeast Asian countries would fight on the Japanese side against the Allies if some major 
political concessions were granted. 
For Malaya there was still no hint of Japanese plans to grant independence, and the 
only positive sign was the formation of certain advisory bodies during 1943-44 in which local 
participation was encouraged. State and city councils were established from August 1943 to 
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January 1944, but even these were similar to the former prewar British Executive Councils for 
the Straits Settlements Colony and the Malay States.668 Although the functions of these bodies 
were nominal and advisory, they had the potential for development into a system of self-
government. The abrupt Japanese surrender forestalled this possibility, however, unless some 
local organization was able to pick up where the Japanese had left off. Anyway, all the above 
plans were cut short by the surrender of Japan. 
7.13 Interruption or Transformation? 
Did the Japanese occupation of Singapore represent an interruption or a 
transformation? Gildea argues that the occupation brought about a psychological, social, and 
political transformation of a “land which was a political backwater” and changed it “into a 
political maelstrom”. The impact of the war on Malayan society and the response to the 
occupation varied among the different ethnic groups. Few would disagree that the most 
significant impact of the forty-eight-month occupation upon the Malays was its catalytic role 
in the emergence and development of nationalism. After the great rolling back of European 
power in the region between 1941 and 1942, the local populations could never return to the 
view of their former masters that they had maintained before the war. In Indochina and the 
East Indies, local partisans took up arms to resist the return of the French and the Dutch, 
while the guerrillas who had fought the Japanese in Malaya returned to the jungle to drive out 
the British. In China, where the European powers had been driven to court the goodwill of 
their wartime Chinese Nationalist allies by signing away their rights in the old treaty ports, the 
Nationalists took swift action to show the expatriates that it was they who were in power.669 
By politicizing a Malayan society characterized by three major ethnic groups and a weak 
political consciousness prior to the outbreak of war, the Japanese policies of economic 
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autarchy and Japanization acted as significant catalysts in the transformation of Malayan 
society and politics during the postwar years. 
To a large extent, the Japanese military administration’s policies and actions towards 
the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya had determined not only Chinese attitudes towards the 
regime but also towards other ethnic groups, especially the Malays and Indians. Japanese 
policies that produced resentment and hostility among the ethnic groups, exacerbated by the 
competition for favours, privileges, jobs, goods, and foodstuffs necessary for survival, had 
created great ethnic tension that persisted into the postwar era. Such tension is reflected in 
postwar Chinese accounts of the war that generally depict cooperative Malays as Japanese 
“collaborators” and “informers”, even though some Chinese could also be accused of 
cooperating. However, greater Malay cooperation was inevitable due to Japanese policies 
towards the Malays, which were much less repressive. When the Japanese used Malay village 
chiefs, police, and Volunteer Corps units against the Chinese resistance, the Chinese 
interpreted Malay involvement as cooperation, and the Malays as the “chosen” group of the 
Japanese. Such tension only needs further misunderstandings to trigger large-scale conflicts.  
The British failure to defend them and their success in providing for themselves 
during the exigencies of war had awakened and imbued within the Chinese in Singapore a 
new drive to promote their own interests,670 one that made deep impressions on those who 
were later to assume the leadership of Singapore.671 They realized that they must rely on their 
own strengths and resources to ensure that they will not be subjected to occupation and 
subsequent exploitation by others ever again. This enhanced consciousness that their way of 
life was worth preserving and that their country was worth fighting for was a necessary step in 
creating a sense of national loyalty in a country largely composed of immigrants.672 
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Before the war, Malay nationalism had been at only an incipient stage, and confined to 
a small group of left-wing intellectual radicals with neither a well-organized national body 
nor mass support for a reformist political platform. This weak nationalist movement atrophied 
after the MMA disbanded the KMM and banned its political activities. The opportunity to 
reactivate the Malay nationalist movement arrived in July 1945, when the DATA turned to 
the KMM and encouraged former KMM officers to prepare the ground for independence, 
leading to the formation of the Kekuaten Ra'yat Istimewa (KRIS). A further consequence of 
the Japanese occupation was a change in Chinese and Indian political orientation. Until 1945, 
Malay nationalism had no distinct platform because the major ethnic groups had three distinct 
foci for their nationalistic aspirations. However, as Malay nationalism, energized by the 
Japanese, asserted its power in the postwar years, the Chinese and Indian communities found 
it necessary to form their own political associations to protect their respective interests. Their 
increasing concern for their own welfare demanded their involvement in local political affairs, 
thus turning them more towards a Malay-centric political perspective. They became interested 
in Malayan issues and identified themselves increasingly with the destiny of Malaya, 
considering Malaya their country of permanent residence; they were no longer overseas 
residents or aliens who were either apathetic or loyal to Britain, China, or India. The 
formation of the MIC and the MCA was evidence of this change to a Malay orientation. 
The rapid growth of a new consciousness among the different ethnic groups was not 
entirely a blessing for postwar Malayan society and politics. Whereas the British had 
maintained harmony among the three major ethnic groups through their policy of divide and 
rule, the Japanese engendered communal conflict, particularly between the Malay and 
Chinese communities, by their failure to develop a racial policy. Consequently, the two 
communities began to harbour a mutual enmity that manifested as communalism until it 
erupted into open communal warfare. This communal strife, combined with the MPAJA’s bid 
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for power, which threatened the very existence of Malay, encouraged, at worst, the division of 
Malayan society into two hostile camps, or, at best, settlement into an uneasy coexistence. 
The first racial clash occurred in February 1945, in what appeared to be the beginning 
of a general blood-letting, when Malays killed several Chinese on the outskirts of Batu Bahat, 
Johore. In retaliation, MPAJA soldiers burned Malay villages and executed their headmen. 
Malays responded by attacking Chinese and taking revenge on any Chinese in the vicinity for 
the murder of their leaders.673 The Japanese were at first delighted by these local initiatives 
against the Communist bandits, giving support to predominantly Malay Jikeidan (self-defense 
corps) which were reinforced by Japanese troops. Malays took the opportunity to vent their 
hatred of Chinese, killing hundreds and destroying and looting several hundred houses. Only 
when the situation got out of control did the Japanese intervene and mediate the bloody racial 
conflict between the two antagonistic groups. 
It is against this background that the communal strife of the interregnum between the 
Japanese surrender on 15 August and the British arrival on 5 September 1945 must be 
understood. The Japanese MMA withheld information from the public about Japan’s 
surrender for a week. In the meantime MPAJA soldiers, in accordance with previous 
arrangement with British officers of Force 136, came out of their jungle hideouts and took 
control of the whole of Johore outside of Johore Bahru. They occupied police stations, 
disarmed Malay policemen, and rounded up Malay collaborators for trial and execution.674 
The jungle fighters, intoxicated by victory and honored by the British as national heroes, 
established political hegemony in the interregnum period. This was a bid for power resulting 
from the ‘identification of the AJA [Anti-Japanese Army] with Chinese which had taken 
place during the Japanese occupation and of the protective role they had assumed during the 
period from February and July when Malays were attacking Chinese residents in Johore.’ The 
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MPAJA was determined to establish Chinese hegemony in Malaya, and a bid for power was 
evident in its propaganda that (1) it would ‘fly the flags of the Soviet Union, the Chinese and 
three stars in Malaya;’ (2) it would unite Chinese to chase the British out of Malaya if they 
returned; (3) it would ‘reject the service of the high ranking Malaya officials’ and ‘Rulers and 
Chiefs of this state;’ and (4) it would replace British government officials with Chinese 
because Malaya would ‘belong to the Chinese.’675 
Therefore, we may argue that a large share of the present communalism in Malaysia 
must be attributed to MMA wartime policy. Out of expediency and the absence of a coherent 
racial and educational policy, the MMA allowed the British educational system to continue 
along communal lines, planting the seeds of separatism. The MMA thus missed a prime 
opportunity to bring about a fundamental change in the communal relations that have plagued 
Malaysia since the postwar period, and were epitomized by the bloody May 1969 racial riots. 
The sultanate was perhaps the only institution that went through the occupation without much 
transformation, largely on account of the MMA’s preferential treatment, although occupation 
policy had weakened the sultans’ authority and tarnished their prestige.  
Last but not least, an equally significant factor emerging from the period of the 
Malayan Union controversy was a growing Malaya-oriented political focus on the part of the 
Chinese. Before the war the Hua chiao (Oversea Chinese) of Sinkeh origin in Malaya were 
largely concerned with the affairs of their home country, while Peranakan Chinese (local 
born Chinese) and Baba Chinese (Straits born Chinese) remained either apolitical or loyal to 
Britain. After the war, Chinese began to turn their interest towards Malaya and Malayan 
issues. The MPAJA attempt to seize power was but one example of this political change. 
Other examples were the formation of political association such as the All-Malaya Council of 
Joint Action, the Malayan Democratic Union, and finally the Malayan Chinese Association 
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(MCA) to protect their communal interests—citizenship, taxation, representation in the 
Federal Council and the like. The emergence of the MCA under the leadership of Tan Cheng 
Lock, a prominent Baba from Malacca, at the time of the Chinese Communist victory on the 
Mainland in February 1949, was a definite turning point in the political attitudes of the 
Malayan Chinese and represented a break with their earlier mainland orientation. This was the 
beginning of the transformation of the Chinese from Hua chiao, Huayi (Chinese person), Ma 
Hua (Malayan Chinese) to Malaysians—in effect defining themselves permanent residents of 
Malaysia and identifying themselves with its destiny. It is unfortunate, however, that Chinese, 
like Malays and Indians, organized a political party along communal lines, contributing to the 
perpetuation of communalism in present-day Malaysia. Consequently, pluralism continues in 
Malaysia, despite the transformation in Chinese political attitudes—a change whose seed was 
planted during the Japanese occupation period.676 
In summary, under the Japanese, Malay’s administration underwent several important 
changes. For the first time in the country’s history an integrated government was imposed for 
the whole of Malaya, with a central authority based in Singapore a marked contrast with the 
prewar dual system of direct and indirect rule. The Japanese demoted the Sultans further by 
removing their nominal status as rulers, which the British had allowed, thus turning them into 
minor officials. Like the British, the Japanese pursued a ‘pro-Malay’ policy of appointing 
more Malays than Chinese and Indians in government service. But they went further than the 
British in encouraging Malays to rise to higher positions than had been allowed in the prewar 
era. These Japanese policies were to have important effects in postwar Malaya. 
Second, the Japanese occupation enabled the predominantly Chinese MCP to increase 
its political influence in Malaya during the war and in the postwar period. As the only 
political organization prepared for an active anti-Japanese insurgency, it attracted widespread 
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support among the Chinese who suffered greatly from the brutality of the Japanese. The MCP 
succeeded therefore in establishing a strong politico-military resistance movement, the 
MPAJU/MPAJA, in the midst of the Chinese community. There was, however, less support 
for the MCP from Malays and Indians, because Malay and Indian cooperation with the 
Japanese was clearly greater than that of the Chinese. Nonetheless, because of its large 
guerrilla army, the MCP became a major political force in postwar Malay. 
Third, the Japanese occupation helped to bring about certain changes in the structure 
of Chinese society in Malaya. Traditional Chinese leaders had either fled the country or were 
forced to cooperate with the Japanese if they remained. Consequently, the prewar elites were 
discredited and frequently despised. Their place tended to be filled by Chinese communists 
who were mostly of a younger generation. On the whole, the Japanese occupation and the war 
experience strengthened Chinese nationalism and their sense of ethnic identity. 
Finally, the greatest overall change produced by the Japanese administration was in 
the area of race relations. Although the Japanese did not deliberately foster racial conflict 
between Malays and Chinese, their policies had this effect. Repressive measures against the 
Chinese led to the formation of a Chinese dominated resistance movement; their ‘pro-Malay’ 
policy created an undercurrent of resentment and distrust among Chinese towards Malays. 
Malay cooperation made them appear a chosen instrument of the Japanese. As Willard 
Elsbree later observed, had there been equal proportions of Chinese and Malays in the 
resistance as well as in collaboration, ‘the bitterness which came in the wake of the 
occupation would not have had such a pronounced racial tinge.’ 
In short, the transformation of Malayan society instigated by occupation policies and 
the Malayans’ responses to them resulted in revolutionary changes in the political, social, and 
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psychological outlook of the Malayan citizens.677 Having either fled the country or been 
forced to cooperate with the Japanese if they remained, traditional Chinese leaders and prewar 
elites found themselves discredited and despised and their places filled primarily by a younger 
generation of Chinese communists. The Japanese occupation and the war experience thus 
strengthened both Chinese nationalism and ethnic identity in Singapore. 
 
7.2 Responses of the Hong Kong Elites to the Return of the British 
News of Japan’s collapse had provoked an instant resumption of the familiar 
partnership of the most important pair of local elite leaders: Kotewall and Chow. On 16 
August, Kotewall, seemingly having made a rapid recovery from the illness that had 
immobilized him two weeks earlier, and Chow engaged in several hours of talks with 
Rakuman Kinji, the civilian head of the No. 1 Department of the Governor’s Office. Kotewall 
and Chow then went to Police Headquarters, where they exchanged views with Kanazawa, 
the Police Commissioner and Kempeitai chief. On the following day, the two men gave a 
press conference at which they declared that the situation in the colony was now “on the 
verge of change”, and praised the Chinese public for their “patience and good behaviour” 
over the past three years and eight months.678 
Kotewall and Chow were clearly making a bid to fill the vacuum of authority in the 
stupefied city, an endeavour supported by the elites’ concern to fend off social chaos. At their 
meeting with Kanazawa, they discussed ways of strengthening the existing police apparatus, 
stressing that “law and order must be fully protected”.679 In his capacity as Chairman of the 
Police Affairs Committee, Chow then attended a meeting of the Directors of the Cooperative 
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Society, which had been set up in May to raise funding for the police. “Sparing no effort to 
devise protection for the Hong Kong Chinese” in spite of his eighty-six years, Chow held a 
second meeting with Kanazawa on 18 August at which they decided that the Cooperative 
Society would distribute rice to the police paid for by the Police Affairs Committee.680 
Kotewall and Chow also organized a drive to sustain the activities of the auxiliary Protective 
Guards through donations from the elites, resulting in most of the Guards’ expenses over the 
following week being met by voluntary donations by “wealthy people” in each district. These 
donations gradually began to flag as the days passed, but they seem to have had some effect: 
on 26 August the Protective Guards were still reported to be “continuing their efforts to help 
maintain order”.681 
Second and equally urgent, the two local leaders were seeking to manage a smooth 
transition from one regime to the next, which required maintaining an outwardly cordial 
relationship with the beaten Japanese during the final days of the occupation. On 20 August, 
they attended a farewell banquet that Governor Tanaka had organized for the Chairman and 
Vice-Chairmen of the two Chinese Councils and the editors of the local Chinese newspapers 
to thank them for their assistance over the past four years. On 29 August they returned the 
compliment, treating Tanaka to a banquet at the East Asia Chinese Restaurant, where they 
made speeches expressing thanks to the Japanese Governor for his past administration and 
his kindness to all the residents of Hong Kong.682  
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At the same time, they were quietly re-establishing communications with the British. 
By the last week of August, they had made contact with Gimson’s officials. Kotewall is 
reported to have made a daily trek to the French Mission building to call on R. A. C. North, 
the former Secretary for Chinese Affairs, and Brian Hawkins, who had been designated as 
North’s successor. A newspaper report from some days later confirmed that Hawkins had 
been engaged ever since his emergence from Stanley in discussions with “a number of 
Chinese residents” about matters relating to the reconstruction of the colony.683 
The remainder of the local leaders moved with equal dexterity to adjust to the likely 
postwar shape of things, unobtrusively severing their more gratuitous ties to the beaten 
regime. On 23 August, Phoenix, the BAAG agent, arrived at the home of M. K. Lo with a 
message from Gimson stating that Lo had been assigned the additional task of “prompting 
local initiative”.684 At this stage, no other British effort (perhaps significantly) appears to 
have been made to contact any local leaders apart from the trusted Lo. On 25 August, the 
House of Commons in London denied that a Chinese Nationalist army would accept the 
Japanese surrender and affirmed that a British fleet was about to move in, which “without 
doubt indicates that Hong Kong is to be a British colony”.685 The first reference to Gimson's 
skeleton government and British preparations to resume control were made on 29 August. 
The newspapers reported on the need to concentrate on restoring Hong Kong to its former 
prosperity and highlighted a recent speech in which General Eisenhower had declared, “From 
ancient times Britain has emphasized freedom”.686 
Keen to assist in the safe restitution of Hong Kong to their fellow imperial rulers, the 
Japanese command encouraged the pro-British drift of the local elites by endeavouring to 
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provide Kotewall, Chow, and other local elite members with what a later generation would 
call a “through train”. On 29 August, the Governor’s Office was reported to be trying to 
maintain “the various organizations” operated by the Hong Kong Chinese “so that after the 
handover has taken place they may continue to be consulted and employed by the British 
military authorities”. 687  The same principle was applied at a more mundane level. In 
accordance with the promise made by the Governor’s Office to keep the public utilities in 
working order, Chinese personnel were retained at their posts in the telephone and telegraph 
offices, the Tramways Company, and the Electricity Works. 
 
7.3 Responses of the Local Masses to the Return of the British 
The British realized that “a smart appearance” would go a long way in helping to 
restore their prestige in the Colony. Harcourt observed in his briefing, 
Face is important to the Orientals. When we surrendered Hong Kong we lost face; we 
now have to regain Hong Kong and face. The Chinese will judge us by our behaviour 
ashore and first impressions will count. Troops should be marched in an orderly 
fashion giving the impression that we are moving back into what is rightfully ours, 
rather than taking an area by assault against resistance.  
The conduct of the force had to be exemplary, and like Kitchener’s volunteers in 1914, avoid 
misbehaving with “wine or women”. If these guidelines were followed, there was good 
reason for thinking that those Chinese who had worked with the prewar British rulers would 
“fully appreciate” that a benevolent, stable government was in their own interests, and would 
be “even more cooperative” than they had been in the past.688 
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When the British task force arrived off the Stanley Peninsula and glided slowly 
through the Lei Yue Mun Channel and into the ruined harbour on 30 August, they 
experienced almost none of the expected resistance from Japanese diehards. After sighting 
three Japanese boats moving out of a bay on the nearby island of Lamma on an apparent 
suicide mission, the British immediately bombed them and the rest of the craft in the bay.689 
Scattered shots were directed at Harcourt's flagship from the Naval Dockyard, but these were 
soon halted after the flagship had made wireless contact with the garrison commander, Major-
General Okada Umekichi.  
However, British concern regarding the response of the Hong Kong Chinese was, to 
some extent, justified. As they drifted through Lei Yue Mum in an eerie silence, scarcely any 
local fishermen even looked at them. An Australian journalist on Harcourt's flagship 
described the scene: 
On the rocks a coolie whistled shrilly. It was like an obscenity in that stillness. Then 
we were in Victoria Harbour. And still there was no movement. . . . There was not a 
launch or a sampan moving on the water. A few Chinese—not more than about fifty— 
stood on the waterfront opposite the Peninsula Hotel, watching. We walked into our 
berth in Kowloon and tied up. The Chinese clapped and cheered. It was a watery 
reception and made practically no impression on the oppressive silence. It was like 
entering a near dead city.690 
Gradually, the crowds thickened, the smiles broadened, and the firecrackers began to 
be lit. Nevertheless, it was still not clear whether these were signs of welcome for the British; 
arguably, the populace would have been pleased to see anybody. An old Chinese clerk well 
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disposed to the British authorities reported that no one cared whether the incoming ships were 
British, American, Russian, or Chinese, only happy that “now we will eat”.691 If the Chinese 
masses were expecting any particular saviour, it did not seem to be Britain. Many buildings 
and virtually every junk flew the White Sun flag of the Nationalists, which outnumbered the 
Union Jacks by four to one.692 
Still, Harcourt’s squadron had reached Hong Kong ahead of any possible Chinese or 
American force, and Gimson had hovered for two vital weeks in the vacuum that might so 
easily have been filled by local Chinese activists. In the first press conference held by the 
British, Duncan Sloss, the Vice Chancellor of Hong Kong University and now Publicity 
Officer in Gimson's Government, observed there remained danger from “lawless elements” 
that might try to cross into the colony “with a view to creating disturbances”. Brushing off the 
“rumours” that had been circulating about the “political future” of Hong Kong, 693  he 
confirmed that no Chinese army had made its appearance. 
In the absence of British officials, much of the work necessarily devolved on the local 
population. Many Chinese, Indians, Eurasians, and Portuguese employed before the war were 
reported to have returned to their posts. The fire brigade, for example, was almost entirely 
composed of the prewar Asiatic staff; a large number of clerical workers, including “the key 
men” had “reported for duty” in the Imports and Exports Department; and a fair proportion of 
the Chinese revenue officers had also returned “back”.694 Some of these prewar employees 
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may have genuinely “returned” in the sense that they had gone underground during the occu-
pation and re-emerged after Harcourt arrived to sign up once again with their old British 
masters. However, most had likely continued on with their jobs through the years, regardless 
of changing regimes.  
The British also drew on the large pool of new local employees whom the Japanese 
had brought into government service in the course of the war. The new regular police force 
that began being recruited in early September consisted mostly of Chinese men aged eighteen 
to twenty-five who had been originally recruited by the Japanese. 695  Whatever their 
background, these Asian employees were clearly instrumental during the early months of the 
British military administration. The Telecommunications Department’s provision of “skeleton 
technical services” was supplied by “non-Europeans”, and the Asians in the fire brigade 
performed with sufficient effectiveness that the Chief Officer was “prepared to carry on 
without replacing Inspectors”.696 The situation was far different than it had been during the 
European-dominated prewar period. 
 
7.4 Postwar “Collaborators” in Hong Kong: Dynamics and Interactions between the 
British and Elites  
 The restored British colonial government next endeavoured to rebuild its local support 
base. The greatest challenge that the British faced at this stage was gaining the cooperation of 
the local elites. In the first months after the Japanese surrender, the colony witnessed signs of 
a massive backlash against the community leaders who had acquiesced so tamely to the 
Japanese takeover, primarily within expatriate circles. Angry reports had made their way back 
to London from a range of sources, including the British and other Europeans who had fled 
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the colony as well as Ride and his assistants at the BAAG headquarters in Guilin and Reeves 
at the British Consulate in Macao.  
Particular opprobrium was heaped on Sir Robert Kotewall, whom rumour maintained 
had been chosen by the Japanese as their puppet governor and had “publicly made some 
venomous anti-British and fervently pro-Japanese speeches”.697 An Irish doctor debriefed by 
Ride reported that Kotewall had a monopoly on tobacco in Hong Kong and was “buying up 
all kinds of silver, crystal, etc.” A Russian woman declared that Kotewall’s daughters were 
“among the few women who seemed able to shop for anything save the bare necessities of 
life”.698 Sir Shouson Chow was castigated alongside Kotewall as a local leader who had 
matched him in “pro-Japanese fervour and anti-British advocacy”.699 
Other elite figures also came in for their share of vitriol. Sir Robert Ho Tung had 
earlier attracted some notice as he slipped between Macao and Hong Kong in the spring and 
summer of 1942. An employee of the British firm Dodwell and Company reported that Ho 
Tung had made a speech at a Japanese dinner praising the Co-Prosperity Sphere and thanking 
the conquerors for all they had done for China. The critics were slower to catch up with Aw 
Boon-haw, but catch up they did. One intelligence report drew attention to the newspapers 
that the Tiger Balm King had been sponsoring under Japanese auspices in both Hong Kong 
and Canton, describing him as “a typical rich Overseas Chinese, enterprising but politically 
an opportunist”.700 
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The British soon found themselves struggling with a dilemma: Could they afford to 
discount the services of those local leaders on whom they had relied for upwards of twenty 
years? From the perspective of Whitehall, the answer was a definitive NO. Within days of 
Harcourt's arrival, Kotewall and his colleagues had quietly taken up their familiar role as the 
Chief Representatives of the Hong Kong Chinese and, on the strength of the contacts that they 
had made with Gimson’s officials in the final days of the interregnum, were installed as 
members of a new Chinese Advisory Council.701 Kotewall, Chow, and Li Tse-fong, who were 
all received with “high favour” at Government House, “formed the backbone of the group of 
VIPs at all functions”.702  
Other prominent figures of the occupation lost equally little time in re-emerging. On 4 
September, Peter H. Sin, the wartime “Mayor of Hong Kong”, joined his fellow solicitors at a 
meeting convened by Chief Justice MacGregor to announce the reestablishment of the 
colony’s courts of law. On 20 September, Tung Chung-wei, formerly of the Rehabilitation 
Advisory Committee, and Kwok Chan, lately of the Chinese Representative Council, presided 
at an early postwar session of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce. Ho 
Kom-tong, the perennial master of ceremonies who was last observed directing Jockey Club 
races on behalf of the Japanese, organized the Allied victory celebrations held throughout the 
colony in mid-October.703 
Despite showing such favour to these figures, the Colonial Office duly opened a file to 
house the accumulating sheaf of reports regarding collaborators and traitors. Although some 
officials expressed that Kotewall and Chow might eventually have to be stripped of their 
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knighthoods,704 none was in any hurry to rush into action. As early as February 1942, W. B. L. 
Monson, the official in charge of investigating accusations of collaboration and treason, 
remarked of accusations that Kotewall had served as a puppet governor, “It is safer for us to 
reserve judgement of the person selected until the facts of his selection are clearer”.705 In fact, 
from the summer of 1943 onwards, the officials in London began to display a marked 
tendency to give their former protégés the benefit of the doubt. In an analysis of Kotewall's 
Christmas broadcast that year, Monson observed that it had been “very carefully phrased” to 
compare Isogai’s regime favourably with the chaos of the Gunseicho period rather than with 
the prewar British era, which he interpreted as a sign that despite his eulogy of the Isogai 
administration, Kotewall was “hedging”. 706  A second official strongly agreed with this 
interpretation: 
I am most pleasantly surprised at the content of this speech. It seems to boil down to 
this—things got in a bloody mess at the time of the [initial] occupation but the Nips do 
seem to be trying to get things a bit better and to our surprise the arrangements often 
work out smoothly. . . . That is what our Robert seems to be saying. . . . I’m glad to 
see that he refrains from saying anything derogatory of our Government—if he 
refrains from comparisons, it may have been from the feeling that he's playing on a 
sticky wicket.707 
Sir Shouson Chow was viewed with even greater indulgence. N. L. Smith, a prewar 
Colonial Secretary who had been named the First Head of the Hong Kong Planning Unit, 
insisted that Chow had been “a loyal servant of the British” and was “violently anti-Japanese”, 
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but in any event he was “too old to matter much now”.708 Lesser figures on the two Chinese 
Councils, such as Li Tse-fong, his brother Li Koon-chun , and the comprador Kwok Chan, 
seemed to Smith “not a great deal worse than the postmen or sanitary employees who carried 
on the machinery of government”.709 As for Sir Robert Ho Tung, Monson “would not be 
prepared to say anything other than that he is keeping a foot in both camps”.710 
Rather than harp on the possible sins of the elites, officials in London eagerly seized 
on the one figure whom reports from Hong Kong and South China had tended to depict in a 
favourable light. M. K. Lo, they observed, was reported to have “worn the armband 
unwillingly, to have joined the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee only after being 
subjected to considerable pressure”, to have been “so violent in his opposition to everything 
Japanese that he was in considerable personal danger”.711  As such, he represented the 
natural starting point for any British bid to reconstitute a local leader following, and 
attempts were accordingly initiated to reach out to him. As early as September 1942, a 
BAAG deputation made contact with Lo, who was said to have voiced his pleasure that he 
“had not been forgotten”.712 
7.41 Factors in the Absolution of “Collaborators” 
 
Several Japanese officials and staff who had served in Hong Kong, notably the 
Japanese executioner at Stanley Prison, and some Chinese underlings, informers, and torturers 
were lynched or manhandled. However, revenge killing for collaboration stopped after order 
had been restored following the first few weeks of British military administration, and the 
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Annual Report of the Hong Kong Police Force 1946-47 lists only one murder in which the 
motive was suspected to be collaboration with the enemy. In contrast, some thirty to forty 
thousand suspected collaborators were executed in France.713  
What prevented the Hong Kong populace from engaging in the mass killing of 
collaborators witnessed in France? One is the existence of plentiful evidence that the local 
elites had made efforts to attend to the needs of the Hong Kong population. It was they, after 
all, who had directed, funded, and generally sustained an entire network of local charities. 
Most of the charities were still hard at work when the British took over, and in the following 
weeks they played a key role in distributing such food as the British managed to bring in to 
Hong Kong. MacDougall remarked that in their “long and honourable history”, those bodies 
had “never given better service than now”.714 
There were other, more pragmatic considerations for forgiving the local elites. One 
was their role as interlocutors between the British and the Hong Kong Chinese masses. 
Although the press called vociferously for “new blood” in the leadership of the Chinese 
community and “a brand new set of advisers to Government”,715 it failed to suggest where 
such leaders could be found. The fact was that in spite of the criticism, none of the local 
people were willing to come forward and challenge the Anglicized Chinese and Eurasian 
oligarchy that had represented them for the past fifty years, and the British knew no other 
source of leadership.716 Chinese informants to this dissertation reported that there was little 
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resentment against the members of the Chinese Councils during the occupation; the Chinese 
understood that such people had to bow before the Japanese Governor and occasionally shout 
“Banzai!” However, they did note those who shouted too vociferously.  
It may be justifiably concluded that most of the members of the Chinese Councils 
accepted nomination either to protect their families and interests or to mollify the severities of 
the occupation. Few were collaborators in the strict sense of the term or allowed themselves 
to be brainwashed by the Japanese; they remained implacably Chinese and racialist. When 
asked what they had done during the occupation, they could give Sieyes’ answer regarding 
what he had done during the French Revolution with a clear conscience: they had survived.  
Other citizens, however, were not disposed to allow accusations of collaboration to 
remain unchallenged. Many expatriates who poured out of Stanley were outraged to discover 
that the same people who had shouted “Banzai!” yesterday were singing “God Save the 
King” today.717 The result was a torrent of protest in the resuscitated English-language press. 
On 12 September, an editorial in the South China Morning Post commented on “the ease 
wherewith the scallywags who worked for the Japanese have been able to ingratiate 
themselves anew not only with the restored Hong Kong government but also with the public 
utility managements and private firms”.718 Two days later, an ex-internee urged the paper to 
print a list of such culprits, and on 17 September a writer who had assumed the pseudonym “a 
Jail Sufferer” cheered on the campaign: 
The traitors themselves were quite frightened three weeks ago, and only the 
tenderness of Government officials made them more brazen as the weeks passed 
by. . . . The Government should let the public realize in no uncertain terms that men 
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who can turn their coats with chameleon-like rapidity are not the type of men to 
assume the responsibilities of public service.719 
The expatriates were not alone in their outcry. One Chinese correspondent alluded to 
“the fawning gentries”, and calls started mounting for the immediate detention and trial of the 
local leaders, Kotewall in particular.720 The elites’ re-emergence thus threatened to create 
more difficulties than it resolved. A real danger existed that the reclaimed Hong Kong might 
be torn down the middle by recriminations. The local public was not the sole group to be 
clamouring for the heads of the gentry. Many of the Nationalists wished to see Kotewall and 
his associates called to account for their hypothetical treason to another nation: China.  
The British administration responded with the argument that by working with the 
Japanese instead of fleeing to “Free China”, these “loyal Chinese” had “proved that their 
loyalty was, in the last resort, to Hong Kong exclusively. For the sake of Hong Kong they 
would strike an accommodation with whoever happened to rule it. They were thus, 
paradoxically, the segment of society on whom the returning British could now best rely in 
the face of the intensified threat from the mainland”.721 MacDougall acknowledged that “few 
substantial citizens of the colony escaped contact with the occupying forces in one form or 
another . . . [and] it seems certain that a proportion of them behaved very badly”.722 However, 
the British “needed Hong Kong Chinese, Chinese loyal to the concept of a separate status for 
Hong Kong, even if some among this group had worked, seemingly for the establishment of a 
Japanese ‘New Order’ in Hong Kong”.723  
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The Colonial Office eventually determined Chow and Kotewall had been acting in the 
colony’s best interest based on the fact that both men had worked with the Japanese to ensure 
a smooth transition back to British rule shortly after Japan surrendered to the United States in 
August 1945.724 Regarding Kotewall, MacDougall alleged, “So far as I can see no one has a 
scrap of real evidence, and all I have seen so far would not stand up in court for two seconds”. 
In support of his judgement, MacDougall drew a distinction between Kotewall and his 
counterparts in occupied Europe; while the local elites might have shouted “Banzai!”, there 
was no suggestion that they had betrayed a single soul to the Japanese.725 
On 2 October, R. A. C. North, the prewar Secretary for Chinese Affairs, issued a 
statement to the newspapers before embarking for Britain with the rest of the ex-internees. 
Regarding what had happened when he called on Kotewall and Chow in the China Building 
in January 1942, he stated that he asked them “to take upon themselves what should have 
been my duty in working with the Japanese”. As a result, the two local leaders and their 
colleagues had been not merely humiliated by the conquerors but also “misrepresented and 
abused” by some of their friends, leading him to “regret more than I can say that 
misunderstandings should have arisen over this matter, and I sincerely hope that the true facts 
will now be realised”. 
The administration used other, more direct methods to stem the outburst in the 
newspapers, the details of which are unclear. In later years, MacDougall simply stated, “We 
jumped on it; I jumped hard on it”. 726  By the second week of October, the topic of 
collaboration had suddenly and completely disappeared from the colony’s press. In keeping 
with a policy formulated during the latter part of the war, the British military administration 
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set up a War Activities Committee to look into the conduct of “quislings and renegades”, but 
the Committee had barely started work before it started experiencing resistance. The 
resistance began when Harcourt rejected the Committee’s recommendation that Kotewall be 
put on trial. 727  Committee focus then shifted to Li Tse-fong of the Bank of East Asia, 
Kotewall's former colleague on the Chinese Representative Council, but by this point the 
gentry themselves has started to protest.728  
In December, MacDougall dispatched T. M. Hazlerigg, an official who had served 
before the war in the legal department of the Hong Kong government and who was now 
attached as a special adviser to MacDougall's Civil Affairs staff, to London to confer with the 
Colonial Office about the Li Tse-fong case specifically and allegations of collaboration 
generally. In his talks, Hazlerigg was emphatic that the drive to prosecute the gentry should 
be brought to a halt, as it was “reasonable” to assume that their wartime pronouncements had 
been delivered in a state of fear and duress, and that they would have tried to flee from the 
colony if the surveillance on them had not been so intensive. In any event, the British military 
administration had been unable to find any other “informed and representative” Chinese 
advisers, and now that the public mood had begun to grow calmer “it would seem highly 
impolitic to stir up animosities”. The outcome was, as MacDougall expressed it, that “we 
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cleared the whole thing”.729 The Colonial Office agreed that Li Tse-fong should not be tried, 
and within several weeks had endorsed the entire tenor of the British administration’s 
thinking. On 30 March 1946, London issued formal instructions that only those persons who 
had helped the Japanese inflict acts of cruelty on the Hong Kong population should be 
brought to trial. 
In short, several factors contributed to the immunity of many prominent Chinese from 
prosecution for alleged collaboration with the Japanese against both the British and Chinese 
governments. One factor was the argument that these leaders had acted as a shield between 
the people and the Japanese, and had attempted to represent the needs of the Chinese 
population to the occupiers. The British now needed these Hong Kong Chinese, who were 
loyal to the concept of a separate status for Hong Kong even if they had seemingly worked 
for the establishment of a Japanese “New Order” in Hong Kong. Another factor was that only 
about six hundred thousand people remained in Hong Kong, with the rest having died or been 
forcibly evacuated, leaving few who were qualified to fill leadership positions. A third factor 
was that those who returned after the war had little firsthand knowledge of events under the 
Japanese occupation, and were therefore unlikely to have strong negative feelings regarding 
the former leaders of the Chinese community. 
7.42 Future of the Local Elites 
The formal instruction that only those persons who had helped the Japanese inflict 
acts of cruelty on the Hong Kong population should be brought to trial, issued on 30 March 
1946 did not mean that the local elites escaped altogether. A “very general feeling” lingered 
that those who had been associated with the Japanese regime should at least not “continue to 
                                                 
729 Hazlerigg memorandum to Gent, December 31, 1945, CO 129 594/9, 152; Tsang interview with MacDougall, 
65. 
 304
bask in the sunshine of official favour”. 730  The most prominent local leaders were, 
consequently, edged into retirement. In October 1945, Harcourt instructed MacDougall to 
instruct Kotewall to withdraw from public life until investigations into his wartime record 
could be completed, and banned his attendance at the sessions of the newly formed Chinese 
Advisory Council. A British officer sorrowfully recalled, “I was under strict orders not to 
admit [Kotewall] to a Council meeting, and it was a terrible moment in my life to have to tell 
Sir Robert that he could not come in, for I had dined many times in his house before the 
war”.731  
When civil government was restored the following May, Kotewall was obliged to 
resign without ceremony from his prewar seat on the Executive Council. MacDougall had 
argued that the fallen leader should be allowed to attend the first session of the Council, after 
which he could bow out in a face-saving manner on grounds of ill health, but the returning 
Governor Young adamantly opposed him (“It was this Banzai thing”).732 There is no doubt 
that Kotewall was greatly affected by these actions; he had apparently counted on being 
praised for his wartime attempts to improve the lot of the Chinese population. In a piteous 
circular, he appealed to his old British patrons that “a Scottish verdict of ‘not proven’ is 
insufficient to drive away the unjustified odium which, in ignorance, is permitted to besmirch 
the good name of one who has given the Crown half a century of loyal, wholehearted and 
faithful service”.733 Shadows also fell over the other leading figures, albeit to a lesser extent. 
Sir Shouson Chow, the ageing leader of the Chinese community, never completely returned 
to public life, yet his family still received a message of sympathy from H.R.H. the Duke of 
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Edinburgh upon his death in 1959. Li Tse-fong failed to win reappointment to the Legislative 
Council when it was re-established in 1946, and Peter H. Sin, the “Mayor of Hong Kong”, 
had some difficulty in renewing his lawyer’s licence.734  
Apart from losing their prestige, the community leaders found their “punishment” to 
be remarkably mild, with ways found to cushion the fall of even those who faced prosecution. 
In the month that Kotewall resigned from the Executive Council, the House of Lords in 
London passed a motion endorsing his conduct, and both Harcourt and Young were induced 
to write letters assuring him of their continued regard. Neither Kotewall nor Chow was 
deprived of his knighthood in spite of the wartime rumours swirling at the Colonial Office. 
Following his exclusion from the Legislative Council, Li Tse-fong found it judicious to 
absent himself for a ten-month period in the United States. When he returned in February 
1947 to resume his post as Manager of the Bank of East Asia, he was once more invited to 
public functions, and continued to sit on a number of advisory bodies and on the boards of a 
number of charitable concerns.735 By the end of 1945, Peter H. Sin had secured the right to 
appear as an authorized advocate in the defence of persons brought up before the military 
courts on charges of war crimes.736 More peripheral figures received complete absolution. 
Towards the end of 1945, Sir Robert Ho Tung was “invited” by the British military 
administration to return from his retreat in Macao to resume his business and participate in 
rebuilding the colony.737 Aw Boon-haw continued operating his newspaper, which had now 
resumed its prewar title, Xing Dao Ribao,738 and Tung Chung-wei and Kwok Chan remained 
as Heads of the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber of Commerce with little interference. 
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In the meantime, the British set to work constructing a new elite leadership out of the 
handful of candidates whom they believed to have been relatively untainted by the events of 
the war. Foremost among them was M. K. Lo. Nevertheless, Lo was not altogether free from 
controversy, having served successively on the Rehabilitation Advisory Committee and the 
Chinese Cooperative Council and signed an early statement saluting the puppet regime of 
Wang Jingwei. Almost all the wartime reports that came through to Whitehall had, however, 
testified to the extreme reluctance with which he had performed these duties, and by October 
1945 there was a “general feeling” that he might be the “best representative” of the local 
Chinese.739 After MacDougall recommended him for the newly formed Chinese Advisory 
Council, Harcourt appointed him as Rice Controller with the key assignment of organizing 
the food supply. As the British military administration prepared for the new civil government 
in spring 1946, MacDougall appointed him to a seat on both the Executive and the Legislative 
Councils. When a query about Lo's wartime activities was tabled in the House of Commons, 
the Colonial Office rebutted that Lo had acted “in accordance with the instructions he was 
given, and was inspired by no motive other than those of concern for the suffering and 
distress of the people of Hong Kong”.740 
 Singled out for advancement along with Lo was T. N. Chau, the senior member of the 
prewar Legislative Council who had fled to Macao several shortly after the Japanese takeover. 
Describing him as “the only public figure who appears to have entirely clean hands”,741 
MacDougall recommended him for both the Executive and Legislative Councils. The 
authorities also alighted on Sik-nin Chau, the nephew of Sir Shouson Chow who had won the 
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gratitude of the captive British bankers in the Sun Wah Hotel by attending to their medical 
needs. Harcourt recommended him for the Legislative Council, pointing out that his wartime 
record had earned the high praise of both the British and Chinese governments.742 These three 
elite leaders soon began to be sanctified in the classic British way. By the end of the British 
military administration period in April 1946, T. N. Chau had been awarded the CBE, and two 
years later Lo was awarded a knighthood for his “outstanding service in Hong Kong’s 
rehabilitation programme”.743 
7.43 End of Preoccupation with Collaboration 
In May 1949, Sir Robert Kotewall died from heart disease and, according to some 
sources, from grief. His sidelining had undoubtedly inflicted a deep wound on him and his 
family. His fate had deterred at least two of his children from pursuing a public career, and 
one of his daughters maintains to this day that her father's treatment was “the most unfair 
thing the British have ever done”.744 The British did their best to keep up appearances, 
sending the Governor’s Aide-de-Camp and the Acting Secretary for Chinese Affairs to attend 
his funeral—a lower-key send-off than he might once have expected, but better than 
nothing—and publishing an “appreciation” of him in the South China Morning Post.745 In 
later years, British officials went to some lengths to head off any prurient depiction of his 
wartime activity, and MacDougall recalled kindly that he “was a poor man . . . the only one 
of the bunch who was a poor man”.746 In Hong Kong his memory is preserved by Kotewall 
Road in the Mid-Levels, which was named after him during his prewar days of glory, and a 
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bronze bust of him that adorns the Sir Robert Kotewall Room in the Hong Kong Public 
Library, to which he donated his large collection of books. 
Sir Shouson Chow did a great deal better. By the 1950s, he had been fully restored to 
his prewar status as one of the “grand old men” of the Chinese community.747 At the annual 
banquets held in Government House for the local Justices of the Peace, he was seated at the 
Governor’s side, and when he died in 1959 at the age of ninety-eight, his family received a 
message of sympathy from the Duke of Edinburgh. One postwar Governor’s memoir recalled 
him as having been “jovial, human and everybody’s friend”.748 His name lives on in Shouson 
Hill on Hong Kong Island and the Shouson Theatre of the Hong Kong Arts Centre. 
By the 1950s, the charges of fence-sitting during the early months of the occupation 
that had been levelled at Sir Robert Ho Tung had been swept into the obscurity of the 
government files, with the veteran plutocrat having been once again joined Sir Shouson in the 
status of a “grand old man”. The last years of his life were passed in a glow of directorships. 
In 1955, his knighthood was upgraded to a KBE, and when he died in the following year the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank (at his special request) flew its flag at half-mast.749 
Kwok Chan, the one leader to have had the distinction of serving on both the wartime 
Chinese Councils, was elected to the chairmanship of the Rotary Club in 1951. By 1957, he 
had become an OBE and the Honorary Vice President of the Hong Kong University 
Economics Society. 
The “good” local leaders who had been picked out and approved by the postwar 
authorities progressed even further, perhaps none more so than M. K. Lo, who went from 
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prewar gadfly to pillar of the postwar colonial establishment. In the 1950s, he became a 
permanent fixture on the Executive Council, where he was admired by the Governor for his 
“first class brain” and “great moral courage”, and a member of dozens of public 
commissions.750 In 1959, he died suddenly while preparing to attend an official reception at 
Government House in honour of the Duke of Edinburgh. 
By the summer of 1947, the wartime role of the local elites had largely been 
forgotten,751 with any lingering odium attached only to Chan Lim-pak and Lau Tit-shing, both 
of whom were conveniently dead. In 1952 Harold Ingrams, a British writer who published an 
account of Hong Kong under the auspices of the Colonial Office, confidently stated that the 
loyalty of those Chinese who remained in the colony during the Japanese occupation to the 
Allied cause was “never in doubt”.752 
 
7.5 The Myth of Interruption: Legacy of the Japanese Occupation in Hong Kong 
Several scholars have argued that the Pacific War and the Japanese occupation not 
only did NOT destroy Hong Kong’s prewar social and economic order but also strengthened it 
by eliminating several conflicts of interests and modifying the position of the British 
Mandarinate. Several factors support their arguments. First, source of new leadership, 
whether in the form of a trade union, political party, or other association, has emerged 
immediately after the war to challenge the privileged, the entrenched, and the wealthy—the 
foundation of Hong Kong society. Most Chinese appear not to be troubled by this fact, 
although some, including businessmen, support and speak in favour of Communist China. 
Despite its appearance as a Chinese city characterized by traditional Chinese social 
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organizations and values, Hong Kong continues to maintain a British-style administration 
whose top echelons are almost completely monopolized by Europeans creating the conditions 
necessary to allow a small group of Chinese and European businessmen to express their talent 
for making money. 
 For the most part, Japanese occupation had little influence in the creation and 
character of postwar Hong Kong; none of the Japanese administrative institutions or theories 
of government survived the war, and practical reforms in social welfare, education, and health 
did not survive the British takeover. The reasons are fairly clear. First and foremost, Japanese 
hostilities left a legacy of Chinese hatred of the Japanese and all that they represented. Second, 
as the population had been reduced to 600,000 at most by 1945, relatively few were 
influenced by Japanese ideas over any length of time before being exposed to those brought 
in by the large waves of Chinese who immigrated after the war. Finally, the Japanese were 
never able to test their ability to govern constructively owing to the demands of the war. 
Hong Kong has never been community in the ordinary sense, but an agglomeration of 
individuals seeking their own economic salvation as they have always done, and asking only 
to be left alone. Having few local resources, Hong Kong has always been supported by the 
commercial expertise of its immigrants, which cannot be democratized or reorganized in the 
interest of the community as a whole except by some form of nationalization, which is 
anathema to a commercial free-enterprise society. The war-time controls imposed by the 
Japanese administration thus had little permanent impact, and were continued after the 
occupation ended only until the traditional laissez-faire business and societal practices could 
resume full operation. Practices inconsistent with the predominately laissez-faire philosophy 
of the Chinese community, including the re-imposition of direct taxation in the forms of an 
income tax, a property tax, and a tax on business profits in 1947, met with prolonged Chinese 
protests. When several liberal-minded observers urged the Government to place public 
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utilities under some form of Government ownership and control as part of the postwar 
rehabilitation, they found the opposition of Chinese and foreign businessmen to be too strong 
to overcome.  
In 1948, journalist Su Fuxiang described Hong Kong as a “meeting point of East and 
West”, but one whose rulers remained English and subjects Chinese, preventing the birth of a 
new Hong Kong culture. Su argued that after a century of British colonialism, the Chinese in 
Hong Kong still could not properly be called Hong Kong citizens because they did not enjoy 
full representation. Although several Chinese served on the colonial Legislative Council, 
Executive Council, and Sanitary Board, they were appointed by the Governor rather than 
elected. 753  The end of Japanese administration did not lead to self-government for the 
Chinese but merely a return to the colonial government and another rule, albeit a more 
benevolent one. The new Hong Kong was dominated by Chinese who intended to remain 
Chinese and had little desire to build a separate, independent Hong Kong community as an 
amalgam of East and West. Only a relatively small number of Eurasians, Portuguese, Indians, 
local Chinese, and foreign families of long standing considered themselves Hong Kong 
citizens. 
7.51 Interruption only? 
Although Japanese rule was brief, Japan’s successful invasion destroyed the myth of 
the invincibility of the British Empire in Hong Kong. The clock could not be turned back; the 
nature of British rule after the war could not be the same as it had been before the war.754 One 
authority argued that the “British Mandarinate, whatever that might mean, had come to an end 
in the war and had not been replaced!”755 Still, the Hong Kong masses and elites did not rise 
up to resist the return of the British in the same way that the peoples of Vietnam and 
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Indonesia rose up to resist the second coming of the French and the Dutch. Nevertheless, they 
explicitly expressed that they were not prepared to accept a re-erection of the barriers that had 
hemmed them in so efficiently in the decades before 1941.  
The Hong Kong population’s refusal to be entirely dominated by a foreign ruler was a 
significant legacy of several Japanese policies and actions during the occupation. First, the 
Japanese administration had appointed more Chinese into the “central administration of the 
colony than the British had ever done”, 756  which had granted the Chinese greater 
representation, regardless of the motives of the Japanese for doing so. Second, the Japanese 
supplemented this greater representation by delegating certain responsibilities to the Chinese 
representatives, which had conferred a measure of prestige upon even the humbler officials. 
Third, the Japanese provided for representation at the local level by creating the District 
Bureaux and ward system, thus endowing the colony with an entirely new infrastructure of 
local government. The Japanese bureaucratic machine in Hong Kong was an adaptation of 
Japan’s administrative system, which provided services on the local level while maintaining 
links with the central government. The Japanese derived the ward system from the Chinese 
part chia system, which was also practised in Japan. The wards were grassroots organizations 
that provided a tighter structure for the common people757 and whose leaders served the 
important role of complementing the work of the military police. None of the informants for 
this dissertation could cite any example of ward leaders being punished for offences occurring 
in their wards. The Japanese also created structures that allowed for limited progress in 
popular representation. No district assemblies had existed under the British in either Hong 
Kong Island or Kowloon, and the British had been content to deal with one or two headmen 
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in the villages rather than encouraging the formation of any kind of a local committee. Even 
the Japanese promise of elections at the ward level, propagandist in purpose though it 
undoubtedly was, marked a contrast with prewar Hong Kong, where the only elected officials 
had been the two members of the Urban Council. 
The role of the District Affairs Bureaux and ward system in the Japanese occupation 
cannot be underestimated towards the present one. The present District Administration 
Scheme in Hong Kong was implemented in 1982 with the establishment of a district board 
and a district management committee in each of the districts in Hong Kong. The aim of the 
scheme is to achieve a more effective coordination of government activities in the provision 
of services and facilities at the district level, ensure that the Government is responsive to 
district needs and problems and promote public participation in district affairs. The Home 
Affairs Department is responsible for the District Administration Scheme, community 
building and community involvement activities, minor environmental improvement projects 
and minor local public works, and the licensing of hotels and guesthouses, bedspace 
apartments and clubs. It promotes the concept of effective building management and works 
closely with other government departments to consistently improve the standard of building 
management in Hong Kong. It monitors the provision of new arrival services and identifies 
measures to meet the needs of new arrivals. It also disseminates information relating to and, 
where necessary, promotes the public’s understanding of major government policies, 
strategies and development plans; and collects and assesses public opinion on relevant issues 
affecting the community. These responsibilities are discharged primarily through the 18 
district offices covering the whole of Hong Kong.  
As head of each district office, the district officer is the representative of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region Government at the district level. He has the 
responsibility of overseeing directly the operation of the District Administration Scheme in 
 314
the district. He is charged with implementing and coordinating the execution of district 
programmes, ensuring that the advice of the district council is properly followed up, and 
promoting residents’ participation in district affairs. In addition, he is required to maintain 
close liaison with different sectors of the community and reflect their concerns and problems 
to the Government. It is his duty to ensure that district problems are resolved promptly 
through inter-departmental consultation and cooperation. Also, he acts as a link between the 
district council and departments and serves as a mediator between them when problems arise. 
The district officer is also involved with the community at every level. He has a role to 
mediate in the resolution of disputes between corporate bodies and residents. He performs an 
advisory and liaison role in providing assistance to building management bodies. He operates 
a public enquiry service to enable the community to have easy access to services and 
information provided by government. In emergency situations, the district officer is 
responsible for coordinating various departments’ efforts on the ground for ensuring the 
effective provision of relief services.  
To what extent this present system is a legacy of Japanese occupation is open to 
debate. There is little doubt, however, that the functions of these district offices are 
remarkably similar to those of the District Affairs Bureaux under the Japanese occupation. 
Prewar Hong Kong had had districts, but these had been primarily geographical expressions, 
and the British had never tried to maintain any regular district offices, let alone offices run by 
Chinese.758 The utility of the Japanese administrative structures and their representatives were 
later supported by postwar testimonials. There is some evidence to suggest that the Hong 
Kong public were by and large fairly comfortable with the schoolmasters, village 
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storekeepers, and other obscure worthies who were selected to serve as their local chiefs, and, 
widely recognizing that the staff of the District Bureaux were in a difficult position, did not 
generally view them as collaborators.759 The Bureau staff continued to maintain in postwar 
testimonials that because the Bureaux had been “organizations for the people”, they had “had 
the closest connection with the population”.760 
In short, the establishment of these officers recalled in some measure the wartime 
attempts of the Japanese to extend their control at the local government level. This 
demarcation was observed to be “conceptually modelled” on the precedent of the wartime 
District Bureaux.761 
Fourth, unlike the British, the Japanese went to great lengths to publicize and 
explain their policies and the nature of their bureaucracy, the latter of which was remarkably 
adaptable and suitable for the situation in Hong Kong. At the very beginning of the 
occupation, the Japanese demonstrated that they had no hesitation in using their most 
powerful weapon, their overwhelming military strength. However, once their power had been 
firmly established, they were prepared to restore at least a facade of civilian rule. They 
realized that a government, however omnipotent or ruthless, must make some compromises 
with at least some of the demands of its people. They extended the practice of using natives 
as figureheads, which they had used in Taiwan and Korea, to Hong Kong, realizing that 
despite the lack of national sentiment or community spirit in Hong Kong, the appointment of 
several influential Chinese as representatives would create some sense of community 
coherence. As the Chinese leaders whom they eventually appointed to the Chinese Councils 
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had been used to working under a colonial government, the Japanese had little trouble 
inducing them to resume their leadership roles under the new administration. Such 
appointments of representatives with little power or influence did little to serve Chinese 
interests but served Japanese interests by helping pacify the population. 
The Japanese propaganda campaign waged in Hong Kong against Western 
colonialism and ethnic prejudice and its associated bureaucracy, together with three-and-a-
half years of diligent indoctrination of the population, left behind an indelible legacy that 
would not allow for a complete return to the status quo ante after the war had ended. The 
sudden collapse of British power in the East was too difficult to explain away; the humiliation 
of the British in Hong Kong too visible. An editorial of 14 January 1942 in the Hong Kong 
News gave powerful expression to this mood of disillusionment: 
Today the British and Americans have a much greater respect for the Oriental 
soldier—for in Hong Kong, Malaya, and the Philippines the outcome has been the 
same: the vaunted supermen of the white races have melted like butter. . . . In eighteen 
days of conflict it was all over—horrible muddle of inefficiency and helplessness 
which has bequeathed a miserable aftermath.762 
It addressed a particularly memorable statement to Lo Man-kam: 
Your return, Sir, signifies the birth of a new Hong Kong, which, in surviving the 
ordeal of the war years, has learned to appreciate the inestimable boon of law and 
order, the sense of responsibility in a greater measure of self-government 
foreshadowed by Your Excellency, and the need to strive for and attain an even higher 
standard of life and living through unity of purpose and effort. . . . Imbued with this 
spirit, [we are] thankfully rejoicing in deliverance from an intolerable yoke. 
                                                 
762 Hong Kong News, January 14, 1942. 
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Facing both a Chinese population that had been separated from its control by the 
Japanese interregnum and an increasingly nationalistic China, the British administration 
found it expedient to adopt a more placatory and less racialist attitude. The legacy of Japanese 
occupation was the foundation of a new Hong Kong government that drew the local elites and 
masses more closely together than ever before. 
In letters to newspapers and in conversations with Western acquaintances, bankers, 
compradors, teachers, journalists, junior civil servants, and company clerks all began to give 
vent to their distaste for the old colonial system and suggest ways in which it should be 
changed. Harcourt considered the immediate priorities for the civil government to be the 
introduction of a new constitution, the appointment of Chinese into positions of responsibility 
in the administration, the elimination of ethnic and racial discrimination in government 
service and society, and the dismissal of those who failed to realize the need for a new 
outlook.  
In turn, the populace urged an end to discrimination in the workplace as well as to the 
“old order based on race and privilege”, under which Asians had been denied the right to live 
on the Peak and debarred from admission to the Hong Kong Club, and to the stigma attached 
to miscegenation, as for a European to marry “a well-bred Chinese or Eurasian” was “no sin 
against society”.763 They advocated that more positions, including high-ranking government 
posts, be opened to non-Europeans, and that a plan be developed for training young Chinese 
for government service. They also advocated for equal pay for equal work, arguing that 
because the cost of living was ten times higher than it had been before the war, a Hong Kong 
Chinese who had spent fifteen years on the government payroll could no longer be expected 
to get by with a fraction of the salary drawn by his European colleagues, regardless of how 
                                                 
763 Comments of a “Hong Kong Chinese lady teacher” and a “well known and respected banker” cited in WIS no. 
5, October 25, 1945, and comments of a “Chinese lady graduate of the University of Hong Kong” cited in WIS 
no. 6, November 1, 1945, CO 129 592/6, 61, 74-5; comment of a young university-educated Chinese with a 
Eurasian wife quoted in Clark, An End to Tears, 165. 
 318
unfavourably the latter might compare with him in terms of experience or ability. To press 
their point even further, they warned, “Such a state of affairs can have only one result—
namely, the transfer of the victims’ friendship and likings to the Americans, a trend already 
apparent in China”.764 To ensure greater representation of the Chinese in the running of the 
colony, they asserted that an increased number of Chinese should “sit on the Legislative or 
the Executive Council to coordinate public opinion and the Government’s Urban and District 
Councils should be organized so that ‘lesser fry’ too could have opportunities for public 
service. And the censorship which had been slapped on the Chinese press in the twenties and 
thirties should be repealed”.765 
More rapidly than had the Japanese administration, the British administration became 
aware of an “undercurrent of discontent” among their more articulate Asian subjects.766 
Harcourt recognized that any British behaviours that reflected a prewar mentality were 
“absolutely taboo” and discordant with the enlightened “1946 outlook” 767  that the local 
population expected of the administration. Such a perspective accorded with that of the 
British drive for reform in London. The new Labour government under Clement Attlee 
pledged to pursue the goal of decolonization in every part of the Empire, and the top officials 
whom London sent to pursue that objective in Hong Kong were personally sympathetic to the 
“1946 outlook” of the local public and convinced of the need to accommodate it. 
Pursuing long-term, systematic, legislated change after his return, Young enacted 
legislation that led to a spectacular break with the past almost immediately. On 27 July 1946, 
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the restored civil government announced the repeal of the carefully crafted 1918 ordinance 
that had debarred Asian citizens from living on the Peak—from now on anyone who could 
afford to do so could live on the prestigious heights overlooking Victoria—and abolished a 
ruling designed to prevent local settlement in the hills on the island of Cheung Chau, another 
choice part of the colony confined to Europeans. Residential apartheid had ended. Young 
then confirmed and expanded the tentative moves that the British military administration had 
made to provide local Asians with new opportunities, officially announcing that more local 
people were to be recruited for government jobs.  
By autumn 1946, a broad push for “localization” was well under way. In October, a 
Hong Kong Chinese was enrolled for the first time in the Cadets, the elite stream of the 
colony’s civil service. The choice for this privileged posting fell on Paul Tsui, the wartime 
loyalist who had played a major role in selecting local Chinese for the BAAG. Young and his 
team then aimed at nothing less than a complete substitution of local for expatriate personnel 
lower down in the hierarchy. Radical ethnic changes were launched in the police force, and, 
in keeping with the ideas that had been mooted in Stanley by Police Commissioner 
Pennefather-Evans, Young readied plans for the phasing out of European inspectors, a project 
aided by the fact that the bulk of the prewar European officers had been sent home to 
recuperate. After 1,002 local Chinese and no Europeans were recruited into the police force 
in 1946, the Chinese contingent of the police force exceeded fifty percent for the first time.768 
Lastly, Young set to work on an overhaul of the colony’s political system. As his 
predecessor had done in the late 1920s, he called for a slight increase in the number of local 
leaders attached to the Governor’s side, but the objective this time went a great deal further. 
                                                 
768 See Annual Report on the Hong Kong Police Force 1946-47, 9-10; Miners, “Localisation of the Hong Kong 
Police Force, 1842-1947”, in Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, vol. XVIII, no.3, October 1990, 
311-2. A contingent of British police from the former Shanghai Municipal Police Force were brought to Hong 
Kong in 1945 and 1946, mostly in the capacity of sub-inspectors. This move was presumably intended to tighten 
the British grip in the first precarious months after Harcourt’s arrival, and does not seem to have held back the 
drive towards localization that took place under Young. 
 320
In his inaugural statement in May 1946, he proclaimed Britain’s purpose of giving the entire 
Hong Kong population “a fuller and more responsible share in the management of their own 
affairs”.769 Young advised the Colonial Office that it would be “useful as well as politically 
expedient” to increase Chinese membership on the ten-seat Executive Council from one to 
two (hence the combined elevation of M. K. Lo and T. N. Chan).770  
Young had brought with him a scheme for reform that had been sketched out in the 
final months of the war by the Hong Kong Planning Unit in London. In its essence the Young 
Plan, as it came to be known, entailed nothing less than the transformation of Hong Kong 
from an autocratically managed Crown Colony into a self-governing city-state. The old Urban 
Council with its modest element of election was to be expanded into a thirty-seat Municipal 
Council set up “on a fully representative basis”. Half of the seats would be occupied by Hong 
Kong Chinese and half by Europeans, while two-thirds of the seats would be directly elected 
and the remainder appointed by representative bodies such as the Chinese professional guilds. 
Vastly more powerful than its predecessor, the Municipal Council would operate in tandem 
with the established Government, gradually taking over such major spheres of activity as 
education, social welfare, town planning, and public works. During the course of the summer, 
the Young Plan was submitted for consideration to the Hong Kong Chinese General Chamber 
of Commerce and other local bodies, and in October it was formally recommended by the 
Governor to the Colonial Office. 
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A more tentative form of democratization was introduced into the established 
governmental structure as well. The “unofficial” members of the Legislative Council, the 
members appointed from the major firms and other non-governmental bodies, would now 
have a majority over the ex-officio members who were obliged to vote as the Governor 
ordered, and two of these unofficial members would be nominated by the new—and partly –
elected— Municipal Council. The push for democracy even extended into the colony’s 
hinterland. In 1946, elections were held for the first time in some of the districts of the New 
Territories, where representatives of twenty-eight sub-districts were chosen to sit on a 
network of rural committees.771 
Economically, British impoverishment through the sacrifices of the war was 
discouraging the inflow of British capital into the Colony at the same time that the Chinese 
were increasingly expanding small family businesses and often generating their own capital 
for expansion. Increasing numbers of Chinese entered the professions, such as law, medicine, 
and accountancy, partly because the Government had opened professional posts to them. 
Chinese self-respect was enhanced by their success in competing with Europeans in the 
professional examinations and in gaining high academic qualifications in overseas 
universities, achievements that made it impossible to deny them a correspondingly enhanced 
status in the Colony. At the same time, the Hong Kong foreign community was undergoing 
great changes. War casualties and early retirement due to privation meant that a great number 
of Europeans never returned to the Colony, and the old colonial element was considerably 
diluted by newcomers from Britain who brought a more liberal attitude with them. The 
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customary loud shouts of “Boy!” by clients in bars and clubs gradually ceased. The war had 
clearly spelled the end of what may loosely be termed the colonial era.  
Later events, such as the Communist takeover of China in 1949, followed by the flood 
of Chinese refugees, including entrepreneurs from Shanghai, into Hong Kong merely fortified 
the tendency of making the leaders of the business community the most important and 
powerful figures in the Colony and the unofficial formulators of government policy. The 
refugees imposed an enormous financial burden and created social problems in the colony 
that these business leaders could partially resolve by providing jobs. They could accept no 
help from the government, which had never adhered to any form of Keynesian economic 
policy; to this day, even the public utilities are privately owned. The laissez-faire philosophy 
of the business community had prevented, and continues to prevent, the development of any 
form of “municipal socialism”. Hong Kong continues to prosper, as The Economist notes, “on 
a governmental philosophy of laissez faire that one had not expected to meet this side of the 
nineteenth century”.772 Government may have been more progressive in its views than the 
Chinese community and business leaders, but when it lacked the support of this important 
constituency—one whose power it had just increased—it was often forced to compromise 
with it. 
In conclusion, the overwhelming Japanese victories in the first few months of the 
Pacific War inevitably undermined confidence in the security offered by the British flag. Most 
European colonists had, until that time, been utterly secure in the conviction that their empires 
were immortal. That dream ended abruptly with the Japanese invasion; in less than six months, 
the Japanese had seized with impunity what the European colonial powers had taken several 
centuries to acquire, ending what may loosely be termed “the colonial era”, and 
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demonstrating to the Chinese that the British were no longer an international power of real 
importance. 
 
7.6 Significance of the Japanese Occupation in the Transformation of Postwar Hong 
Kong 
After their invasion and occupation of Hong Kong, the Japanese ensured that the myth 
of supreme British power had indeed been shattered by ceaselessly promoting their doctrine 
of Asian self-government and hostility towards Westerners. Even Westerners who spent part 
of the war in the occupied city had no doubt that this doctrine would leave its mark: their side 
would win, but, as one put it grimly, “ours will be no victory”.773 The effects of this doctrine 
manifested in the calls for reform that broke out among articulate Asian citizens just weeks 
after Harcourt’s arrival. The clamour for an end to social and political discrimination recalled, 
almost point for point, the critiques of prewar British rule that had filled the pages of the 
Japanese-sponsored Hong Kong News in January and February of 1942. The local Chinese 
were buttressed by their new power at the expense of the British by China’s new status as one 
of the victorious Allies. One local schoolmaster observed that now that the Chinese had “risen 
in the social scale”, they “wished to live on equal terms with the Europeans”.774 
In view of all the suffering inflicted by the Japanese occupation, few citizens were 
willing to acknowledge that Japanese policy or administration had created the conditions that 
had given rise to their demands for reform. However, several postwar demands were 
explicitly ascribed to a Japanese precedent. One South China Morning Post correspondent 
who advocated a system of District Councils to increase opportunities for “lesser fry” to 
participate in government declared frankly that “the Japanese introduced it here and it might 
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be revived for the new Hong Kong”. Alluding to the grassroots control measures employed 
by the wartime regime as a possible basis for his proposed Poor Law arrangements, he 
pointed out, “The Japanese made use of the District Bureaux to compile a register of residents, 
and a new Hong Kong should have little difficulty in compiling a better one”.775  
In an August 1945 report, S. Y. Lin, a former Superintendent of Fisheries Research, 
provided a surprisingly positive account to Dr. Herklots, who was on the point of launching 
his new Fisheries Organization, of the “considerable success” achieved by the fish-handling 
system introduced under Japanese rule. Advising that the wholesale fish market be “similar in 
the main to that which the Japanese had adopted, with some modification”, Lin suggested that 
the District Syndicates of the Japanese period could be “changed easily into a Fishermen’s 
Cooperative Society”.776 Dr. Herklots later recorded that his eventual scheme for cooperative 
fish marketing had “incorporated a number of Mr Lin’s suggestions”.777 
Although few British were willing to acknowledge that any specific reform that they 
had enacted had in any way been inspired by Japan, the legacy of Japanese occupation 
manifested nonetheless. Possible legacies of Japanese wartime practice appeared in the 
holding of regular press conferences to keep the public abreast of their latest decisions and in 
British postwar promotion of intensive crop-raising in the New Territories, but such links are 
at best hypothetical. More obvious manifestations of Japanese legacy appeared in a system 
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introduced for marketing vegetables778 and the rural representative committees that Young 
and his officials began to organize in 1946, which were essentially modelled on those that the 
Japanese had established during the occupation as a more efficient substitute for the loose 
prewar British system of ruling through village headmen. Japanese-sponsored committees 
had still been functioning in Saikung and other districts at the time of the British return, and 
the spread of representative bodies in the countryside was described as “owing something to 
Japanese-inspired wartime creations”.779 
As these new aspects of the British administration demonstrate, the Japanese 
succeeded politically in establishing the foundations of a New Order in Hong Kong despite 
their ultimate defeat militarily. Thus, although difficult for them to acknowledge, the 
occupation ultimately worked to the benefit of the leaders of the Chinese community. As a 
result of the British failure in the Far East, the Chinese were able to make the Government of 
Hong Kong a government that served their own interests, one of which, as expressed in 
Lethbridge’s words, was the acquisition of wealth: 
The British Mandarinate collapsed in 1941: it has never been replaced. The “Peak 
mentality” and colonial arrogance were put aside. . . . The local population . . . seem to 
have acquired greater trust in the Administration. They were impressed by the speed 
with which the rehabilitation of the economy was achieved, by the establishment of 
law and order and of a milieu favourable to the acquisition of wealth.780 
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The Government honoured its pre-war debts and obligations and compensated its former 
employees. Its post-occupation record was admirable—it believed in business first.781 Despite 
this great achievement and sporadic attempts to introduce a more advanced structure of 
municipal governance, Hong Kong’s legacy as a colony has impeded its evolution into an 
independent nation to this very day.  
                                                                                                                                                        
Many of the Hong Kong notables benefited from this policy, and no doubt felt gratitude, or at least less 
antagonism, toward the administration, one that was prepared to guarantee, or at least provide the conditions for, 
their continued existence as members of a high-status group. Finding their credentials endorsed by a government 
that desperately needed them and that sought their loyalty, Hong Kong notables found themselves part of a 






8.1 Conflicting Loyalties: A Review of Collaboration in Hong Kong during the Japanese 
Occupation 
8.11 Difficulty in Defining “Collaboration” in a Hong Kong Context 
As explained in detail in chapter 1, this dissertation used the term collaborator to refer 
to one who willingly assists the enemies of his or her state in conducting military operations 
against his or her state or in implementing policies after gaining control of the state. The 
Hong Kong Government in the Chinese Collaborators (Surrender) Ordinance of 17 May 1946, 
which made provisions for the handover of Chinese collaborators taking refuge in Hong 
Kong to China in accordance with a United Nations decision, defined a collaborator as one 
who had “done any act or thing designed or calculated to benefit the enemy, or hostile or 
detrimental to, or designed or calculated to defeat, hinder or prejudice the cause of the United 
Nations or the prosecution of any war in which any of such nations were engaged”, with 
design and calculation clearly being the operative words. 
According to English Common Law, collaboration can take the extreme form of 
treason, historically a capital offence defined as being “adherent to the King’s enemies in his 
realm, giving them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere” committed (a) by any British 
subject in any part of the world or (b) any alien who voluntarily resides on British territory. 
Alternatively, the offence may be a breach of defence regulations, for which the maximum 
penalty has historically been imprisonment for life, and could be committed by anyone. The 
Hong Kong Defence Regulations of 1940, based directly on the British Defence (General) 
Regulations of 1939, provided that “if, with intent to assist the enemy, any person does any 
act which is likely to assist the enemy or to prejudice the public safety, the defence of this 
Colony, or any other part of His Majesty’s dominions or the efficient prosecution of the war, 
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then, without prejudice to the law relating to treason, he shall be guilty of an offence against 
this regulation and shall on conviction on indictment, be liable to imprisonment for life”.782  
Collaboration with the enemy was not a phenomenon peculiar to Hong Kong or 
WWII. All the peoples of Southeast Asia faced similar conditions and choices, as indeed all 
the conquered have faced in every age; there have always been and always will be those 
willing to break the law in pursuance of ideals to which they believe they owe a greater 
loyalty. Collaborators in Hong Kong may have genuinely believed in the doctrine of Asia for 
the Asians, however much they might suspect that the Japanese were bent on substituting 
their own domination of Asia for that of the West. How many willingly supported the 
Japanese cause is difficult to ascertain. There was certainly no lack of volunteers for posts in 
the Japanese administration, including in the police force, but what evidence there is suggests 
that the vast majority of local people cooperated with the Japanese with reluctance and 
misgivings, and as a matter of mere survival. 
Perhaps a distinction can be made between collaboration during the hostilities and that 
during the occupation. The offence remains legally the same, but in the former case the intent 
is obvious and the individual has made a deliberate choice. Occupation posed different and 
difficult problems, as the Hong Kong Government could no longer provide protection or 
enforce laws, leaving individuals to decide for themselves what to do after weighing the 
possible consequences and understanding that any course of action was necessarily a 
compromise. The nature of collaboration is particularly ambiguous in a colonial society 
where the difference between the rulers and the ruled was based on ethnicity. Collaboration in 
Hong Kong was quite different from that in a homogeneous community like France which, 
under Petain, was forced to determine whether to cooperate with the Germans. Hong Kong 
was not one but a number of communities, each with its own loyalty and whose members, 
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free to leave and return, were held together only by economic self-interest. If the Chinese 
could secure the same economic opportunities under the Japanese that they enjoyed under the 
British, there seems little reason why they should not accept the substitution of Japanese for 
British rule, was the purposes for which they resided in Hong Kong would be equally served 
by both. None was compelled to reside in the colony except a few indigenous Chinese 
villagers. In such a society, collaboration was not regarded as the heinous action that it was in 
close-knit communities in France.  
Several other factors must also be considered when assessing the nature of Hong 
Kong collaboration. First, the masses of newcomers fleeing from the Japanese had no time to 
develop any loyalty to Hong Kong. Second, the British had made little attempt to enlist the 
loyalty of the Chinese until just before hostilities broke out, no doubt because of the high 
proportion of refugees among them. Third, the Hong Kong Government was neither 
representative of nor responsible to the people of Hong Kong, who did not seek political 
power as long as they could carry on their economic activities freely. Fourth, there was great 
uncertainty regarding the outcome of the war, as Japan’s unbroken chain of successes and 
range of conquests made a Japanese victory appear as likely as an Allied victory during 
certain periods of the occupation. Until 1943, there was likely widespread belief that the 
Japanese conquest of Hong Kong might prove to be permanent, in which case the prudent 
course of action would be coming to some terms with the occupying authorities, aiming to 
achieve the least harmful compromise until the situation became clearer while hoping not to 
jeopardize the chances of an Allied victory. Gaining understanding of this context is 
necessary to gaining understanding of why only a very few individual or group was prepared 
to confront the Japanese openly during the occupation in Hong Kong, as did some French 
patriots against the Germans. 
 330
The essential element in criminal collaboration is a deliberate intention to assist the 
enemy. Therefore, while some consider all obedience to Japanese regulations during the 
occupation to have been a form of collaboration, most understand that it was a form of 
obedience mitigated by the absence of intent. Often individuals had no choice but to obey, 
such as when the only form of employment necessary to obtain basic goods for survival was 
working for the Japanese. The mainland Chinese could and did return to their villages, where 
the most that they could expect was bare subsistence. Many Eurasians had nowhere else to go, 
and after their supply of gold ornaments had been depleted, they were forced to choose 
between serving under the Japanese or starving. Locally recruited Government officers were 
faced with a unique dilemma: They had not only not been discouraged from continuing in 
their positions by the British but actively advised to do so. Many police who served under the 
Japanese were undoubtedly assisting the enemy, but only a limited number did so with any 
enthusiasm. For most it was simply a matter of survival; there could be no moral obliquity is 
such a context of duress, regardless of what the law might say. 
The main argument used to defend collaboration was that some collaboration was 
necessary to serve the interests of the people. For an example, the teaching of the Japanese 
language might be considered a form of collaboration, as it assisted the Japanese in imposing 
their own language and culture on the proposed Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. 
Many religious neutrals who controlled schools conscientiously felt they could not object to 
teaching Japanese because it did not conflict with their main purpose, which was to educate 
Chinese youth according to principles that they believed to be right. They had taught English 
when the British were in control, and by the same token they could see little justification for 
refusing to teach Japanese under the new administration. A few rare Hong Kong Chinese 
citizens with a sense of social responsibility reluctantly expressed that it had been necessary 
to cooperate with the Japanese as the only way to serve their community and mitigate the 
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severity and rigours of the occupation, arguing that some had had to represent the interests of 
the people to make the views of the Chinese majority heard. Those prominent figures who did 
not flee Hong Kong, as did many of their compatriots, were in a very real sense making their 
loyalty to Hong Kong known, regardless of unofficial requests by British officials to 
undertake this responsibility. Apparent collaboration in Hong Kong by such people was 
certainly fraught with more serious consequences than the inconspicuous deeds of compara-
tively unknown members of the public that often passed unnoticed. Members of the 
Executive or Legislative Councils could never escape the significance of their former official 
positions, particularly as the Japanese had put great pressure on them to collaborate, along 
with the unofficial members of the Chinese Councils and the leaders of commerce and 
industry. If, after being rounded up at the onset of the occupation, confined in admittedly 
reasonably comfortable conditions,783 and then called on to collaborate to further an Asian 
agenda at a luncheon, these Chinese leaders had refused to collaborate, they would have 
inevitably laid themselves open to suspicion. 
As Sir Robert Kotewall had been the senior unofficial member of the Executive 
Council, it was vitally important for the Japanese to secure his cooperation, as well as that of 
Sir Shouson Chow, the first Chinese to be made a member of the Executive Council. After 
the war, these two men were in a special category, not only because of their standing but also 
because they had worked with the Japanese at the invitation and with the express approval of 
leading members of the Hong Kong Government. On 1 January 1942, R. A. C. North, 
Secretary for Chinese Affairs; J. A. Fraser, Defence Secretary; and C. G. Alabaster, Attorney-
General, called on Kotewall and Chow and requested them to act on behalf of the Chinese in 
Hong Kong, where British officials were now powerless, and to promote friendly relations 
                                                 
783 FO 371/31671/1942. Telegram M.205, January 29, 1942 from Military Attache, Chungking. This reported 
that a Chinese puppet governor had been appointed. However, as well as local considerations, the Japanese had 
diplomatic motives in China for this treatment of prominent Chinese citizens. 
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between the Chinese and Japanese to the extent necessary to restore public order, protect life 
and property, and preserve internal security.784 Kotewall and Chow therefore had reason to 
believe that the British had empowered them to cooperate with the Japanese to the extent 
necessary to enable them to do whatever possible to assist the Chinese community. 
To what extent they were in fact able to do so for the Hong Kong community is 
difficult to determine. They were treated in a cavalier manner, if not with disrespect, except 
in public venues where their “face” was respected. The Rehabilitation Committee held fifty-
nine meetings until its brief tenure ended on 30 March 1942, but its members were not 
allowed to consult Heads of Departments and were forced to work with Japanese interpreters. 
Members were given orders for which they had to assume responsibility in public, and after 
being ordered to make speeches, give radio talks, and submit drafts for approval, endure 
seeing garbled versions of their presentations in the press. When the British returned, 
Kotewall resigned his membership of the Executive Council on the grounds that doing so was 
the honourable course to take. Governor Young agreed, and warmly commended him for his 
public service to Hong Kong. 
Other prominent Chinese, including unofficial members of the Legislative Council 
and commercial leaders, found themselves forced into membership of the Chinese Councils, 
but managed to keep in the background by toeing the line just enough to allay suspicion. A 
few were undoubtedly whole-hearted collaborators. The Japanese-educated Lau Tit-shing, 
President of the Chinese Japanese Returned-Students Association and Chairman of the 
Japanese-sponsored Chinese Bankers’ Association, was very pro-Japanese, as his speech of 
congratulations on the fall of Singapore reported in the Hong Kong News of 17 February 
                                                 
784 See the account given after the war by R. A. C. North in South China Morning Post, October 2, 1943. North 
stated that he had “requested Sir Robert Kotewall and Sir Shouson Chow and their colleagues to take upon 
themselves what should have been my duty. These gentlemen in carrying out this task were abused and 
humiliated by the Japanese and were misrepresented and abused by some of their friends. I regret more than I 
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1942 clearly shows. Chan Lim-pak, a prominent businessman who later became a fourth 
member of the Chinese Representative Council, was a well-known Japanese supporter who 
had been arrested by the British during the fighting on a charge of aiding the enemy. A larger 
number of Chinese collaborated with the Japanese in districts where close contact with the 
people afforded greater opportunities for community service. Some no doubt acted from self-
interest and others from a genuine belief in Japan’s self-proclaimed mission of freeing Asia, 
but many more as a way to survive. 
The British tended to take a broad and understanding view of collaboration with the 
Japanese, and in some cases condoned it on grounds of political expediency. For example, the 
Burmese National Army had fought for the Japanese during the Burma Campaign, an active 
collaboration amounting to the clearest treason, until deserting in order to fight once more on 
the British side. Regardless of their treason, the British welcomed their return on the grounds 
that the Burmese had been primarily fighting for their own independence and that it would be 
politically undesirable to take punitive action. The New Territories villages did not escape the 
controversy regarding collaboration. Many of the younger men who had joined the 
communist guerrillas and imbibed communist ideas, particularly those in the Hakka Districts 
in the Saikung area and the area north of Tolo Harbour, returned after the end of the war 
proud of their record in resisting the Japanese and assisting the United Nations’war effort. As 
such, they tended to be contemptuous of the village elders who had remained behind, whom 
they accused of collaboration.  
Deep and bitter feelings within local communities resulted in a spate of accusations, 
mutual recriminations, and a strident demand for retribution against the guilty. In response, 
the British military administration established a War Activities Committee to identify and 
inquire into the activities of suspected collaborators. To assist its efforts, it appealed to the 
public to come forward with information and reviewed BAAG files and descriptions of the 
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experiences of its underground agents. Although over fifty suspected collaborators were 
being held in custody by December 1945, there was considerable delay in bringing them to 
justice because of the shortage of police, the absence of witnesses, and a hesitation to bring 
these cases before the military courts under the military administration.  
The proceedings against collaborators were quite different from the War Crimes trials 
of Japanese nationals, chiefly members of the armed services accused of crimes against 
humanity and the accepted usages of war, which were contemporaneously being held in Hong 
Kong before specially constituted Allied military tribunals. As, unlike the Japanese, the 
collaborators were charged with specific offences under English law, such as treason or 
breach of the Defence Regulations, it was considered preferable to bring them before the 
ordinary civil courts in due process of law, even if this meant waiting until normal civil 
government had been restored. This arrangement also had the advantage of avoiding the 
awkward situation of some suspects being tried by the military courts under the military 
administration and others by the ordinary civil courts. Instructions from London the previous 
March directed that future proceedings should be taken only against collaborators proved to 
have committed atrocities, a ruling that gave the collaboration trials even greater similarity to 
those being conducted by the special War Crimes Military Courts. 
However, when the restoration of civil government continued to be postponed, it 
became clear that further prolonged delay would be unfair to those in custody. The 
collaboration trials opened on 17 February 1946 with public committal proceedings being 
held against six persons accused of treason before a summary military court. One defendant 
was sentenced to death and hanged in Stanley Gaol the following July after an appeal for 
clemency had been rejected. Another, a Eurasian, was acquitted but banished for life, while 
the charges against the two others appear to have been dropped, as their names do not appear 
in any subsequent newspaper reports of proceedings or in any official records. After the 
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restoration of civil rule on 1 May 1946, a total of twenty-nine suspected collaborators, 
including one woman, appeared before the magistrates in committal proceedings. This figure 
includes the twenty-one committed by the magistrates and presumably the remaining eight 
who came up from the Summary Military Court. Of these twenty-nine, five were sentenced 
by the magistrate on a charge reduced from treason or breach of the Defence Regulations, and 
three were acquitted.785 According to newspaper reports, thirty-one persons appeared before 
the Military Courts before 30 April 1946, when the military administration ended. The trials 
attracted some criticism on the ground that relatively unknown collaborators were being 
charged while more important figures felt to be equally guilty were escaping justice. 
 As time passed, the Court demonstrated a tendency towards greater leniency, for 
example ordering that the sentence of three years’ hard labour awarded in one case should 
commence from the date of arrest of the accused. The annual reports of the judiciary show 
that no committal proceedings were taken against collaborators in the magistrates’courts 
between 1947 and 1948 and that the Supreme Court had completed its last collaboration case 
in May 1947. Amongst the thirty-one persons reported by the newspaper, five of the accused 
received the death sentence, four from the Supreme Court and one from the Standing Military 
Court, and were hanged in Stanley Gaol after their appeals had been dismissed. The 
remainder, except one who was acquitted, received terms of imprisonment with hard labour 
as follows: two received fifteen years, one being reduced by the Appeal Court from a life 
sentence; two received ten to twelve years; seven received six to nine years; nine received 
                                                 
785 Included in the total was Inouye Kanao, the Japanese interpreter who was so hated by the men in Shamshuipo. 
He had been tried for war crimes by the special Military War Crimes Court and condemned to death on 25 May 
1946, but it was then decided that as a Canadian, he had been guilty of treason, and would have to be re-tried on 
that count by the Supreme Court. He claimed to be a Japanese citizen who owed no allegiance to the Crown, but 
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appeal had been dismissed and leave to appeal to the Privy Council refused. One of the twenty-nine, a European 
who worked for the Japanese at the Dairy Farm during the occupation, was acquitted. The remaining twenty-
eight were found guilty on one or more counts of their indictment and sentenced. They included six Indians, 
seven Europeans or Eurasians, and fifteen Chinese. 
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two to four years; one received one year; one received six months; and two, including a 
woman, received one day.786  
Two distinctive features of these collaboration trials stand out: they occurred within a 
relatively short period of time—between February 1946 and May 1947—and affected 
relatively—according to newspaper reports, only thirty-six people were formally prosecuted. 
Proceedings against the remainder held in custody appear to have been dropped. 
8.12 Reflection on Collaboration in Hong Kong 
By exploring the manner in which the Japanese government in Hong Kong both 
exploited and appealed to the interests of the Hong Kong elites and masses, this dissertation 
endeavoured to explain the seeming readiness with which the Hong Kong populace accepted 
Japanese occupation and engaged in cooperation with the Japanese military administration. In 
the course of doing so, it demonstrated the manner in which the Japanese in Hong Kong 
simultaneously assumed the roles of agents of socioeconomic change and oppressors, creating 
a partnership based on “mutual dependence and advantage”. 
The actions of the Hong Kong elites and masses during the Japanese occupation 
demonstrated that self-rule was not a skill confined to Europeans, and that one aspect of 
survival by self-rule had been acceptance of the need to cooperate with the Japanese for the 
survival of their community. From the establishment of British administration in the 
nineteenth century and into the twentieth century, Chinese notables had collaborated with the 
colonial authorities to build and preserve Hong Kong as a special place dependent on not 
being part of China “proper”. Having collaborated with British colonialists before the war, 787 
                                                 
786 Hong Kong Law Reports, Vol. XXX (1946-7), 66-77. 
787 From the perspective of the forerunners of the local Chinese elites, Japanese occupation in Hong Kong had 
not been imposed in a “one-way” manner. The occupation in Hong Kong was made possible with local Chinese 
cooperation, consistent with a long tradition of cooperation with foreigners. LooAqui and Kwok Acheong had 
helped the British during the Opium War, which led to the cession of the island, and contractors such as Tam 
Achoy were instrumental in the building of the infant colony. Indeed, without their help, there could well have 
been no colony for the British to rule. For the Chinese who helped found and build the colony, British 
colonialism provided invaluable opportunities. By rewarding these men with privileges such as land grants, 
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it likely appeared rational to continue collaborating with the new colonialists—the 
Japanese—particularly as most felt only a diffuse loyalty to either an emerging entity called 
“China” or the village or region that they had left behind many years ago.788 Therefore, using 
the term “collaborators” to denote the local elites who had cooperated with the Japanese 
occupiers is disingenuous. As no comparison can be made, for instance, between occupied 
Hong Kong and occupied France, no comparison can be made between so-called Chinese 
collaborators in Hong Kong and French collaborators in Vichy. The French collaborators 
were citizens of what had been an independent country, whereas the Hong Kong 
“collaborators” had merely exchanged one overlord for another.  
To whom and to what did the Hong Kong Chinese properly owe allegiance? The 
postwar British administration appears to have understood the conflict of loyalties resulting 
from the anomalous position of the Hong Kong Chinese, who expressed loyalty and 
maintained ties to their families and kin, the Chinese community in Hong Kong, and to 
certain regions and associations, but not to any entity as large as a nation-state. Being neutral 
under the prewar British administration, the local Chinese community in Hong Kong believed 
it only pragmatic to remain neutral under the Japanese military administration; had the 
Chinese communists overthrown the Japanese, they would have undoubtedly remained 
neutral. Their loyalty was never to a people but always to the concept of Hong Kong. As one 
resident best expressed their belief, “Our loyalty has never been to the Queen. But it has been 
to Hong Kong”.789 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
lucrative monopolies, and separation of the business and residential districts, the colonial government helped 
foster the growth of a Chinese business elite in Hong Kong. As the colonial nature of Hong Kong enabled the 
members of this elite to join a traditional order from which they had been excluded in China, their success was 
inseparably linked with the colonial nature of the island. 
788 The Cantonese term Heung Ha is used to describe “the province, district and village from which each person 
derives his ancestry, usually in the direct male line and usually for many generations, even if neither he nor his 
father has ever set eyes on that village or knows the way there”. Hong Kong: Report on the 1961 Census, vol. 2, 
xlviii. 
789 Quoted in The Economist, London, April 13, 1996. 
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8.2 Comparison of the Japanese Administrations in Hong Kong and Singapore 
Examination of the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong and Singapore reveals that the 
Japanese invaded both territories for the same purpose—ensuring the security and supporting 
the economy of Japan—before subsequently installing a similar military administration in 
both territories. However, the nature of the administration in each colony had differing 
political, economic, and social impacts on these territories that indelibly affected their later 
development. 
8.21 Similarities in the Japanese Administrations in Hong Kong and Singapore 
The pre-eminence of strategic considerations and the quest for prestige ensured that 
the Japanese administrations in Hong Kong and Singapore would be overwhelmingly military 
in nature.790 Having reserves of war resources for about two years, top policymakers in Japan 
understood that a prolonged war would require the import of resources from other territories, 
resulting in their priority on conquering new territories to exploit their resources to the 
maximum extent. Such policy accorded with the Japanese military’s belief in self-sufficiency, 
which could be achieved through colonial expansion, and brought with it military glory and 
respect. Due to the predominance of the military in Japan and the Japanese colonial empire, 
Japanese colonial planning and administration were removed from the civilian approach.791  
The policies implemented in Hong Kong and Singapore had to serve both the 
immediate objective—the ruthless exploitation of resources—and the long-term objective—
the creation of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere—of the Japanese Empire. In 
between fulfilling these objectives a series of other goals must be fulfilled: first, ensuring that 
the colonies could be defended from attack; second, exploiting the colonies’ potential 
contribution to the prosecution of the war; third, politically and economically assimilating the 
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colonies into the Japanese Empire and a pan-Asian system controlled by Japan; and fourth, 
serving as bases for the assimilation of other colonies into Southeast or East Asia by 
functioning as major centres of transport and production. 
Historically, civilians have rarely played a vital role in the design and development of 
colonial empires. The colonization of Singapore and Hong Kong was no exception, as their 
administration was largely the domain of the military. The Governors, mostly Army men who 
put military objectives first, were vested with executive, legislative, and judicial powers, in 
effect giving them absolute power to rule their colonies. As the military in Japan enjoyed a 
higher status than any of its European counterparts, its officers were not only more powerful 
than their civilian counterparts in Hong Kong and Singapore but also their military 
counterparts in other empires. Granted special rights by the Meiji Constitution and under the 
direct command of the Emperor, they could force their will upon civilian leaders in Japan as 
well as those in the Japanese colonial empire.792 The structure of the military supported the 
hardline nature of the occupation of Hong Kong and Singapore. The Army was always 
prepared to be dispatched for the suppression of any armed or unarmed resistance, and as both 
civilian and military Japanese colonial officials knew that they could rely on strong military 
support in implementing their policies or facing down any opposition, they had much less 
incentive to compromise with the wishes of local populations than their European 
counterparts.793  
The nature of Japanese occupation in Singapore and Hong Kong differed from that of 
Korea and Taiwan. Although the Japanese initially met much resistance in Taiwan, they had 
the time necessary to employ a “carrot-and-stick” approach to the maximum extent possible. 
While introducing the Chinese pao chic system to deprive the guerrillas of their bases and 
imposing the Japanese system of urban and rural administration, they endeavoured to 
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improve the agriculture and industry for the benefit of the people. In contrast, they had little 
time to implement their administrative policies in Hong Kong and Singapore, leading to their 
exclusive use of “the stick”. As a result, the Japanese were never able to fully win the hearts 
and minds of the Chinese in Singapore and Hong Kong. By late 1942, by which it had 
become clear that Japanese governance was far more despotic, bureaucratic, and corrupt and 
less rational and efficient than British governance, only die-hard collaborationists still 
supported “new-order” colonialism.  
The Japanese attempted to change Chinese attitudes and establish a structure of 
control by methods far more brutal, coercive, and unskilled than those used by the British. 
Many Japanese officials, usually seconded from the armed forces, behaved like feudal 
overlords, first alienating the masses by failing to provide sufficient food and employment, 
then alienating the elites by depriving them of the means of making money (although some 
made money during the war by acting as buyers or agents for the Japanese army). Certainly, 
the British had socially, politically and economically discriminated against the Chinese, but 
their forms of control were much less violent. In order to exploit their occupied territories, the 
Japanese had to maintain a much closer control over the local people in terms of the 
administrative, legal, law enforcement, and educational systems; the distribution of food and 
necessities; the development of commerce, industry, and agriculture; the means of 
communication; and the maintenance of public health.  
The British system was only concerned with the actions of the local Chinese elites and, 
as it did not reach down to include the masses in an all-embracing network of controls, was 
not concerned with gaining the cooperation of the masses. In contrast, the Japanese system 
controlled every aspects of day-to-day administration in Hong Kong and Singapore through a 
top-down approach. Japanese policy required most, if not all, of the Chinese population of 
Hong Kong and Singapore to submit to Japanese rule. While some submitted for profit and 
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some from a sense of being betrayed by the British, most submitted as a result of the ruthless 
techniques of the Japanese. 
8.22 Differences between the Japanese Administrations in Hong Kong and Singapore  
Despite their similarities, the Japanese military administrations in Hong Kong and 
Singapore were characterized by several differences that had different impacts on each 
territory. One factor that led to these differences was the nature of the prewar leadership in 
each territory. When the Japanese invaded Singapore, they encountered no influential local 
opposition leaders whose cooperation or acquiescence was necessary for the Japanese 
administration to succeed, whereas they found that gaining the cooperation or acquiescence of 
prominent Hong Kong leaders was essential. Being well aware of their limitations, these 
leaders did not resort to radical means, which would only have provoked Japanese repression. 
Regarding the Hong Kong masses, the Japanese had allowed those who so desired to flee the 
colony. Therefore, those who had decided to remain were likely prepared to accept Japanese 
rule and cooperate with their new rulers.  
Second, in Singapore, 70,500 British servicemen had been defeated and captured by 
36,000 Japanese, who suffered 1,713 killed and 2,772 wounded,794 in comparison to the 1,996 
killed and 6,000 wounded that the Japanese suffered over the 18 days of the Hong Kong 
campaign.795 As a result, one important question could be asked: why was there only the sook 
ching in Singapore, but not in Hong Kong? 
 The difference in the personnel of war between Japan and the two colonies in Hong 
Kong and Singapore may provide the answer. It seems clear from the various accounts of the 
massacre that the sook ching policy did not originate with the Japanese Military High 
Command in Tokyo, and there are reasons to believe that it took shape in the course of the 
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Malayan Campaign.796  The government-military liaison conference held in Tokyo on 20 
November 1941 identified the Chinese in Malaya and elsewhere in Southeast Asia as a special 
problem and a possible threat to Japanese interests, but it advocated a conciliatory approach: 
‘Chinese residents shall be induced to defect from the Chiang Kai-shek regime and to 
cooperate and align themselves with our policies.’797 However, the 25th Army adopted a 
much harder line following its successful campaign in Malaya, as seen in the following set of 
instructions issued in April 1942 by Military Administration Headquarters: 
Rely upon severe judgements. Those who refuse to cooperate shall be dealt 
with by means of extremely severe measures - specifically, confiscation of 
property and deportation of the entire family with prohibition of reentry - 
while hostile elements shall be answered with capital punishment, thereby 
influencing the course to be adopted by the entire Chinese community.798 
The War Crimes trial held in Manila in October 1945 found Gen. Yamashita guilty of 
war crimes, as he was overall commander of the Japanese troops that committed atrocities in 
Malaya and elsewhere. However, most, if not all, Japanese and non-Japanese accounts have 
identified Col. Masanobu Tsuji, Yamashita’s senior Planning and Operations Officer, as the 
person really responsible for the massacre in Singapore. Retired major General Kiyote 
Kawaguchi first made this accusation some eight years after the Japanese surrender, when 
Tsuji emerged from hiding in China and declared his intention to stand for a seat in the 
Japanese parliament. Kawaguchi had returned to Japan after spending six years in a Manila 
prison as a punishment for the murder of Jose Abad Santos, the Chief Justice of the pre-war 
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798 ‘Principles Governing the Implementation of Measures Relative to the Chinese’, April 1942, Doc. No. 47, in 
ed Benda, Selected Documents, 180. 
 343
Supreme Court of the Philippines, an action ordered by Tsuji. His accusation appeared in the 
Japanese daily newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun on 4 March 1953. Notwithstanding the 
controversy over his wartime activities, Tsuji won a seat in the Diet, but Kawaguchi pursued 
him, repeating the accusations and engaging Tsuji in public debates. This airing of his 
criminal past ultimately caused Tsuji to be barred from holding public office. In a book 
published in 1992, Ian Ward called Tsuji Japan’s ‘No. 1 War Criminal’, and blanned British 
bureaucrats and American intelligence operatives for allowing him to evade war crimes 
charges at the end of the war. Both Ward and Chen Su Lan, author of a memoir about the 
occupation entitled Remember Pompong and Oxley Rise, claim that before the war Tsuji’s 
Singapore-based espionage network had collected lists of residents with anti-Japanese 
tendencies, and that these lists were used in the screening operations.799   
Someone may wonder why nothing of the sort had been done upon the earlier 
occupation of the various states of the Malay peninsula? According to Cheah Boon Kheng, 
this question is complicated. There are two possible reasons why sook ching operations were 
not carried out in the peninsula until after the fall of Singapore: either the 25th Army had no 
time to deal with ‘mopping-up’ operations, or the Japanese considered Singapore the best 
place to begin their anti-Chinese operations. Evidence on this point is insufficient to supply a 
definitive answer.800 
Third, Hong Kong was only important as an entrepot, and could only function in 
relation to other ports. Even though the Japanese declared that they intended to develop Hong 
Kong’s economic potential, their objectives were firstly military and secondly 
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psychological.801 These differences were reflected in the Japanese military administration’s 
overall policy towards the people of the two colonies. Although the Japanese installed an 
authoritarian political system and strict social control in Hong Kong, the Governor had to 
maintain the façade of running a fair and liberal government, and the people were granted 
some degree of freedom and certain rights. A Chinese escaping to Chungking from Hong 
Kong as late as the fall of 1944 corroborated earlier reports that there had been and was then 
very little underground activity directed at hampering Japanese control. Informants to this 
dissertation agree that the Chinese in Hong Kong may have hated the Japanese military, but 
tended to regard the Japanese civilians as being of the same race as themselves, allowing for 
an easier camaraderie between them.802 The Chinese in Hong Kong could talk quite freely 
among themselves and were not ordinarily overborne by any feelings of very strict 
supervision; 803  they suffered more from the confusion of the government than from its 
harshness.804 There were thus no deep loyalties, no sound historic or political bases from 
which the desperate underground activities that characterized Yugoslav or Greek resistance 
could have arisen in Hong Kong.805  
Finally, the Japanese also assumed differing approaches towards ethnic issues in each 
colony. In Malaya, the Japanese authorities highlighted the distinctions among the three main 
ethnic groups and pitted the Malays and Chinese against each other. Although it has been 
argued that the impact of the Japanese military administration was less profound in Malaya 
than it was in Hong Kong and that there was considerable continuity between prewar and 
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postwar British rule in Malaya, the Japanese invasion of Malaya is remembered as the most 
important event in modern Malaysian political history. Despite its administrative subdivisions, 
Malaya formed a single social complex under British rule, but the Japanese, perceiving the 
population as divided into three ethnic groups, stimulated nationalism in three different 
directions, giving rise to a communalism that has remained a fundamental feature of postwar 
Malaya and Malaysia. In contrast, ninety-nine percent of the wartime Hong Kong population 
was Chinese, preventing the Japanese from dividing the population into three rival ethnic 
groups of equal number. Furthermore, as most of the population were refugees, they did not 
identify with Hong Kong, preventing the development of any nationalist sentiments that the 
Japanese would be forced to overcome. The Japanese could thus assume a relatively moderate 
strategy of administration in Hong Kong. 
A central argument of this dissertation is there are differences for the Chinese of Hong 
Kong adapted to living under a foreign, usually repressive regime. Contrary to conventional 
wisdom, this dissertation argues that when compared to Singapore under Japanese occupation, 
Hong Kong under Japanese occupation was not such a harsh or poor place. To support this 
argument, it has traced the historical roots of the relationship between the Hong Kong 
Chinese elites and the Japanese military government in the previous chapters, to demonstrate 
that the Japanese occupation of Hong Kong was not simply a function of Japanese 
imperialism. Rather, it was as much a function of the collaboration of local people, who 
cooperated with the Japanese to build the new economic, social, and political infrastructure.  
This dissertation had to probe the processes by which such collaboration arose, how 
the Japanese elicited collaboration, and why and how the local Chinese community responded 
to Japanese overtures. This examination is based on the assumptions that all parties had 
limited or no knowledge regarding the extent of the Japanese invasion and subsequent 
occupation or of the complex nature of the intersection between Chinese and Japanese 
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interests in Hong Kong. As the Japanese colonial empire was largely strategically motivated 
and military in character, it adapted its administrative approach to each colony according to 
local exigencies rather than applying a single model to all colonies. Thus, its approach to the 
administration of Hong Kong and Singapore differed in accordance with each colony’s 
characteristics and situation, and was not merely a duplication of European colonialism. All 
these factors have made Japanese colonialism an anomalous phenomenon in modern history. 
 
8.3 Final Assessment of Japanese Policy towards the Chinese Communities in 
Singapore and Hong Kong 
 
8.31 Policy in Singapore 
The Japanese policy towards the Chinese in Malaya and Singapore over the three-and- 
a-half-year occupation changed from moderation to both repression and repression, then to 
moderation marked by vacillation and ambivalence.806 The policy prepared before the war 
appeared moderate and was phrased with vague terms and generalities, suggesting some 
flexibility in its operation. Finding the Chinese loyal to China, friendly towards Britain, and 
generally hostile to Japan, as evidenced by their long record of anti-Japanese activities, the 
military’s view of the Chinese hardened. The most extreme manifestation of the military’s 
increasingly hardline policy towards the Chinese community was its sook ching of the 
Chinese community after the fall of Singapore. The brutal purge of the Chinese left a deep 
and indelible scar on the community, and drove many Chinese into the arms of the 
Communist-dominated guerrillas. 
Having acquired extensive experience with the Chinese in China, Watanabe had a set 
of definite and fixed ideas about the Chinese, foremost among them that the Chinese were not 
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to be trusted and must be made to repent for their past crimes against the Japanese. Thus, 
from the outset of his Gunsei, Watanabe pursued a policy of repression first and pacification 
later, a prime example of which was his order that the Chinese community “donate” $50 
million. The anti-Japanese guerrillas were able to propagandize this order, which “badly 
misfired”,807 and other examples of Japanese cruelty to win support for their cause. 
One great tragedy was that many Chinese who had no involvement in the war in China 
were targeted by the Japanese simply because they were of Chinese origin. When they 
arrested and executed the Chinese, the Japanese did not distinguish between those born in 
China and local-born Chinese of third-, fourth- or even fifth-generation descent, or between 
those who were Chinese patriots and those who had no political affiliation. Even those Malay 
speakers of Chinese descent who were proud to identify with Malaya were suspected of being 
pro-British, and thus equally an enemy of the Japanese Empire. The effect of this repression 
was enforcement of a Chinese cultural identity on all people of Chinese descent, no matter 
how long they had lived in the colony, which inevitably led to the consolidation of a sense of 
Chinese nationalism.808 
As the Japanese had no blueprint for Singapore, they had no detailed policies to 
implement when they established their administration in February 1942. Their polices 
subsequently fluctuated constantly as administrators struggled with the unfamiliar and often 
intractable conditions in which they found themselves.809 Almost all administrators, even 
those at lower levels of the military hierarchy, had a great deal of scope for private initiatives, 
which, combined with frequent transfers at all levels, created great confusion. The aimless 
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nature of the Japanese administration was partly a function of conflicts between different 
service heads and politicians in Japan, as well as within the Army, and in Malaya between 
military and civilian administrators. It was also partly a function of the fact that the Japanese 
authorities could never decide on the future status of Malaya or on the relative position of the 
various communities within it, which they were still debating when Japan surrendered in 
August 1945.810 As Mamoru Shinozaki explained, 
 There were many bosses in Syonan. All of them were the “Supreme” Command of 
the Southern Army Headquarters. Then came the Twenty-Fifth Army Headquarters 
(when they left to Sumatra, the Twenty-Ninth took over). Then came the Military 
Administration Department, and under this Department were the Malai (Malayan) 
Military Administration Headquarters and the City Government (T'okubetsu-si).What 
created considerable confusion was that all the “bosses” issued orders or made 
requests to the Tokubetu-si, usually disregarding the lines of command. They all 
issued a stream of notices, laws and regulations. As such, there arose a situation where 
a lesser “boss” could pass regulations, having the effects of law which were 
inconsistent with that of a higher authority. It is submitted, however, that this problem 
was a self-resolving one, for the bigger “boss” always superseded the smaller boss. 
Nevertheless, this situation caused much confusion to the local population, who had to 
observe all Japanese orders very strictly, if they wanted to avoid trouble.811 
With Watanabe’s reassignment, the hard-line policy gradually gave way to the 
moderate policy. The deteriorating war situation demanded the military authorities to make a 
moderate change in the Chinese policy in order to solicit Chinese cooperation, upon which the 
gunseikambu was increasingly dependent for establishing an economic self-sufficient Malaya 
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– one of the three gunsei objectives. As Fujimura states, how to administer the Chinese for 
eliciting their cooperation became one of the central problems for the gunseikambu.812 The 
authorities allowed remittances, appointed a larger proportion of Chinese to the advisory 
council in recognition of their importance, relaxed Japanese company monopoly permitting 
Chinese participation in economic affairs, and created the Epposho. The Epposho experiment 
won hearts of an important segment of the Penang Chinese community. It was unfortunately a 
limited success only to be cut short by military expediency. 
The real difficulty in the gunsei’s Chinese policy is that the Japanese were out to 
‘utilize’ Chinese resources and talents but gave them little in return. The Japanese 
administrator–rarely tried to see the Chinese other than an economic animal who found his 
life’s satisfaction in making money. Therefore, according to this thinking, he could be 
induced to cooperate with the Japanese so long as profit was to be made in business. Such 
was the general attitude of the Japanese that the Chinese understandably did not respond to 
Japanese request for economic and commercial cooperation. Another difficulty is the 
ambivalance of Japanese policy. On one hand, the authorities enunciated a moderate policy 
but, on the other, they pursued a repressive policy, partly as a result of expediency. The 
banning of Chinese language instruction for the Japanese language negated such moderate 
policy, making it appear only a lip-service. Such ambivalence caused the Chinese to be 
suspicious and distrustful of the Japanese. 
Overall, the main limitation of the Gunsei policy towards the Chinese was that it 
aimed to “utilize” Chinese resources and talents through issuing nonnegotiable orders while 
giving the Chinese community little in return. In effect, the Japanese were hoping to use the 
Chinese as a milk cow despite giving them little incentive to produce milk.813  
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8.32 Conflict among the Army, Navy, and Kempeitai 
Shortly after Japan began preparing for prolonged war, the Imperial War Cabinet 
essentially became a conflict-resolution body. This phenomenon explains the peculiar fact 
that many decisions were made based on inadequate information; as those departments that 
had essential information about the prosecution of the war could not directly influence policy, 
they were only “consulted” by another powerful group to support a decision essentially 
already taken. The official of one such essential but powerless department, the Ministry of 
Supply, attended War Cabinet meetings only when asked to do so, despite the fact that 
accurate information on food, oil, and other supplies was obviously important in prosecuting 
the war. As the two principal bureaucracies in the War Cabinet, the Army and Navy 
developed their own “special” sources of information to support their own points of view, 
even claiming to have obtained special knowledge regarding foreign affairs from their 
military attaches.  
On 20 November 1941, the Army and Navy Headquarters in Tokyo agreed to a 
division of authority in the soon-to-be conquered Southeast Asian colonies. Although Hong 
Kong was primarily the domain of the Army, the Twenty-Third Army and the Second China 
Expeditionary Fleet, the latter being the Navy force off the coast of South China, had made a 
subsidiary pact providing for some naval role in the colony. The Navy had played its part in 
the invasion by blockading the colony’s offshore waters, but had failed to take part in the first 
“peace mission” to browbeat governor Young into surrender. Nevertheless, its officers and 
troops insisted on being represented—with separate and equal status—in the second 
mission.814 After the colony was captured, they wanted their place recognized—and their 
share of the loot. Within days of the takeover, friction had inevitably arisen over the division 
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of booty between the Army men in their patched, shabby uniforms and the Navy in their 
smart, grass-green serge. To avoid still more turbulence, the Army had little choice but to 
accommodate the Navy’s pretensions, and duly implemented the prewar pact. A naval 
commander named Honda Katsukuma was seconded to the Gunseicho as Head of the 
Maritime Department, and a division of turf was arrived at between the two rival services: 
Kowloon and the western half of Hong Kong Island were placed in the Army’s charge while 
the entire eastern half of the Island as far as the Naval Dockyard and Garden Road was placed 
in the Navy’s charge.815 
A second, more sinister challenge to the Army’s pre-eminence came from the 
Kempeitai, the Japanese military police, whose primary task was to ferret out subversion, 
regardless of whether the threat came from troops or civilians, from compatriots or foreigners, 
or from inside or outside Japan. Although nominally subordinate to the Army, they operated 
for all practical purposes as a law into themselves. The invasion force had included a squad of 
Kempeitai officers under the leadership of Colonel Noma Kennosuke, who had initially 
followed the orders of his field commander, Major-General Sano, but then began acting on 
his own initiative even before the invasion force landed on Hong Kong Island. By 24 
December, he had set up Kempeitai Headquarters at the Cuttlefish Commercial Bookshop in 
North Point. He would later claim credit for authorizing the dispatch of Shields and Manners 
through the British lines to plead the case for surrender to Governor Young. By 26 December, 
he and his team had become detached altogether from the command of the Twenty-Third 
Army,816 and in the following weeks they rapidly gained the upper hand in the local battle for 
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clout and spoils. Observers described how the Army or Navy would drive the inhabitants 
from a building only to be evicted in their turn by the more potent gendarmes, as well as how 
the Army would order one thing and the Navy another, only to be countermanded by the 
Kempeitai with a different order altogether.817 
8.33 Role of Hong Kong in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere: The China Faction 
vs. the Southern Faction 
Japan’s decision to strike out at the Europeans and Americans created tension 
between two Army coteries that have since been labelled the “China Faction” and the 
“Southern Faction”. The priority of the China Faction, which, as its name suggests, drew its 
backing primarily from the China Expeditionary Force and its offshoots, including the 
Twenty-Third Army, was to bring Japan's drawn-out conflict on the Chinese mainland to a 
painless and satisfactory end. In contrast, the priority of the Southern Faction, which 
consisted of the generals who were organizing the Army’s assault on Malaya, Burma, the 
Dutch East Indies, and the other European-ruled territories of Southeast Asia, was to muster 
all resources that might add to the momentum of their onrushing legions.  
Lying at once on the coast of China and on the fringe of the European empires in 
Southeast Asia, Hong Kong quite literally formed a natural bone of contention between the 
two groups. The China Faction wanted to ensure that the Twenty-Third Army remain in 
charge of the colony to realize their hopes of using Hong Kong as a base for “political 
schemes” designed, like the failed Operation Kiri of 1940, to subvert Chiang Kai-shek’s 
regime in Chungking and induce Chiang to drop his resistance to the Japanese subjugation of 
China. The Southern Faction’s objective was to prise Hong Kong away from the grip of the 
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Twenty-Third Army and turn it into a centre of transport and supply, a logistical stepping-
stone for the grand advance to the South.818 
The arguments deployed by the two rival factions were summarized in a report on the 
Hong Kong controversy submitted by Chief of Staff Sugiyama to Premier Tojo on 10 January 
1942. The China Faction held out for the standard arrangement under which newly occupied 
territories were administered by local Japanese forces; that Hong Kong be ruled by a 
“defence commander” responsible to the Twenty-Third Army Headquarters in Canton; and 
that the Twenty-Third Army’s Commander-in-Chief, Sakai, serve simultaneously as the 
colony’s Governor. Proposing a break with standard procedure, the Southern Faction instead 
recommended the highly unusual expedient of direct rule; Hong Kong, they urged, should be 
placed in the hands of a Governor directly appointed by and responsible to Imperial 
Headquarters in Tokyo. They rationalized that such a break in protocol was necessary 
because Hong Kong “differed somewhat in character” from the other territories that the Army 
had occupied on the Chinese mainland, and was consistent with Imperial Headquarters’ 
intention to preserve the separation of Hong Kong from the mainland in order to annex it as 
an integral part of Japan.819 
The differences between the China Faction and the Southern Faction can be traced to 
their different perspectives on Hong Kong. The China faction considered Hong Kong a 
promising part of China with a distinctive colonial background that could be exploited for its 
political ends. In contrast, the Southern faction considered Hong Kong to be a politically 
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unpromising part of Southeast Asia, believing that the Chinese who constituted the 
overwhelming majority of its people would, unlike the colonized populations of Burma, 
Malaya, and the Dutch East Indies, be unwilling to assist Japan in furthering its goals for the 
South, as they did not share in these goals.  
As the new long-term government became established, it appeared to assume the 
agenda of the Southern Faction, one characterized by indifference to local wishes and needs. 
Ultimately, the Southern faction completely prevailed.820 On 19 January, the first Japanese 
Governor of Hong Kong was presented by Tojo to Emperor Hirohito in the Phoenix Hall of 
the Imperial Palace. Announcing the appointment in the Diet on 21 January, Tojo explained 
that because Hong Kong had for years been used by the British as a base for “creating 
disturbances” in East Asia, the Empire had decided to secure it as a “bulwark” for the 
region’s defence. On 1 February, the new Governor set off, as a Japanese war historian 
aesthetically described, “from a Tokyo adorned with the year’s first snow, and two weeks 
later he arrived in the colony”. On 20 February the Gunseicho was dissolved, the blue 
armbands of the Twenty-Third Army were replaced by the yellow armbands of a newly 
created Governor’s Office, and the Governor formally assumed his duties as the direct 
representative of the Supreme Command. After eight weeks of turmoil, Japanese rule in the 
colony had at last been established on a more or less stable basis. 
8.34 Unique Status of Hong Kong in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
There had in fact been yet another conceivable option after the occupation of Hong 
Kong: to return it to China for administration by the puppet mainland regime of Wang 
Jingwei. As far as can be ascertained, this option was never considered by either of the two 
Army factions involved in the Hong Kong debate. Expectations, however, appear to have 
been raised in some Hong Kong Chinese circles by the uncertainties of the Gunseicho weeks 
                                                 
820 For a reaction from the losers, see diary of General Hata Shunroku, Commander-in-Chief of the China 
Expeditionary Force, January 21, 1942, quoted in Honkon-Chosha Sakusen, 330. 
 355
that Isogai felt necessary to immediately disabuse upon his arrival. At his inaugural press 
conference, the new Governor was asked by a local journalist “whether there was any 
question of the administration of Hong Kong being handed over to the Nanking government 
in future, on the same lines as Philippines for the Filipinos”. Isogai replied “laughingly” that 
“so far as he understood Hong Kong was not part of China”, observing in this connection that 
the colony had been under British rule for the previous hundred years.821  Justifying the 
annexation as matter of wartime necessity, as everything else was justified, Isogai proclaimed 
that Hong Kong “had tremendous value as far as military operations were concerned, and was 
to be kept for such purpose”.822 
 The weeks after Isogai’s arrival witnessed the end of hopes that the Wang Jingwei 
option was viable. Wang supporters who had been active during both the invasion and the 
Gunseicho period were shunted to the sidelines, and nothing more was heard of the Wang 
partisans in the New Territories. Cheng Kwok-leung, the Chinese commandant of the Stanley 
internment camp who was known to have been a Wang adherent, was replaced by two 
Japanese.823 Still, the possibility of giving up Hong Kong to Wang lingered on in the minds of 
some officials in the Japanese Foreign Ministry. At the end of 1942, Wang went to Tokyo to 
negotiate an agreement committing his regime to Japan in the broader Pacific conflict by 
declaring war on Great Britain and the United States. These negotiations took place at exactly 
the same time as the two Allied powers were preparing treaties relinquishing their privileges 
on the Chinese mainland to the rival government of Chiang Kai-shek. 
 In spite of, or perhaps because of, Wang’s puppet status, the Foreign Ministry team 
assigned to draft the agreement believed that Japan would be wise to reward his regime for its 
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entry into the war by making some concessions to Chinese irredentist feeling that were at 
least on par with those that the Allies were making to Chiang. As one logical area for 
concession was clearly Hong Kong, their proposals ranged from guaranteeing China’s 
sovereignty over the New Territories to handing back the whole of Hong Kong in exchange 
for Wang’s acceptance of Japanese long-term domination of Hainan, the large and 
strategically crucial island near Vietnam.824 However, the Army, not the Foreign Ministry, 
held power in Tokyo, and the Army had no intention of committing itself to the return of 
Hong Kong in whole or in part, at least until the war had been won. 
8.35 Assessment of Japanese Policy in Hong Kong: The Myth of Ineffective Administration 
The conventional explanation for the ineffectiveness of Japanese administration in 
Hong Kong is that the Japanese invaded the colony without a sophisticated agenda for its 
subsequent occupation. However, the truth is more complex. First, as described in the 
previous section, the Japanese occupation in Hong Kong was characterized by not only 
tension between the Japanese administration and the local population but also by conflict 
within the Japanese administration itself. The relationship between the Japanese Army and the 
Japanese Government in Hong Kong can be compared to that between the Chinese 
Communist Party and the Chinese Government. In both cases, the Army and the Party were 
truly in control. In Hong Kong, the Military Police Department reported directly to the Army. 
As a result, even though Noma, Head of the Military Police Department, was merely a 
Colonel and lower in rank than the Governor, Lieutenant General Isogai, he was a much more 
powerful man. Several sources who had contacts with both Noma and Isogai have reported 
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that the two were by no means on good terms with each other. Moreover, the civilian 
department heads and administrators were often terrified of the Military Police Department.825 
A second source of tension existed within the Chinese Representative Council. Of the 
four members, Robert Kotewall and Li Tse-fong had been prominent in the British 
administration, while Lau Tit-shing and Chan Lim-pak were believed by the Japanese to be 
loyal to them. As a result, there was little informal consultation between the Council members. 
Moreover, as the Japanese provided the only links between the Chinese units through their 
own administrative organs, the Chinese could not work together as a whole, and as they were 
forced to work under the instruction of the Japanese, the members of the Chinese Councils 
and the District Affairs Bureaux had even less opportunity for communication.826  
A third source of tension was the lack of understanding on the part of the Chinese 
regarding how the Japanese ran the bureaucracy.827 In accordance with Japan’s grandiose 
ambition of trying to Japanize their occupied territories, the Japanese administrators insisted 
that all registration and application forms be issued and completed in Japanese, believing that 
forcing the population to learn the Japanese language would lead to an understanding of and 
admiration for Japanese culture. However, they were remarkably unsuccessful in their 
educational efforts.828 Their insistence on using Japanese as the official language and their 
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clumsy bureaucratic procedures put tremendous pressure on the District Affairs Bureaux, 
which had to provide interpreters and translators.  
Lacking an understanding of the Japanese bureaucratic system, the influential members 
of the Chinese Councils attempted to complete their tasks through official channels, primarily 
during committee meetings with the Japanese heads.829 However, doing so led to cumbersome 
red tape, particularly in light of the jockeying among Japanese officers for private plunder and 
lush appointments. Moreover, the entire administration was too departmentalized and lacking 
in cooperation among the major authorities; the Army might order one thing, the Navy 
another, and the gendarmerie would countermand both and order still something else. The 
glaring inconsistencies and the blundering contradictions in Japanese rule illustrated that 
Japan’s grand strategy was being executed most inefficiently. 
As a result, a Hong Kong News article of 26 December 1944 could report that even three 
years after the invasion, it could not “be truthfully asserted that the Japanese understands the 
Chinese and vice-versa”. To a “very great extent” this was due to the language barrier.830 If 
social relations between the Japanese and the local residents had been closer, the latter would 
have realized that the former were “undergoing the same hardships and facing the same 
difficulties”. It was “regrettable, but unavoidable, that the really creditable successes achieved 
by the Administration should have been offset by the circumstances brought about by the 
war”.831 
In short, the Japanese made two basic and interrelated errors in Hong Kong. They 
wished to dominate the region to achieve both an economic goal—self-sufficiency—and a 
more complex political goal—to assume the role that China had once played in the great days 
                                                 
829 See Ba Maw, Breakthrough in Burma: Memoirs of a Revolution, 1939-1949, (New Haven: Yale University 
press, 1968). 
830 Hong Kong News, December 3, 1944. 
831 Hong Kong News, December 26, 1944. For the same resigned tone, see also the farewell remarks of Ichiki 
Yoshiyuki, the retiring Chief of the Civil Affairs Department, quoted in Hong Kong News, November 25 and 26, 
1944. 
 359
of the Celestial Empire, when China was regarded as exemplar and fountainhead of civilized 
life.832 In effect, the Japanese aimed for recognition of Japan’s ethical and cultural superiority 
in the region, but pursued this goal primarily through an ineffective means—the use of 
force—based on their misunderstanding of history. They did not understand that China had 
achieved its past glory by first becoming vastly wealthier and more powerful than all its 
neighbours, allowing it to dominate them by the display of generosity rather than force. 
However, Japan did not have the wealth to be so generous with its neighbours.  
Japan’s second mistake was a failure to recognize that winning “freedom for Asia”, 
particularly if only achieved by the iron fist of a new hegemonic power, even if it was Asian, 
“was not enough, that each national movement demanded its own freedom”.833 The Japanese 
never intended to treat other Asians as equals or genuine partners.834 Consequently, even 
though they technically liberated many Asian peoples from Western imperialism, they could 
not secure, with a small number of exceptions, their loyalty and support, and felt forced to 
pacify their new empire by repressive measures. The Japanese administration in Hong Kong 
was no exception. Whatever favour the Japanese had won from the Chinese in removing their 
British colonial masters was quickly destroyed and replaced by fear and hatred. 835 
8.36 Japanese Successes in Hong Kong 
There are many criteria by which one can judge the success of an administration. From 
an objective point of view, the success of the Japanese military administration in Hong Kong 
may be judged by the criteria of (1) the development of Hong Kong, (2) the well-being of the 
population, and (3) the degree of totalitarianism of the regime. By these standards, the 
Japanese administration was remarkably unsuccessful. First, the administration did not pursue 
                                                 
832 F. Jones, Japan’s New Order in East Asia: its rise and fall, 1937-45, (London: Oxford University Press, 1954), 
333. 
833 Elsbree, Japan’s Role in Southeast Asian Nationalist Movements, 10. 
834 F. Jones, Japan’s New Order, 332-4. 
835 Steve Tsang, A Modern History of Hong Kong, chapter 9. 
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the commercial development of Hong Kong, leading to a largely stagnant wartime economy 
characterized by little trade. Such lack of development led the populace to experience a 
standard of living much lower than that they had experienced under British rule, with a bad 
situation made worse by having to live under a totalitarian regime. 
Despite these failures, this dissertation finally argues that in certain respects the 
Japanese administration in Hong Kong was remarkably successful. Specifically, the Japanese 
attempted to adapt their administration according to local conditions and circumstances; 
retained complete control of the colony; had the full, albeit reluctant, cooperation of all levels 
of society necessary to implement all policies; and encountered little resistance from the 
population. The Japanese had made careful preparations for the occupation of Hong Kong 
years prior to the invasion. Therefore, after the Japanese occupied Hong Kong in December 
1941, they implemented the military administration smoothly and impeccably. To ensure the 
security of their forces of occupation, they turned over control of the city to the gendarmerie. 
To gain the cooperation of the Chinese, they allowed the colony to devolve into anarchy 
before demonstrating that only they could restore order. To strengthen the defence of the 
island, they drove out the surplus population. To ensure control of all the population that 
remained, they impoverished both the upper and middle classes, making all helpless and 
dependent on them.836 
Second, the Japanese attempted to involve the whole of the population by implementing 
an all-embracing, two-way administrative system linking the population to the different levels 
of the government that proved very effective, especially in terms of mobilizing the population. 
Still, in practice the system only functioned in one way—the population was forced to comply 
with Japanese orders and had little right to appeal them—allowing the bureaucracy to control 
                                                 
836 Ward, Asia for the Asiatics?, 9. 
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the population but never willingly gaining their cooperation. 837  Failure to gain such 
cooperation was a great challenge, as the Japanese had invested many resources in securing 
the cooperation of the Chinese, one of their chief aims in all their conquered territories. They 
had likely realized that as a nation of 450,000,000 could never be completely “Japanized”, 
achieving their other aims required the cooperation of the Chinese. To this end, they 
employed the same methods of propaganda in Hong Kong that they had in China. While 
Hong Kong radio broadcasts continuously blasted the British “oppressors” and proclaimed 
the Japanese to be the friends and deliverers of their fellow Asians, the Japanese demonstrated 
their goodwill by building amusement areas, forming philanthropies, and organizing cultural 
conferences. 
In the final analysis, the author would argue that the Japanese military administration in 
Hong Kong and Singapore was the result of two conflicting policies that reflected the basic 
mode and philosophy of the Japanese Imperial Army in Tokyo. On the one hand, the Japanese 
wanted to exploit their occupied territories to advance their drive for hegemony throughout 
Asia. On the other hand, they wanted to Japanize their colonies as part of a pan-Asian ideal 
that would free all Asians from foreign encroachment. However, their need to achieve both 
aims within a brief period inevitably led to conflict between them, one which was ultimately 







                                                 
837 Newell, Japan in Asia, chapter 2. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: CALENDAR YEARS ACCORDING TO THE GREGORIAN, JAPANESE, 
BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM CALENDARS 
 
According to the Gregorian calendar the Japanese invasion took place in 1941 and the 
occupation lasted until 1945. Three other calendars were used in Malaya during this period: 
the Japanese, Thai and Muslim (see Table 1). Japanese and Thai (Buddhist Era) dates 
followed the solar year, and changed to the new year on the first of January of the Gregorian 
year. The Muslim calendar is based on a lunaryear, which is shorter than the solar year by 
eleven days. Fortuitously, , during the occupation the lunar New Year happened to fall close 
to the solar New Year, and Muslim years nearly coincided with solar years. To make it easier 
to follow the sequence of events, dates in the main text are given according to the Gregorian 
calendar, but footnote citations show years from the various calendars as they appear on the 
original documents. 
Table 1. CALENDAR YEARS ACCORDING TO THE GREGORIAN, JAPANESE, 
BUDDHIST AND MUSLIM CALENDARS 
Gregorian Japanese Buddhist era Muslim (ca.) 
 
1941 2601 (Syowa 16) 2484 1360  
1942 2602 (Syowa 17) 2485 1361  
1943 2603 (Syowa 18) 2486 1362  
1944 2604 (Syowa 19) 2487 1363  















Appendix B: Member Lists of the Rehabilitation Committee, the Chinese 
Representative Council and the Chinese Co-operative Council, Hong Kong 
1942-1945 
 




Vice-Chairman 副主席: 周壽臣 
Standing Committee Members常務委員:  羅旭龢 
         周壽臣 
         劉鐵誠 
         羅文錦 
         譚雅士 
Committee Members委員:     李子方 











Committee Members 委員: 劉鐵誠,  李子方, 陳廉伯 
 
 
Table 3: Members of the Chinese Co-operative Council, Hong Kong 1942-1945 
  香港華民各界協議會名單 
 
Chairman主席: 周壽臣 
Vice-Chairman 副主席: 李冠春 








郭贊,     周耀年 
王通明, 顏成坤 
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Appendix C: Structure and Personnel of Local level of Hong Kong 
Administration 1942-45 
 
Local Level of Hong Kong Administration 1942-45 
Civil Administration Department 
Chinese Section Chiefs 
Controller of Fuels:   Lia Kia-fan 
Director of District Affairs Bureaus: Hsien Ping-hsi (Peter H. Sin) 
Director of Census Bureaus  Yung Ngai-sung 
Hong Kong Construction Department 
Member of the Staff:   Wang Yung-nien 
Hong Kong Opium Commission  
Chief (under a Japanese):  Liu Chuo-pak 
 
The Asiatic Affairs Bureau 
East Asia Cultural Association 
President:    Chang Ku-shen 
(Chairman – 1942):   Yeung Tsin-lei 
Vice Chairman:   Ma Kian 






President:    Lin Chien-yin 
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The Control Wards 
Hong Kong Wards Control Officers: 
Central Ward:           Hsien Ping-his (Peter H. Sin) 
Shang Huan Ward:          Shao Wei-ming 
Hsi Ying Pan Ward:          Li Chi-hsin 
Shih Tang Chu Ward:          Sun Kuang-chuan 
Shan Wang Tai Ward:         Chien Wen 
Wan Tzu Ward:          Ho Jib-ju 
E Ching Ward:                     Ho Te(h)-kuang 
Tung Lo Wan Ward:          Kuo Hsien-hung 
Race Course Ward:          Wu Wen-tse 
Yuan Hsiang kang Ward:    Wang Tai 
Chih Chu Ward:          Li Sung-ching 
Shao Chi Wan Ward:          Tseng Shou-chao 
Kowloon Wards Control Officers: 
Kowloon City Ward:  Tai Jo-lan 
Shen Shui Ward:  Huang Po-chin 
Wang Chueh Ward:  Tseng Jung 
Yuamati Ward:  Feng Hao 
Chien Sha Chu Ward:  Liang Chi 
Hung Kan Ward:   Li Shou-sha 
Kowloon Tang Special Ward: Kuan Hsin-yen 
Hsin Chieh Wars Control Officers: 
Ta Pu Ward:   Chen Tiao-chin 
Yuan Lang Ward:  Peng 
 366
Easten District Bureau 
Assistant Director:    Lo Chai-sing 
General Affairs Bureau for Kowloon Districts 
Members of the Political Division:  Huang Chung 
 
Banks and Banking Associations 
Bank of Communciations 
Manager:     Lau Tit-sing 
Overseas Chinese Banks 
Representative:    Tang Yat-yan 
Hong Kong Bankers’ Association 
Chairman:     Lau Tit-sing 
Vice Chairman:    Li Tsu Fang 




Hong Kong Financier:   Ho Tung, Sir Robert 
 
Central News Agency (Hong Kong Branch) 
Chief:      Wu Pei-yuan 
Representatives:    Lo Ching-kwang 
      Wei Kuo-lun 
Hsiang Tao Jih Pao 
Proprietor:     Aw Boon Haw 
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Hua Chiao Jih Pao 
Editor:      Lu Meng-shu 
Managing Editor:    Tsen His-yung 
News Editor:     Lu Mun-hsi 
 
Hong Kong Jih Pao 
Editor in Chief:    Huang Pao-shu 
 
Nan Hua Jih Pao 
Publisher:     Kuang Chi-tung 
Editor:      Liu Hsieh-tang 
 
Journalists and writers:   Chang Kuang-yen 
      Wong, Peter 
Press Official in Hong Kong:   Kong Kai-tung 
 
People’s Food Association 
Chairman:     Aw Boon Haw 
 
Hong Kong General Relief Association 
Chairman:     Chan Lim Pak 
Chairman, General Affairs Committee: Li Tzu Fang 
Vice Chairman, General Affairs Committee: (Wong Yat-chung) 
Secretary for Relief and Culture Exhibition: Wang Te(h)-feng 
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Chinese Reflief Association 
Chief of the Executive Departmetn:  Lau Tit-shing 
Chief of the General Affairs Department: Lo Kuk-wo (Sir Robert Kotewall) 
 
Trading Union of Hong Kong 
Director:     Kiu Kuk 
 
Hong Kong Commercial Insititute  
Director:     Yeh Lan-chuan 
 
Chamber of Commerce 
Representative for Foreign Goods:   Kwok Chuen 
 
Representatives of  Commercial Associations 
Firewood Merchants:    Lai Kong-sun 
Rice Importers Association:   Ma Ting 
Nam Pak Hong Merchant Houses:  Tong Ping-tat 
 
Hong Kong and Kowloon General Labor Association 
Chief Executive:    Ling Hong Fat 
Kowloon Markets Bueau 
Chief:      Tong Ching Kan 
Chinese Language Society 
Hong Kong Representatives:   Chan Pai-li 
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      Chu Sen 
 
Hong Kong Race Course 
Chairman of Stewards:   Ho Kom Tong 
 
Hong Kong Jockey Club 
Members of the Racing Committee:  Yip Kui-ying 
      Pan, S. H. 
      Pih, C. C. 
      Wei, Peter 
 
South China Athletic Association 
Chairman:     Luke Oi-wan 
 
Source: Office of Strategic Services, Research and Analysis Branch, Structure and Personnel 






















Appendix D: SPEECH of LIEUTENANT GENERAL SAKAI TAKASHI To the 
Leaders of the Chinese Community in Hong Kong 
 
General Sakai spoke of the currency problem and the tasks of restoring order, the cleansing of 
the city and the reopening of business. He said he would make every effort for the 
reconstruction of Hong Kong and Kowloon, and expressed the hope that the Chinese guests 
present would do their best to cooperate in this direction. 
 
Both Mr. Law Kuk-wo and Mr. Chow Shou-son expressed complete agreement with what 
General Sakai said, and voiced the hope that peace between Japan and China would soon be a 
reality. They also promised to do whatever they could to bring about the return of normal 
conditions in Hongkong and Kowloon. 
 
Lieut-General Sakai said: It gives me great pleasure to see you all here today. For the last 100 
years, Hongkong has been under the misguided rule of the British, who seized the place from 
China. You, gentlemen, happened to form a part of it, but I hope that you will all recognize 
the change that has come and export all your strength for the reconstruction of Hongkong so 
that it may become a model city for East Asian peace. 
 
Firstly, I hope that all of you will understand the object of co-prosperity for all the races of 
Great Asia. The brave troops that I lead seized Hongkong and Kowloon in a little over then 
days, and have driven out the evil forces of the British. We were not fighting against the 
Chinese of Hongkong, for whom we have the deepest sympathy. Therefore, in the plan of 
attack we did not use artillery and large bombs in order to avoid hurting the common people 
and damaging the city. You, who were then in Hongkong, will surely understand this. 
 
Selfish British Aim 
 
Secondly, from the corruption of the British Colonial Administration, you may understand 
that they only planned for their own profit, and did not care about the life or death of the 
Chinese people. 
 
You, who have dwelt in Hongkong for the last 100 years, should awaken to the fact that, in 
this battle, the British Government used Chinese Volunteers, Canadians and Indians in the 
front line. The English soldiers were hiding in the hills, and investigation of the casualty lists 
shows mostly coloured troops with very few Englishmen amongst them. You can see, 
therefore, that the English soldiers fear death and convet life. 
 
Thirdly, the Chinese and Japanese are of the same people and have the same literature. They 
are also of the Great East Asian race. In all the islands of south-ast Asia dwell Chinese 
citizens. Although they have left their country for a long time, yet they belong to our race. 
These overseas Chinese are your relatives, friends or clansmen. I hope that the words I have 
addressed to you will be transmitted to them, so that they may join in the establishment of a 
Greater East Asia. 
 
Fourthly, both Hongkong and Kowloon have received a considerable amount of damage 
during the fighting, and this has caused unavoidable suffering. I shall make every effort to 
clear up matters for the re-construction of Hongkong and Kowloon, and to make it a place 
where people may reside in peace. But if the Army is unable to make the change in the 
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shortest possible time, I hope you will forgive me; and I ask all of you to form a local 





The following are the most important items that I have to talk to you about: 
 
1. Order – with regard to order, this is naturally the responsibility of the Military Authorities, 
but if we use too many troops, then the people may find certain inconveniences. 
 
Therefore, the former Hongkong Chinese Police are being reemployed. All people can 
safely resume their businesses, or organize their own self-protection guards under the 
direction of the officials. Thus, all obstruction to order will be removed. 
 
2. Currency – Currency is the blood of business. Therefore it must be settled. I have 
appointed people to deal with this matter, and the result of the investigations will be 
announced very shortly. 
 
I have heard that the people are suffering from a lack of small notes. This will be attended 
to. As regards the non-acceptance of higher currency notes, there is a reason for that but 
this will be handled later. 
 
You, gentlemen, form the influential and wealthy element of the population. Some of you 
play a big role in currency circles. For the time being, you should tell all people not to 
think of hurting other people, or to spread around idle rumours. If there is any matter 
which may be of benefit to all, it may be written out. 
 
3. Relief of business – After the cessation of hostilities, relief is of great importance. I hope 
that you will get together and help in settling the fuel and rice problems and helping those 
who are suffering hardships. I hope that you will devise methods for this and apply to the 
Administration for permission to carry them out. 
 
 
















Appendix E: Requirements for Those Leaving Hong Kong 
 
In order that persons leaving Hong Kong may know what to do, the Repatriation Bureau 
yesterday issued a notice, mentioning the following requirements: 
 
People leaving for Canton and Macao, must have a cholera and inoculation certificate with a 
photograph attached, a vaccination certificate and a permit for departure. 
 
In buying tickets, two photographs must be produced. 
 
Tickets for Macao can be bought at the Inland Transportation Company, except for third class 
which are sold at the Wing Lok Wharf. Tickets must be bought one day before the sailing of 
the ship. 
 
Passengers going to Taiping, Shikiu, Kongmoon, and Tongkawan are required to have a 
cholera inoculation certificate, a vaccination certificate, a medical examination certificate 
with photograph attached, and a departure permit. 
 
Two photographs must be produced when buying tickets, which are sold at the Saikong Wharf. 





In Hong Kong, cholera injections can be had, by payment of 50 sen, from the Health Bureau 
on the second floor of the former National City Bank Building, the Sino-Nipponese Medical 
Association at the former Prince’s Building, Tung Wah Hospital town office on the second 
floor of the Bank of China Building. 
 
In kowloon, injections can be obtained at the Kwong Wah Hospital and at the Chinese 
Y.M.C.A. for a similar charge. 
 
As for medical examination, this is conducted at the Anti-Epidemic Bureau in the former York 
Building. The fee is one Yen and the certificate is valid for three days. 
 
In applying for departure permit at the District Bureaus, the person concerned must return his 
or her ration card. 
 












Appendix F: Regulations for the Bureaus dealing with the governing of Hong 
Kong 
 
Article 1. The following Bureaus are appointed for governing the Captured Territory of Hong 
Kong: - Hong Kong Bureau; Kowloon Bureau; New Territory Bureau. 
 
The position of the Bureaus and areas governed by them will be decided later. 
 
Article 2. The Bureaus will employ the following personnel: - chiefs of Bureau, 3; Deputy 
Chiefs of Bureau, 3; Subordinate Chiefs, 9; Officials, 126. 
 
Article 3. The Chief of Bureau under orders from the Chief of the Governor’s Office will 
supervise the carrying out of the Governor’s laws and attend to the business of the Bureau. 
 
Article 4. The Chief of Bureau will direct and supervise his subordinates. 
 
Article 5. If the Chief of Bureau should be otherwise occupied, the Deputy Chief will take 
charge of the Chief of Bureau’s duties, Should the Deputy Chief of Bureau be otherwise 
occupied, the Chief of the Governor’s Office will depute one of the subordinate chiefs to act 
for him.  
 
Governor’s Order No. 13  
 
Article 6. The Deputy Chief of Bureau will assist the Chief of Bureau in his business. 
 
Article 7. Each Bureau will establish three subordinate offices as follows: - General Office, 
Economic Office, Health Office. 
Article 8. The duties of the General Office: 1. To handle the general business; 2. To deal with 
financial plans; 3. To deal with educational matters; 4. To handle other matters concerning 
their area. 
 
Article 9. The duties of the Economic Office are: 1. To deal with industrial economy; 2. To 
deal with communications and transportation; 3. To deal with necessities from raw materials. 
 
Article 10. The duties of the Health Office are: 1. To deal with promotion of health; 2. To deal 
with the infectious diseases and other diseases; 3. To deal with medical supplies. 
 
Article 11. All subordinate chiefs will carry out their duties under the direction and 
supervision of the Chiefs and Deputy Chiefs of Bureau. 
 
Article 12. Officials will carry out their duties under their superiors. 
 
Article 13. In small islands and places not easily accessible to communications, branch offices 
may be instituted under the head office. 
 
Article 14. The head of a branch office will act under the orders of the Chief of Bureau. 
 
This order shall take effect from date of publication. 
Source: Hong Kong News, 16 April 1942 
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Appendix G: The regulations pertaining to the Hong Kong Chinese Co-operative 
Council are herewith promulgated 
 
HONG KONG GOVERNMENT 
Governor’s Order No. 11(Signed) RENSUKE ISOGAI 
 
Governor, Captured Territory of Hong Kong 
 
Regulations for the Chinese Co-operative Council 
 
1. In order to ensure the smooth conduct of affairs of Chinese residents in the Captured 
Territory of Hong Kong, there is now established the Hong Kong Chinese Co-operative 
Council, called for short the Co-operative Council below. 
 
The Co-operative Council will be under the direction of the Chinese Representative 
Council, which will submit to the various departments of the Hong Kong Government 
for examination matters concerning the governing and co-operation of Chinese residents. 
 
2. The Chinese Representative Council will elect the president and members of the Co-
operative Council from Chinese residing in the Captured Territory of Hong Kong, and 
those who are to represent all sections of the people will be appointed by the Governor. 
 
3. The Co-operative Council will appoint one chairman and one vice-chairman from the 
elected members. 
 
4. The Chinese Representative Council will attend the Co-operative Council’s meetings to 
state their opinions. 
 
5. The opinion of the Council’s chairman, president and members will be discussed and 
decided upon. 
 
6. After the opinions have been set forth and discussed, the Chinese Representative 
        Council will present them to the Government. 
 




















Complied by Lt/Col Kanazawa, Asao 
 
Chief – Chief of General Affairs Department 
           --- General Affairs Section (chief) – Staff 
           --- Intendance Section (chief) – staff 
           --- Sanitary Affairs Section (chief) -- staff 
         -- Chief of the police affairs department  
      --- police affairs section (chief) – staff 
       --- special branch section (chief) – staff 
  
 
Organization and chain of command of the police headquarters  
 
complied by Lt/col Kanazawa, Asao 
 
Police commissioner 
--deputy police commissioner 
 
-- chief of the general affairs dept 
-- general affairs section (chief) – staff 
-- intendance section (chief) staff 
-- chief of the police affairs dept 
-- police affairs section (chief) – staff 
-- administrative section (chief) – staff 
-- special branch section (chief) – staff 
-- chief of the internal inspection dept 
-- first section (chief) – staff 
-- second section – staff 
 
 
Line of command of the police affairs  
 
Governor – chief of staff – Hong Kong police headquarters 
-- Hong Kong police station 
-- police sub-station ----- 9 
-- police posts ----- 6 
-- fire brigade station ----- 2 
-- godown guards ----- 1 
-- fire brigade sub-station ----- 3 
-- Kowloon police station 
-- police sub-station ----- 13 
-- police posts ----- 5 
-- fire brigade station ----- 2 
-- fire brigade sub-station ----- 3 
-- water police station 
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-- police sub-station ----- 3 
-- fire brigade sub-station ----- 2 
-- police training school ----- 1 
 
police headquarters --- 1 
police stations --- 3 
police sub-stations --- 25 
police posts --- 11 
fire brigade stations --- 4 
fire brigade sub-stations ---8 
godown guards --- 1 
police training school --- 1 
(total – 54) 
 
































Appendix I: List of Government House and British Colonial Secretariat staff in 
Hong Kong, December 1941 
 
His Excellency Sir Mark Young, Governor 
Mr.F. G.Gimson,  Colonial Secretary 
Mr. C. G.Alabaster, Attorney General 
Mr H. R.Butters, Financial Secretary 
Captain S. H. Batty Smith, A.D.C. to the Governor 
Mr. C. R. Lee, Private Secretary to the Governor 
Mr.M. Brickerton, Interpreter 
Mr E. W Pudney, AccountantGeneral 
Mr R. J. Minnitt, Assistant Defence Secretary 
 
 

















Appenidx J: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPACT OF THE WAR ON 
HONG KONG 
 
A great deal of research must be done into the social, economic, and political structure 
of Hong Kong in the pre-war period. But at least it is clear that the Colony, even if it was 
primarily a trading post, was not like the Shanghai of the old days, an international concession, 
a cosmopolitan city; yet paradoxically the permeation of government into the everyday lives 
of the inhabitants, residents, refugees, expatriates - was far less than at present. Even among 
the top echelons of society, among the taipans and the top officials, as Lethbridge suggests, 
there was little contact and even conflict.838 Perhaps as Agnes Smedley, herself a temporary 
refugee from the mainland, said, echoing the Japanese attitude, socially Hong Kong was an 
effete outpost of Empire ‘like a rotten fruit’ ready to drop into the plunderer’s hands.839 It was 
a divided community, united only by the tangential interests of commerce. Indeed, a 
newcomer to the Colony, F. C. Gimson, the Colonial Secretary, with a long career in Ceylon 
behind him, was shocked at the lack of identification of the Europeans with the welfare of the 
place where they made their wealth. And what of the poor, who previously had shared this 
‘bird of passage’840 mentality, but who now were trapped in an insecure permanence as 
Kwangtung became more and more a waste-land of destruction? It would seem, even without 
the added burden of penniless starving refugees, that Hong Kong was recognized as a place 
where ‘more than half [of] the Chinese population of the Colony - that is over 400,000 people 
- exists in a state of semi-starvation’.841 These were, as the North-China Herald correspondent 
wrote, ‘The products of the social system of the colony which does not provide wages on 
which the average Chinese family can subsist.’ And, if this is thought to be a journalistic 
exaggeration, the facts of utter destitution were undeniable in the embarrassing shape of the 
many thousands of pavement-sleepers who, day and night, huddled on the only space to 
which they could lay claim. 
 
This might seem to depict a scene ripe for the revolution of the have-nots: but, of 
course, this did not happen, chiefly because this condition of existence was a common fact of 
life on the mainland. But, one might ask, these sufferers would surely respond to the 
                                                 
838 Lethbridge, ‘Hong Kong during Japanese Occupation’, 77-81. 
839 A. Smedley, Battle Hymn of China (London, 1944), 357. 
840 The phrase is Gimson’s. 
841 North China Herald, June 23, 1937, 496. 
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liberating ideals of the Pan-Asiatic brotherhood propagated by the Japanese in China? The 
balance of the evidence indicates that the Japanese did little to secure the voluntary co-
operation of the local population, apart from a few Eurasians, and the Indians who were 
mainly members of the police force and therefore vitally necessary for the control of the 
territory.842 The first aim of the occupation forces was to cow the residents into submission by 
brutality and terror. The overriding objective was to cut down to the minimum the needs of 
the local population which even at that time was not self-subsistent and very much dependent 
on imported food supplies. This was done by strict measures of administration and hygiene, 
e.g. no one was entitled to a ration card unless he was in employment, and by lax control of 
emigration regulations to the mainland. As many Chinese families as possible were en-
couraged to leave the Colony. As the Allied blockade became tighter these pressures became 
greater; to remain in Hong Kong became a luxury not easily bought by working to aid the 
Japanese war effort. As Tanaka, the second Japanese Governor of Hong Kong in 1944, 
promised his subjects: ‘If rice is available, the people will have rice to eat. If there are only 
sweet potatoes, they will only eat sweet potatoes, and if there are only beans, they will eat 
beans.’843 With little work to earn a living, with no ships calling at the port, with few or no 
public amenities such as electric power or public transport, with fuel or firewood almost 
unobtainable, and the people dying daily of starvation, the B.A.A.G. report was undoubtedly 
accurate in declaring, ‘The occupying Japanese authorities have nothing to offer except vague 
promises of Utopia around the corner.’ The promises were by now threadbare and barely 
credible.844 
 
In view of this it is difficult to attach great significance to other reports, for example 
that even early in the war, on the celebration of the fall of Singapore, there was great 
jubilation in Hong Kong. Then there were processions of Chinese in the streets, but the 
participants (probably Chinese government employees who could not refuse to be present) 
had been given a cake each as a ‘present’.845 On the contrary, in the words of one report: ‘. . . 
As if in full expression of their sentiments thousands of Chinese residents packed their scanty 
belongings and made for their homeland - Free China.’ 
                                                 
842 The study of Hong Kong’s Indian population by K. N. Vaid, The Overseas Indian Cammunity in Hong Kong 
(H.K.U.P., 1972), says very little about this episode. As he shows, the Indian community has never been fully 
integrated into Hong Kong society 
843 CO 129/591. Intelligence Report No. 68, August 28,1944. 
844 FO 371/31671 (1942), Report by an Australian-Chinese lady (Mrs. Gwen Priestwood?). 
845 Ibid. 
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In a later similar report the writer, Count R. de Sercey, a Frenchman from the Chinese 
Postal Service who left Hong Kong in April 1944, confirmed anti-Japanese feelings in even 
stronger terms. He thought the Hong Kong inhabitants had more confidence in the British 
than in the Chinese Government. They had great faith in ‘a not distant allied victor.’ (In this 
respect the practical Chinese were voting with their precious money, hoarding their Hong 
Kong dollars.) This neutral observer also pleaded extenuating circumstances for the 
prominent Chinese citizens forced to be members of the puppet Councils: it was the extreme 
necessity to keep their families from starving which bound them to their masters.846 On the 
other hand, the Japanese administrators did meet resistance. There was the passive 
unwillingness of school teachers, for example, to provide propaganda material. 
Questionnaires issued to schools for pupils to fill in questions such as, ‘What would you do if 
the British came back to Hong Kong?’ were skilfully parried with answers, ‘We would do 
what our parents told us to do.’ Similarly opinion polls about ‘the present war’ produced 
results which can only have been disappointing to the framers of those questions.847 
 
Resistance of a more active kind was represented both by the Chinese members of the 
B.A.A.G. and the guerrillas of the East River Company. Both of these aspects have been 
covered by Endacott, but an article written just after the war by an author, H. C. K. 
Woddis,848 amplifies that account. This article appropriately enough begins with the burning 
question, ‘On which side lie the sympathies of the people of Hong Kong?’ This seemingly 
authoritative account of the exploits of the East River Column and the Hong Kong, Kowloon, 
and New Territories Independent Battalion - controlling the New Territories against `bandits' 
and Japanese forces alike; in posting up proclamations at the entrance of the Central Market 
in Hong Kong; rescuing allied soldiers and airmen; in intelligence work - claims that these 
irregulars played a vital part in helping to defeat the occupying armies of Japan.849 
 
The million or more Chinese who flocked back into the Colony after 1945 at the rate 
of 100,000 a month provide some evidence that Hong Kong under British rule did appear to 
                                                 
846 CO 129/591, Intelligence Report 1944. In that month the Japanese were unable to maintain the supply of rice 
rations, and the official distribution was abandoned. 
847 Father S. J. Ryan, Steering in troubled waters. (unpublished MS.) 
848 H. C. K. Woddis, ‘Hong Kong and the East River Compan’, Eastern World, vol. 3, no. 7, July 1941. 
849 Woddis also claims that these irregulars were the first allied troops to march into Kowloon after the defeat of 
Japan. The presence of an irregular force is confirmed by several Foreign Office papers. Indeed, as Chan has told 
the story, the imminent liberation of Hong Kong by these ‘Chinese forces’ appeared as a threat to the British 
plans for the re-occupation of Hong Kong. 
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have some merits. Realistically, of course, one should take into account that some of those 
returning to Hong Kong calculated that British administration offered greater security for 
their lives and property than China, still in tumult after the Japanese defeat.850 
 
According to Lethbridge, despite defeat and the eradication of the Japanese 
occupation - taking down the Japanese street signs and the demolition of the Japanese war 
memorial – ‘The Japanese succeeded in establishing the foundations of a New Order in Hong 
Kong’.851 In other words, the occupation worked ultimately to the benefit of the leaders of 
the Chinese community. Through the British failure in the Far East, the Chinese were able to 
make the Government of Hong Kong their own government. How this came about is 
conveyed again in Lethbridge’s words: ‘The British mandarinate collapsed in 1941: it has 
never been replaced.’ The ‘Peak mentality’ and colonial arrogance were put aside. As for the 
Chinese, ‘The local population ... seem to have acquired greater trust in the Administration. 
They were impressed by the speed with which the rehabilitation of the economy was 
achieved, by the establishment of law and order and of a milieu favourable to the acquisition 
of wealth. The Government honoured its pre-war debts and obligations and compensated its 
former employees. Its post-occupation record was admirable - it believed in business first.’852 
 
This reading of the Colony’s transformation at that time, of course, does depend very 
much on the interpretation that the present day Hong Kong is a Colony run for a small group 
of Chinese and European businessmen. To discuss the whole complex body of the Hong 
Kong Government policy and administration in the years after 1945, in order to test this 
premise, would take this discussion beyond its intended objectives. However, it is a truism of 
Hong Kong’s development that as a Colony it is debarred from the evolution, hastened by 
the Pacific war elsewhere, to independent nationhood. Thus politically, whether there is 
greater welfare for the people than previously is in a sense irrelevant. However, even here, as 
Endacott has described in this book and in his Government and the People, the returning 
Governor of Hong Kong, Sir Mark Young, did attempt, though abortively, to introduce a 
more advanced stage of municipal government to Hong Kong. Where the blame should lie 
for this failure is again not a question to be debated here: however, the intention to introduce 
reform was there. Indeed, my own subsequent research into the Colonial Office papers 
                                                 
850 This point was made by Li Shu Fan in 1944. 
851 Lethbridge, ‘Hong Kong during Japanese occupation’, 78. 
852 Ibid., 127. 
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suggests, albeit sketchily, that immediately after the war the British Military Administration 
looked for candidates ‘to dispute local leadership with the established order’. What was 
ultimately in view, whether a more representative system or something more limited, is not 
known. In the mind of MacDougall, at least, there was every intention to start anew, as the 
following quotation from his informal report shows: ‘We have dusted out the marriage 
chamber, cleaned the windows, put in some (almost) fresh linen and turned back the covers. 
But there is no sign of the bride and the groom grows restive.’853 As subsequent attempts to 
introduce reform into Hong Kong Government have shown, it is because of the special 
characteristics of the local population that the democratic development so earnestly espoused 













                                                 
853 CO 129/591 54132/45. F. C. Gimson, the retiring Officer Administering the Government, in a broadcast on 
the eve of his departure from the Colony also expressed the need for reform: ‘I took forward to an era of rapid 
progress is ameliorating the methods of public administration here in accordance with the settled policy of His 
Majesty’s Government to foster the development of selfgoverning institutions throughout the Empire. There is 
great need in Hong Kong for reform on the social as well as the political side; and we are now presented with the 
opportunity of a clean sheet on which to sketch for early implementation schemes for educational, medical, 
housing and town-planning improvements. Not least should attention be paid to the problems connected with the 
promotion by legislation and otherwise of better conditions for the people of the labouring classes.’(Gimson 
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